Free and Fair elections – and beyond

Final report

The International Electoral

Ur KB:s samlingar
Digitaliserad år 2014

National Library of Sweden

SOU
1993:100

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SWEDEN

Free and Fair elections – and beyond

Final report

The International Electoral Institute Commission

October 21, 1993

SOU
1993:100

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SWEDEN

Ref KB Occ 500

Swedish Official Reports Series
1993:100
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Free and Fair elections

– and beyond

Final Report from The International Electoral Institute Commission
Stockholm 1993

SOU och Ds kan köpas från Allmänna Förlaget som ingår i C E Fritzes AB. Allmänna Förlaget ombesörjer också, på uppdrag av Regeringskansliets förvaltningskontor, remissutsändningar av SOU och Ds.

Beställningsadress: Fritzes kundtjänst
106 47 Stockholm
Fax: 08-20 50 21
Telefon: 08-690 90 90

Original: Editorial Office of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

THE PRINTING WORKS OF THE
CABINET OFFICE AND MINISTRIES
Stockholm 1993

ISBN 91-38-13481-0
ISSN 0375-250X

Table of contents

1. Executive Summary 3

2. The Commission's Mandate and Work 8

3. Democracy on the Move - Some Experiences of the Recent Past 11

4. What is the Challenge? - What are the needs? 17

5. Mandate and Tasks of the Institute 24

6. The Role of the UN and Other Organizations 36

7. Statutes 40

8. Organizational Principles and Guidelines 44

9. Budget and Organization 48

10. The Further Process 55

Annex 1 - 3

1. Executive Summary

This report deals with the prospects for free and fair elections and how to support and reinforce the electoral process as part of the quest for democracy around the world. After the end of the cold war a great opportunity is there and should be seized.

The International Electoral Institute Commission, appointed by the Swedish Government, has been at work for one year. Its task has been to seek answers to four questions:

1. At this time in history there is a potential to promote and support free and fair elections, a transition to democracy and international cooperation on these matters. What is the character of the demand - short-term, long-term or a combination?

2. What is not currently being done and what will be the challenges in a longer-term perspective?

3. Is there a need for a new institute or can existing bodies be adapted to fill possible gaps? How could an institute complement the United Nations and other bodies in this field?

4. What is the international interest in an undertaking of this kind?

This report addresses these questions under its various headings.

The Commission concludes that there is a need for and a broad interest world-wide in establishing a new international institute. It recommends the Swedish Government to take the initiative to invite interested partners to discuss and negotiate the formation of such an institute, based on the proposals and recommendations contained in this report.

I. Democracy on the move

The end of the cold war led to an upsurge in the demand for pluralism and democracy in eastern Europe and parts of the former USSR. Country after country turned to the international community as they started the transition from one-party states to multi-party democracies. A similar development is taking place in other parts of the world. The fall of the Berlin wall precipitated developments in some instances, but many political systems were pregnant with change for strong domestic reasons.

From now on democratic values could become more universally accepted. The international community has an opportunity to reinforce and give support to democratic processes that might otherwise founder. History demonstrates what can happen when such a moment is lost. Internal confrontations can become overriding concerns for the world community also. There is a wide recognition today of the link between democracy and peace.

Democracy must grow from within and be supported from below. Outside interventions and top-down initiatives can often play a significant role in a specific situation, but should be seen as incidental to developments with a broad domestic base. Democracy is more of a movement than a fixed and finished state. It must be furthered as a process, requiring exchange of experiences, ideas and views on the efficacy of different institutional frameworks. There are limits to how much of this can be carried out in a government-centred setting. A growing role for actors other than governments is foreseen. Parliaments and parliamentarians, electoral commissions and monitoring groups, local governments, media, popular movements and other NGO's all have vital roles to play in their different capacities.

II. The challenges ahead and largely unmet needs can be summarized into five categories:

1. *Needs and demand* far outstrips supply in this field of international cooperation. The end of the cold war and a changing perception of sovereignty have opened up for extended international cooperation on a broad range of subjects.

2. *A long-term view* is necessary rather than the concentration on or around election day, which has been the custom so far. Dealing with processes before and between elections, such as the role of the opposition, legislation, a more coherent and less selective approach, exchange of experiences and networks, follow-up of the second and third election in a transition.

3. *Political neutrality and integrity:* the sensitive nature of electoral

cooperation raises the question of who sets the agenda for different phases. Impartiality is highly relevant i.a. to the establishment of universally accepted rules and guidelines. The international cooperation must be based on and reflect different cultures and perspectives.

4. *Professionalism and efficiency:* Except for some international organizations there are very few actors, who work professionally and with a long-term perspective to support electoral processes. In order to achieve greater efficiency it is desirable that several professional categories coordinate their efforts in a more systematic manner.

5. *Mandates and roles:* In a democratic society the different actors in electoral processes(parties, governments, parliaments, electoral commissions, the judiciary, researchers and media) have distinctly different mandates and roles, which cannot be taken over by others. International cooperation should reflect this so that mandates and roles are not misunderstood or unduly mixed up.

III. Mandates and tasks of the institute

The Commission proposes a flexible mandate that sees beyond present short-term projects requirements - a mandate that has several windows and leaves some doors open.

The tasks can be described under three captions:

1. *Normative and Research tasks,* which include a data bank, international networking of researchers, initiating and supporting research activities, development of internationally accepted norms, rules and guide-lines for election observers as well as for aspects of electoral processes. Publication of reports, research and studies.

2. *Capacity-building, Consultancy and Assistance.* This includes training of and support to national groups involved in the development of rules, guide-lines and institutions to uphold free and fair elections. Electoral systems, laws, studies of election costs and other aspects to promote a democratic culture. The method of work should be process-oriented rather than short-term projects.

3. *International Electoral Cooperation.* Tasks related to support and back-up of international observers in order to make such activities more efficient. Coordination and exchange of experiences and knowledge through conferences and seminars. Examples of possible items could be the role of the opposition, the media as well as the military, nationality and citizenship, the role of minority groups, costs of elections, local elections and democratic culture.

The distinction above naturally has weaknesses. Very few issues can

be neatly compartmentalized according to theoretical categories. Many questions encompass several aspects. Normative and operative activities presuppose each other. The right balance has to be struck for the Board of the institute and be influenced by experiences, demand and the activities of others.

IV. Statutes

Political neutrality and integrity must be safeguarded in the statutes and in the functioning of the institute.

The proposed institute would bring together governments, NGO's, parliamentarian bodies and international agencies as equal partners. A *Board of Trustees* should be created to act as the principal of the institute. It would be the guardian of the statutes, take decisions on the overall mandate of the institute's work and establish the annual budget. Three categories of interests should be represented: financers, representatives of various international bodies and the UN and, thirdly, individuals with different experiences, reflecting a balance of geographical and professional backgrounds.

The Board of Trustees should appoint an *Executive Committee* and a Secretary-General to run the institute. The Committee is expected to lead and direct the institute's operations. The Committee should thus comprise expertise of different kinds such as legal skills, electoral techniques, academic research, information technology, political science etc.

It is proposed that the institute be established as a foundation. Apart from the formal structure it is recommended that the institute consider the use of *advisory panels* for advice as well as national committees and support groups for networking.

V. Organization and budget

The operational principle of the institute is very much based on the idea of networking different professions and experiences to achieve the best results. Permanent staff can therefore be limited but must, on the other hand, represent an intellectual critical mass to be able to perform well.

The report presents a staffing plan for the institute and a tentative budget for its first three years. It deems it desirable for the institute to grow gradually, achieving full capacity within three years. At that stage the institute would have a total of thirty employees. The total budget for year three would amount to around USD 6 million, of which about half will be direct programme costs. It is calculated that the budget for the first year would be about USD 2 million and 4 million in year two.

VI. The role of the United Nations and other organizations.

The United Nations has emerged as a significant actor in electoral cooperation. The Commission has worked closely with the different entities in the UN, involved in the issues related to the task of the Commission. They have all welcomed the establishment of a new institute as a complement to their own efforts. The Commission proposes the establishment of a link between the UN and the institute.

The many other actors on the electoral scene have different characteristics and emphasis. Some have a distinct geographic or geopolitical focus, some have a specific professional or national background while others are owned by one single category of principal.

This is one of the reasons why the present actors welcome a new institute that is envisaged to cover new ground as well as to combine the capacity of the different actors in a way which is not being done today.

The Commission has had the privilege to conduct extensive consultations with a great number of governments, parliamentarians, international and national organizations, researchers and other experts around the world. These consultations have produced strong encouragement and a large number of good ideas and suggestions, which are reflected in this report and for which the Commission wants to express its profound gratitude.

The final chapter of the report gives some suggestions regarding the further process of creating the institute.

2. The Commission's Mandate and Work

In September 1992 the Swedish Government established a commission to study the feasibility and relevance of a new independent international institute for electoral cooperation. Ambassador Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, former Under-secretary of state for development cooperation was appointed to chair it. The creation of this Commission came as a response to demands from several parties in the Swedish parliament to that effect, and was also i.a. a reaction to a dramatic increase in the numbers of requests to Sweden from all over the world for electoral observation.

The Commission has consisted of a secretariat and parliamentarians and specialists in various fields(see Annex 1).

The Commission's mandate was to explore the need for a possible electoral institute. If its findings were positive, it was to outline proposals for the mandate, statutes, costs and provide other information necessary for a later, more specific decision.

It could be argued that a feasibility study on an international institute should be undertaken by a group of governments or organizations. The Swedish Government acted with a sense of urgency. It could take considerable time to identify potentially interested parties, agree on terms of reference and appoint a group to study the question.

It was felt, however, that information-gathering and analyses could probably be entrusted to a national commission. An international approach would be necessary for a possible next step, if an institute were to be established.

The Commission has chosen to carry out its work in a transparent manner, testing ideas and proposals along the way. Most of its thoughts have been well received, a few have been questioned and challenged, as was to be expected and indeed was one of the reasons for adopting a tentative and listening approach. This has provided the Commission

with many ideas and suggestions, reflected in this report. A list of the
./. Commission's contacts and discussants is attached as Annex 1.

The Commission wishes to place on record its thanks and indebtedness to all these contributors and to express its appreciation of the interest and support it has received. For whatever may be found useful in this report, these inputs are to be given credit; for whatever is doubtful, the Commission alone accepts responsibility.

The Commission has emphasized consultations and informal discussions. Much time has thus been spent on travel and direct interaction with representatives of many governments, parliamentarian bodies, organizations and individuals. The Commission also had the privilege of being invited to present its ideas at several international conferences and meetings.

As a complement to these broad contacts the Commission organized an informal round-table discussion in Geneva with some 50 participants, who had manifested an interest in the Commission's work at an early stage. A summary of the conclusions from that meeting and a list of
./. participants is enclosed as Annex 2. Those present were from organizations or, in some cases, were invited in an entirely individual capacity.

Two position papers have been circulated, one dated November 1992 and one of March 1993. Several Newsletters from the Commission have briefly and at irregular intervals indicated what activities it had recently undertaken. The position papers were made available in English and in French. Japanese members of Parliamentarians for Global Action translated the March paper into Japanese.

The main questions the Commission sought to answer were the following.

1. There is a potential at this point in history to promote and support free and fair elections and a transition to democracy. What is the character of the demand - short-term, long-term or a combination?

2. If the answer should be that unmet needs do exist, what is currently not being undertaken and what will be the challenges in a longer-term perspective?

3. Is there a need for a new institute or can existing bodies be adapted to fill possible gaps? Could an institute complement the UN and other bodies in this field?

4. What is the international interest in an undertaking of this kind?

This report addresses these issues under its various headings. But the answer the Commission received to the fundamental question of the need, was a massive yes.

The international community is at a juncture of great transformation potential, when much can and should be done to promote democracy. Earlier modalities and structures need to be complemented and

remoulded in this light. The Commission sees a demand for a new body that could perform some tasks outstanding, especially when looking at the challenges of the years ahead. The following chapters of this report set out to describe the various aspects of these findings.

The Commission has taken as a point of departure the acute demand for electoral observation and monitoring. But it has seen this as a symptom of new developments still taking shape and has chosen to emphasize these ongoing changes and needs. The reasons underlying requests for electoral missions, and the implications those forces have for the future, are still issues that need to be addressed. How the present generation faces the challenge of boosting democracy and a civil society will no doubt colour the verdict of posterity on the present-day international community and its leaders.

The Commission feels satisfied after its rounds of talks and all the points of view it has received that there is a case for a new institute as such. There is space and a rationale for a special mandate. Such a body would be a potentially important complement to existing facilities. Leaving things as they are, would in the view of the Commission and many of those with whom it has spoken, imply following a course of inertia instead; in many quarters the Commission has met a strong sense of urgency and concern for the fundamental questions of democracy at stake, a stress on keeping up momentum. The Commission's report and suggestions are a modest contribution to these discussions and to meeting the need for new policies that have come to the fore i.a. as a result of the demise of the cold war and a growing concern with human rights, international interdependence and peaceful development.

How an institute's links with the UN could be crafted, is treated in a separate chapter of this report.

The Commission's work formally ends with the presentation of this report to the Swedish Government. The final chapter outlines what in the Commission's view could be a next step.

3. Democracy on the Move - Some Experiences of the Recent Past

The Commission has taken as its point of departure the electoral process in a wide sense. The Commission's mandate only makes it possible to hint briefly at a few of the factors that have contributed to placing electoral cooperation high on the international agenda in recent years. Doing justice to the profound and sweeping changes on the political landscape in the latter half of the eighties and in the nineties would require several volumes. The aim of this report is simply to highlight a few of the features that the Commission perceives as particularly relevant to its task.

The demand

The end of the cold war led to an upsurge in the demand for pluralism and democracy in Eastern Europe and parts of the former USSR. Country after country turned to the international community for electoral assistance in various forms, as they started the transition from one-party states to multi-party democracies. This led to an unprecedented number of foreign electoral teams being sent to many countries of this region in a short period of time. A similar development is taking place in other parts of the world.

The demise of the one-party state in these latter instances is, however, far from always an aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The concept of the one-party state and military rule in various forms were increasingly coming under fire. In many countries the legitimacy of the ruling elites had been eroded by time. For new generations, liberation struggles and the popular support that swept post-colonial leaders to

power were a thing of the past to which they could not relate. What they could observe was economic stagnation, abuses, corruption and autocratic attitudes in varying mixes from country to country. People were disenchanted and suffered from economies in deep trouble. There was a growing mood for change and a pressure for old leaders to step down, quite apart from the influence of events in Europe and elsewhere. The fall of the Berlin wall precipitated developments in some instances, but many political systems were pregnant with change for a number of strong domestic reasons.

There are some parallels in this context with developments in the area of human rights. The past ten to twenty years have by and large witnessed a gradual strengthening of respect for human rights.

Both an outcome of this movement forward and a prerequisite for it, is the existence of bodies capable of articulating needs, providing documentation and information, and taking action.

The world could be on the threshold of similar advances in democracy. The opening of this window of opportunity raises demands for long-term action in order to make this development sustainable.

Military regimes took over in many Latin American states that were democracies in the 1950's. The one-party state ousted multi-party systems or took over after colonial rule in many parts of Africa in the 60's and 70's. There and elsewhere such trends are being reversed. In Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union democratic issues are being addressed.

It would thus seem that from now on democratic values could become more universally accepted. For what may be a brief period in time, the international community has an opportunity of reinforcing and consolidating democratic processes that might otherwise founder. History demonstrates what can happen when such a moment is lost.

Underlying factors

The following are some of the salient features of the democratic scene that should be brought out as especially relevant to the Commission's work.

1. A New Field for International Cooperation

The issue of national sovereignty was strongly championed in many parts of the world far into the eighties. Newly independent states naturally tended to safeguard their independence and were sensitive to what they perceived as attempts to encroach on it. The division of the world into cold-war blocs had partly similar effects.

The scene today is different.

a) Governments feel a greater need for international and regional cooperation in order to tackle common concerns. Many states are reconsidering their systems of governance and welcome sharing

experiences and views. The globalisation and integration of what previously were defined as national interests have opened up new horizons and new possibilities.

b) Other actors are becoming increasingly important. Non-governmental organizations of various kinds, parliaments and parliamentarian bodies and the business community are examples of entities and interests that have come more to the forefront than previously, also in an international context. Accepted authority is consequently often questioned; governments are under pressure from below while having to adjust to a different pattern of cooperation across borders. The situation for many NGO's and international bodies is complex in a similar way.

