

**UN-Secretariat matters A-Pe:  
UN-Secretariat matters A-Pe -  
14**

*HS L 179:94*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

UN/Secretariat matters 1954

Press clippings - 26 Jan. - 25 Feb. 54

concer. Big Four Conference in Berlin - 25 Jan. 54

# Remarks by Bidault, Eden and Molotov at Start of Berlin Talks

BERLIN, Jan. 25 (AP)—Following are excerpts from speeches today at the four power meeting by Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister:

## By M. Bidault

We have to come here with our minds open to any solution which may be proposed and with the sincere determination to obtain concrete results.

We meet in an atmosphere of hope. We must not spoil it.

How can we not note with satisfaction that the simple fact of our meeting is an important contribution to the improvement of the international atmosphere? Even before we have met an end has been put to hostilities of a local but serious character [Korea] which were being waged at one point of the globe. Peace is urgent everywhere.

On the other hand the bold offer of the President of the United States allows for the first time a glimpse of progress toward a solution of the atomic menace.

Nevertheless, we must recognize that the difficulties to be settled between us remain immense. I have frequently insisted they cannot be permanently resolved without an understanding between the great powers on a general limitation and international control of armaments.

As for the Asiatic problems, which are undeniably connected with the question of disarmament, they must also be solved—and the sooner the better—but their solution would not be hastened by treating with them out of their framework in connection with European problems, to which they would be artificially tied.

The best method seems to be to examine the questions themselves according to their own data and to accelerate the meetings already planned or desirable for settling the problems of Asia.

## European Solution Urged

Our meeting, by its very nature, should devote itself to European problems. I do not believe that the system of reaching agreement by global exchanges is to be recommended or is even efficient. We do not see why the fate of Austria should depend on that of Korea, why there would be a connection between the unification of Germany and a change in the international status of Communist China.

Would it not only mean starting on a world level a type of bargaining which would not only be unworthy of the governments we represent but would also have a most cruel effect on the peoples whose immediate futures are affected?

For the progress of our work here it is essential that it shall be understood from the beginning that our defense effort cannot be the object of negotiation. If we ourselves are intransigent as concerns our own security, we are equally anxious to take into account the legitimate preoccupation of others with their security.

It is clear that the two pillars of a European settlement are the German and Austrian peace treaties. Never let us forget that we have already passed the tenth anniversary of the Moscow Declaration, whereby the allies promised Austria the re-establishment of her sovereignty and her independence.

In the case of Germany, the essential pre-condition for drawing up a peace treaty—that is to say the existence of a government representing Germany as a whole—is not yet fulfilled. Such a government, as we have so often insisted, would not be representative unless it resulted from free elections.

## Free German Vote Stressed

From the democratic point of view it is the election that makes the government and not the government that makes the election. We must therefore arrive at an agreement on the conditions which are essential for ensuring complete freedom for these elections.

The peace treaty with Germany must be of such a nature as not only to provide a suitable conclusion to the war but to avoid sowing the seeds of a new conflict.

It is essential at one and the same time not to leave Germany isolated in the heart of Europe and to prevent the rebirth of aggressive militarism.

The French Government believes and has always believed that Germany should be brought into a strictly defensive association which by its very nature would make any individual or collective aggressive by its members impossible.

The lessons of the past demand we should avoid ever again arriving at a state of affairs where a country in the center of Europe can play off the East against the West, increase its own power by extracting concessions from both camps in turn and thus become umpire after having been the stake. This principle is vital for the security of the four powers including the Soviet Union itself.

The French Government believes that the evolution of West German during the last few



**BIG FOUR TALKS OPEN:** Anthony Eden, left, British Foreign Secretary, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, right, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, just as they were about to take their seats yesterday at the opening of the Big Four foreign ministers' conference in the Allied Control Authority Building in Berlin. In the center background is Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister.

years leads to the conclusion that the fate of democracy in Germany is linked with the association of Germany with the West.

## By Mr. Eden

There is no doubt that this Berlin conference has aroused hopes throughout the world. The people who love peace expect us here to do a work of peace. We must not fail them.

We have been working for many months to bring about this meeting. In Britain many of us had hoped that the partnership of war could have been carried through to the years of peace. I know that the British people profoundly regret that this did not prove possible. As a consequence they had no choice but to take action with their allies to safeguard their security and to preserve peace in Europe. This was the origin of NATO.

But it is certainly the sincere wish of the British people that the contacts which have now been re-established between us at this table may be maintained. Our meeting here is the first occasion for many years when we have been able to test in this way the possibilities of agreement on those major issues which divide us in Europe. That is why our people view this conference with a generous expectation.

Our object must be first, to break down the barriers within Europe, and second, to encourage more confident relations between the nations of the West and the Soviet Union. We shall do everything we can to make this meeting successful. We hope we may be met in a like spirit.

This is a conference in Europe about Europe. At the suggestion of the Soviet Government it is being held in Berlin. Clearly, therefore, it should attempt above all to deal with the major European problems, Germany and Austria. I hope we shall concentrate our efforts on these two urgent and long-standing issues.

## Remarks on Austria Deferred

I do not want to go into the Austrian question in any detail today. Compared with the German problem it is a simple one. There is no conceivable reason why we should not at this Berlin meeting find agreement upon it.

M. Bidault has made some thoughtful observations on the problem of security with which

I fully agree. I should like to comment upon them, particularly in so far as it affects the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Her Majesty's Government are members of the United Nations. We have also a treaty with the Soviet Union which has still many years to run. We are unshakably loyal to these commitments. They insure that we can never be a party to any act of aggression and can never threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

On the contrary we are pledged doubly pledged, to oppose aggressive action against the Soviet Union. Certainly Soviet security is not threatened by us or by any one of our allies. For the agreements we have made, the treaties we have signed, are all purely defensive in character and organization. They can threaten no one.

But not one of us will deny that in this modern world any country, however, vast and powerful, can yet feel concern for its security. If despite the guarantees I have already mentioned the Soviet Government still feels that further assurances are needed regarding our defensive purposes, we shall be ready to examine that problem with them.

We are all agreed, I think, that the German question lies at the heart of our differences and difficulties in Europe.

## German Reunity Stressed

There is today an unnatural division of Germany. In their own interest and that of their neighbors the German people must find a safe and honorable place within the European community. Strong ties of blood, sentiment and interest link the Germans in the East and the West. It would be a dangerous illusion to suppose that a vigorous nation nearly 70,000,000 strong can remain divided indefinitely. So long as the Germans remain artificially divided there can be no unity or stability in Europe.

On the other hand, the peaceful reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a German peace treaty would give stability to the Continent of Europe. It would be a major contribution to peace. It would relax international tension throughout the world.

But there are certain essential considerations. German reunification without the free choice and consent of the German people would be a mockery. That is why Her Majesty's Government has so long insisted that free elections throughout

Germany are the essential first step.

Only through such elections can an all-German government be formed which has the necessary authority to speak and act on behalf of the German people and to discuss and accept a peace settlement.

In our view the all-German government should be free to assume any international rights and obligations of either regime.

The peace treaty should be negotiated with this representative all-German government, which must itself have the basic right of all free democratic nations to associate with other nations for peaceful purposes. The entry into force of the treaty will mark the end of the authority exercised by the four powers in Germany.

## By Mr. Molotov

So far as the Soviet Government is concerned it cannot accept the point of view of those who are ready to agree in advance with the futility of the Berlin meeting.

It is quite obvious that the German question cannot be considered as an isolated question and that consideration of this question is indissolubly connected with the whole problem of ensuring the security of Europe.

