

# Trips: Trips - 26

*HS L 179:70*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

D. H. trips 1956 April 21

Sec. Gen. — to Andrew Cordier (Executive Assist.  
to the Sec. Gen.)

DRAFT - 21 April 1956

All copies of ferial  
To Mr Smith. pl

Dear Andy,

Enclosed please find an aide-memoire "for personal use only", which ~~is~~, as you <sup>may</sup> will gather from its contents, ~~is probably my~~ <sup>personal</sup> ~~purported to be the most important~~ document so far ~~in~~ <sup>on</sup> this mission. ~~Read it carefully,~~ not only as regards the two stands I have taken, but also as regards the Israeli stand and the whole situation as concerns compliance.

~~In fact~~ <sup>to be</sup> The question of reciprocity has turned out the key problem around which not only the Israelis but also all Arab discussions <sup>are likely to</sup> ~~turn,~~ <sup>are interested</sup> ~~The Israelis in the~~ <sup>because of</sup> ~~case of~~ their wish to get rid of the Suez <sup>problem</sup> ~~pressure,~~ the Northern Arabs because they hate the idea that my stand on the question of reciprocity ~~will~~ <sup>would</sup> rob them of ~~any legal~~ <sup>the</sup> excuse for "firing" in case the Israelis start ~~the~~ work on Banat Yakoub.

.../...

However, this is not the <sup>full</sup> story. The real story starts where the paper ends. In a <sup>final,</sup> private talk, I ~~have~~ told Ben-Gurion that I believe that it is impossible <sup>now</sup> to bring up the Suez and Tiran issues without <sup>meeting the</sup> ~~implying~~ <sup>reaction that</sup> ~~that this is~~ a move towards peace, <sup>(with the added question:</sup> and what contribution ~~is~~ <sup>would be</sup> are the Israelis <sup>willing</sup> ~~able~~ to make? If such a question <sup>to me</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>would</sup> put, I pointed out, it ~~refers~~ <sup>refers</sup> only to one thing: <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ refugee issue. On that <sup>question</sup> ~~one~~ / my ~~own~~ <sup>would be</sup> feeling ~~is~~ that the Israelis should accept the principle of option, but ask for negotiations on its implementation. If the Egyptians were to put <sup>the</sup> ~~such a~~ question, <sup>I had mentioned</sup> it would be my hope that I <sup>would be</sup> ~~could feel~~ entitled to say that "the door is perhaps not locked <sup>quite</sup> / so firmly <sup>in Israel</sup> as the Egyptians might believe."

As you see, <sup>all</sup> this means that <sup>the</sup> this way in which I <sup>may</sup> ~~have~~ taken up the Suez issue, <sup>clearly</sup> which is very closely subordinated <sup>for me, /.../...</sup>

a concession on these points would represent

to my mandate, and for that reason does not contradict my public statements on the limitations of my mission, <sup>growing effort</sup> may well be the beginning of a way towards peace. In

that light, you certainly understand how important I <sup>my stand on Suez</sup> consider ~~it~~ to be, and how touchy I am on the issue.

It may seem to you that the Israelis are just <sup>horse trading</sup> trying to start a bargain, buying Suez for El Auja.

That, however, and on this point I am convinced, is not

I have than one superficial aspect of the story. While Ben Gurion strongly feels that he should not be ~~convinced~~

~~the story.~~ I have no doubt that there is not the slightest doubt in Ben Gurion's mind that <sup>that</sup> he might be co-responsible <sup>starting a</sup> for the start of war, <sup>Further</sup> that he honestly <sup>that there is</sup> believes ~~this~~ an Egyptian plan of attack, and that it is <sup>this</sup> for that reason, <sup>believe, that</sup> he does not see any possibility to

drop the strategic position in the El Auja area without <sup>see point to at least</sup> being able to <sup>some</sup> indication, in Egypt's policy, of intentions in the direction of peace. This attitude

<sup>only</sup>  
is not ~~un~~ understandable but extremely natural when

you have had a few talks with the leaders in the Middle-

East, ~~and~~ I must respect it. ~~Seeing further~~ the vistas

<sup>It was when I saw</sup>  
<sup>the Israeli stand, in its final form may open</sup> <sup>when I</sup>  
~~opened~~ for a solution of the refugee question, and re-