2. Security and democracy

One of the tasks of democracy is to promote a peaceful solution for conflicts and non-violent transfers of power. When this is the case domestically, most states and peoples tend to apply the same attitudes and values regionally and internationally. Viable and stable democracies consequently seldom start wars or armed conflicts.

This lends special importance to the challenge of democracy. Recent history demonstrates how internal confrontations can also become overriding concerns for the world community.

In some parts of the world nationalism and movements for self-determination grew in recent decades and have become a powerful force. Civil strife based on regionalism or power struggles of other kinds tore societies apart, not seldom because of inadequate systems of governance. A climate of seeking peaceful means to settle differences and the existence of domestic and external institutions that can help create such attitudes and values are important elements in diminishing the risk of future conflicts.

There is thus a wide recognition today of a link between democracy and peace.

In many quarters the inference drawn from this is that:

a. Strengthening democracy is an urgent requirement that still largely has to be met, and

b. Investments in this area are much less costly in terms of human lives, money and political energy than the undertakings resulting from a lack of adequate commitment at an early stage.

3. The Issue of Promoting Good Governance, Human Rights and Democracy

The challenge of setting accepted and passable standards of governance is now more widely felt than only a few years ago, when the shadow of

the cold war tended to obscure abuses of human rights and democracy and to stress other issues.

Today these governance concerns are squarely on the agenda. Funds are being invested in this field and guidelines developed by aid donors and international bodies. Strengthening the civil society is now high on the agenda.

At the national level, thought and effort are being devoted to questions of governance and human rights in many parts of the world.

Electoral processes in a wide sense are a part of this picture and require a corresponding methodical treatment.

To put it briefly, powerful forces were previously working contrary to the need for more focus on good governance and its many expressions, among them pluralism and elections, but most of these constraints have either gradually diminished or disappeared during the early nineties. The result is that a floodgate of pent-up expectations and needs was opened and posed a new type of challenge to the international community.

We are currently experiencing pressure for external support to electoral processes worldwide. This can be seen as a symptom of democratic aspirations and developments; the call for electoral observation is an expression of a much deeper, more profound and far-reaching need. The immediate challenge is in the field of electoral observation and monitoring, but the long-term perspective is different and brings out many other concerns.

Strengthening democracy

Internationally there is a slowly growing awareness that the long-term perspective presents a new agenda for action. Many decision-makers in capitals and centres in different parts of the world see a need to adapt to a swiftly changing world scene in relation to democracy and to rethink existing policies and means of executing them in the light of both current and foreseeable demands. Such forward-looking approaches are being sought and discussed despite the pressures and exigencies of more acute crises and considerations.

Leaders and researchers with this kind of vision for the future of democratic values and civil society underline the need to address problems and policy options in a way that can respond to both the short-term and the long-term demands. Some of these challenges are on the international agenda now, such as electoral assistance in a narrow sense, others are more far-reaching issues that still largely need addressing.

Examples of such discussions are viewpoints on the nature of future demands for good governance including electoral assistance. There is a growing awareness of the centrality of many other questions that today are in the background but in all likelihood will attract more emphasis and attention. Some of these varying considerations are the following, quoted as a few random examples only, given to illustrate the need.

1. The Establishment and Strengthening of Democracies

Democracy must grow from within and be supported from below. Outside intervention and top-down initiatives can often play a significant role in a specific situation but should be seen as incidental to developments with a broad domestic base.

Democracy is more of a movement than a fixed and finished state. Democracy requires an ongoing reassessment and discussion of modalities, institutions and values. Even mature democracies with a long tradition of pluralism have a need to redefine and recast aspects of their systems. It follows from this that democracy must be furthered as a process, requiring exchanges of experiences, ideas and views on the efficacy of different institutional frameworks, and that there are limits to how much of this can be carried out in a purely government-centred setting.

2. New Actors - In Their Own Right

There is thus a growing role for actors other than governments: parliaments and parliamentarians, who also have loyalties to their constituencies and parties, local governments, NGO's of various kinds, popular movements and not least ordinary citizens.

The increasing importance of democracy strengthens the need for the non-governmental actors to be able to participate on their own terms. That they can do so, is a fundamental prerequisite for a sustainable democratic development and civil society.

The integrity of the various actors on the democratic scene and emphasis on their constituencies is therefore a crucial issue, both philosophically and in practical terms. Democracy is an exercise in pluralism. Who sets which agenda must be addressed as a key question.

There is a demand for new ways in which different actors can interact. This is true not only of types of bodies but also geographically; very often initiatives have emanated from the North. But the perceived needs are shared in many quarters of the world. Countries and groupings in the South wish to see their special emphases and aspirations adequately expressed.

Many national groups engaged in civic rights, human rights and furthering democracy in various ways need international partnerships and networks to be able to function in their role as agents of democratic change. Such collaboration provides them with a certain degree of protection, capacity-building and an exchange of seminal ideas.

New partnerships should be established, and adequate vehicles for them, between governments, parliaments, national and international bodies and other actors in democracy and development, respecting their different mandates and terms.

3. Action-orientation

Sometimes events are in control of policy. Ideally they trigger the formulation of long-term policies and help develop orientations. Going to the more specific question of elections, similar observations can be made as in the broader field of democracy. As noted earlier, the present spate of demands for electoral observation is an indication of more far-reaching needs. The question the requests raise is as much what action must be taken now in the long-term perspective as what must be done immediately to address acute issues. A consensus is developing in many different quarters that the time has come to craft new policies and survey the institutional scene in order to buttress democracy and advance its development. A view shared by many is that an imaginative approach is now possible to concerted action - respecting different mandates and terms - in order to further sustainable democratic development and civil society, including electoral processes in a wide sense.

It should be noted that there are differences of opinion regarding what is short-term and what is long-term. Electoral observation is a case in point. Some see the present demand as a passing need - in a few years' time there would be little or no demand on the international community for this kind of assistance.

Others take an opposite view. They put forward the intriguing vision of electoral observation becoming an accepted feature of the international scene, much as is the case with the observation of military manoeuvres. The advantages of such a system would be to a) remove the stigma of being observed and in principle put countries on a more equal footing, b) make it more difficult for reluctant rulers to dismiss elections outright or rig them, c) help create a common basis of international understanding in this area, which would further both human rights and mutual security and could successively be deepened, d) help to raise domestic capacity and awareness in this field. The Commission is aware that this idea has many complications, such as sometimes the vested, negative interests in elections in one country by its neighbours or by regional or other powers, but it feels that solutions to such problems could be found.

This example demonstrates clearly that a dynamic and forward-looking approach to the issue of democracy in itself opens new horizons and creates opportunities also for preventive measures in the security field.

4. What is the Challenge? - What are the needs?

Much good work has developed and is taking place in the field of electoral assistance in recent years. Also, the scene is characterized by ongoing improvements and change. The main actors are flexible and meet new challenges as they arise. To present an up to date and in every detail accurate picture of what is going on is therefore far from easy. What is true one month may be less than reliable the next and perhaps even misleading a short time after that. Nevertheless, through its consultations the Commission has identified some areas of electoral assistance in which the international community should intensify its efforts. There is a broad consensus on the importance of addressing these electoral issues in a consistent and systematic manner.

At an earlier stage the Commission listed some of these challenges and has been privileged to receive many observations – incorporated here – on its reading of the situation.

1. Demand and Supply

Demand outstrips supply in the field of electoral cooperation. The Electoral Assistance Unit of the United Nations has at any one time a long list of requests for various kinds of observation missions, technical assistance and other types of smaller and bigger projects to be carried out by the UN or other organizations. To this list can be added, from various countries, demands which have not found their way into the UN, e.g. to the Commonwealth, The Council of Europe, CSCE and other regional bodies.

National election bodies in established democracies have natural limitations with regard to what they can undertake abroad,

constitutionally, financially and with regard to manpower. They came into being and were dimensioned to cater for domestic needs. On the international scene, the UN and other actors were not originally conceived for all the different roles that they are now called upon to play.

2. A long-term view

International concern has hitherto tended to centre on election day. The perspective, generally speaking, is short-term. The approach has been more project-oriented than concerned with processes.

Hitherto there has also been an imbalance between building domestic capacity and sending external teams, the latter form of action being more favoured.

These observations should be seen in the context of how swiftly and radically changes have taken place in recent years. The international community has had to respond to a new situation, by the nature of events, and has had to do so ad hoc and in a largely improvised manner.

The call for external election observation and monitoring should be interpreted as a symptom of a more complex and far-reaching demand for support for democratic and electoral processes. The international community has recognized this and has indicated by fielding missions that this need is high on its agenda. One of the questions that must be asked is, however, how cost effective and adequate in a longer perspective it is to address electoral issues in the present manner.

The fundamental challenge is how to further a sustainable democratic process. Policies and operations should be optimally crafted in both financial and substantive terms. In order to meet both these requirements, the overall perspective should comprise the entire process from election to election. Many decision-makers have stressed this point. Others have also emphasized the need to take account of local situations and needs.

There is also a growing debate about the consequences of the ongoing transformation of the role of the nation-state and of increasing international interdependence. This has i.a. raised the question of new patterns of democratic cooperation across boundaries.

a) The Role of an Opposition

The first test of the viability of a democratic electoral process often occurs in the days following an election - when most foreign teams have left. How is the opposition treated? How does it act?

This is one of the benchmarks of a sustainable democracy. A government's propensity to hold elections is less than reinforced, if the new rulers arbitrarily throw the opposition-to-be into prison or the gutter. The role of an opposition should be clarified, showing a number of models and indicating what constitutes the bottom line with regard to commonly accepted conduct on the side of both governments and

oppositions. The Commonwealth Secretariat has i.a. indicated this aspect as one that in its experience calls for more reflection and support; other discussants hold similar views.

Most of the Commission's contacts have also highlighted the working conditions of an opposition, such as de facto possibilities to influence public opinion. The role of the media is of course a central issue in this context.

In many quarters there is an anxiety that unrealistic expectations of what democracy can bring about in the short term, may lead to a backlash in many societies, unless the longer-term challenges are tackled squarely and forcefully.

b) Legislation and Domestic Models

Legislative measures - electoral laws and similar provisions - are also elements of a viable and sustainable democracy. Part of this scene is the existence of a strong, competent and independent judiciary. This is a field that today requires more assistance.

Although the basic values underlying pluralistic systems of government may be widely shared, the outward expressions of democracy do differ. Much reflection and thought still has to go into this area.

A special feature of this demand for adaption and innovation is within the area of cost. Present procedures are often outside the financial range of many poor nations. New, more cost-sensitive alternatives should be promoted.

c) Local Government

A broadly held view is that democracy should be rooted on the local and municipal level. The procedures and practices there are a crucial factor in creating a climate conducive to a sound electoral development nationally. Civic education, participation by citizens in decisions that affect them immediately, and a strong civil society are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Against this background, much more should be done to further sound procedures for local elections.

d) Dearth of Long-term, Coherent Support

The international scene with regard to electoral support is characterized by some paradoxes. While there is a proliferation of different teams and forms of assistance in some cases - those that have attracted extensive attention - many electoral needs are scantily met in others.

Looking at some instances, there is ground for concern that too much is being undertaken by too many; whereas many other observers, taking in the broader picture, are struck by the diverse and largely unmet

challenges that call for additional efforts.

Many of its contacts have pointed out to the Commission that the international community and national governments are devoting considerably more funds and other resources to issues of economic development than to questions of sustainable democratic processes, including electoral support.

The global democratic deficit must be reduced, but relatively little resources and efforts are being consistently applied to this task - a pittance in comparison with what goes into economic development, which in itself is inadequate. The risk is imminent that the present democratic mood will be lost and swept away in a backlash of frustrated hopes, unless more is done now.

However, many decision-makers have noted this imbalance and are aware that it must be redressed. A part of their analysis comprises the necessity to review and reshape the international institutional tools for new, long-term policies.

e) Exchanges of Experience

The thrust and content of electoral cooperation are determined by what constitutes a functioning democracy. Democratic institutions take time to build; they are the result of an ongoing process and cannot come about overnight. Nor can democracy come from the outside. Democracy and elections have fewer chances of becoming a sustainable element of governance, if external cooperation concentrates overly on the run-up to an election, the election itself and the work of non-domestic observers and teams.

The pre-electoral phase requires analysis and reflection based on experience gained and relevant research. Decisions on issues of electoral support are not seldom taken after less than adequate preparation in this respect. The international community would benefit from a more systematic learning process and a more structured approach to electoral challenges, particularly but not only at this early stage.

Members of the international community need to learn from each other and benefit from each other's experience. Many groups in the South perceive a need of networks that would both permit such exchanges and - not least - provide a degree of security and leeway for action that might not be as evident without the international connection. Ms. Grace Githu, a Kenyan lawyer who chaired the National monitoring team in Kenya's election December 1992, has, for instance, remarked to the Commission in relation to this aspect: "A number of national groups are springing up in developing countries and the need therefore arises to establish an international body which would offer a basis for co-ordination, networking and technical assistance." The Commission has received many similar views from bodies and individuals in the South.

f) Role of the Military

Among the areas that could be studied is the role of the military in many societies. The challenge is how the military establishment could become more democratic or function better as a support to democracy rather than act as an antidemocratic force, as is often the case.

g) Follow-up

The post-electoral phase is crucial for the establishment and acceptable functioning of democratic institutions; the real test of democracy is generally the second and third election in a transition period, not always the first one, which today gets most of the attention and where the risk of exposure for cheating is greater. A consistent and well-articulated follow-up could benefit the entire international community.

Experience has furthermore shown that there is a need, not always met today, for support structures and professional backup for outside parliamentarians, researchers and others in one way or another active in electoral support.

Another concern is when electoral support should begin and where the responsibility of the international community ends - politically, technically and morally. A point that can be taken from operations hitherto undertaken is that the timespan of international involvement should be much longer than has normally been the case.

h) Worldwide Approach

Many of the actors in the field of electoral assistance are regional or national. An equitable balance between interests and perspectives, and interaction, would be facilitated by a forum for common debate and reflection, with a specific focus on electoral processes.

The inference drawn by the Commission from the long-term, process-oriented needs indicated above is that more institutional capacity internationally would considerably improve opportunities for backstopping, professional expertise, reflection and analysis.

3. Political Neutrality and Integrity

Elections and democracy are fundamentally a result of pressures from within a society and must be carried forward by that society. Ultimately the people participating in an election must own their election. They who are most affected by the outcome should have the best possible means for making their judgement. For this, they often need external support and advice. The outside world can assist in several ways.

Electorates would benefit from having a picture of what is possible and desirable in different situations. There are no electoral systems that

are perfect in every respect, and patterns and procedures can rarely be replicated.

The sensitive nature of electoral collaboration in a longer and more process-focused perspective also raises the question of who sets the agenda for different phases and elements of electoral cooperation. Political neutrality and integrity are vital concerns.

This issue of political impartiality is highly relevant i.a. to the establishment of universally accepted rules and guidelines. The sustainability of democratic processes and within them of the electoral system requires such norms - a need acknowledged by most who have reflected over experiences of the past few years. Some of the salient questions are enumerated below as examples. The list could be made very long.

What can and should observers concentrate on? On whose behalf do they make statements? Who do they report to? What do they do, if they discover irregularities? Will the opposition be accepted? How does it perceive its role? How can political considerations and not seldom necessary political compromises be separated from factual conclusions regarding an election as such? Sometimes even a marred election may be a step forward, but in such instances it is crucial that the findings of observers - both domestic and international - be put on record in their own right as distinct from whatever political course different actors choose to follow. These are just some of the key questions on which there is no consensus today. What is intolerable and what is laudable in a given situation, is furthermore not always a clearcut issue.

Elections are exercises in pluralism. Many different actors and voices must therefore also be welcome in electoral observation and cooperation. Little purpose would be served by attempts to centralize procedures, even if this were practically feasible. But having said this, it is equally clear that the present proliferation in some instances of observer groups would benefit from an element of stringency, clarity and a core of accepted guidelines. This presupposes a close collaboration between international and domestic organizations, which in its turn requires some form of worldwide contact.

Against this background, there is a need felt by many for an agent for electoral support that in its decision-making is balanced both in relation to the various interests at play - governments, political parties, NGO's, parliaments and comparable bodies - and in relation to the cultural and historical realities of societies in different parts of the world. The Secretary-General of the OAU is among those who have especially emphasized this aspect.

4. Professionalism and Efficiency

A major concern is the interlinked challenge of professional competence and capacity-building. In many of the countries in transition, there is a dearth both of expertise on elections and on the wider but related question of democratic institution building, and of election observers, monitors and researchers.

