

**Congo. U.N. Advisory
Committee on the Congo -
correspondence, statements,
p...**

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Congo - 1961

8-14 March

- a) Kasavubu, Joseph (President of the Congo)
- 2 letters } to D.H.
 - 1 cable }
- b.) - 4 messages from D.H.

13 March 1961
(35th Meeting)

Message of 8 March from the Secretary-General to President Kasavubu

In discussions following the deplorable incidents at Matadi, according to the information I have received, there have been put forward certain conditions regarding UN activities in the Congo, freedom of movement, deployment of troops, use of certain facilities, etc. I wish in this context to draw your attention to some legal aspects of the UN presence in the Congo.

We are, of course, strongly aware of the fact that the initial action of the UN was undertaken in response to a request of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. But I am certain that you, on your side, are also aware of the fact that this action was taken because it was considered necessary in view of an existing threat to international peace and security. Thus, in its resolution of 22 July 1960, and subsequent resolutions, the Secco expressly linked the maintenance of law and order in the Congo to the maintenance of international peace and security, and made it clear that the primary basis of the Secco decision was the maintenance of international peace and security. The considerations ruling the relationship between the Republic of the Congo and the UN, therefore, should not be seen solely in the light of the request of the Government and what flows from that request. The status, rights and functions of the UN are basically determined by the fact that the action was taken in order to counteract an international threat to peace.

This becomes important especially to an interpretation of the undertaking entered into by the Government of the Republic of the Congo on 27 July 1960, in which the Government agreed that

"in the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960; it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force".

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You will observe that the Government undertook "in the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the UN Force" to be guided in good faith by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Secco of 14 and 22 July 1960, and, specifically, to ensure the freedom of movement of the Force. This undertaking has obviously continued in legal force and must be considered as precluding any actions of the Government which would make it impossible for the UN Force to function under the resolutions in the way called for as a means of eliminating the threat to international peace and security. This in particular refers to its freedom of movement.

As a further element of the legal situation you will have noted the explicit declaration by the Secco in its resolution of 9 August 1960, that all Member States are bound in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council and, in particular, to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided by the Council. This obviously precludes all Member States, including in this case the host State, from actions which render the UN operation ineffective for its declared purposes or hamper its successful continuation. In fact, Member States are under the obligation positively and actively to assist in the operation.

You will see from the references made that the relation between the UN and the Government of the Republic of the Congo is not merely a contractual relationship in which the Republic can impose its conditions as host State and thereby determine the circumstances under which the UN operates. It is rather a relationship governed by mandatory decisions of the Secco. The consequence of this is that no Government, including the host Government, can by unilateral action determine how measures taken by the Secco in this context should be carried out. Such a determination can be made only by the Secco itself or on the basis of its explicit delegation of authority. It is of special importance that only the Secco can decide on the discontinuance of the operation, and that, therefore, conditions which, by their effect on the operation, would deprive it of its necessary basis, would require direct consideration by the Secco, which obviously could not be counted upon to approve of such conditions unless it were to find that the threat to peace and security had ceased.

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I am sure that the fundamental legal points which I have recalled here will be taken fully into account by you in your consideration of the present situation.

Approaching you in this way, I feel that I should bring to your attention also another fact of relevance in this context. In the cease-fire talks in Matadi, after the incident of 5 March 1961, Mr. Delvaux acknowledged, according to the reports available to me, that the UN Force requires for the free movement of its personnel and supplies that UN troops be stationed at Matadi. The only reservation made by Mr. Delvaux referred to the undesirability of deployment of Sudanese troops in Matadi; on this reservation I have already expressed my views in my message to you of 4 March 1961, indicating this reservation cannot be accepted as a condition by the UN as it would mean an interference in what must be solely a UN responsibility. The recognition of the need for the UN to be in a satisfactory military position in Matadi was again recognized clearly and unconditionally in the message communicated to me by the delegation of the Republic of the Congo on 7 March 1961. However I wish to draw your attention to the fact that in other and later contacts we have understood that there was a wish to introduce conditions going considerably beyond the one mentioned by Mr. Delvaux in Matadi, on 5 March 1961, and already rejected by us. If such an effort is or were to be made, it obviously would mean that the Congolese authorities would go back on their previous word, which I am convinced cannot be your intention.