<sup>ed</sup>  
cognizing ~~all~~ the impact of the ~~declaration,~~

<sup>that I</sup> <sup>fact that the Israeli attitude</sup>  
~~I did~~, faced with the ~~full Israeli position of attitude~~

<sup>which was given but ~~was~~ was taken after a Cabinet</sup>  
<sup>meeting</sup>

<sup>switched</sup> <sup>modified</sup>  
on the subject, ~~swing around~~ to the stand indicated in

<sup>the</sup>  
the last paragraph of my ~~my~~ Aide-Memoire.

To a cool mind in New York, this may sound a

little bit exalted, but it is not. The situation in

<sup>Gaza arrangement</sup>  
which the ~~El Auja agreement~~ was possible may bear more

fruit. As I said to Ben-Gurion when he put his cards

on the table, "You ask me to make a miracle. I <sup>shall</sup> accept

<sup>try,</sup>  
~~your challenge~~ because recent developments have made me

believe in <sup>miracles</sup> ~~your~~ ". [However, I send this

paper to you not only in order to inform you, but in

...../.....

I defined  
in my aide-  
memoire,  
I would have  
on Egypt's policy  
and Arab  
reactions,  
I changed  
from my  
last stand

order to ask you for action. I can well see ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup>  
situation where Nasser and Fawzi, once I approach  
the Suez subject, do not turn me off, but put me on  
have  
a shelf in order to/a chance to consult the Big Powers  
~~or some of them.~~ <sup>the Egyptians</sup>  
Ambassadors, <sup>I</sup> would not like ~~them~~, in that situation,  
to meet a surprised face, or <sup>a</sup> request for time in order  
to ~~meet and put~~ <sup>submit</sup> the question of <sup>the scope of</sup> my mandate to the  
Cabinet~~s~~. For that reason I ask you, <sup>now</sup> without ~~even~~  
showing the paper <sup>privately</sup> to explain to the four  
Ambassadors concerned what the situation is, and ask them  
most confidentially to see ~~to see~~ to it that their  
Ambassadors in Cairo are instructed to say just simply  
that the Secretary-General, as ~~agent~~ of the Security  
Council, <sup>to their knowledge seemed</sup> ~~in their view seems~~ to have remained ~~strictly~~  
within the limit of his mandate, but that, as to what  
the Secretary-General might do on the basis of his  
constitutional rights as Secretary-General, they

<sup>had reasons</sup>  
~~neither have the right~~ to express opinions nor any  
<sup>cause now</sup>  
~~reason~~ to submit the issue to their Governments, which,  
 would, <sup>to express their view</sup> in due time, have ~~an occasion~~ to pass judgment  
 on the personal policy of the Secretary-General.

on the pos-  
 sible further  
 development

<sup>Thus</sup>  
~~That is~~, I would like you, in proper form and without  
<sup>Israeli stand on the</sup>  
 giving away my attitude, to indicate that the Suez  
<sup>feel that I</sup>  
 question has put me in a position where I ~~would have~~  
<sup>should</sup>  
 to go into the matter, and personally consider that  
~~it might be useful to do so, but that I feel that if~~  
~~I do so it falls~~, entirely outside my mandate, and  
~~is~~ under my terms of reference as Secretary-General.

~~That is only under the constitutional rights privileges~~  
~~opened to any member of a Government in the United Nations.~~

I attach considerable importance to <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ backstage  
<sup>through</sup>  
 briefing of the four Ambassadors to their Governments,  
<sup>they would</sup>  
 as I believe that ~~it would have~~ all work against their  
<sup>national</sup>  
 own interest if, for professional reasons (or misunderstood

...../.....

reasons of principle) they were to delay, or in other ways to put a <sup>spoke</sup> ~~egg~~ in the wheels <sup>of the Cairo eye -</sup> ~~of what I hope to do~~ ~~ration.~~ ~~in the way I can do it.~~