In discussions with the Commission, representatives of Switzerland and Austria have particularly keenly stressed this aspect. They have also pointed out that in their international development cooperation they have facilities to help achieve this goal and would be interested in seeing it pursued also by others - the need is seen as considerable. On a national basis Norway has carried out a thorough inventory of what Norwegian society as a whole has to offer - Nordem. The Commission sees these initiatives as examples that could be emulated nationally and serve as an inspiration internationally.

On the international side also, it is striking that so many of the actors, for instance parliamentary bodies, have main tasks other than election observation and monitoring. Such work is generally not what they were created for. Consequently they most often feel that they do not have the resources or the structures to carry them out as well as they would wish. The Speaker of the Danish parliament is one of the Commission's discussants that has expressed a desire for more technical support in various ways for parliamentarians participating in electoral observation misssions.

The field is in need of a centre that could develop, merge and maintain professionalism in the electoral field over the whole gamut of expertise required - jurists, parliamentarians, government officials, experts on electoral systems and the mechanics of elections, political scientists, educators, and others whose know-how and experience is relevant to electoral operations.

5. Mandates and Roles

In a one-party state the organs of the state, party and parliament are not separated. Often their roles are even combined in one and the same individual. Nominal NGO's in such systems are also often manifestations in another form of this monolithic power structure.

In a pluralistic democracy, on the other hand, different actors have different mandates and roles, and these roles are not interchangeable. Parliaments, parliamentarians and NGO's do not report to national government bodies or to international, intergovernmental organizations. The UN, other multilateral agents, individual governments, parliaments, NGO's and the research community have separate constituencies, which must be respected.

All these different actors should be able to participate in their own right and on their own terms.

In elections the ruling government is but one of the actors. For an election to be free and fair it is crucial to separate the role of government from that of an electoral commission. A similar view must be taken with regard to the varying mandates and roles of election observers.

Even a sketchy overview of the available resources and actors indicates that there are tasks currently not being performed and for which existing bodies cannot provide a full response because of limitations in their mandates and affiliations.

5. Mandate and Tasks of the Institute

In chapter 3 of this report the Commission has described what in its consultations have emerged as the major challenges in the field of international electoral assistance today. They have led the Commission to the conclusions that follow regarding the institute's mandate and work.

Also, there is the question of where to begin. Irrespective of what agenda the institute might have in a medium-term perspective, it would have to build up to this gradually. In a later chapter the Commission puts forward some ideas of what the initial tasks of the institute could be (during the first two to three years).

Among the many persons with varying backgrounds and perspectives with whom the Commission has been in touch, there is a broad consensus regarding most of the possible tasks of the institute - the process-oriented and forward-looking mandate - and differences of emphasis on a few others, depending mainly on how much prominence is also given to some aspects of the immediate, project-centred needs.

A point that most people have made is that the institute should focus mainly on what happens between elections. Consequently it should not concentrate on election day and the immediate run-up to it. The long-term electoral process in a wide sense should be the centre of focus rather than electoral projects of various kinds. This point is taken. It has obvious implications for the kind of mandate the institute should have.

Some of the Commission's contacts have gone one step further and pointed to democracy in a broad sense as the concern and possible mandate of the institute.

An institute dealing with elections would obviously be furthering an essential element of democracy. But as an immediate task in the short term, it should concentrate on building professionalism and competence in a clearly delimited sphere. The institute's leadership may feel at a later stage that a broader approach than this would be desirable.

Whether or not such an extension of the mandate should be contemplated, should depend on experience gained, perceived needs and the institute's competence at that juncture. The institute's statutes should therefore be flexible enough to accommodate a possible broader scope at some future date. Democracy is a wide concept that embraces more than what directly and indirectly relates to the electoral process. It is better to begin in a specific area rather than raise unrealistic expectations of early expansion into a wider field. A strengthening of the electoral process and its foundations is a formidable challenge in itself.

The institute's possible tasks can be described under three captions:

A. Normative and research,
B. Capacity-building, consultancy and assistance,
C. International electoral cooperation.

However, this is a distinction that should be used as an intellectual tool only. There is a risk in overemphasizing it as a basis for firm decisions on the institute's mandate. Very few issues in reality can be neatly compartmentalized according to theoretical categories, as the following examples will demonstrate. Many questions encompass several aspects, although they may be mainly characterized as belonging to one or other of the three types of tasks.

A. Normative and research functions

The Commission has found a large degree of unanimity as regards the need for a normative capacity on the international electoral scene. This heading is an umbrella for a spectrum of related but different tasks.

The most central of them are the following:

1) A data bank
2) Research-oriented activities
3) Internationally accepted norms, rules and guidelines
4) Publication of reports and studies

Examples of "Normative" Needs

The borderline between normative, capacity-building and operative demands is not always distinct, as some of the following examples serve to illustrate. They have a normative side but also others.

These examples of practical needs represent possibilities for an institute. Longer term and shorter term priorities would have to be set within them. A work plan for the institute would probably comprise some of the following issues but not necessarily all of them - they are quoted to demonstrate the type and scope of demands that still have to be met.

a) Where does one turn to today for comprehensive information, compilation of studies and research. On all the different aspects of the

electoral process - technical, financial, comparative, legal and others?

b) Where is there an up to date, universal and easily accessible repository of information on national systems? The Inter Parliamentary Union, IPU, has extensive records within its special field of competence, for instance, which it has expressed willingness to put at the disposal of a new institute. So far this source of information has been largely untapped for lack of a body that could utilize it and draw it together with other related documentation.

c) Much research should also be done in fields that today receive scant attention. In the present changing situation, fresh areas of research should be identified. The institute could help to focus on vital questions.

d) The need to clarify the respective roles of a government and opposition has been mentioned earlier. Electoral legislation, the role of parliaments and other popular assemblies also need to be analysed. In some cases practical guidelines should be developed.

e) Hitherto most international attention has been directed towards presidential and parliamentary elections. But in a longer term perspective a democracy develops from below; its foundations are on the local level. Practical tasks here are beyond the capacity of the international community and must be undertaken nationally. But there is scope for discussing different models and approaches internationally with a view to assisting countries in reinforcing democratic processes in a local context.

In many respects the local level is crucial to the growth of a democratic culture and to civil society. What happens there, tends to happen nationally. Local decision-making is the nursery of democratic and electoral development. However, local governments and local level representative institutions are often struggling against constraints in many countries undergoing a democratic transition. Can they be assisted conceptually by material and advice from a body that has a broad view of the scene?

f) There is a need to gain international acceptance for standard norms, rules and guidelines. What is observed? Who observes? To whom do observers report? What do they do, if they observe irregularities? These and similar questions need to be tackled in a comprehensive and as uniform a way as possible.

The situation today is less than clear. Some bodies do have highly professional staff and rules, but different external teams tend to follow their own norms, which are sometimes ad hoc; and national observer groups diverge even more from country to country and from time to time. The aim should be that not least domestic teams should by and large have comparable guidelines, with due consideration for specific situations.

g) What body today documents the extent to which electoral rights are observed in different parts of the world? A suggestion could be an annual "state of the art" document centred on electoral processes in a wide sense.

These are only some of the normatively oriented issues that the Commission has met in its consultations and that the institute could address. The case for an international "normative" and research-oriented mandate is a strong one, widely recognized by the international community. The challenge is, as even the relatively short list of unmet needs demonstrates, to confront a number of practical and down-to-earth tasks rather than purely theoretical ones.

Some fundamental, initial tasks would have to be undertaken and some normative capacity would have to be in place early on, the chief of which are the following.

1. Data Bank

An institute would have to establish a data bank acting as a service facility for researchers and practitioners in the electoral and related fields. The data bank could draw together and process factual information on a country basis, reports, evaluations, research findings and similar documentation. A professionally managed information repository of this kind could quickly become an important instrument for individuals and bodies seeking reliable and easily accessible material computerized and structured to facilitate cross-references. Many alternative grounds for presentation should be possible. Digests, executive summaries and annotated bibliographies would also be part of the services offered. In short, the data bank would act as a modern, specialized information centre.

National committees and support groups would also benefit from the services of a data bank.

It is likely that a data bank would entail some form of periodical publication, although the data facility at least to begin with, would probably mainly react to requests.

2. Research Orientation

Another facet of the normative work could be research-oriented. The institute could maintain a network of researchers and research institutions (see chapter 8). Not least by utilizing its own data capacity, the institute could initiate or stimulate research into significant issues that the body of information available and indications from the field show to be relatively little explored.

The Commission does not envisage the institute itself carrying out much academic research of its own. To build up extensive new such facilities could be a duplication of what anyway is often best handled in a more distinctly academic environment that can provide researchers

with the infrastructure and daily departmental and interdepartmental contacts that they need to function well.

On the other hand, the institute should have a nucleus of qualified researchers in order to have a professional overview of ongoing work worldwide and to commission and initiate research projects in fields that the institute has identified as meriting more attention.

A part of this analytically oriented work could be more to provide information and compile material than to undertake research in the strict sense of the word, but the borderline is not distinct and need not be so.

B. Capacity-building, consultancy and assistance

Capacity-building, as the name indicates, encompasses measures to strengthen domestic developments. They could include:

1) Assistance in establishing national needs and priorities
2) Facilitating the work of local groups
3) Establishing networks for training
4) Some aspects of confidence-building

Examples of Needs in these Areas

As in the case of normative tasks, the Commission has encountered many unanswered questions relating to the building of domestic capacity to handle electoral processes. The following is a small, illustrative selection. Like several of the previous ones, they combine different aspects although they centre mainly on capacity and know-how.

Much of the emphasis today in the electoral field is on the role of external teams. They do play a vital role and are sometimes an indispensable element. But giving more prominence to the long-term processes means placing domestic capacity high on the agenda. Each nation will have to develop its institutions and train electoral personnel of various categories. This requires international cooperation and exchanges on a massive scale. The necessary skills must be imparted and effective and adequate organizational structures put in place. This is a long-term process.

The mood and culture of a society may in many cases have to be affected. Some multi-party systems are more adversarial than others, but a democracy does presuppose an understanding of the role of an opposition and that of a government and of the complementarity of the two.

Meeting National Needs

a) The cost of elections is a question that should be given more thought.

The Commission has asked an expert from Elections Canada - a body that has experience from some fifty countries - to write a short paper on this subject, which is annexed (Annex 3). In many countries elections under the existing patterns are most difficult to undertake without heavy outside support; domestically sustainable methods would have to be different. In some parts of the world regional cooperation might help to bring down costs; several countries could share ballot boxes and other material and institutional infrastructure, if they coordinated their elections in time. How can this and related issues be tackled systematically?

b) Many voices from the South have emphasized the need to analyse the particular constraints and challenges in many developing countries, where illiteracy and other country-specific conditions militate against many of the procedures and assumptions on which European and North-American elections are based. This is particularly true of the rural areas, where most of the electorate lives in such countries.

c) The values and rationale underlying elections are the same, but the way varies in which an electorate freely and fairly expresses its will and how the electoral system is conceived. There are no doubt alternatives to be considered that would better suit the conditions of many countries - but more thought and comparative study has to go into these and other practical problems.

d) The existence of an experienced and well-trained judiciary and an adequate legal framework is central also to the electoral process and often needs strengthening in countries with fragile democracies or in transition.

Local Groups

e) In some countries there are domestic groups, often recently established in connection with a first election, that seek i.a. to strengthen the principles of democratic governance and to monitor elections. They often work with small means and have concluded that they must operate in a long-term perspective and in a wider context than that offered by their national situation. Their need is for back-up, service and support, sometimes also the protection that an international network could provide. This kind of group is an important part of future interlinkages and is to be found in different countries.

Training Network

f) Several governments and organizations run training courses in subjects connected with the electoral process in its broad sense. Many potential beneficiaries of these facilities are, however, unaware of the

range of possibilities that could be open to them. There is a role for a body that caters to the needs of nationals of countries who might not otherwise have information of what is offered or that perhaps do not have the funding to participate owing to bilateral limitations or other practical obstacles.

Confidence Building

g) Often national impasses over elections are characterized by distrust between parties and groups in a country. Now and then an impartial outside body can help to overcome this lack of confidence and loosen tight knots simply by presenting facts - giving professional advice based on experiences in many quarters of the world.

This kind of intervention cannot be planned. But when the need and possibility arise, the institute could consider playing such a role, by informing the parties involved about legislation and practices in other countries.

The question of who is a national and thus eligible to vote is a bone of contention in many countries. Citizenship issues are often solved more through negotiation than by the application of accepted rules; but in some instances it does help to have access to systematic surveys and analyses of what has been tested in other situations. This function would be in between norm-setting and mediation.

The Commission recognizes that most aid donors are already engaged in providing electoral assistance and wish to be seen doing so. It also notes, however, that the needs today are great and varied and will be so for a long time to come.

Much more effort and development assistance are called for in the period in between elections than is currently forthcoming. Capacity-building in this area stretches from the day after one election up to and including next election day and comprises an array of support measures. The beneficiaries are governments, parliaments, local communities and NGO's in the countries concerned. The range is from helping NGO's and developing local government to furthering national elections in a broad sense.

For the foreseeable future there will be a demand for strengthening institutions and attitudes that are fundamental to elections and democracy. A democratic culture and democratic attitudes take time to become sustainable. The problem here is not too much involvement but too little; for the institute more where to begin and what limitations to make than if it should do anything at all.

Support for national elections is often described as homogeneous in character 0 as if all electoral assistance everywhere was basically the same. In reality, many very different types of action are lumped together under the heading of electoral assistance, even of electoral observation. The perspectives and goals of teams differ. Some are more technical, some more political. Even in one and the same election, teams may have varying agendas. Election support falls into several categories.

One is when elections are part of a larger peace-making process of the UN, such as Namibia and Cambodia. In other instances an election is part of a transition, such as in Kenya and Malawi, to quote recent examples, and the upcoming elections in Russia and South Africa. Such exercises are generally well-covered projects.

On the other hand the second or third election and the long and painstaking process of creating a democratic climate is much less supported, although generally seen as being at least as important. A consistent, coherent and broad approach to the issue of electoral cooperation is a largely unmet need, despite the superficial impression of wide support to the field that the most publicized elections tend to create in the public mind.

The role of the institute in this area should be both a direct and an indirect one. Through its data collecting, situational mapping, expertise and networks in different fields, the institute could help in establishing national needs and priorities when requested to do so. It could also act as a broker by collaborating closely with training centres and course organizers in different parts of the world in order to secure places and organize tailor-made courses for representatives of NGO's or governments. Similarly it could identify possible sources of assistance to meet pinpointed needs.

Capacity-building can take many forms. The institute should have the development of know-how and of institutions as one of its central themes, but it should be open and flexible about how it achieves these aims.

C. International electoral cooperation

The Commission identifies two main types of work for an institute in the field of international electoral cooperation:

1) one relating to exchanges of experiences through seminars and conferences and

2) one that focuses on supporting electoral observation and monitoring in various forms.

The two areas treated under A and B previously are those on which there is a large degree of consensus. As regards some elements of the third of the institute's possible undertakings, electoral observation, monitoring and verification, the emphasis differs depending on how this task is perceived and defined. An emphasis on the present and its needs leads to one kind of bias, whereas a preoccupation with where the international community is heading, implies another stress.

The Commission has discerned a need to discuss a broadening of operational action beyond electoral observation, monitoring and verification, which today often are seen as almost synonomous to electoral assistance. There is much international interaction of other

kinds that potentially could be as important.

One such concern is to bring about exchanges of views on concerns shared by many, such as the role of the military and costs. If such exercises were action-oriented and down-to-earth, the implementation of accepted proposals would no doubt follow. In most instances, changes and improvements are in any case best carried out domestically.

In most quarters - not least in countries in transition - there is a strong desire to exchange information and experiences, to come together in seminars, workshops and at round tables to discuss issues also in a practical manner; the need is as much for intellectual assistance in tackling domestic practical problems as for more abstract debates on principles and theories.

The institute should be well placed and equipped to mount seminars, conferences and workshops on spearhead topics, to meet the needs referred to elsewhere in this report. An annual conference (see chapter 7 on the role of the Board of Trustees) could be one of the activities serving this purpose.

Another task is backstopping and support to observers, both domestic and international service.

An accepted fact is also that experiences of international observation are mixed. Some teams have worked well; others have been less than perfect. There could thus be a case for evaluating and helping to improve electoral observation.