It is known that the main responsibility for unleashing World War I as well as World War II rests with Germany.

It follows from the above that in the present conditions the German question should be settled in a way that would exclude the possibility of new attempts of German militarism to unleash a third world war.

This also indicates the inadmissibility of involving Germany as a whole or of any part of it into a grouping such as the European Defense Community, which constitutes a military bloc of a group of European countries directed against other European states.

Anyone who now entertains any illusions as to the possibility of holding German militarism within the framework of the original plans for the formation of the so-called European army may possibly come to regret having done so, but find that it is too late.

## Five Power Talk Proposed

We express our readiness to put forward an appropriate specific proposal for the calling of a five-power meeting, which could take place some time after the Berlin conference.

At the present time these most important provisions of the United Nations Charter cannot be fulfilled if only for the reason that the Chinese People's Government, the only legal representative of the Chinese people, is not represented in the United Nations.

This situation has been created primarily as a result of the fact that the re-establishment of the lawful rights of the Chinese People's Republic is opposed by one of the states, namely, the United States of America.

The summoning of a five-power meeting is necessary first and foremost to put an end to the armament race.

It is perfectly obvious that the building of American military bases in a number of European states, on the territory of North Africa, on the territories of some Near and Middle Eastern states has nothing to do with defensive purposes. American military and nonmilitary lead-

ers have made many statements openly proclaiming that the building of numerous American military bases on foreign territories is directed against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the people's democracies. But such a policy and such plans discredit themselves in the eyes of the people and are doomed to inevitable failure.

All this suggests certain definite conclusions.

## Arms Reduction Called Urgent

First of all, it is necessary to recognize the urgent need to carry out such measures as a considerable reduction of all armaments, especially those of the great powers, and the need to adopt decisions aimed at the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, at the establishment of effective international control over this prohibition and, as the first step, to recognize the need for the governments to renounce the employment of atomic weapons. As far as the latter problem is concerned, the Soviet delegation will, naturally, proceed from the fact that a definite procedure of discussion of the atomic problem was recently indicated, a procedure which should be followed.

It is known that the convocation of the political conference on Korea has met with serious obstacles. Agreement has not yet been reached even on the composition of the conference. There are also other sharp differences between the parties concerned, a fact that has found expression in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement on the prisoners of war.

There can be no doubt that the calling of a five-power meeting would contribute to a removal of a number of difficulties existing at the present time in regard to the Korean question and to the solution of certain other urgent international problems.

## Austrian Freedom Stressed

The interests of strengthening peace in Europe and the need to assure the national rights of the Austrian people demand the earliest re-establishment of a free and independent Austria and the settlement of the Austrian question.

The Soviet Government believes that this question should be settled in accordance with the existing four-power agreement. While considering this question it is necessary to proceed from the fact that its settlement should help to ensure security of the peoples of Europe and the independence of Austria and that Austria should not become again a tool in the hands of the aggressive forces and, in particular, the tool of German militarism.

All the foregoing permits me to submit the following proposal on the agenda of the Berlin meeting:

1. Measures for reducing tension in international relations and the convening of a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of France, Britain, the U. S. A., the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic.
  2. The German question and the problem of insuring European security.
  3. The Austrian state treaty.
- In accepting such an agenda we should have an opportunity to concentrate our attention on the questions which are most urgent and essential at present.

# Text of Statement by Dulles at Big Four Parley

BERLIN, Jan. 26 (AP)—Following is the text of the speech made by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference today:

This conference affords us the chance to recapture the lofty spirit of those who with sacrificial dedication won for us the chance to make the peace. The United States has come here and will persevere in that spirit.

During the nine years that have elapsed since the end of World War II many hopes have turned to despair and many friendships have dissolved in bitterness. It is indeed five years since our foreign ministers have even met together. Those five years have been marked by a major war in Indo-China and a growing fear that we are merely in another interlude between world wars.

This conference provides an occasion for making a fresh start. We meet here in a city whose ruin and division symbolizes the tragic consequences of aggression. Here it should be possible in a mood of equalizing humility to work together for peace.

When we came here we knew there were many matters where we disagreed. But we hoped to find an area of agreement which, if it were jointly cultivated, would invigorate peaceful principles which would finally encompass us all everywhere.

We thought Germany and Austria provided such an initial field for a successful effort. That was the mood which was made manifest by the opening speeches of M. Bidault and Mr. Eden.

Neither of them uttered a single word of recrimination. Both do it constructively with the future and sought cooperation which would enable the four of us to help build here in the heart of Europe a society which, turning its back upon the tragic past, would be a monument of enduring peace.

## Molotov Speech Criticized

It was thus a matter of profound disappointment to hear the opening address of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It was not that he said anything that is new. I've heard the same speech many times before.

What was saddening was the fact that he seized upon this occasion, the opening of a new conference, this beginning of what could be a new chapter of history, to accumulate and repeat old false charges and recriminations which have been heard so often from Soviet rulers.

If any one thing is certain, it is that the future will never be a future of peace unless it reflects new ideas and new vision. Peace is not had by merely wanting it.

We all, I suppose, want peace on our own terms. Instead of getting peace, they have gotten an endless cycle of recurrent war. War has constantly bred war because, with rare exception, the victors in war have been so animated by a spirit of vengeance and hatred that they have been blinded and have themselves unwittingly become the causes of new war.

If, from this standpoint, we review the three speeches which were made yesterday we cannot but be struck by the difference. M. Bidault and Mr. Eden both made constructive proposals for Germany which, because they were just, would be lasting.

They proposed a Germany which would be united under a government of its own choosing and which would bury its antiquated nationalistic and militaristic ambitions in a durable unity with those who in the past have been the victims of its aggression.

## Lincoln's Words Recalled

As I listened to the calm, wise words of M. Bidault I could not help but think of our own President Lincoln who, animated by the spirit of "malice toward none and charity toward all," forged the political unity which produced the largest measure of human welfare that the world has yet known.

As Mr. Molotov pointed out, France, equally with Russia, was a victim of nazism but M. Bidault evoked the spirit which can bind up and heal the wounds of war.

Mr. Molotov evoked the spirit

of vengeance and of hatred which marked the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles. He recalled the decisions of Yalta. It was Yalta which called for the "dis-memberment of Germany," for the stripping of Germany of all removable assets and for impressed German labor. These decisions of Yalta which my own Government shared were understandable in the context of the day. The German war was still in full vigor and wars are not won by the spirit of tolerance.

But it is sad that today, nine years since the German armistice, one of the parties to the Yalta conference should attempt to revive the bitterness and hatred of those days and the cruel decisions which that hatred and bitterness occasioned.

I had some part in the Paris conference which created the Treaty of Versailles. It is easy for me to recall the mood of that conference. We then believed that the way to exorcise the evil from the German spirit was to occupy Germany, demilitarize Germany, impose upon Germany humiliating discriminations so she would always be a nation apart, branded openly with the stigma of Cain.

From that experiment those who truly and wisely seek peace have learned that no great nation is made harmless by subjecting it to discriminations so it cannot be an equal in the family of nations.

## Warning Issued on Curb

Restrictions such as were imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and as are implicit in the Soviet proposals of yesterday merely incite a people of vigor and courage to strive to break the bonds imposed upon them and thereby demonstrate their sovereign equality. Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited.

In contrast to the Soviet reversion to a sterile and dangerous past is the French approach as put forward by M. Bidault. France has resolved not to repeat that past. In the interest of permanent peace she is striving to forge strong links of common interest and purpose to unite Germany with its neighbors.