I know that it will require much delicacy ~~on your~~ ~~side~~ to get this across in the right way, but I am sure that you can do it ~~without default~~. God knows where we

are, but with present attitudes not only in the two <sup>(, as it seems, among</sup> leading countries, but ~~in all~~ the Big Powers, we may <sup>that we are at a juncture</sup> find ~~out a juncture~~ where things ~~may start turning right.~~ ~~can be turned in the~~

<sup>We</sup> ~~I~~ <sup>those</sup> happen to be ~~the man~~ on the spot, and ~~I~~ <sup>we</sup> have to play <sup>such a</sup> the ball with both guts and prudence; ~~In that~~ situation

<sup>we</sup> I would be very sorry indeed if ~~I~~ were stopped by ~~unnecessary~~ diplomatic redtape.

<sup>briefing</sup> ~~of course,~~ The ~~manoeuvre~~ should take place as

early as possible next week, so that the right kind of warning <sup>may be</sup> ~~has been~~ sent to the Ambassadors (in unbreakable code) before Tuesday, week after next, when I hope to return to Cairo.

*English*  
*may be given a new direction.*

WASAW  
O-BOND

*Over*

~~My~~ talks in Israel were tough and tiring, but  
~~extremely~~ successful in the sense that we have agreement  
all over the line, if ~~I~~ <sup>we</sup> manage to give them ~~the~~  
de facto satisfaction <sup>as to</sup> of Egyptian compliance with ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup>  
Security Council decisions, ~~not in the form of a public~~  
~~commitment, not even in the form of~~ ~~formal~~  
~~committee to meet, but just solidly~~ enough for me to  
be able to give the Israelis a personal assurance.

*What is needed is only an Egyptian declaration of intent to me, solid*

*above ed so far,*  
What I talk about is the story. As to the rest,

two things are achieved: We have got a cease-fire, under  
international law, between Israel and Egypt, which is more  
than the Security Council ever asked for; and we have  
a fair chance to get ~~a complete~~ <sup>an all round</sup> return to full compliance

with the Armistice Agreements. ~~My~~ <sup>Our</sup> present effort is  
concerned with <sup>the</sup> acceptance by <sup>the</sup> Northern Arab States of the  
principle <sup>(legal structure of the</sup> implied in the General Armistice Agreement)

~~that is,~~ that the assurance to observe II, 2 (or what  
corresponds to II, 2) is conditioned only by reciprocity

as regards) ~~of compliance~~ of the very same paragraph, <sup>(with exception, under</sup> and general  
~~rules~~ <sup>for</sup> of self-defence). The resistance <sup>stems</sup> comes from the  
~~very simple fact that, if I get it my way, I will put~~  
~~will be put to further talk by~~  
~~a stop to all the talks in Syria about shooting in~~  
~~the Israelis start working on Damiyat Yaloum.~~  
~~case they do not get their way in the Canal story.~~

~~What~~ <sup>What</sup> should I tell you more about the negotiations?

Perhaps that, the last two days in Jerusalem, <sup>(they)</sup> finally  
reached the height of "Peking" <sup>both</sup> as an experience and as a  
difficulty (which, as you know, made me most happy).

Let us pray ~~that~~ <sup>now</sup> to God that ~~some~~ <sup>now</sup> fool will ~~not~~ <sup>now</sup> throw

us back, or that other fools will not believe that what  
~~we~~ <sup>is</sup> achieved entitled <sup>them</sup> to call ~~me~~ <sup>turn their</sup> back <sup>to</sup> on desperate problems  
~~of this part of the world.~~ <sup>(the)</sup>

There are two things I should add in order to bring  
you up ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> date. One is that the stopping of the  
Fedayeen was in accordance with a direct promise given

roughly at 6.00 p.m. Wednesday afternoon, 11th April, ~~and~~

~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> the Egyptians kept ~~their~~ <sup>this</sup> promise, ~~thus proving~~ <sup>proves</sup> that they

are not without power over the refugees.