The Commission wishes to raise this kind of concern for two reasons. One is conceptual. International electoral cooperation should be basically a mutual concern.

Another, more practical motive is that the Commission also wishes to emphasize the long-term operational needs as a balance to the present trend to stress short-term electoral projects.

Examples of operational needs

Topics for Collaborative Exploration

a) The role of the opposition has been mentioned under the normative heading, but it has operational implications of an advisory nature as well. In principle an opposition must be a viable alternative to the sitting government. It should consequently be able to follow societal needs and study how the government tackles them, implying an openness on the part of the sitting administration and a willingness to discuss major issues across party lines to ascertain whether there is common ground. The opposition for its part must develop its role as a responsible alternative. This may seem self-evident, but experience demonstrates that much remains to be done to reinforce this part of the electoral and democratic process.

b) A generally accepted tenet is that democracy - and by inference the electoral process - is basically about what happens at the grass-roots

level of society. Democracy must function on the local level, if it is to be a viable and sustainable process. This is a fundamental requirement. The practical demands are more often than not even greater there than at the national level. Arguably some societies in transition towards democracy should place special emphasis on decision-making and participation locally. What bodies are addressing this issue systematically? How much attention and resources are being directed towards this area of concern?

c) The role of the military is also a subject that many societies wish to penetrate more and that an institute could help in analyzing and for which it could provide a forum for discussing.

d) The situation of minorities and the issue of nationality and eligibility to vote is likely to remain an important question that needs to be studied further.

Elements of Electoral Observation and Monitoring

e) As has been said above, there have been different views as regards to what extent an institute should involve itself in organizing international observer missions. This will have to be decided as the institute comes into being. What follows here is a description of problems encountered in such missions and a proposed model for observers, that has been presented to the Commission:

A problem in many elections is who makes a statement on how free and fair the process has been and on whose behalf this kind of judgement is passed. Sometimes many individual observers in a group make comments and give interviews, which might or might not be consistent with each other. Sometimes observers are required not to have any communication at all with the media; in such instances the final assessment may even be left to people or bodies that have not been in the country.

The Secretary-General of the institute and its governing bodies could not and should not play the role of some kind of international super arbiter. Besides other groups under its aegis, the institute could by drawing on its network appoint a small Chief Observer Group of experienced and respected individuals - say five - for this delicate overall task, chaired by an eminent person who would reach a decision together with the group and supported by it. These conclusions could be based on this Chief Observer Group's contacts with observers (including those that the institute may have in place), NGO's and others whose findings and opinions they might wish to seek in order to complement their own observations in situ. The chair could normally make any official statements on behalf of the expert group and be solely responsible for whatever the verdict might be, in much the same way as the bench in a court reaches its decision in its own right in a specific case, irrespective of who has made the appointment or pays the court's salaries.

The role of the institute could in some instances be to establish such

a team of eminent personalities and other observer groups and to assure 1) that all those involved are objective, well qualified and of high integrity, and 2) that certain set rules and guidelines are adhered to. Given this preeminence of the personal authority of the chief observation team, the institute could very well also help to build local capacity and competence through its own people, by drawing on its networks or by brokering.

f) Some elections attract much international attention and observation. Others - the majority - do not. The ones that are not so much in the limelights often merit as much support. How can this need be adequately met? Are there demands for observation that still are largely ignored?

g) Evaluating the work done by teams of electoral observers is yet another type of activity that today receives scant attention. What can be improved? What has functioned well, and why?

One inference to be drawn from this brief list - which could be much longer - is that different possible tasks for the institute are not so easy to separate from each other when it comes to concrete action. Democratic and electoral processes have mutually reinforcing elements. Another observation is that very much still remains to be done.

Many governments and organizations wish to mark their presence by fielding their own teams for electoral observation in elections that they have special reasons to follow closely. Some discussants have therefore drawn attention to the case for practical coordination in the field.

But as has emerged from this overview, the Commission's opinion is that the major challenges and fundamental needs today in the field of democracy and electoral processes do not include the issue of an abundance of observers in what are short-term projects anyway. More coordination should be achieved if possible, but certainly other issues should have precedence. The fundamental argument for an institute has little bearing on the proliferation question either way.

The international community needs to pull together strongly and to act on the window of opportunity that now exists for furthering democratic and electoral processes. The overriding need is for a far-sighted strategy and adequate means of implementing it.

Concluding Remarks on Mandates and Tasks

In its consultations the Commission has established a need for an institute and has identified a number of other needs that it could address. The more the Commission has penetrated the issues and proceeded with its talks, the less has it been able to exclude some of the challenges or to give higher priority to others. Hypothetically one or the other type of task could be isolated, but when looking at the practical issues facing us all, the Commission has found difficulty in saying that

only one or two aspects of them should be relevant and not others. Solutions will probably cut right across the board in many cases and have both normative, capacity-building and operational sides to them. The right balance between these tasks should be a task for the institute's Board and leadership and be influenced by experiences, demands and the activities of other bodies in the electoral field.

Normative and operative activities presuppose each other. Much research in the social and political sciences is participatory in some sense. How is the necessary link between research (and evaluation) and operations best and systematically handled today?

Complementarity and interaction with regard to other actors should be vital principles for the institute to maintain.

The Commission's plea is for a mandate that sees beyond present short-term project requirements. A consequence of this should be a mandate that has many windows and leaves some doors open. To box in an institute that should deal with what is necessarily a fluid and dynamic factor in development should be avoided. Democracy is an ongoing process, a movement. The institute's mandate should reflect this.

6. The Role of the UN and Other Organizations

A large number of organizations are currently engaged in electoral assistance in different forms. Annex 1 indicates those with which the Commission has discussed outstanding needs and that have briefed the Commission on their activities. Many others should no doubt have been part of the Commission's deliberations. The Commission would ideally have sought even broader contacts but had time constraints.

The Commission is deeply indebted to the bodies and individuals it has been in touch with for their many observations and sound advice. Together they represent a wealth of experience and professionalism that would merit an in-depth individual presentation.

Regrettably, the format of this report precludes doing justice to each and every actor in the electoral field, especially as new developments are constantly bringing about changes of emphasis and approaches. One of the many initial tasks of the institute could be to publish an overview of what is being undertaken already in the field of electoral assistance.

The Commission's mandate and immediate task was to ascertain whether these organizations already working with electoral support see a need for activities that are vital but fall outside the scope of issues that these players are able to address. One of the Commission's concerns was also whether some existing body could meet whatever needs there might be in the field without having to create an entirely new entity for the purpose.

On both these points the Commission received an unequivocal and unanimous reaction: Yes, there are needs (summed up in a preceding part of this report), and yes, the present major actors in the sphere of electoral assistance would welcome an institute. In its suggestions for a mandate (cf. chapter 5 of this report) the Commission has taken many

cues from them and has been attentive to what they have defined as desirable.

The United Nations, UN, is an especially significant actor in relation to electoral cooperation also. The Commission has been in close communication with the Electoral Assistance Unit and UNDP in New York and the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva at various stages in its work. They have been very helpful and have repeatedly welcomed the establishment of a new institute as a complement to the UN's efforts and as a potentially reinforcing factor in relation to the UN.

The various organizations have also expressed a desire to collaborate with an institute around different tasks that they see as crucial.

The UN

Member states seek assistance from the UN essentially in four circumstances: when a country is undergoing a transition to democracy; when it is seeking to build a peaceful alternative to conflict; following decolonization; and in self-determination elections.

Very quickly after its inception, the Electoral Assistance Unit (EAU) of the UN launched an ambitious and successful programme of electoral observation and monitoring. Particularly taking into account its resource constraints and the flood of incoming requests for support it received, the Unit must be deemed to be singularly successful. It is particularly noteworthy that the Unit has not only managed the many demands placed on it in terms of numbers, but it has also step by step developed its methodology. The referendum in Malawi in mid-1993 is the best example to date of functioning coordination by the UN of many different actors and inputs.

From its perspective the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva has conceptually moved forward the positions of the international community also in electoral support and has cooperated with the EAU and others in many field situations.

The UNDP as a financer, through its resident representatives and through technical assistance has been able to further electoral observation projects and other elements of the electoral process.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the UN has expressly welcomed the idea of creating a new institute, given the magnitude and complexity of the tasks ahead. It has repeatedly stated its interest and willingness to cooperate with such an institute, particularly in the normative and capacity-building fields, where an institute would complement the work of the UN.

Characteristics of the scene apart from the UN

The many other actors on the electoral scene have an individual emphasis that follows from their particular background.

1. Sometimes their chief focus is geographic or geopolitical. The regional organizations in Europe such as the CSCE and the Council of Europe are illustrations of this; there are corresponding entities elsewhere.

2. In some instances the role played by major actors is defined by their political identity. The Commonwealth Secretariat is perhaps the best example of this. Its mandate is naturally centred on the requirements and demands of the states that make up the Commonwealth. The European Communities have similarly a mandate that derives from EC priorities.

3. By virtue of their professional background some of the actors have a crucial role to play in one part of an electoral process but see their specific task as centred on that, without comprising the whole agenda of electoral cooperation. Elections Canada and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) of the USA are cases in point; without their skill, dedication and professionalism the electoral field would be much poorer, but they have chosen to limit themselves to their special sphere of competence.

4. The contributions of American institutes - particularly the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) - are global, professional and recognized as crucial in many cases. They are pioneers in the field and have experience that very few other actors enjoy. However, they are nationally based and are to some extent interpreted as linked to specific political interests. They share this characteristic with a number of other actors, among them parties and national parliaments. Sometimes this perceived national affiliation can be a strength, sometimes it is a disadvantage. Neutrality and impartiality are much easier to make credible in a context where the principals of a body are more balanced.

5. All actors today are owned by one single category of principal ony: governments, parties, NGO's, or parliaments. Most entities are from the North. The need, stressed by so many of the Commission's contacts, to combine various constituencies, geographic/economic backgrounds and types of perspective, is unmet today.

This brief analysis – although in no way doing justice to the combined, substantial know-how and efforts in the electoral field and even less to individual actors – can serve to highlight a few points.

a. It illustrates why all the present actors welcome an institute that could cover the ground that the other players for individually varying reasons cannot or will not enter.

b. Mandates and perspectives differ for many individually well-founded reasons, so there is a need for a more comprehensive mandate.

c. A large number of the present actors define their mandate and tasks in the light of acute demands and in project terms. This is often a conscious priority evolving from their having other primary tasks. They thus conclude that they would benefit from the services of a more long-term oriented institute.

A link to the UN

The field of electoral assistance is fluid and dynamic. Responses and approaches should therefore be flexible. The UN has demonstrated its ability to adapt creatively to new challenges in this area, as has been indicated.

However, despite these creative initiatives and documented progress, the challenges facing the UN and other actors are daunting. The UN, in particular, with its global mandate and responsibility feels the combined pressure of short-term and long-term demands. Not even the UN can hope to provide in-depth electoral support in every situation where there is an acute need and simultaneously reinforce the process from election to election. Perhaps such an ambition would even be counterproductive. The role of the UN could be a strategic one, as in the case of the recent referendum in Malawi, drawing on resources from different quarters, also for more forward-looking and process-oriented efforts. The work must be done at several levels. The UN should be able to mobilize and direct efforts by others in areas where it feels that this would benefit the task at hand.

At the outset of its work the Commission had as one of its hypotheses that there were possibly too many actors involved on the electoral scene. This assumption has proved to be wrong. Whereas a proliferation of observers is manifest in perhaps ten to twenty key elections annually, there is a dearth of resources and actors overall and patently an enormous unmet need when it comes to the electoral process as a whole.

Many of the Commission's contacts have stressed the desirability of a subtle link to the UN to be able to work closely with the UN and guarantee complementarity. The unanimous opinion the Commission has encountered on this issue is that the institute should be formally free in relation to the UN and be financed outside the UN context but nevertheless have a conceptual and operational relationship.

How such a link could be crafted, must await the creation of the institute. Representatives of the UN have kindly supported the work of the Commission and the idea of establishing an institute. An institution with an agreed mandate and statutes must more or less have come into being, before the UN can be formally approached on the relationship.

The Commission suggests as a possibility that the link could take the shape of the Secretary-General of the UN appointing a personal representative on the Board of Trustees and the Board presenting its annual report to the Secretary-General.

7. Statutes

Political neutrality and integrity must be safeguarded in the statutes and the functioning of the electoral institute. There should be checks and balances to ensure that the institute is impartial and is seen to be so. This implies i.a. that a fair globally based representation is assured.

A special issue is the need to create a principal for the institute. Normally an organization derives its mandate from a national government, an intergovernmental body or some specific NGO or NGO's. In this case the institute would not be dependent on any one government or other agent; this follows from the need for freedom of action and for non-partisan decision-making.

The Commission thus proposes that a Board of Trustees be created to act as the principal of the institute.

The institute governing structure is suggested as comprising the following:

1. A Board of Trustees
2. An Executive Committee

The institute should have a Secretary-General as its operational head.

I. Board of Trustees

The Board of Trustees would be the guardian of the statutes and have as one of its tasks to make changes in the mandate and overall direction of the institute's work, as and when the Board deems such modifications to be necessary.

Another major responsibility of the Board should be to establish the

annual budget of the institute. The financial framework and directives on the use of funds would require specific decisions by the Board of Trustees, which would appoint an external auditor for the institute. However, the Commission's view is that the Board should restrict itself to the main elements of the budget, delegating executive decisions and details to those responsible for the policies and guidelines for the operations of the institute. This is a consideration not only based on principles of subsidiarity. The institute's impartiality could conceivably be jeopardized, if constraints imposed by the Board in effect regulated what the institute's practical decisions would be in a specific situation.

The Board of Trustees would exercise control over the institute not least by appointing its Executive Committee and Director. Establishing a shortlist of possible candidates would no doubt be an exacting task requiring the assistance of persons also outside the Board of Trustees. The Commission sees merit in the Board drawing on a network of well-connected senior personalities with varying backgrounds. As a resource group this network could be consulted for many purposes, not least in connection with the appointment of qualified leadership for the institute. Such an advisory panel should be informal but could play an important role by reinforcing the expertise of the Board of Trustees. As advisors influential people worldwide could help to ensure both a geographically broad recruitment of staff and generally facilitate the institute's and the Board's work.

Composition

The Board of Trustees should comprise three categories of interests. One would be represented by the financiers, another by persons with different backgrounds, reflecting balanced geographical and professional backgrounds, and a third should be individuals with their base in international bodies and the UN. This latter group could e.g. comprise parliamentarian and parliamentary bodies, NGO's, regional organizations and institutions with an international share of activity close to or relevant to that of the institute.

Size and Right to Representation

The Commission has given much thought to the question of numbers. The Board of Trustees should not be unmanageably large. Yet at the same time, there is an advantage in having many financiers - the institute's freedom and integrity would be greater that way, and the economic burden on each contributing government or body would be less. As the size of the financing group influences that of the others, a point of departure is inevitably the composition of the financiers' group.

The Commission is, however, not in a position to define exactly what an optimal size of the group should be. Presumably all financing bodies

would wish to be represented and should be so.

The chair of the Board should be elected by the Board of Trustees for a limited period, perhaps five years. The incumbent should be recruited on a worldwide basis.

Work of the Board

As the Board of Trustees would not be involved in the operational activities and decisions of the institute, it should normally meet once a year in plenary.

The annual board meeting could be combined with a symposium or conference on a topic related to the general scope of the institute. The Commission has perceived an interest in and a need for some periodic event of this kind, where researchers, jurists, electoral technicians, parliamentarians and decision-makers could exchange views and experiences. Indeed, such a recurrent exercise may well in its own right become one of the more prominent of the institute's undertakings.

II. The Executive Committee

The Board of Trustees should appoint an Executive Committee and a Secretary-General to run the institute.

The Committee should consist of about ten members, including the Secretary-General.

Appointments to the Committee are suggested to be on an individual basis and a limited, renewable mandate. The same should apply to the Secretary-General. The terms of tenure should be staggered, not more than half the Committee being up for renewal at a time, in order to safeguard continuity.

The Committee is expected to lead and direct the institute's operations. This would require a composition of the Committee that adequately reflects the various facets of the institute's work. Thus the Committee should comprise expertise of different kinds: legal skills, electoral techniques and methodology, relevant research fields, information technology, training and capacity-building, political science, economy, administration and other areas that are important for the institute's work. The basis for selection should be proven competence and experience. Incumbents should be sought world-wide but with a view to striking an acceptable geographical balance as far as possible.