We can well pause here to pay tribute to the genius of France which has drawn together six nations of Western Europe in a coal and steel community, which conceived the European Defense Community and which stimulated the development of the European political community.

Such creative thinking marks freedom at its best. It condemns to ridicule those who would destine France to a humble place in a Soviet world of enforced conformity.

Mr. Molotov professes to fear that the European Defense Community would be dominated by German militarism. That is precisely what the E. D. C. is designed to prevent. It is a program which acceptably precludes any German national army and any German general staff. I say "acceptably" because the treaty operates in a non-discriminatory way. Each E. D. C. country accepts for itself in Europe the same conditions as apply to Germany.

## National Aims Ruled Out

Thus there is brought into being a modest defense force in which individual Germans have a minority part and the whole of which is dedicated to defensive purposes. No part of the European army can ever be used to serve any national ends in Europe.

This is a program which the Germans themselves willingly accept. The German people are eager, as are the people of France, to find a way to end forever the hideous spectacle of European nations fighting each other.

The treaty to create the E. D. C., conceived by France, has been signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The process of ratification is far advanced. There is no known substitute for the E. D. C. Certainly the Soviet Union has proposed none except a return to the obsolete, bankrupt system of Versailles and other so-called "peace" treaties which have bred war.

Surely statesmanship can do better than to recreate the

world's worst fire hazard. The country and people of the Soviet Union have been cruelly mutilated by the consequences of German hostility toward France. It seems incredible that Soviet leaders should now be devoting themselves to reviving that Franco-German hostility and to obstructing the unification which would realize the vision of wise European statesmen who for generations have been preaching unity as an indispensable foundation for lasting peace.

The Soviet Foreign Minister suggested that the formation of a European or a North Atlantic Treaty military force might lead to the creation of a defensive alliance of other European countries, thus splitting Europe into two opposing military groups of states. This is a grotesque inversion of history.

Following the end of World War II, the United States withdrew vast armies and air and naval forces from Europe and largely dismantled its military establishment. The United Kingdom did likewise.

Western Europe itself was left totally devoid of military strength. The Western nations put primary dependence in the pledges of the United Nations Charter.

## Korea Outbreak Recalled

They continued to do so until June, 1950. Then the sudden outbreak of hostilities in Korea showed the United Nations Charter did not constitute any absolute guaranty against armed aggression. Free nations realized their insecurity if they remained disarmed and disunited in the face of a powerful military bloc combining the resources of 800,000,000 people.

Mr. Molotov in his address cited the principle that action provokes reaction. That is true, as we see it, but not with the application which Molotov gave it.

Another disheartening aspect of the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement was the reiteration of the importance of accepting the Chinese Communist regime as one of the so-called "five great powers" which have world-wide responsibility for the establishment of peace.

This offspring of Soviet communism committed a flagrant aggression in Korea for which it was formally condemned by the United Nations. It is actively promoting aggression against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. All nations which are neighbors of this Chinese Communist regime feel menaced by its scarcely concealed aggressive purposes.

Although six months have gone by since it agreed to hold a political conference with relation to Korea, Communist China has constantly found excuses and placed obstructions in the way. This convicted aggressor is the nation which the Soviet Union chooses to be its companion in the quest for peace and which it demands be accepted by the United States and the others.

## Role for Peiping Rejected

I would like to state here plainly and unequivocally what the Soviet Foreign Minister already knows—the United States will not agree to join in a five-power conference with the Chinese Communist aggressors for the purpose of dealing generally with the peace of the world.

The United States refuses not because, as suggested, it denies the regime exists, or that it has power. We in the United States well know that it exists and has power because its aggressive armies joined with the North Korean aggressors to kill and wound 150,000 Americans who went to Korea in company with British, French and other United Nations forces to resist that aggression in response to the appeal of the United Nations.

We do not refuse to deal with it where the occasion requires. We did deal with it in making the Korean armistice. We deal with it today at Panmunjom in our effort to bring about a Korean peace conference. It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good.

Moreover, the United States rejects the Soviet concept that any so-called "five great powers" have a right to rule the world and to determine the destinies of other nations. The United Nations Charter confers no such

mandate. Nor is any such mandate to be found in the principles of justice and fair dealing.

Undoubtedly, great power carries with it a great responsibility for promoting and protecting peace but such power gives no right to dictate to smaller powers or to manage the affairs of the world. We believe in the principle embodied in the Charter of the United Nations that there is a sovereign equality of all states, great and small.

Despite the discouragement which must be the first reaction to the Soviet Minister's speech, I propose that we refuse to be discouraged and get ahead with our business. We hope that there will be a genuine opportunity for us to explore together new ideas such as have been put forward in the addresses of the foreign ministers of France and of Great Britain. In this respect, Mr. Eden has made a series of concrete proposals regarding Germany which deserve our serious consideration.

## Soviet Agenda Accepted

Mr. Molotov has proposed an agenda. It is not the agenda that we would propose but it is an agenda which we will take for the sake of getting on with our work. We do not want to turn this conference into another Palais Rose conference where our deputies met [in Paris] for many weeks in futile argument about the agenda.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has proposed a first agenda item which includes the convening of a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples' Republic. The United States is willing to deal with and dispose of this agenda item.

Then would come the German question and the problem of insuring European security. Germany is a matter which primarily concerns us here and the sooner we can get to it the better.

Then the Soviet Union proposes discussion of the Austrian state treaty. Since the treaty was already substantially concluded five years ago and since the Soviet Union has already received much more than the reparation which it originally demanded, this problem should be quickly disposed of. We would have preferred to deal with it earlier. But if the Soviet Union prefers to leave to last what is the easiest to do, then we will accommodate ourselves to their wishes in this respect.

The important thing is that we quickly show a capacity to discharge our responsibilities toward the others and not to waste our time in recriminations amongst ourselves.

I have said that power carries with it a great responsibility. Today, as the four occupying powers in Germany and Austria, we possess a responsibility for which, unless it be well discharged, the verdict of history will find us guilty.

Therefore, I say, let us get on with our work. Let us truly discharge that responsibility on which the hopes of millions center.

# Texts of Statements by Dulles and Eden at Four-Power Parley

**BERLIN, Jan. 28 (AP)—**Following are the texts of statements by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, at the Berlin conference today. (The Soviet delegation did not make available the text of the statement by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister.)

## By Mr. Dulles

When we adjourned yesterday evening, I had a sense of complete recall, recall to those days in 1945 when I gained a great admiration for Mr. Molotov's diplomatic skill. I am glad to see that he has not lost his touch.

Yesterday, Mr. Molotov produced out of the hat rabbits for all of us, peace in Korea, peace in Indo-China, an end to the armaments race, the abolition of atomic weapons, the ending of all tensions everywhere through the Pacific settlement of all the disputes which rage throughout the world, and a tremendous increase in economic prosperity.

These achievements were all to be made possible if only we were to invite Mr. Chou En-lai to come and sit down with us. That fact, Mr. Molotov implied, would automatically satisfy the aspirations for peace and welfare which men have had throughout the ages.

Who is this Chou En-lai whose addition to our circle would make possible all that so long seemed impossible? He is a leader of a regime which gained de facto power on the China mainland through bloody war, which has liquidated millions of Chinese as the only means of maintaining its power, which so diverts the economic resources of its impoverished people to military efforts that they starve by the millions, which became an open aggressor in Korea and was so adjudged by the United Nations, which promotes aggression in Indo-China by training and equipping the aggressors and supplying them with vast amounts of war munitions.

