

**Middle East - Suez story No
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Middle East / Suez story - 17

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D.H.'s draft memorandum conc. Lebanese
problem.

DRAFT

M E M O R A N D U M

5 July 1958

Analysing the Lebanese problem I note the following:

1. Mr. Malik in one of his ^{early} ~~urgent~~ talks with me and Bunche said that there had been only little infiltration until the time ^{when} ~~that~~ he went to the Arab League and the Security Council. The following week, pending consideration in the Security Council, infiltrators had "poured in." He had to "take the responsibility for that."
2. President Nasser said in my talk with him in Cairo that the UAR had kept the bars on until the matter was taken to the Arab League and the Security Council, but at that stage, when the question got internationalised, had lifted them. This, obviously, confirms, from the opposite angle, Mr. Malik's statement as ^{to} the development of infiltration.
3. The Lebanese authorities have all the time ~~said~~ claimed that short of massive infiltration and ~~massive~~ smuggling of arms, that is to say if the border is "sealed", the Government forces would be perfectly able to deal with the rebels. This, obviously, means that the Government considers its army, gendarmerie, etc., strong enough to cope with the rebel forces, even after they have got strengthened through infiltration after the appeal to the Security Council. It follows a fortiori that ~~it~~ is the Government's view that they would have been able to do so before the matter was brought to the Arab League and the Security Council. It is well known that no serious attempt to use ~~the~~ ^{this} army in ~~that~~ ^{that,} way at ~~this~~ ^{that,} early easier stage was made.

4. My demarches in Cairo would have been a lot easier -- although it would have had to be based on a slightly different approach - ~~and~~ ^{than it} ~~was rendered mor difficult than it would have been~~ ^{now was,} before the matter was brought to the Arab League and the Security Council ⁱⁿ by the following reasons: circumstances

a) the public proceedings which have turned the matter into a prestige question for the UAR;

b) the traditional reaction of President Nasser to what he ^{ed} considers as Western threats; and

c) the fact that a new policy line had been chosen, according to what the President said and to what seems to be confirmed by Malik, after the Lebanese appeal to the Council, so that what I had to achieve, if possible, was a reversal of Cairo's policies in relation to the Syrians and the rebels, which ^{probably} would ~~have~~ not have ^{been necessary} ~~taken the same turn~~ ^{in an earlier approach.} ~~at all if worked out earlier.~~

5. The above points indicate that the whole problem would have taken a very different and much more innocent turn, and that probably it would have been fairly easy to solve, had the Lebanese Government, ^{as that earlier time} instead of going to the international bodies, taken vigorous ~~the~~ action against the rebels combined with ^a the good office demarche by the Secretary-General in Cairo, at their request.