The Committee might convene three or four times a year; details of its working methods should be up to the Committee itself to decide.

The total competence of the Committee should be one of the guiding principles for selection as member of the Committee. It would be important to ensure that some crucial area of expertise was not absent in the Committee.

The Committee should also be responsible for the maintenance of internationally recognized budgetary and other administrative routines.

III. The Status of the Institute

The proposed institute would bring together in the same body governments, NGO's, parliaments and international agencies as equal partners. The Commission proposes that the institute therefore be established as a foundation or have similar status, depending on the legislation in the country where the institute is sited, that could cover a cooperation between governments, international organizations and parliaments.

Parallels in other fields demonstrate that legal arrangements can be made with host governments to secure exemptions from domestic fiscal and other regulations when necessary and that such special understandings are often not required. This area is a matter for negotiation with a host country government and can only be tackled, when firm suggestions for a seat have been tabled. This whole area must be a subject for negotiation when establishing the institute.

Advisory Panel and Contact Groups

Apart from this formal structure the Commission sees advantage in the institute's having access to a network of personalities who could proffer advice on specific issues and assist in head hunting for senior posts and missions. Such an advisory panel would be outside the structure of the institute but could nevertheless reinforce and broaden the institute's decision-making capacity.

The Commission has also met suggestions - i. a. from quarters in the Netherlands and Kenya - that national committees, support groups or societies of friends of the institute could provide it with points of contact and inputs. This idea is appealing, but any such groups should be external to the formal decision-making structure. In some countries there might be a strong case for national groups, in others not; national contact groups should be an option to consider but should be voluntary.

8. Organizational Principles and Guidelines

Three main areas of tasks have been proposed above for the institute.

A firm organizational structure for the institute follows from later decisions on the mandate. At this stage the Commission li
mits itself to suggestions regarding principles and some practicalities.

Organizational principles

The following are a few of the considerations that might be useful as guidelines for the institute in organizational terms.

1. There could be advantages for the institute in having a system based mainly on *networks* of various kinds. Much of the initial work to be done would then be in establishing and maintaining these networks.

- On the normative side important linkages would be with and between research institutions worldwide and the institute.

- Capacity-building would imply making a resource inventory internationally resembling that established by Norway nationally (Nordem), and creating more formalized cooperation between training and briefing institutions and bodies in one way or another engaged in reinforcing competence in the different elements of the electoral process in a wide sense.

- An especially significant network should comprise national groups,

as indicated earlier. Their needs should be met, and they should be in a position to influence the institute's and other actors' agenda.

- Electoral assistance would necessitate the setting up of rosters of experts in different fields and working i.a. with parliamentarians.

These networks should be actively maintained. This means going well beyond a documenting or letterbox exercise. The networking groups and bodies should be able to interact with one another and with the institute. This could be brought about i.a. through meetings, conferences and publications with considerable inputs from the participating organizations.

2. National support groups or "friends of the institute" could be encouraged wherever there is a domestic interest to have them. Such groups could serve as a focal point nationally for the institute and could bring together various domestic actors who might otherwise have less possibility of interacting and cooperating.

This possible catalytic effect of the institute is a function that could potentially be as important as much of its direct action.

3. The other side of the networking coin is that the institute should cultivate and emphasize its position as a facilitator and analytical resource. This places two demands on the institute as an organization.

a) It should be able to draw on know-how external to it in specific areas and apply its own capacity strategically to the overall scene.

As Samuel Johnson remarked: "Knowledge is of two kinds. Either you know the answers or you know where to find them." A part of the institute's knowledge should be of the second kind - coupled with a special competence related to the needs and dynamics of the electoral process in its broad sense.

b) Through its data bank the institute would also be able to supply many concrete answers. It should serve as a central agent for information and analytical capacity. However, this role presupposes the one just mentioned - an overview coupled with a willingness to employ the services of, for instance, centres of learning to assist in a consultancy capacity. The institute should be responsible for the analyses and overviews it produces on the basis of its data, but some of the actual compilation and study could probably be farmed out. Whenever feasible such an approach should be adopted.


4. A consequence of this approach is that the institute's staff could be limited in number. Specialists in various fields would be available externally. The institute could emphasize problem identification and definition and an understanding of the comparative advantages of different bodies and actors worldwide in providing solutions in given situations.

5. By virtue of its structure the institute should have a special task to combine actors with varying constituencies on their own terms. This implies a clear policy of facilitating such cooperation – in field operations, conferences and studies. Institute staff may sometimes, through their work, be more in touch with one category of actor than with another. Also, the internal working procedures at the institute should take this into account and create a balance in the overall organizational culture.

6. Whatever organizational structure is adopted by the institute, there should be a built-in close contact between different activities. As has been indicated earlier, in actual practice the borderlines between tasks are often ambiguous, even arbitrary. Different parts of the institute would probably often have to draw on each other's skills and networks. There should be both formal and informal ties to secure this collaboration.

Some practical suggestions

At this stage it would be premature to draw an exact organogram of the institute. However, based on the previous chapters, a suggestion could be the following:



A few practical points can also be raised:

a. Information in various forms will predictably be a major practical work-load for the institute. There should be a continuous flow of information in and between the networks. Both on request and on its own initiative the institute will be supplying governments and organizations with material and studies. Briefings should constitute an integral part of what the institute will be expected to deliver. In its formative years the institute will also have to make its mandate and plans known.

Some of this work - of a more general nature - should be the responsibility of the Secretary-General's office. Most of it would, however, be organically linked to the institute's activities and indeed

often be an important element of its output.

In the latter instances the staff involved should provide the substance and see production of the information as one of its tasks. But as specialists in other fields they should have the support and backing of professionals in information techniques and communication.

The institute should have its own nucleus of such competence, given the role that providing information can be expected to have.

b. The work plan of each department of the institute should regularly specify what time and inputs it would require from other departments, in consultation with those units. Budgets should regularly include such non-financial needs.

c. Electoral cooperation - field operations - can demonstrably edge out more normative work, unless checked by priorities and policy constraints. It is important that the institute's leadership be attentive to this possible risk and through the budget and supervision ensure that no individual part of the institute's operations grows in an unforeseen way. The Commission has encountered a few misgivings on this particular issue but anticipates that the institute's leadership will be aware of the possible problem and will utilize the instruments of control and management that it has at its disposal.

Sometimes tensions in organizations arise from the fact that outside pressures create a demand for operational activities that is greater than the organization's own wish to carry out other activities, e.g. long-term or normative action. This can be countered by creating an external pressure group for such work, for instance in the form of an advisory group of experts who have such activities at heart and can be expected to push for them.

As indicated earlier, the different sides of the institute's activities also presuppose each other and can to some extent be mutually reinforcing.

d. Staff should be employed in stages, rather than incumbents sought for all the established posts at once. A staggered recruitment could provide for greater leeway in finding persons that complement each other.

9. Budget and Organization

This chapter outlines a tentative budget for the establishment of the Institute and the first three years of operations.

As stated in chapter 8 on organizational principles, at this stage it is premature to draw an exact organogram of the Institute. Nevertheless it is necessary and possible to calculate preliminary costs.

The Commission estimates that a staff of about thirty in all should be a feasible target, provided that the institute draws on external resources on an ad hoc basis to complement its own capacity.

The first three years of operations should be characterized by an organic growth of the Institute. Staff should be employed in stages, rather than all at once. In order to simplify the picture, we take year three as the point of departure when sketching the preliminary budget. It should be understood that this is a rough outline, due to the fact that the details of the growth process and the administrative structure must be subject to decisions by the Institute itself and its Board of Trustees.

The costs will be treated under three different headings: A) Salaries and Related Costs; B) Office Rent, Furniture and Maintenance, and C) Direct Programme Costs.

A) Salaries and related costs

1. Outline of staffing plan

To enable the creation of a preliminary budget expressing the costs of establishing and running the Institute, a number of assumptions regarding the Institute's staffing will be made in the following. It should be underlined that the personnel establishment is meant to reflect the Institute's situation in the third year.

The Secretary-General's office could, apart from the Secretary-General him/her self, be manned by i.a. one clerk, a senior administrator, a communications expert and a senior secretary.

The departments for normative work, capacity building and electoral cooperation could each consist of a) one Head of Department, b) four senior officers/experts, c) two junior officers and d) two secretaries.

The figures mentioned in the following are comprehensively displayed in table no 1. The text below explains the preliminary budget figures in table no 1.

2. Salaries and related costs

As points of reference for salary estimates, the Commission has used three international organizations. These are a) the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) a semigovernmental organization based in Geneva, b) the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) an international NGO based in London and, c) the Mekong Secretariat, a regional intergovernmental organization.

Professional staff should be recruited on an international basis. Others should be employed locally. The personnel costs will naturally depend on where the Institute will be sited. The following is an approximation arrived at by amalgamating and weighting salaries and related costs from the three different bodies mentioned above. (The figures, it should be emphasized, cover total expenses for a post, i.e. - medical care, social costs, etc - more than the incumbent's actual salary.)

(All figures in USD)

Personnel	**Year 3**
1 Secretary General:	**100,000**
12 Senior officers/experts:	**950,000**
1 Communications expert:	**70,000**
1 Senior administrator officers:	**290,000**
1 Clerk:	**40,000**
4 Senior secretaries:	**160,000**
3 Mid level secretaries:	**90,000**
Total cost for staff year 3.	**1,760,000**

The Commission has also made an estimation of these salary costs based on available UN standards. That approximation turned out to be almost USD one million higher than the figure above. The Commission has preferred to use the lower figures.

However, bearing in mind the Institute's proposed link to the UN and the importance of being able to recruit truly competent staff, the Commission can see a possible need to recruit staff on UN terms. The issue of salaries will be a question for the Board of Trustees. There

should thus be a preparedness for a somewhat higher figure than the one quoted above.

3. Fees and related costs, non-permanent staff

Funds must be available for the Executive Committee's fees and travel expenses. As described in chapter 7, Statutes, the Executive Committee should consist of about ten members and meet about four times a year. The cost for this could be estimated at USD 200,000 annually.

Funds must also be available for the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, which as outlined in chapter 7, could be combined with an international symposium or conference, hence the cost of organizing the Annual Meeting could amount to USD 200,000.

In chapter 7, the Commission suggests the creation of a network of senior personalities to be connected to the Board of Trustees as a sort of advisory panel. Travel expenses and fees for such an advisory panel could be estimated at USD 100,000.

The Institute must have a budget for fees to consultants and for temporary assistance of not directly related to specific projects or programmes, i.a. administrative or organizational work during the formative period of the Institute. A sum of USD 200,000 is an estimate for year three.

4. Travel and communication costs

The Institute's international character indicates relatively high costs for travel, telecommunications, postage etc.

The figures for travel costs are based on the assumption that the professional staff of 18 persons will make on an average four intercontinental journeys annually, and two regional trips each.

	Year 3
Travel expenses	**500,000**
Telecommunications, postage etc:	**70,000**
Total estimated cost for travel and communication, year three:	**570,000**

B) Office rent, maintenance, furniture and equipment

Recurrent costs

The estimated cost for rent of office space in a major capital is USD 10,000 per employee, which sums up to approximately USD 300,000 year three.

The budget for general maintenance and normal office upkeep is

approximated at USD 40,000 year three.

The annual budget for replacement of equipment is estimated at USD 40,000.

Initial costs

The initial cost for office furniture and equipment is estimated at USD 10,000 per employee, plus a round sum of USD 100,000 for equipment and furniture not related to individual employees. This amounts to a total investment cost of USD 400,000. This investment could, for the sake of simplicity be divided equally over the first three years, which in round figures leads to an estimated annual investment cost of USD 140,000 during the first three years.

C) Direct programme costs

The Institute's programme-related costs will depend on the level of activities that the Institute engages in, which is an issue to be discussed among, and decided by, the Board of Trustees.

Below follows an estimate of the costs directly related to programme activities.

1. Establishing and maintaining a data bank

The setting up and maintenance of the proposed data bank would be a part of the Institute's day-to-day activities. The basic cost for personnel is reflected in the personnel budget. Costs for the systematic acquisition, processing and distribution of information are estimated at USD 100.000, year three. The Commission has consulted organizations with similar activities. The cost of running a data bank depends on the extent it can draw on information in other existing data banks and data bases. The figure quoted here presupposes that some of the necessary information can be compiled from a diversity of existing sources and that some have to be created from scratch. If the need for manual data collection proves to be extensive, the cost for the data bank will increase. This must be studied in more detail before concrete decisions have to be taken regarding the data bank.

2. Academic and professional networks

The Institute's support to external academic work, linking of academic and professional institutions/organizations in global networks and commission of analytical work, would require a budget of USD 500,000 for year three.

3. Organizing international seminars and workshops:

The cost of organizing a seminar/workshop, with fifty international participants would depend on geographical location and the number of participants covering their own travel expenses. A cost estimation lies between USD 125,000 and 200,000 per seminar. The Institute could be expected to organize two such meetings year three, and one minor meeting - at an approximated total annual cost of USD 450,000.

4. Organizing training and courses

The Institute will engage in the organization of courses and training programmes i.a. to strengthen national electoral committees and the civil society. A sum of USD 600,000 is an estimated figure for year three.

5. Information and Publications

The Institute will need to undertake extensive information activities such as i.a. production and distribution of newsletters, yearbooks and participation in conferences. An estimated budget for external information amounts to USD 200,000, year three.

6. Electoral cooperation activities

As stated in chapter 5, a consistent, coherent and broad approach to the issue of electoral cooperation and the practical challenges outlined there, is a need to be met by the Institute. Long-term projects (over several years) could be an important element of the Institute's undertakings.

The Commission recommends that the Institute should have a budgetary preparedness to participate in and to undertake electoral cooperation activities. The cost for electoral cooperation activities during year three is approximated at USD 1,000,000.

The total cost of estalishing and running the institute

By summing up all the costs accounted for in this chapter, as shown in *table no 1*, one ends up with a grand total of USD 6,400,000 as a preliminary figure reflecting the possible cost of running the Institute during the third year of operations.

In order to make a rough estimate of the total cost of setting up the Institute, and the first three years of activities, the costs for the first two years must be added to the sum of USD 6.400.000. To make an approximation of the costs for the first two years we suggest, for the sake of simplicity, and bearing in mind that the Institute is to grow gradually, that the cost for the first two years is regarded as equal to the cost of year

three, meaning that the cost for the first two years could be estimated at USD 6,400,000. The division between year one and year two could, again bearing in mind the gradual growth of the Institute, be approximated at USD 2,200,000 year one, and USD 4,200,000 year two.

This exercise leads us to a round sum of USD 12,800,000, reflecting the probable cost of setting up the Institute and the first three years of operations.

Table No 1

Cost estimations (in USD) Year 3

A) Salaries and related costs

1. Staff		1,760,000
2. Fees and related costs, non-permanent staff		
Executive Committee	200,000	
Consultants	200,000	
Annual Meeting	200,000	
Advisory Council	100,000	700,000
3. Travel and communication		
Travel expenses	300,000	
Telecommunications, etc.	70,000	
		570,000

B) Office rent, maintenance, furniture and equipment

Recurrent		
Office rent	300,000	
General maintenance	40,000	
Replacement	40,000	
***Initial* (annually during a three-year period)**		
Furniture and equipment	140,000	
		520,000

C) Direct programme costs

Data bank	100,000
Academic and prefessional networks	500,000
International seminars and workshops	450,000
Training and courses	600,000
Information and publicationes	200,000
Electoral cooperation	1,000,000

Total estimated cost (year 3) 6,400,000

Assuming a gradual growth of the Institute, the cost for the first year could be estimated at USD 2,200,000, the cost for the second year USD 4,200,000, and as shown above the cost for the third year estimated at USD 6,400,000. This gives a total estimated cost for the first three years of USD 12,800,000.

10. The Further Process

If the institute comes into being, it will develop and change in response to demands placed on it. The only phase that should be defined at the outset is the general thrust and the priorities of the first few formative years. On the other hand these initial steps are crucial for the character of the organization. The Commission therefore sees a need to outline in broad terms how it sees the first period of the institute's establishment.

The Commission recommends that the Swedish Government should issue invitations to an exploratory meeting the purpose of which would be to take the initiative a step further in a more formal manner. Invitations should be addressed to bodies that have indicated a willingness to discuss the matter further when approached by the Commission in its rounds of consultation.