The second thing<sup>7</sup> of which you should inform Stavropoulos<sup>7</sup> is that I had a talk with Fawzi about the Egyptian<sup>law</sup> attitude<sup>8</sup> concerning officials in international organizations. I told Fawzi that I was not going to withdraw my instructions to ~~stop members to stop members~~ not to sign the questionnaire<sup>9</sup>, and that ~~that~~<sup>this</sup> was the basis on which he ~~should~~<sup>must</sup> try to find a way out. Fawzi promised me to ~~try to~~ work out a formula<sup>7</sup>, probably along the lines of ~~the~~<sup>our</sup> practice in the United States<sup>relation to</sup>, which he hoped to present to me on my return; ~~pending~~ that I should not worry about the consequences of a refusal to fill out the questionnaire<sup>10</sup>. The legal procedure would be very slow and would give us plenty of time to find a way out, which would fully ~~respect my~~<sup>recognize the present UN</sup> principles which he Fawzi not only respected but personally endorsed as one of the opponents against Lie's policy ~~in~~<sup>4</sup> 1952-53. Of course

I cannot regard <sup>this</sup> ~~his~~ declaration as a commitment, but I have learned to trust <sup>Fawzi's</sup> ~~his~~ integrity.

I am now firmly convinced that the Security Council meeting in Europe would be a serious mistake. Even

<sup>in our present mission,</sup> in case of a failure and so much more so in case ~~of~~

<sup>could</sup> a success ~~to~~ be registered, ~~in my report,~~ the report

will not provide occasion for a grand debate. Real

<sup>would</sup> progress ~~will~~ be hampered by such a debate. ~~It may~~

<sup>may well be used</sup> ~~well take~~ the present mission as a starting point, <sup>but</sup>

<sup>this</sup> ~~will~~ ~~not~~ ~~be~~ ~~in~~ ~~darkness~~. For that reason, I think that the

more routine-like and inconspicuous the Sec. Council meeting concerning my report could be made, the better.

~~it is~~. Please tell this to Alphand, when you take up

the main issue raised in this letter, and warn him that

I would like to have the same view, in proper form,

brought to the notice of other interested parties in the

Security Council.

*In the direction which I cannot now exclude for wider considerations, but if we are to get further ahead it will have to be in fertile darkness.*

I enclose also a personal note on the stand I will take on Banat Yakoub in Syria. It protects Burns'

position but introduces a new and protective element by

the way in which <sup>we</sup> play ~~at~~ <sup>"II, 2"</sup>, ~~a way based on the~~ <sup>place</sup> ~~that our approach is based not only~~ <sup>very</sup> ~~stanzas~~ <sup>in principle of the Truce clause within the</sup> ~~framework of the~~ <sup>(indeed fully) on the logic of the</sup> ~~Armistice Agreements,~~ <sup>is supported by</sup> but based further on

the fact that <sup>the paragraph</sup> ~~this clause~~ <sup>carries</sup> takes up the Sec. Council cease-fire re-affirmation of 11 August 1949 (which ~~is~~ <sup>as you well know,</sup> exists <sup>by</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>Armistice Agreements</sup>) and by independent <sup>of the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>and further</sup> the specific rules

~~applying to this clause if a questions arises of its~~ <sup>which excludes this</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>paragraph from</sup> ~~relation.~~

I thank you most warmly for frequent and valuable

information and for <sup>what</sup> ~~the way~~ you and your colleagues

do to keep the house running. If ever, <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ this an

occasion where it <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ worthwhile for the Secretary-

General to run his office outside Headquarters and with

a monopoly for one single problem, <sup>were</sup> ~~do~~ even if we ~~do~~ not <sup>to</sup>

get <sup>any</sup> ~~away~~ further, we can be grateful for the results achieved <sup>so far</sup>

which fully warrant~~s~~ the existence ~~both~~ of the United Nations ~~and for the office of the Secretary-General.~~

Perhaps you have to have been a participant in the development during the last fortnight fully to appreciate how the United Nations <sup>has functioned as</sup> ~~was~~ a screen between <sup>- maybe -</sup> us and ~~catastrophes~~. These are strong words, but I

~~deeply~~ believe that they are justified, ~~and~~ that should give us all satisfaction and encouragement to new

efforts : once you go ~~head~~ <sup>even</sup> first into it, the ~~worst~~ <sup>worst</sup> ~~most~~ <sup>important</sup> task shows unexpected opportunities.

*way*

MADE IN AUSTRIA RADIO-BOND