Such is the man whose presence Mr. Molotov urges would enable the world to solve all its problems and to gain lasting peace and mounting prosperity.

In my opening remarks, I said that the United States recognizes the fact of evil, but that we do not take it to our breast and call it good. That is precisely what Mr. Molotov proposes that we should do with this source of so much human misery.

There is within each of our countries an intense longing for

the peace and prosperity which Mr. Molotov so artfully portrayed. But there also remains, I believe, some capacity to assert our reason and some willingness to apply moral principles. Our reason tells us that Mr. Molotov's portrayal is the portrayal of an illusion. Our moral sense forbids the relationship which he proposes.

Mr. Molotov's proposal, when viewed in the cold light of the morning after, consists in effect of holding out to all the world the hopes which were entertained when the United Nations was formed and saying in effect that those hopes can now be realized through establishing a council of five, including Communist China.

Mr. Molotov would transfer to this council all of the essential tasks of the United Nations.

He chided us for assuming that his proposal merely involved the council dealing with questions of political character. He explained that his proposal was far broader than that. Not only would he have the council deal with all of the political problems of the world, but also with problems of a military nature and of an economic character, such as the general reduction of armaments, including the problem of atomic weapons and also the problem of removing trade barriers so that the 800,000,000 people subject to Mr. Molotov's type of Communist rule will no longer be impoverished, because they can draw upon the vastly higher standards of living which prevail in the non-Communist world.

## U. N. Charter Articles Cited

I took the occasion this morning to glance over the Charter of the United Nations. I saw that Article 11 gives the General Assembly responsibility to make proposals with reference to "disarmament and the regulations of armaments."

I saw that Article 13 gives the General Assembly the responsibility to make proposals with reference to "promoting international cooperation in the economic field."

I saw that Article 14 gives the General Assembly the right to "propose peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations."

I saw that Article 26 gives the Security Council the responsibility to develop "plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

I saw that Articles 33 to 51

give the Security Council primary responsibility to deal with the specific settlement of disputes and to take action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression.

I saw that Articles 61 and 62 established an Economic and Social Council to make recommendations with respect to international economic matters.

I saw that Article 99 gave the Secretary General the authority to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

When I thus compared the United Nations Charter with Mr. Molotov's speech, I saw that in effect he proposed that the council of the so-called "five great powers" should in effect supersede the United Nations.

## Potsdam Analogy Denied

Mr. Molotov attempted to meet my earlier statement that his proposal had this effect by pointing out that the Potsdam Agreement created a Council of Foreign Ministers even after the United Nations Charter had been adopted. The analogy is not applicable.

The Council of Foreign Ministers established under the Potsdam Agreement was established pursuant to the provisions of Article 107 of the Charter which expressly authorized the Allied powers to conclude the peace settlements. That was the limited purpose of the Potsdam council. Mr. Molotov's present proposal for a council does not at all fall within the exception provided for by Article 107 of the Charter.

It is obvious that the "five power conference" proposed by Mr. Molotov could not be a conference of temporary duration. It would be incredible that the four of us, even with the addition of the fabulous Mr. Chou En-lai, would be able quickly to solve the political, economic and military problems with which the United Nations has wrestled unsuccessfully for the past nine years. The task proposed for the conference by Mr. Molotov would inevitably turn that conference into a permanent body, with a vast network of subcommittees and experts. This would in effect replace the United Nations.

Mr. Molotov scarcely disguises the fact that this is what he has in mind. He has said that because the United Nations does not accept the credentials of the Communist regime of China, therefore the United Nations

should be bypassed and its responsibilities must be taken over by a new world organization which would be an assumption by the five so-called "great powers" of the responsibility and authority to rule the world with reference to political, armament and economic matters.

Because the United Nations has refused to admit into its councils a proclaimed aggressor, Mr. Molotov contends the United Nations must be penalized by having its responsibilities transferred to the aggressor.

Mr. Molotov has entertained us by an exhibition of his ability to make the preposterous seem plausible. However, we did not come here for entertainment. We came here in the hopes of doing some serious business.

My feeling is that we have had an adequate "first round" exchange of views on this subject and that, without forgetting what has been said, we now move on to an exchange of views regarding the other two agenda items relating to Germany and Austria.

## By Mr. Eden

At the end of his statement yesterday, in which he explained his proposal for a five-power meeting to discuss general world problems, Mr. Molotov said that in addition to such problems a five-power meeting might, in his view, also consider specific Far Eastern problems. As I see it, this means that Mr. Molotov still maintains his original proposal for a five-power conference with a very wide ranging agenda.

I explained yesterday why I consider this proposal to be impracticable. We have already had a full discussion and I will not repeat at length my reason for this view. I will only recall that, first such a conference would be impracticable because in my opinion we can only hope to make solid progress toward the reduction of international tension by tackling, in Asia as in Europe, specific practical problems of concern to the great powers and by dealing with them in their due order. This is really the only way.

In the second place, we cannot, in a meeting restricted to a few powers, deal with questions of world-wide concern and of direct interest to most of the nations of the world. Mr. Molotov mentioned, in addition to political problems, the reduction of armaments, and the development of international trade. Both these are problems of direct concern to a great many countries beside our own. The first is moreover essentially a

topic for the United Nations, before whom it now lies.

Mr. Dulles has just reminded us that Article 11 of the Charter makes this clear. As to the second, there are an immense number of ways open to us in which we can, and in fact do, seek to develop international trade, and we all have an interest in that. Mr. Molotov was good enough to mention one example yesterday in which my country is playing a part—I can assure him with my full agreement.

## Value of Such Talk Doubted

I find it hard to believe that Mr. Molotov really thinks that a five-power conference, which is already to be charged with disarmament and with the widest range of political issues is the right way to further trade. As regards the political problems, the questions of Korea and Indo-China are of special concern to countries represented here.

I am naturally ready, as I am sure my colleagues are too, to continue the search for some method of facilitating the practical solutions of these problems. By all means let us do that. But there are in any event practical difficulties which we shall have to bear in mind.

The Korean question, for ex-

ample, has been the subject of resolutions by the United Nations, and the blood and treasure of sixteen nations has been spent in resisting aggression there. We cannot ignore their contribution or their interests. M. Bidault has drawn our attention very forcibly to these practical considerations. His speech, if I may say so, introduces the stern realities of the situation.

I am sure his approach is the wise one. If we apply our minds to the problem, surely some practical contribution by this conference will become possible. But we must do some hard and clear thinking. I, therefore, suggest to my colleagues that we should, when this round of speeches is completed, defer consideration of Item 1 [a Big Five conference] on our agenda, and pass on to these specific European problems in Item 2 [Germany] and 3 [Austria].

This will give us time for further reflection and exchanges with each other which we hope may prove fruitful. We could later resume our consideration of Item 1 and I would hope that if meanwhile we can make some real progress, on the other items, we might then be better able to reach conclusions upon it.

# Texts of Principal Statements at Big Four Conference in Berlin

**BERLIN, Jan. 29 (AP)**—Following are the texts of a statement by Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, at today's meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers, of his proposal on German unity, of the proposal by Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, on disarmament and the statement by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister:

## Eden's Statement

During my opening remarks at our first meeting last Monday, I gave my colleagues a general indication of the views of Her Majesty's Government on the German question.

We believe that the peaceful reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty would fortify peace and relaxation.

The present unnatural division of the German nation means continuing instability and disunity in Europe, and this contains the seeds of future conflict and ultimate disaster for us all.

This is the principal problem which has brought us together round this table. We have a duty to find a just and lasting solution for it.