The understanding should be that the bodies participating in the meeting would be prepared to make a formal commitment, if reasonably satisfied with the outcome. To a considerable extent the meeting could probably be expected to take the form of negotiations on the central issues relating to the institute - if the meeting should agree on the need for a new body of some kind - such as the mandate and tasks, statutes, organization and budget.

Interim Board

The meeting should result in a negotiated document that could form the basis for setting up an interim board for the institute - assuming as the Commission has reason to believe, that there is support for an institute.

The interim board should be vested with authority by the sponsors of the institute to work out in detail the institute's statutes, mandate, organization, etc. and to begin recruiting key staff.

Staffing

The interim board should give high priority to recruiting the institute's Secretary-General early in its work.

The full staff of the institute should be recruited in stages. It is generally preferable, if personnel are acquired on the basis of experienced needs as far as possible, and with a view to complementing officers already in place. Not even the best of plans can foresee all requirements and even less the particular competence and profile that a recruitee brings to the job.

Early recruitments could, apart from some obvious administrative people, be key personnel responsible for the data bank, surveys and analyses.

A vital area for recruitment at the outset would also be staff to work on norms, guidelines and rules.

Acknowledgements

The Commission wishes to express its profound gratitude to a great number of governments, parliamentarians, representatives of various international, regional and national organisations and to many experts and individuals, who have kindly given the Commission ample time, suggestions, ideas and comments.

The following list includes some, maybe most, of these contact points. They are listed in categories. At the government level some talks have been with cabinet ministers, some with diplomats and other officials. Government contacts at various levels are recorded by the name of the country.. In the case of other categories some names are listed but with the knowledge that, unfortunately, many may be omitted. Please rest assured, however, that the Commission is grateful to all, mentioned or not.

In Sweden the Commission has worked with a secretariat and an Advisory Group. The Advisory Group has consisted of **Mr. Axel Andersson**, MP, **Mr. Karl-Göran Biörsmark**, MP, **Professor Axel Hadenius**, **Mr. Thomas Hammarberg**, former Secretary-General of Amnesty International and the Swedish Save the Children, **Mr. Jan Hult**, electoral expert, **Mr. Gerald Nagler**, former Secretary-General of Helsinki Watch, **Ms. Annika Söder**, Counsellor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and **Mr. Christian Åhlund,** Lawyer and advisor on human rights issues. The Secretariat has been formed by Ambassador **Bengt Säve-Söderbergh**, Chairman, Ambassador **Lars-Olof Edström**, First Secretary **Per Örnéus** and Ms. **Ann Mari Schmidt**, Senior Clerical Officer.

Governments

In various forms the Commission has had the privilege to consult with representatives of some sixty Governments. They are listed here in alphabetical order:

Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Tanzania,

Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The Commission has visited a number of the countries listed above, to meet with government representatives. In other cases representatives have visited Stockholm to discuss with the Commission. The Commission has also had the privilege of participating in seminars and conferences arranged by governments and government officials. In respect of this the Commission would like to thank the governments of Austria, Canada, Germany, Namibia and Venezuela.

International and regional organizations

African Development Bank
Mr Babacar N'Diaye, President
Mr Tekalign Gedamu, Vice President

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
Mr Abdlatif Al-Hamad, Chairman of the Board

Asian Development Bank
Mr Kimimasa Tarumizu, President
Mr Peter McCawly, Executive Director, Australia

The Commission of the European Community
Mr Peter Pooley, Director-General, DG VIII
Mr Dieter Frisch, Ex Director-General, DG VIII
Mr Ed Kronenburg, Director
Mr Hans Smida, Director, DG VIII
Mr Denis Corboy, Political Advisor

The Commonwealth Secretariat
Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Secretary-General
Mr Anthony Siaguru, Dep. Secretary-General
Mr Max Gaylard, Director

Council of Europe
Mr John Hartland, Counsellor, Strasbourg

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (CSCE)
Mr Luchino Cortese, Director, ODIHR, Warsaw
Mr Jack Zetkulic, Deputy Director, ODIHR, Warsaw
Mr Pentti Väänänen, Deputy Director, Secretariat of CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Copenhagen

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Mr Anders Ljung, Vice President for Finance
Ms Sylvia Jay, Director of the Political Department

The European Parliament
Mr André Saby, Chairman, the Development Committee, Brussels
Mr Brian Rose, Counsellor, Luxemburg

International Monetary Fund, IMF
Mr Michel Camdessus, Managing Director

Inter-American Development Bank
Mr Enrique V. Iglesias, President
Dr Louis J. Emmerij, Advisor to the President

International Commission of Jurists
Mr Adama Dieng, Secretary-General

Inter-Parliamentary Union
Mr Pierre Cornillon, Secretary-General
Mr Anders Jonsson, Deputy Secretary-General

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee, OECD/DAC
Mr Alexander Love, President
M. Makota Tiniguchi, Deputy Secretary-General

Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Mr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General
Mr Etulo Mpwotsh Ngung, Director

Parlimentarians for Global Action
Ms Silvia Hernandez, International President
Hon. Mr Walter McLean, Chair, International Council
Mr Julio Camino, Vice Chair, International Council
Sir David Steel, International Council
Mr Kennedy Graham, Secretary-General

Society for International Development
Mr Maurice Williams, President

The World Bank
Mr Sven Sandström, Deputy President
Mr Edward Jaycox, Senior Vice President
Mr Alex Shakow, Senior Vice President
Mr Sarwar Lateef, Chief, Operations Policy Department

Organizations in the electoral field

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, USA
Mr Richard Soudriette, Director
Mr Jeff Fischer, Deputy Director

National Democratic Institute (NDI), Washington, USA
Mr Kenneth Wollack, President
Mr Larry Garber, Senior Associate
Mr Ned Mc Mahon, Senior Officer

International Republican Institute (IRI) Washington, USA
Ms Meg Thompson, Vice President
Ms Mary Coughlin
Ms Julie Heitz

The Carter Center, USA
Mr Stevens P. Tucker
Mr Richard Joseph
Ms Dayle Spencer
Mr Robert Pastor

Elections Canada
Mr Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer
Mr Ron Gould, Ass. Chief Executive Officer

Australian Electoral Commission
Mr Brian Cox

Institute for General Election, Indonesia
Mr Azhar Zainal

Electoral Reform Society, United Kingdom
Mr Michael Meadowcroft, Chairman

United nations

UN Centre for Human Rights, Geneva
Mr Ibrahima Fall, Under Secretary-General
Mr Antoine Blanca, Director-General
Mr Thomas McCarthy, Counsellor
Mr Craig Mukhiber

UN Electoral Assistance Unit, New York
Dr Horacio Boneo, Director, UNEAU

UNDP
Mr Gustave Speth, Administrator
Mr William Draper, Ex Administrator
Mr Mahubub ul Haq, Special Advisor
Mr Timothy Rothermel, Director
Mr Gus Edgren, Ass. Administrator
Mr Hugh Cholmondeley, Chief Officer

Individuals

Ms Maria-Goretti Agaleoue Adoua, MP, Burkina Faso
Mr Martti Ahtisaari, United Nations, Geneva
Mr Amakoe Toto Ajavon, MP, Togo
Mr Jorge Alcocer, MP, Mexico
Mr Jose Maria Soria Arch, MP, Argentina
Mr Oscar Arias, former President of Costa Rica
Ms Pheobe Muga Asiyo, MP, Kenya

Dr Yusuf Bangura, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, Columbia University, New York, USA
Dr Richard E. Bissell, Overseas Development Council, USA
Reverend Allan Boesak, South Africa
Hon. Mr Ed Broadbent, President, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Canada
Hon. Mr Donald Buchanan, MP, Jamaica

Mr Eduardo Calmell del Solar, MP, Peru
Mr David Campos, Mexico
Ms Nicole Catala, MP, France
Mr Victor Moreno Catena, Under-Secretary, Ministry of the Interior, Spain
Mr Pedro Cateriano, MP, Peru
Mr Richard Cazenave, MP, France
Mr Juan Octavio Ceballos, MP, the Dominican Republic
Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary, South African Council of Churches
Mr Erskine Childers, former UN official, New York
Mr Valdir Colatto, MP, Brazil
Mr Barber B. Conable, former President of the World Bank, USA
Mr Stoney Cooks, Director, African-American Institute, USA

Ms Maja Daruwala, the Ford Foundation, India
Mr Basil Davidson, United Kingdom
Professor Emmanuel Decaux, Université de Paris, France
Mr Luc Dhoore, MP, Belgium
Mr Milagros Diaz, MP, the Dominican Republic
Mr Robert Dossou, MP, Benin
Dr Ronald Dreyer, Switzerland
Professor Krzysztof Drzewicki, University of Gdansk, Poland
Ms Peggy Dulaney, Synergos Institute, USA
Mr Carlos González Durán, MP, Mexico

Mr Rawle C. Eastmond, MP, Barbados
Mr Tyrore Estwick, MP, Barbados

Mr Germán Ferres, MP, Venezuela
Mr Joseph Fignole Jean Louis, MP, Haiti

Mr Mario Boyd Galindo, MP, Panama
Ms Ana Lucina Garcia, MP, Venezuela
Mr Laurent Gbagbo, MP, Cote d'Ivoire
Professor Konrad Ginther, University of Graz, Austria
Ms Grace Githu, lawyer, former Chair, National Election Monitoring Unit, Kenya
Mr Eudoro González, MP, Venezuela
Mr Branislav Gosovic, Ex. Director, South Centre, Switzerland
Mr John W. Graham, Organization of American States, OAS
Ms Elisabeth Grotschmann, MP, Germany
Mr Gary Guiteau, MP, Haiti

Mr Michel Hansenne, Director-General, ILO
Dr Graham Hassall, University of Melbourne, Australia
Dr Ingomar Hauchler, MP, Germany
Ms Wakako Hironaka, MP, Japan
Professor Ryokichi Hirono, Seikei University, Tokyo, Japan
Dr Uwe Holz, MP, Germany
Mr Bernando Horande, MP, Venezuela
Mr Dudley Horner, Deputy Director, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Professor Göran Hydén, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA

Professor Kuniko Inoguchi, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan
Mr Jose Rodriguez Iturbe, MP, Venezuela

Dr Peter Jankowitsch, MP, Austria
Mr Idriss Jazairy, former President, International Fund for Agricultural Development
Hon. Mr Anthony Johnson, MP, Jamaica
Lord Frank Judd, MP, United Kingdom
Mr Lamin Juwara, MP, Gambia
Mr Janis Jürkans, Latvian Support Foundation, Latvia

Ms Maria Kamm, MP, Tanzania
Ms Hounda Kanoun, MP, Tunisia
Ms Chalufaya Kapwepe, MP, Zambia
H.E. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, former UNHCR, Switzerland
Dr Malamine Kourouma, Secretary General,
Comité Africain pour le Droit et le Développement, Senegal
Ms Manae Kubota, MP, Japan
Dr Carol J. Lancaster, Director, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. USA
Mr Kango Lare-Lantone, MP, Togo
Mr Paul LaRose-Edwards, Canada
Mr Neville Linton, former Commonwealth Secretariat, United Kingdom
Mr Francois Loeb, MP, Switzerland

Mr Juan Carlos Maqueda, MP, Argentina
Mr Hector Perez Marcano, MP, Venezuela
Mr Jose Antonio Martinez, MP, Venezuela
Mr Melkert, MP, Netherlands
Mr Moacir Micheletto, MP, Brazil
Mr Jean-Claude Mignon, MP, France
Mr Ricardo Monreal, MP, Mexico
Mr Lesedie Mothibamele, MP, Botswana
Professor Leopold Mureithi, Development Bank of Southern Africa, South Africa
Mr Bennie Mwiinga, MP, Zambia

Mr Lourdes Flores Nano, MP, Peru
Dr Beyers Naudé, former Secretary General, South African Council of Churches, South Africa
Mr Winright Ken Ngondo, MP, Zambia
Ms Prisca Nyambe, Vice-chair, Zambian Association of Lawyers

General Olusegun Obasanjo, former President, Nigeria
Mr Luis Enrique Oberto, MP, Venezuela
Ms Karen Olsen Beck de Figueres, MP, Costa Rica
Ms Maureen O'Neil, President, the North South Institute, Canada
Mr Pedro Antonio Angel Orellana, Director,
Supreme Electoral Tribunal, El Salvador
Mr Alexis Ortiz, MP, Venezuela
Ms Rhona Ottolina, MP, Venezuela

Mr Paciano Padron, MP, Venezuela
Professor Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Mr I.G. Patel, former Dep. Administrator UNDP, India
Mr Isidro Morales Paul, President, Supreme Electoral Council, Venezuela
Mr Telesforo Pedraza, MP, Colombia
Dr Tanja Petovar, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights
Mr Manuel Pinto, MP, Uganda
Mr Alan Philips, Chair Minority Rights Group, United Kingdom
Mr Manuel Carrillo Poblano, Director, International Affairs, Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico

Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General, ANC, South Africa
Sir Shridath S Ramphal, former Secretary General, the Commonwealth Secretariat, United Kingdom
Hon. Selwyn Richardson, former Attorney General and Minister of National Security, Trinidad and Tobago
Mr Juan Ignacio Garcia Rodriguez, Director, Electoral Service, Chile

Mr Saihou Sabally, MP, Gambia
Dr Nafis Sadik, Executive Director, USG, UNFPA, USA
Mr Marco Antonio Gonzalez Salazar, MP, Costa Rica

Mr Marco Ameglio Samudio, MP, Panama
Ms Maria Therese Sandwidi, MP, Burkina Faso
Mr Pierre Sané, Secretary-General Amnesty International, United Kingdom
Ms Marie-Angelique Savané, Regional Advisor, UNFPA, Senegal
Mr Peter Schideder, MP, Austria
Mr Dieter Schloten, MP, Germany
Mr Jan Nico Scholten, President, Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid
Professor Victor Sergeyev, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Mr John W. Sewell, President, Overseas Development Council, USA
Mr Maurice Strong, Canada, former Secretary General, UNCED,
Mr Yasuo Suzuki, Senior Editor, The Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo

Mr Mbemba Tambedu, MP, Gambia
Mr Gustavo Tarre, MP, Venezuela
Mr Hans-Gynther Toetemeier, MP, Germany
Professor Stephen Toulmin, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
Mr Marten van Traa, MP, Netherlands
Ms Amy S Tsanga, Researcher, University of Oslo, Institute of Women's Law

Mr Edgar Ugalde, MP, Costa Rica
Dr Brian Urquhart, former USG, UN

Mr Sergio Velasco, MP, Chile
Mr Peter Vollmer, MP, Switzerland
Professor J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Mr Michael Wamalwa, MP, Kenya
Professor Francis Wilson, University of Cape Town, South Africa
Mr José Woldenberg, MP, Mexico

Mr Ali Ben Yalhya, MP, Algeria

Dr Hugo de Zela, Cabinet Chief of the Secretary General,
The Organization of American States
Mr Jorge Zermeno del Pan, MP, Mexico

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
International Electoral Institute Commission March 10, 1993

Summary and Conclusions of an international Round Table on the Feasibility of an Independent Electoral Assistance Institute, Geneva, 10-11 February, 1993

The Swedish Government has appointed a Commission to study the feasibility of establishing an independent international institute for electoral assistance. This Commission presented a position paper in November 1992, which was distributed widely. The Commission was pleased to receive a great number of reactions, comments and proposals to this paper from the international community.

In order to discuss its ideas in a broader circle the Commission hosted a Round Table in Geneva on February 10-11, 1993 with the support of the Inter Parliamentary Union, Parliamentarians for Global Action and The International Commission of Jurists. This Round Table brought together 50 persons with different constituencies and experiences. The discussants came from many different bodies: NGO's, parliamentarians' organisations, national parliaments, governments, multinational and regional agencies. Some were there as concerned individuals. Those present spoke in their personal capacities without necessarily committing their governments or organizations.

The advice to the Commission that emerged from the Round Table can be summarized in the following three points:

1. There was a strong case for a new, independent networking and professional institute for electoral cooperation. In order to achieve credibility the institute should be global in character. By and large, the Commission's points in the background papers were well taken.

2. The institute should initially concentrate on what had been called the normative and analytical role but should combine this with an element of observation/verification and capacity building.

3. Some link with the UN was desirable, but it should be conceived in such a way that it did not jeopardize the institute's freedom of operational movement.

The Commission will now continue its work along the lines presented above. It will further refine its ideas and consult with interested partners internationally. It welcomes further comments and ideas. The Commission plans to finalize its task within some months from now.