There is one final point on which it seems appropriate to make some short comments. It apparently has been assumed by some Congolese units that the recent resolution of the Secco demands the "disarming of the ANC" and authorizes the use of force for that purpose. On this point, I should like to note that para. B-2 of the Secco resolution of 20-21 February 1961 relating to Congolese armed units and personnel does not aim at a disarming of the troops but urges a resumption of the organization and training of the ANC, outside of political involvements. I am sure you have understood that clearly yourself, as is apparent from your message of 6 March 1961, to which I wish to reply as soon as I have had an opportunity to study your suggestions more closely. Nor does this operative paragraph of the resolution authorize the use of armed force

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to carry out even that limited end. Moreover, para. A-1 of that resolution which authorizes the use of force "if necessary, in the last resort" indicates that such use shall be in support of cease-fire arrangements and similar measures for the prevention of civil war; there is no reference in this paragraph which indicates that the authorization to use force "as a last resort" applies to the assistance in reorganization of the army. You will recall that in my statements to the Council concerning the control and discipline of the ANC, I suggested only that the UN Force might have to be used with respect to such units as might have broken loose from their own command and threatened the population. On the more general problem, I made it entirely clear that the reorganization of the ANC would have to be undertaken in co-operation with the Congolese authorities. It is my opinion that this principle remains the accepted position of the UN.

Mr. President, the matters which are here brought to your attention all refer to a question of basic significance for the possibilities of the UN to continue its assistance to the Republic of the Congo. I am certain that you wish to see this assistance continue in a spirit of collaboration and confidence, and I am therefore also certain that you will see to it that no new and harmful developments are precipitated in the present sensitive situation by any rash action but that, to the extent that there is a need for it, full opportunity is given for the elaboration of practical and workable formulas for the continued activities of the UN, taking fully into account the legal aspects I have explained in this cable as well as our needs for a successful operation.

I trust that you will exercise all your personal influence to that effect, and I can, from my side, assure you that we remain animated by the same intentions, while, naturally, being obliged to maintain firmly those principles with which all Member States have to comply in the interest of their joint efforts through the Organization.

Have honour, etc.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General of the United Nations

13 March 1961
(35th meeting)

Message of 9 March from Secretary-General to President Kasavubu

Sir,

Further to my cable of 8 March 1961, having received a report on the conditions put forward by your representatives at Leopoldville, I wish to make the following observations.

You have already taken cognizance of the legal situation with reference to the possibility of subjecting the United Nations operation in the Congo to conditions which conflict with the purposes of that operation. I do not wish to repeat myself. I must, however, emphasize that such conditions would call into question the assistance rendered by the United Nations to the Republic of the Congo. It is my firm opinion, supported by the unanimous reaction of the nineteen members of the Advisory Committee, that the conditions laid before the United Nations during the negotiations at Leopoldville are such as to make the operation impossible, and this applies to the civil as well as the military aspect. Accordingly, you will, I am sure, give your representatives at Leopoldville instructions to reconsider their attitude, having regard to the status of the United Nations operation, the circumstances in which the operation can be continued, and the consequences which would ensue should the Security Council be forced to decide that the operation could not be continued under the conditions stipulated.

What has been said here in general terms applies particularly to the United Nations position at Matadi. Without a satisfactory position at Matadi - and this includes not only a military presence in sufficient strength but also freedom of movement and action - a vital line of communication would be cut, thus raising the question whether the operation could be continued. Mr. Delvaux himself has recognized that it is necessary for the United Nations to have such a presence at Matadi, and this position has been repeated, unconditionally, as your own by your spokesmen here in New York. A retreat on the Congolese side from the position thus taken - a position which is obviously essential - could not but arouse the most unfavourable reactions, and I am sure you do not intend to make any such retreat.

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But time is passing swiftly. The troops urgently need supplies. The departure of the Indonesian contingent has already been postponed, etc. For these reasons we must reach a quick solution, and one which takes the needs of the United Nations operation fully into account, to the problems which have arisen, especially as regards the United Nations position at Matadi.

Allow me to sum up. The legal basis of the United Nations position is clear. The practical needs of the operation are also plain. It disturbs me to think what the probable reaction will be if your representatives should maintain an attitude which is indefensible either from the standpoint of legal basis or from that of the needs of the operation as envisaged by the Security Council. The problem of Matadi is particularly pressing. This problem is in itself a limited one, but it reflects the essential features of the present situation and calls for rapid solution. For these reasons I turn to you again with an urgent appeal to exercise your great influence as Chief of State so that a solution may be found very quickly to the immediate problems, without the complications involved in the attitude hitherto taken by the Congolese spokesmen - complications which, I greatly fear, would have very widespread and very dangerous consequences.