I informed my colleagues earlier this week that, when the time came for us to discuss German unity, we would have a constructive plan to present.

Accordingly I now wish to lay before you on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation a plan for German reunification.

I know that my colleagues will want to study this plan carefully.

I shall welcome their comments upon it.

I believe that it represents a positive approach to this urgent problem.

If we can have a constructive discussion, and can reach agreement on the principles I set out, then our work together in Berlin will have been truly fruitful.

We shall at last have made a significant advance on the road to European unity, prosperity and security.

I outlined on Monday the main elements of the plan.

Now that it is before us, it may be useful for me to explain rather more fully the five stages by which we suggest Germany should be reunited.

These stages are set out in the preamble to the plan.

## British Stand Explained

I propose now to take them one by one, and to explain our position on them.

First, free elections throughout Germany.

This is, for us, the cardinal element of our plan—or, indeed, of any plan for German reunification.

For any democratic country, free elections are the only way of obtaining a true expression of the people's will.

Before we can deal with representatives of a United Germany we must be certain that those representatives have been freely chosen by the German people for themselves.

Only thus can we be sure that any agreement we reach with Germany is founded on German consent.

This is essential if such agreement is to be durable and a source of future cooperation, rather than of resentment and recrimination.

Free elections throughout Germany are the first essential step.

Our purpose is a peace treaty with Germany and the entry of a peaceful and democratic Germany into the United Nations.

We must therefore ensure that the government which signs the peace treaty, and which represents the new Germany in the United Nations, is truly representative of the German people.

If elections are to be really free, there must be certain safeguards established well before and during the elections.

Moreover, under the abnormal conditions prevailing today in Germany, we think it essential that there should be adequate supervision.

This will ensure that the safeguards are observed and the elections properly conducted.

In short, the German people must be enabled freely to choose their own representatives.

It must also be clear to the Germans themselves, and to the rest of the world, that this choice has been free.

The first step must be to prepare an all-German electoral law.

## Electoral Law Proposed

We have carefully studied this problem and have come to the conclusion that the only way of ensuring the due application throughout Germany of an adequate law is for that law to be prepared and promulgated by the four powers themselves.

We four must be willing whenever necessary to discharge the responsibilities we bear in Germany.

On the other hand, both the West German Bundestag and the assembly in the Soviet zone have prepared drafts of all-German electoral laws.

These contain much valuable material.

A four-power draft, therefore, should draw very largely upon them.

I have mentioned the need for adequate safeguards for the elections.

Clearly, these must be provided for in the electoral law itself, so that we can be sure that they will be effective throughout Germany.

My colleagues will find that we regard as the main essential safeguards set out in Section I of the plan, under the heading "Guarantees for Free Elections."

I need not read them to my colleagues.

I think they speak for themselves, and I hope that we shall have no difficulty in agreeing on them, and in ensuring that each of them is effectively covered in the electoral law and in its practical application.

Then comes the question of the supervision of the elections.

To suggest that elections in a country like Germany require supervision could perhaps be misrepresented as derogatory or insulting to the German people.

I need hardly say that it is not in this spirit that we have made this proposal, and I am confident that it will not be so regarded by the German voters themselves.

I do not doubt the ability of

## Dulles and Molotov Will Discuss Eisenhower Atomic Plan Today

## U. S. and Soviet Foreign Chiefs Decide on Parley at Dinner in East Zone in Honor of Secretary of State

By M. S. HANDLER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

**BERLIN, Jan. 29**—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov dined tonight and agreed to begin their discussions on President Eisenhower's proposal on atomic energy tomorrow.

On Dec. 8 at the United Nations, President Eisenhower proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union and other atomic powers form an atomic pool for peaceful purposes.

The dinner for Mr. Dulles took place in the residence of the Soviet High Commissioner in Unter den Linden, East Berlin. It was the first time in almost five years that an American Secretary of State and a Soviet Foreign Minister met in private to break bread. It was also the first time in almost five years that a Soviet Foreign Minister offered a joint toast to President Eisenhower and the President of the Presidium of the Soviet Union, Marshall Kliment E. Voroshilov. The atmosphere that prevailed at this unusual dinner was described as "agreeable."

### Aides Accompany Dulles

Mr. Dulles was accompanied by Charles E. Bohlen, United States Ambassador to Moscow; Dr. James B. Conant, United States High Commissioner in Germany; Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and C. D. Jackson, special assistant to President Eisenhower.

Mr. Molotov was attended by members of his delegation to the Berlin conference, including Andrei A. Gromyko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Arkady Sodolev, specialist in American affairs at the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The American guests were served a dinner consisting of caviar, cold fish, soup with meat balls, lamb, quail, salad and ice cream.

### Second Invitation to West

The invitation to Mr. Dulles to dine at the Soviet residence was the second social bid extended to the West by Mr. Molotov. The French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, was the first to dine with Mr. Molotov. This dinner was followed by an invitation from British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Mr. Molotov to dine with him on Thursday.

The drama of tonight's meeting can be understood if one bears in mind that ever since the Berlin conference began last Monday the principal antagonists in the four Foreign Ministers' conference have been Mr. Dulles and Mr. Molotov. Although the social

accomplished in the current four-power conference it may well come from just such personal contacts between the Foreign amenities have been observed by both men, their arguments have once again underlined the nature of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, some believe that if anything constructive is to be Ministers as tonight's between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Molotov and not from wrangles at the conference table.

One important issue that may be discussed outside the conference room is that of the Indo-China war.

It is already apparent that Indo-China is one of the primary concerns of the French delegation.

Thus it was no surprise that when contacts between the Western Foreign Ministers and Mr. Molotov outside the conference room were inaugurated on the Soviet Foreign Minister's initiative, that the first invitation went to the French Foreign Minister and a group of his advisors for dinner last Tuesday evening.

As far as it could be learned, M. Bidault and Mr. Molotov did not break the ground for serious private negotiations but a friendly atmosphere prevailed.

There are some indications that a tentative approach has already been made outside the conference room, namely by a return to normal diplomatic procedures to sound out the possibilities of arriving at an Indo-China formula that would satisfy all parties concerned.

The first direct attempt at a return to normal procedures occurred at the Eden-Molotov dinner last Thursday, but other meetings between Western and Soviet delegates on a lower level have also taken place.

### Other Diplomats Also Meet

Anthony Nutting, the British Parliamentary Undersecretary, met with Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to London. Mr. Bohlen, the United States Ambassador to Moscow, and Georgi N. Zaroubin, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, had luncheon. Robert Joxe, the French Ambassador to Moscow, and Sergei Vinogradov, the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, also made contact.

Although there was no official information concerning the private Eden-Molotov conversation, there was an indication that serious talk had occurred after the dinner, and there was certainly an opportunity for the China question to have been discussed.

It is known that the Eden-Molotov conversation was discussed at luncheon Thursday by the three Western Foreign Ministers.

the German elector, who has learned many lessons from the past, to choose his representatives with wisdom and discrimination, provided he is free to do so.

But conditions are not yet normal in Germany.

Since the end of the war, despite all our efforts, the gulf dividing the country has become increasingly wide.

As a result, bitterness and distrust have also increased.

Two different political systems confront each other across the line dividing the Soviet zone from the rest of Germany.

The object of the elections which we are proposing is to enable the German people freely to determine the system under which their united country is to be governed.

I believe that the Germans themselves would insist that those elections, which are of such vital importance to their own future, should be under adequate supervision.

Thus they themselves, no less than their friends abroad, can be satisfied that the essential rights and freedoms outlined in our plan are available to every German.

