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Lloyd, Selwyn (British Foreign Minister)

- 1 draft letter from D.H.

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DRAFT Letter to Selwyn Lloyd

PERSONAL

I am sure that, through the Delegation, you have received the fullest information on the developments ^{on} of the UN side of the Lebanese affair. However, I ^{feel} ~~felt~~ that it might be useful for you to have a brief summing up of my way of looking at the UN operation.

1. The authority granted to the SG in the resolution, determining the character and scope of the Observation Group activities, is, first of all, limited by the fact that the decision must be considered as having been taken under Chapter VI ~~and~~ not Chapter VII, of the Charter. Quite apart from the ^{significance of the} use of the word "observation" ^{ation Group}, it is thus obvious that the SG cannot authorise the Observers ^{enable it to} to take initiative in the use of force so as to ^{penetrate} to the border or to break into places ^{from} of which they are excluded.

2. The operation which, thus, ^{must be} ~~necessarily is~~ limited to "observing and reporting" is further, according to the stated purpose of the Security Council, directed towards infiltration and illegal traffic in arms. ^{use of the word "observation" (and the} The refusal by Lebanon to accept the word "investigation" ^{investigate} ~~also~~ limits the activities of the Group regarding such infiltration and such smuggling to the present. It follows, that the Group has ^{investigate} ~~no~~ mandate to ~~report on~~ what may have taken place at an earlier stage, ^{non-observably, less it a} ~~nor~~ any mandate to report on, or intervene against, "massive intervention" by, for example, radio propaganda.

3. The limits set to the operation by both the ~~form in~~^{basis on} which the decision ~~resolution~~ of the Security Council was taken and ~~to~~ its wording, of course, ^{to} give the operation a limited ~~immediate~~^{practical} significance. You will know that for that reason I took ~~it~~ on myself the necessary supplementary steps in order to provide the activities of the Group with ~~a~~^{the} most favorable possible setting. I did so by ~~the~~^a very sharp appeal to the Cairo Government, regarding both ~~possible~~ ^{practical} military collusion with the rebels and the Voice of the Arabs propaganda. As you will have heard from Dixon, this effort was successful ~~at least~~ to the extent of extracting from Nasser firm personal commitments to give orders to the effect I indicated. I ~~never gave any significance to~~^{only noted} these commitments ~~beyond what they meant in themselves~~^{their value and on}, leaving my judgement on the effect of my demarche to two tests:

a) would we register, from the rebel side, that the promised orders had been given;

b) would we register that traffic in arms and infiltration were now on an insignificant level, and would we register any change in the tactics of the Voice of the Arabs ~~That is to say,~~^{Thus,} I did not base any other ~~con-~~^{general} conclusion on Nasser's commitments than that we should not take further action short of having submitted the commitments to those two tests. ~~That~~^{In other words,} I did never feel that the Cairo demarche had solved any problem, but only that ~~its immediate outcome should cause us~~ there was a reason to wait a little with the consideration of further steps, pending ~~an~~^{the} experience of what ~~happened~~^{we might see happening} in the field and in practice, after the Cairo talk. I need not state to you that the approach to Cairo was directed solely toward getting the UAR to withdraw from the picture in all the relevant respects.

(As stated below, this kind, of course, was leaving you on way of developing the observation operation proper).

4. You ^{may} ~~will~~ also have heard that both through our own channels and through the US intelligence, it has been confirmed that Cairo, after ^{the} ~~our~~ talk, informed the rebels that they could not count on any support.

6 5. Different views are held regarding the policy of the Voice of the Arabs. The Lebanese Government maintains that the propaganda is worse than ever, but several other observers, without knowing about my demarche, have volunteered statements to the effect that the situation has improved.

7 8. Regarding the border situation we are still very much in the dark. The Group seems ^{to hold} ~~convinced~~, so far, that there is ^{not now any} ~~no~~ infiltration or smuggling of arms of a military significant size, ~~but~~ I reserve my own ~~op~~ judgement.

8 7. It seems therefore that, so far, the Cairo commitments have, reasonably well, passed test ^{2/} (a), but that it still remains to be seen whether they pass test ^{3/} (b). It can not be excluded that the present influence of Cairo on Damascus is ^{not} ~~insufficient~~ to give ^{to the} Cairo orders ^{full} ~~satisfactory~~ effect at the border, and that therefore test (b) ^{may come to} ~~will~~ contradict the results of test (a).

9 8. Whatever weight is ^{finally} given to the Cairo commitments in the light of the practical tests to which I refer, the Observation operation must ^{naturally} be given the ~~possible~~ highest possible efficiency. The Cairo demarche was intended to support the Observation operation and to make it possible for it to succeed. The outcome of the demarche has in no way influenced ^{and will not influence} our judgement as to the size, scope or mandate of the Observation Group. My stand on these last ^{mentioned} ~~two~~ questions has been ^{and remains} determined exclusively by the attitude taken by the Group itself. As I have said in ^a the press conference, they will have as many Observers as they ask for. On the other hand, I find it very difficult to send to them observers before they consider themselves ready to absorb them in useful current work. If we have shown some restraint in the continued

building up of the Observation Group (at present about 120), it has thus been only because of the stand taken by the Group itself regarding its needs and possibilities, and in no way for any political reasons, least of all any reasons influenced by the Cairo situation.

~~It~~ It is a bit annoying under these circumstances to see wide-spread complaints in the press, which cannot always be its own inventions, to the effect that the Observation Group has not investigated the past or have not said anything about radio propaganda, or has not taken any steps to stop the radio propaganda. It is also rather unjustified when ^{parts of} the press, both in the Middle East and ⁱⁿ the West, ~~xxx~~ accuse me of "believing in Nasser's promises", being "passive" as regarding ^{S/} the Observation operation, preparing "a Middle Eastern Munich, disregarding the facts, and what not. I ~~don't~~ ^{did} expect anything better in view of the far more grotesque theories which developed during the Suez crisis, when I was considered to be fooled by, if not the stooge of, Nasser, but I think that the outcome of the various arrangements with Egypt during and after the Suez crisis, for which I was responsible, should have led the papers to the conclusion that they might ~~will~~ all the time have been wrong. However, what does it matter. The straight line ^{after the books crooked to} is ~~always considered crooked by~~ those who have departed from it. ^{I complained a little.}

~~It~~ ^{of UN Headquarters} I ~~complained~~ In the previous letter to you about speculation and rumour-mongering. The tendencies in that direction in this strange bee-hive have not abated, although, I must say, that the situation remains more sober than I expected it to be. For example, there has only been ~~the most~~ insignificant speculation in the press regarding the most useful and encouraging talk which I had the other day with Dulles, on his initiative.