In making this appeal, I rely on your wish, so eloquently expressed, to see fruitful co-operation develop with the United Nations, and on your will, which I share, to act solely in the best interest of the Congolese people who have already been so sorely tried by events.

I have the honour to be, etc.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD
Secretary-General of
the United Nations

First Message of 12 March from the Secretary-General
to President Kasavubu

13 March 1961
35th meeting

Through our representatives in Leo I have received your reply to my letter of 5 March, delivered on 6 March, in which Mr. Bomboko, on your behalf, presented your comments on various aspects of the present problem. After receipt of the message to which you now have sent a reply, you received two further messages, 8 and 9 March, to which I wish to refer as they partly cover the same ground; you will observe that in my message of the 9th I express my intention to get back to your suggestions in the letter of the 5th as soon as I have had an opportunity to study them more closely.

I have read your message of the 11th with concern, because it seems to me to reflect some continued misunderstanding of the principles which must apply to the UN operation. You should not doubt our sincerity when I say that the UN is animated solely by the interest to assist the Congolese people but realizes that that must be done in such a way as to safeguard not only the Congo but Africa and the world against the present threat to peace and security while fully protecting the independence and integrity of the country. Part of the difficulty in the present situation derives from the fact that in these conditions assistance to the Congo cannot be detached from the much wider international problem of peace, which may sometimes seem to lead to reactions on the UN side running counter to Congolese views; naturally, there is not, and there can not be, any such conflict of interest as the primary concern of the Congolese people also must be the maintenance of peace around the Congo and the prevention of possible military intervention on the part of foreign Powers. Thus, when the Congo has to adjust itself to circumstances and accept decisions of the Security Council in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter, like any other State Member, there is no impairment of the wider interests of the country, as these can best be judged by the Council with its high authority under the Charter; nor is there any impairment of the sovereign rights of the Congo, other than within the limits accepted by all other Member States under a resolution like that adopted 20/21 February.

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Therefore, to the extent that the resolutions are binding on all Member States, I feel that the Congo should not, when it has to adjust itself to a decision in the overriding interest of peace for the world and for the Congo, see any obstacle to true co-operation with the United Nations in the wide area where such co-operation is necessary.

In the present case, what I have said applies specifically to the United Nations Force. Its size, its composition and its deployment cannot be subordinated to the will of any one Government, be it a contributing Government or the host Government. If the United Nations organizes the Force, the Force must remain exclusively under the command of the United Nations, guided by the judgement of the military Command of the United Nations as to what is necessary for the mission of the Force in order to enable it to fulfil its purpose as jointly endorsed by all Governments concerned. This must be accepted by the Congolese Government.

There naturally remains a wide area for co-operation aimed at the best and mutually most satisfactory arrangements. In this respect the basic notion that the Force is in the Congo in the first instance for the assistance of the Congo, takes on its full significance. The situation is similar in other fields, as for example in the administrative field. The Security Council has the right to decide, with binding effect in relation to all Governments, that all foreign military or para-military personnel outside the United Nations Command should leave the country, and the authorities of the Congo are then, like the Governments of countries from which such personnel may have come, bound by the decision. But there remains an important question, that of the way in which the decision should be carried out so as to achieve the desired end without any harm being done to legitimate Congolese interests, and consultations are therefore desirable regarding, for example, replacements through the good offices of the United Nations once a basis is established by acceptance by the Congo of the decision of the Security Council.

I apologize for discussing these matters at such length, but some of your reactions, Mr. President, make me feel strongly that misunderstandings have arisen not only as to the significance in substance of the Security Council resolutions, in particular the last one, but also regarding their juridical significance for Member States, including the Congo. Just as I tried in my message of the 9th to explain what the resolution meant and did not mean with respect to, for example, the ANC, I therefore consider it necessary now to point out in which area and for what reasons the UN must claim autonomy in its operation and, on the other hand, within what spheres active and, I firmly hope, fruitful consultations are called for and will be welcomed by the Organization.