Supervision of the elections, therefore, there must be. In our plan, we have suggested a method by which this can be carried out.

There should be a supervisory commission, on which each of the four powers should be represented.

We can discuss whether or not it should include representatives of neutral countries.

The commission should work on a committee basis.

But, if it is to carry out its task effectively, decisions must be taken by majority vote.

I need not attempt at this stage to deal with the functions and powers of the commission.

As our plan brings out, its main task will be to ensure that the elections take place in genuine freedom and that the electoral law is strictly complied with.

Whatever we finally agree regarding the composition and organization of the commission must, I think, be embodied in the electoral law, thus giving the commission a proper legal basis.

We four ministers cannot undertake the complicated task of drafting the electoral law ourselves.

### Accord on Principles Urged

But, before we assign such a task to others, we must ourselves agree on the principles on which the five stages in our plan are based.

When we have done this, we shall have completed the first essential stage of our work on the German problem.

We can then reasonably claim that we have at last made real progress towards our common goal of a German peace treaty.

I therefore suggest that we should first discuss and agree on these principles with a view to giving instruction accordingly to a working group.

This could most conveniently

consist of the four High Commissioners in Germany, or their representatives.

It should work out the necessary details and submit a report to the four governments.

The plan indicates what we think should be the essential elements of this report, and the general timetable which the working group should adopt.

The next stage in the plan, is, of course, the elections themselves.

They should take place as soon as possible after the four powers have promulgated the electoral law.

These will result in the first truly representative all-German national assembly for many years.

This assembly's first task must be to prepare a constitution for United Germany.

Meanwhile, and indeed until an all-German government can assume full control, I am sure that there will be great advantage if we keep in being at least part of the supervisory machinery set up under the electoral law.

Only thus can we ensure the continued observance throughout Germany of the conditions of genuine freedom which will have been established.

This is a matter to which the working group must give attention.

While the new national assembly is drafting the constitution, it may find it convenient to establish some form of provisional all-German authority.

This would help the assembly to draft the constitution.

It could also prepare the nucleus of the future all-German administrative machine to take over, when the time comes, from the existing German machinery in the four zones.

There is another task which it might undertake.

We all wish to conclude a peace treaty as quickly as possible.

The national assembly could, if it wished, request the provisional authority to open preliminary negotiations with the four powers for the peace treaty.

All this should be provided for in the four-power law.

Next, we come to the adoption of the constitution and the subsequent, and I hope rapid formation of an all-German government.

The constitution will be the basis on which the all-German government is formed.

This government will then at once assume full responsibility for negotiating and concluding the peace treaty.

At the same time, other institutions, such as, perhaps, a supreme court, can be established, as provided by the constitution.

The formation of the all-German government, we must obviously avoid creating a vacuum.

### Continuity of Rule Provided

Therefore, the German Federal Republic and the German Administration in the Soviet zone must continue in being,

in order to ensure continuity of administration and the execution of German international obligations.

But when an all-German government has been formed, there will have to be a transfer of powers to it, and the Federal Republic and the East German Administration must at the right time come to an end.

In our opinion, the decisions about this, especially on timing and procedure, must be left to the national assembly.

Again, there must not be a complete break in German international relationships with other countries.

The all-German government, once established, must be free to assume such of the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic, and of the Soviet zone of Germany, as it considers necessary.

It must also be free to conclude other international agreements, if it so desires, provided of course, that they are consistent with the United Nations charter.

On the other hand, our four Governments have special rights and responsibilities in Germany until a peace treaty comes into force.

The plan sets out how certain of those rights should be exercised.

So far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, our rights will be only in the general interest of peace and with special regard to the interests of the German people.

### Final Section Explained

The final section of the plan deals with the signature and entry into force of the peace treaty.

I think it explains itself. I hope that what I have said may help my colleagues in their study of the plan.

I look forward to discussing it with them as soon as they feel ready to do so.

May I once again summarise the essential features of the plan and in particular the basic thought which runs through it all?

The question of freedom is inseparable from the problem of elections.

We must reach agreement on free elections as the first step.

We must also agree that all-German government resulting from those elections must itself be free especially in the following respects:

(I) It must be free to assume any international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic or of the East German regime which are consistent with the United Nations Charter.

(II) It must be free to negotiate the peace treaty. A dictated treaty would be unacceptable to Germany and to ourselves.

(III) It must be free to associate with other nations for peaceful purposes.

Thus the basic principle of our whole plan is that of genuine freedom. We believe that that is the only principle upon which will be able to join as an equal, peaceful and democratic partner with the other countries of Europe and of the world in the advance toward peace and prosperity.

## Eden's Proposal

### METHOD OF REUNIFICATION

German reunification and the conclusion of a freely negotiated peace treaty with a United Germany should be achieved in the following stages:

I. Free elections throughout Germany.

II. The convention of a national assembly resulting from those elections.

III. The drafting of a constitution and the preparation of peace treaty negotiations.

IV. The adoption of the constitution and the formation of an all-German government responsible for the negotiation of the peace treaty.

V. The signature and entry into force of the peace treaty.

### I. Free Elections Throughout Germany.

Free and secret elections should be held throughout Germany including Berlin at the earliest possible date. These elections must be held in conditions of genuine freedom. Safeguards must be agreed to assure this freedom before, after and during the elections. The elections must also be supervised in such a manner as to make sure that these safeguards are observed and that the elections are properly conducted.

### Preparation for the Election

a. The electoral law. The electoral law should be prepared by the four occupying powers, taking into consideration the electoral laws already drafted for this purpose by the Federal Bundestag and the Soviet zone Volkskammer. When approved it should be promulgated throughout Germany by the four powers. Elections should take place as soon as possible thereafter.

b. Guarantees for free elections. The draft electoral law must contain provisions which will guarantee the genuine freedom of the elections. These include, amongst others: freedom of movement throughout Germany. Freedom of presentation of candidates. Immunity of candidates. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization. Freedom of association and political meetings. Freedom of expression for all. Freedom of the press, radio and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc. Secrecy of the vote. Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

c. Supervision of the elections. Supervision should be carried out by a supervisory commission throughout the whole of Germany. There should be a central body with subordinate bodies at Land [state] and local levels. All votes should be counted and verified at local headquarters in the presence of the supervisory commission.

i. Composition of the supervisory commission: The commission should be composed of representatives of the four powers with or without participation of neutrals.

ii. Organization of the commission: The commission should work on a committee basis. Its decisions should be taken up by a majority vote.

iii. Functions and powers of the commission: The principal task of the commission will be to insure that the elections take

## 7 Seized in West Berlin In Protest Against Film

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

**BERLIN, Jan. 29**—West Berlin was the scene today of the first political demonstration since the four-power conference began five days ago.

Seven persons were arrested in what was described by the police as a Communist-inspired demonstration against a film depicting the life of Hitler. The film had its premiere in West Berlin today. Demonstrators interrupted the performance by throwing stench bombs and shouting.

The film, entitled "Five Minutes Past Twelve," has been drawing crowds in West Germany for several weeks. It has been described by major West German democratic parties as a warning to the German people against dictatorship, militarism and war.

place in genuine freedom and in strict conformity with the provisions of the electoral law.

Method for completing the above preparations. The foreign ministers must in the first place agree on the principles contained in this plan. They will then give instructions accordingly to a working group consisting of the High Commissioners in Germany of the four powers or their representatives which will work out the necessary details and submit a report.

This report should include in particular:

1. A draft of the all-German electoral law.

2. Detailed recommendations regarding the supervision of the elections.

The working group should begin work not later than two weeks after the conclusion of the Berlin conference. It should submit its report to the four governments not later than one month after beginning its work.