Experiencies and gaps

The Round Table discussed recent experiences of international observance, assistance and cooperation as regards elections. While recognizing that much good work has taken place, the discussion reflected a broad consensus among the speakers that there are shortcomings in the present practices. There is now a strong demand for even more effective electoral assistance and cooperation. Some of the gaps and weaknesses in the way this demand is being met internationally were covered in the Round Table as follows:

- There is a lack of internationally accepted norms, rules and guidelines for the proper performance of election observance.

- Observer missions are sent out ad hoc and at very short notice. A widely shared observation was that with very few exceptions the actors on the international electoral scene had their main line of work elsewhere and that their involvement was a side-issue for most of them; one of the major deficiencies was thus a dearth of professionalism.

- There is a question of the legitimacy and integrity of the groups

composed for these tasks. This bears on the credibility of these activities. Ultimately elections have to be owned by the people in each country. It would be preferable to have electoral assistance activities carried out by more neutral, non-political organizations than is the case today. A closely related issue was if existing bodies with some modification of their mandates could take on such tasks.

- Little consideration has thus far been given to the long-term aspects of securing and developing the institutional, legal and other structures that are an integral part of a functioning electoral process. Democracy cannot be created just by a ballot on election day. International interest and cooperation was ad hoc and terminated on or soon after election day. Briefly, a case was made for giving attention to processes rather than, as now, to short term projects.

The need for a new institute and its mandate

Given the deficiencies in terms of professionalism, mandates and a long-term approach, how should a remedial role be defined?

The Round Table's predominant line of thinking, based on experiences and perceptions among the participants, was that today there is a demand for a facility centred on what was termed the normative aspect. This was a rubric that comprised i.a. the development of guidelines and rules; the establishment of a databank and a clearinghouse for research, analysis, documentation and information; the mounting of seminars and conferences for exchange of experiencies; contacts with and support for civic rights organisations; and evaluation. Most speakers welcomed such a facility and regarded this kind of work as constituting an institute's initial centre of activity. No existing body was identified as being specifically active in this way and there was no entity that was identified as a possible actor in this field.

In many quarters there is also an identifiable need for capacity building. The agenda not least of the countries in transtion was understood as being in favour of a facility that would help in butressing good governance through adressing the long-term issues of institutions and frameworks directly relevant to the electoral process. There is also a need for a mechanism whereby concerns of the countries directly concerned could be focussed and brought to the attention of the world community.

Support was also voiced for an institute active in the processes of observation, monitoring and capacity building, with special emphasis on assistance to national electoral commissions and other appropriate national bodies. There were several different views on what this role should be. A number of speakers, especially those coming from parliamentarian bodies, felt a need for an institution that could assume a more professional and coordinated role in dealing with the present observation requests and assist them in this kind of work. The competence

of parliamentarians could be used in a proper context in those important efforts.

As noted before, several speakers wished to give initial priority to the normative and long term role of an institute, especially since there are already a number of institutions dispatching short term missions for election observance. The challenge is for any new institute to take on the broad normative roles as presented in the Commission's documents and to help remedy the present shortcomings as presented above. Some felt the institute should also become involved in observer activities, but there is a risk of an organisational dichotomy and a fear that a broad operational role could ease out and, in some respects, come into conflict with the normative and analytical side of the organisation.

The general understanding was thus that there were unmet needs in the area of electoral cooperation, assistance and in the light of the broader context. The prevailing view was that there was utility in the Commission's going ahead with the work it has begun.

The picture that emerged from the meeting was that many of the needs were long-term and necessitated a mandate that would permit a wider scope than that at present being envisaged; the issues go beyond election day. It was legitimate, crucial even, that the permanence of the process be recognized. Professionalism and political neutrality would, following from this, be essential requirements for a new institute. This broader task might even well be the future cutting edge of a new body. However, the immediate focus of an institute should be more direct and concrete.

The conclusion of the organisers is that a serious effort should be made to overcome the possible dangers of operational and normative activities existing in the same organisation that several interventions stressed. Not all actors have the same expectations of what an institute should do. If some of them, at present active on the scene, would like to see things handled differently in the field, this merits reflection and attention when forming the mandate for an institute. Part of the justification for a new institute to enter this particular part of the electoral field should be to curb the present proliferation. It should be able to subsume some current actors, at their request, and serve as a tool for them, coordinated with others.

A central concern should also be the agenda and the requirements of the countries in transition. A prerequisite for this would seem to be both extensive networks and collaboration centrally by personalities from the regions and countries concerned.

Networks, organisation and statutes

On the organisational side, the Round Table accepted the idea that an institute, if formed, should be a networking organization. It should make use of expertise and knowledge in different organisations and constituencies in order to create a more professional and long term approach to the issues involved. The clearinghouse concept and networking should be seen as corollaries.The Commission presented some background documents with proposals on principles for the organisation and its statutes. These documents did not give rise to a lengthy discussion or objections.

Relationship to the UN

Considerable attention was paid to the question of a link with the UN. It was widely held that such a connection would be desirable for a new institute's legitimacy - although not in itself enough to ensure an acceptance that could come only from the quality and nature of the institute's own work. At the same time, it was emphasized that the envisaged institute must remain politically free in relation to the UN in order to be able to function as anticipated. The link should preferably be subtle and non-inhibiting.

ROUND TABLE MEETING
ON
INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

10-11 February, 1993
Geneva

*
* *

FINAL
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ÅHLUND, Christian Mr.
International Electoral Institute Commission
Box 22016
104022 Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 654 24 75
Fax 650 62 53

ANDERSSON, Axel Mr., MP
Swedish Parliament
10012 Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 40 00

BJÖRSMARK, Karl-Göran Mr., MP
Swedish Parliament
10012 Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 40 00

BONEO, Horacio Mr.
Head of the UN Electoral Assitance Unit
Department of Political Affairs
United Nations, Room S-3750A
New York, N.Y. 10019 (USA)

Tel. (1 212) 963 87 37
Fax 963 29 79

CAMINO, Julio Mr., MP
Vice-Chair, International Council
Parliamentarians for Global Action
211 East 43rd Street
Suite 1604
New York, N.Y. 10017 (USA)

Tel. (1 212) 687 77 55
Fax 687 84 09

CONABLE, Barber B. Mr.
P.O.Box 218
Alexander N.Y. 14005 (USA)

Tel. (1 716) 591 12 33

CORBOY, Denis Mr.
Political Advisor DG VIII
European Commission
200 Rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels (Belgium)

Fax (32 22) 99 28 95

CORNILLON, Pierre Mr.
Secretary General
Inter-Parliamentary Union
P.O. Box 438
1211 Geneva 19 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 734 41 50
Fax 733 31 41

DARUWALA, Maja Dhun Ms.
Program Officer
Rights and Social Justice
The Ford Foundation
55 Lodi Estate
New Delhi (India)

Tel. 61 94 41
Fax 46 27 147

DHOORE, Luc Mr., MP
AWEPA
Parliament of Belgium
Palais de la Nation
Place de la Nation 2
1008 Brussels (Belgium)

Tel. (32 22) 511 32 49

DIENG, Adama Mr.
Secretary General
International Commission of Jurists
P.O. Box 160
1216 Coitrin/GE (Switzerland)

Fax (41 22) 788 48 80

EDSTRÖM, Lars-Olof Mr.
Ambassador
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
P.O.Box 16121
Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 60 00
Fax 723 11 76

GITHU, Grace Ms.
National Election Monitoring Unit
P.O. Box 43874
Nairobi (Kenya)

Tel. 22 70 05
Fax 22 21 78

GRAHAM, Kennedy Mr.
Secretary General
Parliamentarians for Global Action
211 East 43rd Street S.1604
New York, N.Y. 10017 (USA)

Fax (1 212) 687 84 09

HAMMARBERG, Thomas Mr.
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
Surbrunnsgatan 40
11348 Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 612 30 94

HARTLAND, John Mr.
Counsellor to the President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe
67000 Strasbourg (France)

Tel. (33 88) 41 21 22
Fax 41 27 81

HERNANDEZ, Silvia Ms.
Senator
International President
Parliamentarians for Global Action
Cámara de Senadores
Xicoténcatl 9
Mexico, D.F, 06018 (Mexico)

Tel. (52 5) 535 82 21
Fax 546 41 67

HJELDE, Haakon B. Mr.
Ambassador
Special Advisor on Human Rights
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Postboks 8114
Oslo DEP (Norway)

Tel. (02) 34 36 00
Fax 34 95 80

HULT, Jan Mr.
Election Officer
Bollmorav 35
13542 Tyresö (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 785 91 28

HUMMON, John Mr.
USAID Representative
US Permanent Mission
11 route de Pregny
1292 Chambésy (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 749 44 02

IRETON, Barrie Mr.
Under-Secretary
Overseas Development Administration
94 Victoria Street
London SW1E 5JL (United Kingdom)

Tel. (44 71) 917 05 00
Fax 917 0017

IZZAT, Nadia Ms.
First Secretary
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
P.O.Box 16121
Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 60 00
Fax 723 11 76

JOHNSON, David Mr
Human Rights Officer
UN Centre for Human Rights
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 907 12 34

JOHNSSON, Anders B. Mr.
Assistant Secretary General
Inter-Parliamentary Union
P.O. Box 438
1211 Geneva 19 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 734 41 50
Fax 733 31 41

LARSEN, Jacob Esper Mr.
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Denmark
56 rue de Moillebeau
1211 Geneva 19 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 733 29 17
Fax 733 29 17

LEHNE, Hans Fredrik Mr.
Counsellor
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oslo DEP (Norway)

Tel. (02) 34 36 00
Fax 34 95 80

LIDEGAARD, Bo Mr.
Head of Section
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asiatisk Pads 2
1448 Copenhagen (Denmark)

Tel. (45) 33 92 00 00
Fax 31 54 05 33

MACKINNON, Philip Mr.
Director
UN and Commonwealth Affairs
Department of External Affair
Ottawa (Canada)

Tel. (613) 992 79 93
Fax 944 07 22

MAYER, Jean Mr.
Consultant
24, rue de Genève
01210 Ferney-Voltaire (France)

McCARTHY, Thomas Mr.
Centre for Human Rights
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 917 39 41

MOKHIBER, Craig Mr.
Human Rights Officer
UN Centre for Human Rights
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 917 39 23

NAGLER, Gerald Mr.
Chairman
Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
Askrikegatan 7
11557 Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 662 24 47

ÖRNÉUS, Per Mr.
First Secretary
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 16121
Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 60 00
Fax 723 11 76

PENNEGARD, Ann Marie Ms.
Counsellor
Permament Mission of Sweden
9-11 rue de Varembé
1211 Geneva 20 (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 22) 734 36 00

POLEY, Hans Mr.
Directorate General for International Co-operation
Policy Planning Section
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 20061
2500 EB The Hague
Netherlands

RAMPHAL, Sir Shridath S.
Chairman
Commission on Global Governance
Flat 1, "The Sutherlands"
188 Sutherland Ave.
London W9 1HR (United Kingdom)

Tel. (44 71) 266 34 09
Fax 286 23 02

RIVOLLIER, Michel Mr.
Consultant
01260 Hotonnes (France)

ROSE, John Bryan Mr.
Secretary
Committee on Development and Co-operation
European Parliament
Plateau Kirchberg
2929 Luxembourg (Luxembourg)

Tel. 352 43 001
Fax 43 00 49 00

ROTHERMEL, Timothy S. Mr.
Director
Division for Global and Interregional Programmes
UNDP
One, United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017 (USA)

Fax (1 212) 906 58 57

ROTTENBURG, Fritz von Mr.
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Adenauer Allee 99
5300 Bonn 1 (Germany)

Fax (49 228) 17 37 85

SAAVEDRA, Lourdes Ms.
Lafragua 3-3
Mexico, D.F. 06030 (Mexico)

SÄVE-SÖDERBERGH, Bengt Mr.
Chairman
International Electoral Institute Commission
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 16121
Stockholm (Sweden)

Tel. (46 8) 786 60 00
Fax 723 11 76

SORENSEN, Jens Adser Mr.
Head of Department
Parliament of Denmark
Folketinget
1290 Copenhagen (Denmark)

Tel. (45) 33 91 03 77

STEEL, Sir David, MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA (United Kingdom)

Tel. (44 71) 219 46 89

SUTTER, Peter Mr.
Head of Peace Unit
Département fédéral des affaires étrangères
3003 Berne (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 31) 61 34 97

THALMANN, Anton Mr.
Head of UN Section
Département fédéral des affaires étrangères
3003 Berne (Switzerland)

Tel. (41 31) 61 34 97

THEUERMANN, Engelbert Mr.
UNO-Abteilung
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ballhausplatz 2
1014 Vienna (Austria)

Tel. (43 222) 53 115 33 09
Fax 53 185 225

VOURINEN, Anneli Ms.
First Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 176
00161 Helsinki (Finland)

Tel. 13 41 51
Fax 13 41 68 00

WOOLCOT, Peter Mr.
Director
Human Rights Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Parkes
ACT 26000 Canberra (Australia)

Tel. (6) 261 91 11
Fax 261 31 11

ZETKULIC, Jack Mr.
Deputy Director
CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
Krucza 36/Wspolna 6
00-522 Warsaw (Poland)

Tel. (48 2) 625 41 50
Fax 625 43 57

Cost of Elections in Countries in Transition to Democracy

by Ron Gould, Elections Canada

The objective of this paper is to attempt to highlight a number of the factors which influence the cost of elections, and subsequently to discuss some aspects of electoral assistance as these relate to and influence the cost of elections. This paper is intended to provide only a brief overview for discussion purposes.

From the outset, decisions which are made with respect to the essential elements of any electoral process can significantly impact on the cost of that election. For example, a system of proportional representation based on one national constituency will be significantly less costly than a system based on a number of regional constituencies. It follows that a majoritarian electoral system whereby representatives are elected from perhaps hundreds of small constituencies will be even more costly. One of the significant costs involved concerns the extent to which regions, districts of constituencies have to be geographically defined, and mapping activities carried out in order to determine the boundaries of the representatives to be elected. Similarly, the requirements for numerous different constituency ballots as opposed to one national ballot or a few regional ballots, will also directly affect the costs of the election.

The determination of the registration system to be used in relation to existing identity documents is often one of the major expenses of elections in countries in transition to democracy. It would obviously be much less costly to use current identity documents where these are appropriate and acceptable, than to introduce a new country-wide computer-based voter registration system, and/or voter identification registration cards. Obviously the specific electoral environment in

certain cases may require a costly new registration system, but a careful analysis of the optimum registration process in each specific situation could result in significantly reduced electoral costs. Related to the registration system itself are the input requirements such as identity documents and the type and number of electoral lists (if any) that are required.

The nature and extent of voter and political education is another aspect which can impact on the cost of the elections. This will be significantly affected by the number of languages spoken in the country, the number and extent of political party sophistication, the extent of the familiarity of the population with multi-party elections and with the electoral process itself, and of course, the levels of literacy and illiteracy in the country.

Obviously the specific design and types of voting materials and the voting process will have a major impact on the costs of the election. For example, a decision to use ultraviolet ink and battery-powered fluorescent lamps to check the ink will be significantly more expensive than using indelible inks as security against individuals voting more than once. The design and construction of ballot boxes can vary from extremely expensive metal boxes to moderate-cost plastic ballot boxes to extremely inexpensive corrugated cardboard boxes. The ballot itself can be a very costly item if the system requires huge quantities of coloured paper or extremely high-security papers and/or multi-colour printing. These are just a few examples of how decisions with respect to election materials can significantly impact on election costs.

There are "physical" factors which will have a significant impact on cost, including the size and geography of the country concerned, the existing transportation and communication systems and the season of the year in which elections are to be held. In this latter instance, if a country decides, because of the urgency of the situation to carry out an election in rainy season or in winter, this will be a much more costly election than if it was held in the dry season or in summer where transportation and communication problems are normally much less. There is also the "physical" aspect of the poll and the voting system which will often have a significant impact on the number of polling officials needed and the costs of their meals, salaries, equipment, etc. Obviously, the security situation in the country will have cost implications for the election. The above examples, are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed to highlight some of the more costly elements which may be controllable to some extent at the point when initial decisions are made with respect to the election.

The international community may be in a position to play a valuable role in assisting countries in transition to democracy to focus some of these electoral considerations, with a view to reducing unnecessary electoral costs. I would hasten to underline that fact that it is essential this always be done in a context of the political, geographical, social and other situations of that particular country and in the electoral interest of the country as opposed to focussing on the cost-reduction elements as objectives in their own right. However, not infrequently countries in

transition to democracy design electoral systems using inappropriate models from other countries because of their lack of experience, or attempt to modify a system which may have been appropriate for one-party elections but causes major problems for multiparty elections. International input on a coordinated basis can often be a constructive as well as a cost-saving contribution.