I note also with concern your observations on the atmosphere in Matadi and the conclusions which you seem to wish to draw from this alleged atmosphere. I need not repeat what I have already stated regarding the vital significance of Matadi for the whole UN operation, civilian as well as military, nor is it necessary to stress once again the extreme urgency of an arrangement which re-establishes this lifeline for the operation. But I must comment briefly on your observations. First, let me emphatically reject the comparison with the reaction in relation to the Belgians. I am surprised that you have found it possible to make such a comparison with the full knowledge which you have of the happenings in July and with the full knowledge which you must have regarding what happened last Saturday and Sunday, as proved by the testimony of entirely trustworthy witnesses. It is difficult to believe that the presence of a small group of Canadian signal personnel and of some 130 Sudanese, who had never to my knowledge taken any unfriendly action against the population and have never tried to exercise any authority over the population or the ANC, could have given rise to feelings such as those you refer to, unless emotions had been whipped up by irresponsible statements against the UN, of which there are many examples, and by misinterpretations of the purpose of the presence of the UN.

I note what you say in this context with some personal bitterness, in view of the fact that, as you know, Matadi was re-opened, the pilot service reorganized and traffic made to flow again only as a result of efforts and sacrifices of the UN. It is difficult to believe that the memory of the population is so short that this striking evidence of the purposes of the UN assistance has been forgotten within six months.

Given these circumstances, I am convinced that, if you were to use your great personal influence in the region to explain to the population what the UN has done to help it, to indicate the real reasons for the presence of the UN contingent in Matadi, and to explain the purposes of the operation in progress which you, yourself, wish to continue, the psychological background would be changed so quickly as to permit the resumption of regular United Nations services at Matadi without any delay. I am afraid that you would find that nobody would understand it if the Congo, for the time being at least, bows to a supposedly hostile attitude and shows itself unwilling to do its utmost to change that attitude quickly, the more so as this attitude - to the extent it may exist - has undoubtedly been influenced by the misleading information recently circulated.

I wish to address to you a special message regarding the release of prisoners and related matters.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

Dag Hammarskjöld

Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Second Message of 12 March from the Secretary-General
to President Kasavubu

13 March 1961
35th Meeting

In the message you sent through Mr. Bomboko, which was forwarded to me by our representatives in Leopoldville, you react unfavourably to the strong appeal I made in my message of 5/6 March 1961 for immediate steps to release the prisoners held by the ANC since the incidents of a week ago. You infer from this appeal that Ambassador Dayal had given me misleading information, derogatory to the good name of the Congo.

You will realize that the message I sent to you from New York in the evening of 5 March was based on all the information available to our representatives in Leopoldville which had reached us at that stage. That information was naturally not of Ambassador Dayal's making, but consisted of the reports received from the Sudanese captain and Captain Bouffard of Canada. If, after the despatch of our message to you, additional facts such as those you now mention had come to light, they could not, of course, have had any effect on the text of a message that had already been despatched. All that would normally have been called for would have been a straightforward communication from yourself indicating that the steps requested by me had already been taken at the time of the receipt of my message. I regret that, in these circumstances, my message should have been used as an argument for a renewed attack on Ambassador Dayal, who cannot be considered as having any responsibility in the matter, as has been alleged.

In this connexion, I should like to draw your attention to the responsibilities of my representative in Leopoldville. You say that he loses no time in transmitting unfavourable information. Obviously, the situation is entirely different. It is his duty, especially in a situation of such gravity as the one prevailing on 5 March, to provide me with all the first-hand information regarding an incident as soon as he receives it. He is not entitled to hold it back nor can he obviously change the testimony which he receives. Moreover, neither he nor I can abstain from reactions which appear to be warranted by the facts as known to us in the hope that these facts will be corrected. That is possible only in cases of lesser importance where we can assume such a responsibility in relation to the countries concerned or to the Security Council.

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It has always been my wish that incidents or rumours about incidents involving Congolese and United Nations should be quickly investigated, on a joint basis, so as to establish the facts and smooth out the difficulties by mutual agreement. Arrangements of that kind are, in my view, still necessary. However, I do not believe that such a procedure is possible in incidents involving troops and characterized by serious casualties; in such a situation the facts as testified must be known without delay and proper action taken without waiting for a joint and necessarily time-consuming investigation aimed at reconciling what may seem to be contradictory information.