### II. The National Assembly

All-German elections will establish an all-German national assembly. The first task of this assembly will be the preparation of a constitution.

During the period between the end of the elections and full assumption of control by the all-German government it will be desirable for part of the supervisory machinery to remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. Recommendations on this subject should be included in the report of the working group.

### III. Drafting of the Constitution and Establishment of a Provisional All-German Authority.

The national assembly will begin drafting a constitution as soon as possible after its meeting. Meanwhile, it may form a provisional all-German authority charged with assisting the assembly in drafting a constitution and with preparing the nucleus of future all-German ministries. If the assembly so decides the authority may also open with the four powers, on a preliminary basis, negotiations for a peace treaty.

### IV. Adoption of the Constitution and Formation of an All-German Government for the Negotiations of the Peace Treaty.

The constitution will be submitted to the assembly as soon as possible after the final draft has been agreed. Immediately it has been adopted an all-German government will then be responsible for negotiations and the conclusion of the peace treaty. At the same time, such other institutions as may be provided for in the constitution shall be established.

As soon as the all-German government has been formed, the national assembly will determine how the powers of the Federal government and the German authorities in the Soviet zone shall be transferred to the all-German government and how the two former shall be brought to an end.

The all-German governments shall have the authority to assume the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish.

Until entry into force of the peace treaty each of the four powers will exercise with respect to the national assembly and the all-German government only those of its rights which relate to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, Berlin, the reunification of Germany and a peace treaty.

Decisions of the national assembly and the all-German government in carrying out this plan will not require the approval of the four powers. Such decisions may not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the four powers.

### V. Signature and Entry Into Force of the Peace Treaty.

Signatories to the treaty should include all states or the successors thereof which were at war with Germany. The treaty should enter into force when ratified by the four powers and by Germany.

### Bidault's Resolution

The Government of the United States of America, of France, of the Soviet Socialist Republic and of the United Kingdom,

Being convinced that the solution of international differences necessary for the establishment of a durable peace would be considerably facilitated by an agreement on disarmament,

Being persuaded that such an agreement on a coordinated disarmament program, which includes the indispensable guarantees, and is under international control and authorizes only those armaments necessary for individual or collective security of the states, would lighten the burden which military expenditures constitute for peoples and would contribute to the re-establishment of confidence between nations,

Proclaim that any sincere effort with this end in view requires that in order to achieve

cessation of all hostilities, encouragement and support of aggression everywhere in the world should be outlawed and condemned.

Pledge themselves to unite their effort with those of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations in order that the commission should be able to reach substantive agreement on the general principles of disarmament which might permit the calling of a general disarmament conference, in conditions favorable for its success, in conformity with the resolution of Jan. 11, 1952 of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

### Molotov's Statement

On Jan. 27 I turned over to Mr. Eden in his position as chairman a statement by the Government of the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] directed to the foreign ministers' conference so that it could be discussed in due time. A copy of the letter addressed to Mr. Eden together with copies of a letter from the Government of the German Democratic Republic was turned over to Mr. Bidault and Mr. Dulles. The Government of the German Democratic Republic raises the question that a participation of representatives of the German Democratic Republic and West Germany would be necessary when the conference discusses the German problem.

The Soviet delegation holds the opinion that it is necessary to devote particular attention to this request of the German Democratic Republic. From West Germany no such request has been received. But the Soviet Union does not think that West Germany does not want to be represented. The Soviet Government knows very little about the position of the West German Government about questions which are to be discussed at this meeting. The Soviet Government always has been of the opinion there can be no settlement of the German question in a peaceful and democratic manner if the representatives of Germany do not participate in the settlement.

# Text of Dulles' Speech on German Reunification

BERLIN, Jan. 30 (AP)—Following is the text of a speech today by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the foreign ministers' conference:

This second item of our agenda deals with "the German question" and also "the problem of insuring European security." History compels us to treat these two matters together.

From this very city where we are, still largely in ruins, have been launched two World Wars. Two of our four countries, France and the Soviet Union, have suffered land invasion both in World War I and World War II. The United Kingdom was invaded by air. All four of us have twice had to marshal to the full our human and material resources in order to withstand and finally to throw back the tides of German aggression.

Surely we have a vital interest to do all that is in our power to make sure that such aggressions should never occur again. Indeed, that concern is shared by the German people themselves who have suffered cruelly from militarism and tyranny from some of their own people.

The sacrifices which have been made during these two World Wars have now placed in our hands a large measure of power to influence the future, for better or for worse, and to determine whether the coming years will preface a durable peace or another disastrous war.

Nine years have now elapsed since the German armistice, and peace is still unmade. In many ways, that delay is a reproach to us. But there is another side to the matter. The immediate aftermath of a bitter and exhausting war usually finds that reason is submerged by sentiments of hatred and revenge. The instinctive reaction at that time is to turn to repression as a means to future safety. But the lapse of time restores reason to its proper place and now, nine years having passed, we should be able to invoke wisdom and statesmanship to be our guides.

## Two Aspects of Problem

The problem that we face here has two major aspects. First, there is the task of uniting Germany, and secondly, there is the task of insuring that united Germany shall be a peaceful Germany. I shall first speak of the problem of German unification.

The partition of Germany creates a basic source of instability, and there is little merit in our talking about peace if at the same time we are perpetuating conditions which endanger the peace.

I am firmly convinced that a free and united Germany is essential to stable peace in Europe and that it is in the interest of all four nations which are represented here around this table.

How did it come to pass that there is this disunity—this disunity of Germany which is, as I say, a danger to peace? We here are not free from responsibility in that respect, because it is the disagreement of our four nations which has created the present division of Germany. It is the disagreement of our four nations which perpetuates the present division of Germany, and it is only we who can end this division of Germany.

As I pointed out in some earlier remarks that I made, that fact—the fact that we four have a unique responsibility in Germany—should make this German problem a central theme of our work here. It can be the test as to whether or not we are really qualified to work together for peace.

There exists this partition of Germany which is a threat to the peace. It is in our power to end it. All that is needed to end it is that we should have the will to end it. If we do not have that will, then I say we may be peace-loving nations, but we are not peace-seeking nations.

Mr. Eden yesterday submitted a precise and a detailed plan to achieve the unification and freedom of Germany by an orderly series of actions that would start with free elections. It seems to us that this British proposal is clear, is reasonable and is well designed to achieve at the earliest practical moment a full German settlement, including a German peace treaty.

## Modifications Foreseen

I have no doubt that our discussions here around the table, as we debate this intricate matter, may suggest the desirability of some modifications in detail of the plan which Mr. Eden has submitted and perhaps some clarifications. Certainly, I think we must all have an open mind on that, and I certainly have an open mind. But I do so say that in general I endorse the proposal that has been submitted on behalf of the United Kingdom and associate myself with it.

There are one or two observations which I would make, particularly suggested by some remarks that have been made by Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov has, for example, suggested that the proposal of the United Kingdom would be in essence an attempt on the part of the four occupying powers to impose unification upon Germany rather than letting the Germans work out their own affairs. As I read Mr. Eden's project, it would be just the contrary.

Under this proposal, the essential steps in the entire unification process, including their timing, are left up to the freely elected representatives of the German people. Who is it under this plan who will draft the new constitution? It will be the freely elected representatives of the German people. Who will set up a provisional all-German authority and later on the all-German government? The all-German national assembly. Who decides when powers shall be transferred from the existing

## Dulles Is the Doodler At the Big Four Talks

BERLIN, Jan. 30 (Reuters)—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is the doodler at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference here.