In considering possible avenues for international input into cost-effective electoral processes, I believe there are other avenues which are somewhat interrelated.

The first concerns the use of international election "consultant" either as individuals or as a team which might be identified by an organization such the proposed Institute, as expert resources who could provide advice and alternatives to countries in transition to democracy, especially at the point in time when basic electoral decisions were being discussed such during the drafting of the electoral law itself. It is important that this kind of consultation take place very early, not only considering the decisions to be taken with respect to a electoral system and related costs, but also recognizing that in a majority of cases, whatever system and related costs are implemented with respect to the first election, these will often continue to apply to many subsequent elections, but whereas the early election or elections may be subsidized by the international community, eventually the new democracy itself will have to carry 100% of the costs of the electoral system it has designed.

In addition to the role played by electoral assistance and encouraging the most cost-effective electoral considerations, by not only working closely with the electoral authorities in the countries concerned , but also, where international election consultants have been actively working with the particular country, in seeking their advice and guidance with respect to the most effective and, hopefully, cost-effective areas for donor support. In general terms, it would appear that coordinated donor-support can be much more cost-effective than individual initiatives. Through coordinated donor-support the possibilities of "playing one donor against another" are avoided, duplication of effort can be eliminated, and where necessary much stronger influence can be exerted.

Donor-support for elections is not necessarily totally concentrated on supporting the responsible electoral body itself. In some cases donor-focus is only on outside groups such as non-government organizations. However, regardless of the focus of the donor nation or groups, with respect to electoral support, in order to achieve cost-effective assistance, not only is coordination and cooperation amongst donors advantageous, but also carefully earmarking support to assist or even influence the most cost-effective options is worth consideration. For example, funds might be made available for the purchase of indelible inks for identification purposes but not for ultraviolet inks and the required related lamps. A more sensitive issue is the question of whether funds should be allocated for voter education purposes to an election organization or non-governmental organization without having some

KUNGL. BIBL.
1993 -11- 30
STOCKHOLM

specific information with respect to the specific publication and its possible effectiveness. This is where consultation and advice from international election specialists as well as local NGOs or election officials will be most useful. This approach would avoid problems in the past with donors have provided funds for voter education which have resulted in publications being produced which were not completely non-partisan, publications being produced prematurely or with incorrect or incomplete information, which then had to be supplemented with further publications later; and publications which were never distributed to the electors.

The objective in all of the above is to attempt to tread a very delicate path between providing cost-effective coordinated donor assistance to those involved in the electoral process in countries in transition to democracy, while at the same time encouraging independence of action on the part of the local election authorities and NGOs.

It would appear that one possible way of reaching these goals might be if foreign organizations such the proposed Institute develop a roster of respected and impartial international electoral advisers or consultants who could then be selected on the basis of their specific acceptability to a particular country, and to the donor nations involved with that country, who could then act as a "broker" between the country and its NGOs consent with respect to electoral elements and activities and their costs, and with the donor nations with respect to prioritizing electoral activities for which donor support has been requested.

KUNGL. BIBL.
1993-11-30
STOCKHOLM

Statens offentliga utredningar 1993

Kronologisk förteckning

1. Styrnings- och samarbetsformer i biståndet. UD
2. Kursplaner för grundskolan. U.
3. Ersättning för kvalitet och effektivitet.
   - Utformning av ett nytt resurstilldelningssystem för grundläggande högskoleutbildning. U.
4. Statligt stöd till rehabilitering av tortyrskadade flyktingar m. fl. S.
5. Bensodiazepiner - beroendeframkallande psykofarmaka. S.
6. Livsmedelshygien och småskalig livsmedelsproduktion. Jo.
7. Löneskillnader och lönediskriminering. Om kvinnor och män på arbetsmarknaden. Ku.
8. Löneskillnader och lönediskriminering. Om kvinnor och män på arbetsmarknaden. Bilagedel. Ku.
9. Postlag. K.
10. En ny datalag. Ju.
11. Socialförsäkringsregister. S.
12. Vårdhögskolor
    - kvalitet - utveckling - huvudmannaskap. U.
13. Ökad konkurrens på järnvägen. K.
14. EG och våra grundlagar. Ju.
15. Svenska regler för internationell omfördelning av olja vid en oljekris. N.
16. Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik - ekonomikommissionens förslag. Fi.
16. Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik - ekonomikommissionens förslag. Bilagor. Fi.
17. Ägandet av radio och television i allmänhetens tjänst. Ku.
18. Acceptans Tolerans Delaktighet. M.
19. Kommunerna och miljöarbetet. M.
20. Riksbanken och prisstabiliteten. Fi.
21. Ökat personval. Ju.
22. Vad är ett statsråds arbete värt? Fi.
23. Kunskapens krona. U.
24. Utlänningslagen - en partiell översyn. Ku.
25. Sociala åtgärder för jordbrukare. Jo.
26. Handläggningen av vissa säkerhetsfrågor. Ju.
27. Miljöbalk. Del 1 och 2. M.
28. Bankstödsnämnden. Fi.
29. Fortsatt reformering av företagsbeskattningen. Del 2. Fi.
30. Rätten till bistånd inom socialtjänsten. S.
31. Kommunernas roll på alkoholområdet och inom missbrukarvården. S.
32. Ny anställningsskyddslag. A.
33. Åtgärder för att förbereda Sveriges jordbruk och livsmedelsindustri för EG. Jo.
34. Förarprövare. K.
35. Reaktion mot ungdomsbrott. Del A och B. Ju.
36. Lag om totalförsvarsplikt. Fö.
37. Justitiekanslern. En översyn av JK:s arbetsuppgifter m.m. Ju.
38. Hälso- och sjukvården i framtiden - tre modeller. S.
39. En gräns för filmcensuren. Ku.
40. Fri- och rättighetsfrågor. Del A och B. Ju.
41. Folk- och bostadsräkning år 1990 och i framtiden. Fi.
42. Försvarets högskolor. Fö.
43. Politik mot arbetslöshet. A.
44. Översyn av tjänsteinkomstbeskattningen. Fi.
45. Trosa bryter sig loss. Bytänkande eller demokratins räddning. C.
46. Vissa kyrkofrågor. C.
47. Konsekvenser av valmöjligheter inom skola, barnomsorg, äldreomsorg och primärvård. C.
48. Kommunala verksamheter i egen förvaltning och i kommunala aktiebilag. En jämförande studie. C.
49. Ett år med betalningsansvar. S.
50. Serveringsbestämmelser. S.
51. Naturupplevelser utan buller - en kvalitet att värna. M.
52. Ersättning vid arbetslöshet. A.
53. Kostnadsutjämning mellan kommuner. Fi.
54. Utvisning på grund av brott. Ku.
55. Det allmännas skadeståndsansvar. Ju.
56. Kontrollen över export av strategiskt känsliga varor. UD.
57. Beskattning av fastigheter, del I
    - Schablonintäkt eller fastighetsskatt? Fi.
58. Effektivare ledning i statliga myndigheter. Fi.
59. Ny marknadsföringslag. C.
60. Polisens rättsliga befogenheter. Ju.
61. Överföring av HIV-smitta genom läkemedlet Preconativ. S.
62. Rättssäkerheten vid beskattningen. Fi.
63. Person och parti - Studier i anslutning till Personvalskommitténs betänkande Ökat personval (SOU 1993:21). Ju.
64. Frågor för folkbildningen. U.
65. Handlingsplan mot buller. Handlingsplan mot buller. Bilagedel. M.
66. Lag om införande av miljöbalken. M.
67. Slutförvaring av använt kärnbränsle - KASAMs yttrande över SKBs FUD-program 92. M.
68. Elkonkurrens med nätmonopol. N.
69. Revisorerna och EG. N.
70. Strategi för småföretagsutveckling. N.
71. Organisationernas bidrag. C.

Statens offentliga utredningar 1993

Kronologisk förteckning

72. Att inhämta synpunkter från medborgarna - Det kommunala omröstningsinstitutet i tillämpning. C.
73. Radikala organisationsförändringar i kommuner och landsting. C.
74. Kvalitetsmätning i kommunal verksamhet. C.
75. Vissa mervärdeskattefrågor II, - offentlig verksamhet m.m. Fi.
76. Verkställighet av fängelsestraff. Ju.
77. Kommunal tjänsteexport och internationellt bistånd.C.
78. Miljöskadeförsäkringen i framtiden. M.
79. Handel och miljö - mot en hållbar spelplan. M.
80. Statsförvaltningen och EG. Ju.
81. Översyn av arbetsmiljölagen. A.
82. Frivilligt socialt arbete. Kartläggning och kunskapsöversikt. S.
83. Statistik och integritet, del 1 - Skydd för uppgifter till den statliga statistiken m.m. Fi.
84. Innovationer för Sverige. N.
85. Ursprung och utbildning - social snedrekrytering till högre studier. U.
86. Amningsvänliga sjukhus - för att skydda, stödja och främja amning. S.
87. Beredskapslagring av olja. N.
88. Produktsäkerhetslagen och EG. C.
89. Massflykt till Sverige av asyl- och hjälpsökande. Fö.
90. Lokal demokrati i utveckling. C.
91. Socialtjänstens roll i samhällsplanering och samhällsarbete. - En kunskapsöversikt och ett diskussionsunderlag. S.
92. Den centrala polisorganisationen. Ju.
93. Vårdens svåra val. S.
94. Anpassad kontroll av byggandet. M.
95. Ansvars- och uppgiftsfördelning inom det civila försvaret. Fö.
96. Förändringar i lönegarantisystemet. A.
97. Västsverige och Skåne - regioner i förändring. C.
98. Partnerskap. Ju.
99. Kart- och fastighetsverksamhet i myndighet och bolag. M.
100. Free and Fair elections - and beyond. UD.

Statens offentliga utredningar 1993

Systematisk förteckning

Justitiedepartementet

En ny datalag. [10]
EG och våra grundlagar. [14]
Ökat personval. [21]
Handläggningen av vissa säkerhetsfrågor. [26]
Reaktion mot ungdomsbrott. Del A och B. [35]
Justitiekanslern. En översyn av JK:s arbetsuppgifter m.m. [37]
Fri- och rättighetsfrågor. Del A och B. [40]
Det allmännas skadeståndsansvar. [55]
Polisens rättsliga befogenheter. [60]
Person och parti – Studier i anslutning till Personvalskommitténs betänkande
Ökat personval (SOU 1993:21). [63]
Verkställighet av fängelsestraff. [76]
Statsförvaltningen och EG. [80]
Den centrala polisorganisationen. [92]
Partnerskap. [98]

Utrikesdepartementet

Styrnings- och samarbetsformer i biståndet. [1]
Kontrollen över export av strategiskt känsliga varor. [56]
Free and Fair elections – and beyond. [100]

Försvarsdepartementet

Lag om totalförsvarsplikt. [36]
Försvarets högskolor. [42]
Massflykt till Sverige av asyl- och hjälpsökande. [89]
Ansvars- och uppgiftsfördelning inom det civila försvaret. [95]

Socialdepartementet

Statligt stöd till rehabilitering av tortyrskadade flyktingar m. fl. [4]
Bensodiazepiner – beroendeframkallande psykofarmaka. [5]
Socialförsäkringsregister. [11]
Rätten till bistånd inom socialtjänsten. [30]
Kommunernas roll på alkoholområdet och inom missbrukarvården. [31]
Hälso- och sjukvården i framtiden – tre modeller. [38]
Ett år med betalningsansvar. [49]
Serveringsbestämmelser. [50]
Överföring av HIV-smitta genom läkemedlet Preconativ. [61]
Frivilligt socialt arbete. Kartläggning och kunskapsöversikt. [82]
Amningsvänliga sjukhus – för att skydda, stödja och främja amning. [86]
Socialtjänstens roll i samhällsplanering och samhällsarbete. – En kunskapsöversikt och ett diskussionsunderlag. [91]
Vårdens svåra val. [93]

Kommunikationsdepartementet

Postlag. [9]
Ökad konkurrens på järnvägen. [13]
Förarprövare. [34]

Finansdepartementet

Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik – ekonomikommisionens förslag. [16]
Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik – ekonomikommisionens förslag. Bilagor. [16]
Riksbanken och prisstabiliteten. [20]
Vad är ett statsråds arbete värt? [22]
Bankstödsnämnden. [28]
Fortsatt reformering av företagsbeskattningen. Del 2. [29]
Folk- och bostadsräkning år 1990 och i framtiden. [41]
Översyn av tjänsteinkomstbeskattningen. [44]
Kostnadsutjämning mellan kommuner. [53]
Beskattning av fastigheter, del I
– Schablonintäkt eller fastighetsskatt? [57]
Effektivare ledning i statliga myndigheter. [58]
Rättssäkerheten vid beskattningen. [62]
Vissa mervärdeskattefrågor II, – offentlig verksamhet m.m. [75]
Statistik och integritet, del 1 – Skydd för uppgifter till den statliga statistiken m.m. [83]

Utbildningsdepartementet

Kursplaner för grundskolan. [2]
Ersättning för kvalitet och effektivitet.
– Utformning av ett nytt resurstilldelningssystem för grundläggande högskoleutbildning. [3]
Vårdhögskolor
– kvalitet – utveckling – huvudmannaskap. [12]
Kunskapens krona. [23]
Frågor för folkbildningen. [64]
Ursprung och utbildning – social snedrekrytering till högre studier. [85]

Jordbruksdepartementet

Livsmedelshygien och småskalig livsmedelsproduktion. [6]
Sociala åtgärder för jordbrukare. [25]
Åtgärder för att förbereda Sveriges jordbruk och livsmedelsindustri för EG. [33]

Statens offentliga utredningar 1993

Systematisk förteckning

Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet

Ny anställningsskyddslag. [32]
Politik mot arbetslöshet. [43]
Ersättning vid arbetslöshet. [53]
Översyn av arbetsmiljölagen. [81]
Förändringar i lönegarantisystemet. [96]

Kulturdepartementet

Löneskillnader och lönediskriminering.
Om kvinnor och män på arbetsmarknaden. [7]
Löneskillnader och lönediskriminering. Om kvinnor och män på arbetsmarknaden. Bilagedel. [8]
Ägandet av radio och television i allmänhetens tjänst. [17]
Utlänningslagen – en partiell översyn. [24]
En gräns för filmcensuren. [39]
Utvisning på grund av brott. [54]

Näringsdepartementet

Svenska regler för internationell omfördelning av olja vid en oljekris. [15]
Elkonkurrens med nätmonopol. [68]
Revisorerna och EG. [69]
Strategi för småföretagsutveckling. [70]
Innovationer för Sverige. [84]
Beredskapslagring av olja. [87]

Civildepartementet

Trosa bryter sig loss. Bytänkande eller demokratins räddning. [45]
Vissa kyrkofrågor. [46]
Konsekvenser av valmöjligheter inom skola, barnomsorg, äldreomsorg och primärvård. [47]
Kommunala verksamheter i egen förvaltning och i kommunala aktiebilag. En jämförande studie. [48]
Ny marknadsföringslag. [59]
Organisationernas bidrag. [71]
Att inhämta synpunkter från medborgarna – Det kommunala omröstningsinstitutet i tillämpning. [72]
Radikala organisationsförändringar i kommuner och landsting. [73]
Kvalitetsmätning i kommunal verksamhet. [74]
Kommunal tjänsteexport och internationellt bistånd.[77]
Produktsäkerhetslagen och EG. [88]
Lokal demokrati i utveckling. [90]
Västsverige och Skåne – regioner i förändring. [97]

Miljö- och naturresursdepartementet

Acceptans Tolerans Delaktighet. [18]
Kommunerna och miljöarbetet. [19]
Miljöbalk. Del 1 och 2. [27]
Naturupplevelser utan buller – en kvalitet att värna. [51]
Handlingsplan mot buller.
Handlingsplan mot buller. Bilagedel. [65]
Lag om införande av miljöbalken. [66]
Slutförvaring av använt kärnbränsle – KASAMs yttrande över SKBs FUD-program 92. [67]
Miljöskadeförsäkringen i framtiden. [78]
Handel och miljö – mot en hållbar spelplan. [79]
Anpassad kontroll av byggandet. [94]
Kart- och fastighetsverksamhet i myndighet och bolag. [99]