I note that, although you express sharp criticism in your reply of my demand for the speedy release of prisoners, you do not comment on the point to which I wished to draw special attention, namely, the shocking threat of the use of superior force against a foreign unit under United Nations Command - in this particular instance, a unit without means of defence - in order to enforce its evacuation. I need not characterize this threat nor the action intended; had such action been taken, it would necessarily have met with the strongest possible condemnation based on recognized principles of law.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Translated from French

9 March 1961
(34th meeting)

Communication of 9 March 1961 from Permanent Representative
of the Congo (Leopoldville)

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter of today's date addressed by the Vice-Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Mr. Mario CARDOSO, to the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Gervais BAHIZI,
Deputy Permanent Representative

The Secretary-General of
the United Nations

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9 March 1961

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit the text of a telegram addressed to you as President of the General Assembly by President Kasa-Vubu, the Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville).

HAVE THE HONOUR INFORM YOU THAT A CONFERENCE OF THE DE FACTO AND DE JURE AUTHORITIES OF THE FORMER BELGIAN CONGO BEGAN ITS DELIBERATIONS TODAY 8 MARCH AT TANANARIVE. THE CONFERENCE MEETS THE WISH THAT HAS OFTEN BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE CONGOLESE AND BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT THE CONGOLESE CRISIS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY THE CONGOLESE THEMSELVES. I HAVE PLEASURE IN INFORMING YOU OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF WHICH I AM CHAIRMAN: FIRST THE MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE UNANIMOUSLY REQUEST THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING ANY POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE CONGO BEFORE THE RESULTS OF THE PRESENT CONFERENCE ARE KNOWN. SECONDLY HAVING REGARD TO THE TENSION AT PRESENT PREVAILING IN THE CONGO AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 21 FEBRUARY 1961 THE MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE DRAW PARTICULARLY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE FACT THAT ANY NEW POLICY DECISION OR ANY IMPLEMENTATION OR ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT THE SAID RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONGOLESE OPINION AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESENT REQUEST MAY VERY SERIOUSLY AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO.

PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)
TANANARIVE, 9 March 1961

I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this telegram to the knowledge of the members of the General Assembly.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Mario CARDOSO
Vice-Chairman of the Delegation of the
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)

Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND,
Permanent Representative of Ireland
to the United Nations.

13 March 1961
(35th meeting)

Letter of 11 March from Mr. Bomboko (on behalf of President Kasavubu) to the Secretary-General

"Sir,

In the absence of the President of the Republic, I am instructed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 6 March concerning the tragic incidents at Matadi.

We are not surprised to learn that you place the entire responsibility for these incidents on the Congolese National Army. Your Special Representative has, as is usually the case, transmitted a biased report to you.

I do not propose at this point to comment in detail on the sequence of the incidents themselves as our Permanent Representative in New York has no doubt already communicated to you the official report prepared by a member of the Government who was sent to Matadi to conduct an enquiry and negotiate with the ONUC authorities. I wish merely to comment on the fact that you request the President of the Republic to take urgent steps to secure the immediate return to their units of certain military personnel reported missing, although the necessary steps had already been taken for the release and return to Leopoldville of these members of the United Nations Force, as was recognized by one of your representatives in a press conference (7 March 1961). I am bound to conclude that your Special Representative does not hesitate to cable to you information which has not been properly checked and the interpretation of which, in moments of tension, seriously undermines the desire for collaboration which you repeatedly request from the Congo but which appears to be lacking on the part of ONUC. This haste to report any incident likely to discredit the Congo and this lack of caution on the part of your Special Representative has, as you are no doubt aware, resulted in a situation which is, I believe, without precedent in the history of the United Nations, in which representatives of the international press have publicly protested against the biased manner in which the local authorities of the international organization have reported incidents between the Congolese National Army and the ONUC forces.

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I would add that although the member of the Canadian unit and the 12 Sudanese soldiers reported missing have been in fact released and returned to Leopoldville, a captain of the ANC is still missing since the incidents of 26 and 27 February.

We have already informed you that it is our desire that when such incidents occur a mixed commission composed of ONUC representatives and delegates of the Congolese authorities should be sent to the scene and should present a joint report. Your Special Representative has, unfortunately, always shown some reluctance in this respect, which suggests that objective efforts to ascertain the facts are not perhaps his primary concern. The procedure suggested would however offer the only means of avoiding the necessity for denials and protests of the kind which have recently been transmitted to you and which are bound to impair the prestige of your Organization, of which we are a part.

In the tenth paragraph of your letter you very properly state that the United Nations Forces take into account all the pertinent circumstances. In the view of the Congolese Government the pertinent circumstances may be of various kinds. The United Nations would be wrong in this context to consider that the psychological factor is of negligible importance. It would be an undoubted mistake to return a military unit to an area when incidents involving bloodshed have recently occurred between the local Congolese civilian and military authorities and the unit in question as a result of misunderstandings arising from a lack of understanding and collaboration.

The recent engagements between the Congolese troops and ONUC troops have resulted in feelings of hostility towards the United Nations units. Even if the Congolese soldiers could be induced to accept the return of the ONUC personnel, the civilian population would not be prepared to accept their return, at least in the immediate future.

You will no doubt remember the state of public opinion in the country, and in this area in particular, before Independence with regard to the Belgian authorities and units whose presence was considered undesirable by the population. At that time, in the circumstances then prevailing, the only satisfactory solution was to withdraw the authorities and troops in question, and

it is hard to see why your Representative should take a different view in the case of authorities and troops under the authority of ONUC. What was true then is still, as you will realize, true today, and, as in the past, it will be impossible to reduce tension and restore order by requiring the Congolese to accept a presence which is temporarily considered undesirable. This does not mean that the Congolese authorities and the President of the Republic are opposed in principle to the return of ONUC forces to Matadi. The Chief of State and the Government wish merely to stress the necessity of waiting until tension is relaxed on both sides and until negotiations are entered into to determine the arrangements for their eventual return. A unilateral decision to re-occupy Matadi immediately, unconditionally and at any cost would, there is no doubt, be tantamount to an order to attack the Matadi garrisons.

You reiterate to the President of the Republic your request for collaboration with the ONUC authorities. As you are aware, the President himself has repeatedly stressed the need for such collaboration. He has also transmitted a number of observations to you in his most recent letter of 5 March 1961, to which we have not yet received your reply. We have, however, the impression that in United Nations usage, at least in the case of the Congo, collaboration means blind submission to the orders of the international organization.

I am instructed by the President of the Republic to inform you that he regrets that he is unable to accept that view.

In his opinion collaboration necessarily implies negotiations or consultations between ONUC and the lawful Congolese authorities. As an independent and sovereign country, the Congo cannot receive orders from any country or organization. If on the other hand the United Nations respects the fundamental principles of its own Charter, the President reaffirms his sincere determination, and that of his Government, to collaborate fully with the Organization in the accomplishment of the mission assigned to it in response to his request for assistance.

In conclusion I note that you speak of the "Tleo regime" in referring to the government at present in office. I trust that the phrase is simply the

result of a defective translation and that it is not your intention to discredit the government appointed, in accordance with the fundamental law, by the President of the Republic. Specific assurances on your part in this connection would be received with great satisfaction.

I have the honour to be, etc.

J. Bomboko
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade

on behalf of the President
of the Republic "

14 March 1961

Cable dated 14 March 1961 from Mr. Kasa-Vubu to the Secretary-General

Have the honour to inform you that authorities of ex-Belgian Congo attending Tananarive Conference have just completed their work. Am sending you by Telex the most important resolutions adopted by Conference. As you may notice, union among various regions of ex-Belgian Congo has been re-established and danger of generalized civil war is thus averted. Conference therefore requests that Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 be revoked. Moreover, said resolution having no more raison d'être, Conference agrees that the technical and financial assistance which country needs be provided through United Nations without, however, impairing prerogatives of our sovereignty. High consideration.

Joseph Kasa-Vubu,
President of Conference

14 mars 1961

Télégramme du 14 mars 1961 adressé par M. Kasa-Vubu au Secrétaire général

"J'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que les autorités de l'ex-Congo belge réunies en conférence à Tananarive viennent de terminer leurs travaux. Je vous envoie par telex les résolutions les plus importantes de cette conférence. Comme vous pouvez le constater l'union entre les diverses régions de l'ex-Congo belge est refaite et le danger d'une guerre civile généralisée se trouve ainsi écarté. La conférence demande par conséquent l'annulation de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité en date du 21 février 1961. Cette résolution n'ayant plus de raison d'être d'autre part, la conférence marque son accord pour que l'assistance technique et financière dont le pays a besoin puisse se faire par l'intermédiaire de l'ONU sans toutefois porter préjudice aux prérogatives de notre souveraineté. Haute considération.

Joseph Kasavubu, Président de la Conférence"