Russia's Vyacheslav M. Molotov sits with elbows on the walnut table staring steadily ahead through his steel-rimmed spectacles while other ministers are speaking.

Britain's Anthony Eden fidgets in his chair, leaning back, crossing and uncrossing his legs, lunging forward to scribble a note.

France's Georges Bidault frequently just leans back and shuts his eyes. He might be asleep except that at the end of the speech he can quote every passage that affects his country.

Mr. Dulles is the doodler. As he leans forward on the table facing the Soviet minister, he makes lazy circles and loops on his note pad, stopping every now and then as Mr. Molotov warms up to a particularly fierce attack on United States foreign policy. Then Mr. Dulles goes on with his doodling.

regimes in Eastern and Western Germany to the all-German government, and what international rights and obligations it shall assume? Again, the national assembly and the all-German government.

As I read the plan, the entire emphasis seems to be on enabling freely elected German authorities to make the crucial decisions all along the road to a final German settlement. That observation brings me to comment on another point upon which Mr. Molotov has commented, namely, this problem of free elections.

Any proper plan for German unification must provide adequate safeguards of election freedoms. This it seems is covered by the proposal that we are considering. Conditions of genuine freedom must exist not only on election day itself, but for a reasonable period of time before the votes are cast, and also after the elections, in order to insure that there shall be no reprisals, and that everyone may safely vote his convictions.

## Supervisory Machinery

To take care of this latter point, the United Kingdom plan would maintain the supervisory machinery in operation until the all-German government assumes full control and is able to assure democratic freedoms throughout Germany in accordance with its constitution.

We can be sure that the 50,000,000 inhabitants of Western Germany are willing and anxious to cooperate to insure such free elections. The same can be said for my Government and also, I believe, for the French and British Governments. The 18,000,000 inhabitants of the Soviet zone deserve the same kind of assurances, and I trust that my Soviet colleague will agree to the importance of providing those assurances.

Mr. Molotov has made some observations about the pending proposal, which seem to me to imply a lack of full understanding of that proposal, or possibly, I might suggest, the need of further clarification of the proposal. I will not attempt to go into those matters myself, because I am confident that Mr. Eden, who submitted the plan, will himself deal with these matters. But as I read the plan, it is not subject to the type of objections which Mr. Molotov has indicated, and I hope that, on the basis of further clarifications, he would find that the plan itself, at least in its broad outlines, is reasonable and one that we could proceed to adopt as providing a way of bringing an end to this dangerous condition of the continued partition of Germany.

Let me now turn to what I referred to as the second aspect of the problem, that is the problem of security. We want Germany unified, but also we want to be sure that a united Germany will be a peaceful Germany. As I have said, the elapsed time since the armistice should enable us now calmly—and I hope wisely—to consider how best to achieve this indispensable result.

## The Lessons of History

On this point, history has much to teach us. It teaches us that a stable peace cannot be achieved by some countries imposing upon other countries discriminatory restrictions. These methods fail by their very nature. They fail because they present a direct challenge to the spirit of nationalism, and themselves they provoke efforts to demonstrate sovereign equality. The very provisions which are designed to create controls in themselves breed international lawlessness and violence.

The tragic failures of the past should warn us not to resort here to the methods that have so often been tried and as often failed. If we do not want a revival of German militarism and an excess of nationalism, we must ourselves admit the natural and proper desire of the German people to be equals in the family of nations. We must enable them to contribute to a system of security, which, threatening none, defends all.

Our problem consists, most of all, in finding a worthy outlet for the great energy and the vitality of the German people. Whether we like it or not, that vitality is a fact. It is a fact that cannot be forcibly repressed for long, and it is a fact which need not destroy the welfare of

all of Europe, but which can be brought to serve that welfare.

The essential thing is to find a way in which the energies of all of the European countries which form a natural community will be pooled in common constructive tasks rather than perverted to struggles by one to dominate the other.

That vision is already being translated into reality. Under the leadership of France, six nations of Continental Europe are establishing a community. Already, the Coal and Steel Community exists. The same six countries have signed to create a Defense Community, and other aspects of community association are being actively explored.

We have welcomed the steps which the United Kingdom has taken to associate itself with and support this community. The United States also, although not itself a European power, would associate itself durably with the community through the North Atlantic Treaty, which, I recall, is much more than a mere military alliance.

The Soviet Union professes to fear that this new community which is being born might be dangerous to it. This community, it is true, will make Europe healthy, more prosperous and in that sense more strong, but that is nothing to fear if at the same time Europe is made more peaceful.

## Bar to Aggression Seen

That is the purpose and that would be the sure result. No more will there be national armies to fight each other and to invade others in a quest for national triumphs. There will be only the common army so interlocked that no single member of the community could in practice commit armed aggression. There would be no more Ger-

man Army. There would be no German General Staff, and the military service of individual Germans would be closely restricted.

Such a European army could go into action only in response to great and pressing needs of self-defense. It could not be used without the concurrence of countries which themselves have had bitter experience with German militarism and which could never be a party to its revival.

The West German Federal Republic, representing over two-thirds of the German people, has eagerly turned toward the building of a European community in which its own nationalism will be submerged.

It is indeed a historic moment when the Germans have come to realize the danger to themselves and to all Europe if their energies are confined to nationalistic channels and if their future success must be measured only in terms of national grandeur. The German desire to bury the excesses of German nationalism is a desire that cannot be repulsed without grave hazards for the future.

Surely this is a matter which the four of us ought to be able to consider together with the feeling that we are bound together by the same interests. The United States credits the Soviet Union with a sincere desire to achieve security in Europe. Certainly that is our own desire. It would be a tragedy if a division between us on this matter created the very insecurity which we all would vanish.

My plea is therefore that we explore this matter, not in any sense as representing opposing sides, but as a group of countries which, with the Germans, seek a single goal—the transforming of Europe from a cockpit of war to a home of abiding peace.

# Remarks by 3 Foreign Ministers and Soviet Stand on German Treaty

**BERLIN, Feb. 1 (AP)—**Following are excerpts from speeches at the foreign ministers' conference today by Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, plus a Soviet statement on a German peace treaty:

## By M. Bidault

It appeared to me that, for the moment, we must concentrate our attention on the question of the free elections. In this regard, two points seem to be essential.

The manner of organizing these elections ought necessarily to be worked out by the four powers. The freedom of the elections must be guaranteed, mainly, through the control commissions functioning in an entirely impartial manner, and assuring that the necessary guarantees have been observed during and after the elections. I do not believe that the ministers ought to lose themselves in details. I do not believe that they have to enter right into the substance of the matter.

I consider, however, as necessary that an accord be obtained. Hence I recommend the main lines of the plan presented by Mr. Eden, which seems to me to fulfill the conditions I have outlined.

I am, on the other hand, in agreement with Mr. Dulles in estimating that our discussion can certainly produce on various points an improvement of a project which, if I have properly understood it, is being presented to us as a basis for discussion.

I reserve the right, in the course of the debate, to make certain remarks on this subject. For the moment, I will limit myself to one observation on the problem of the make-up of the control commissions. The plan envisages, in this respect, two possibilities. The commissions can be composed of representatives of the four powers with or without the participation of neutrals.

## Role for Neutrals Backed

My preference is definitely for the first alternative. I consider that the presence of neutrals in the commissions would underline even more the completely impartial character of these bodies. It would facilitate more-over the adoption of a rule of majority decisions within the commissions—a rule evidently indispensable if we want these commissions to be able to function effectively.

Everything depends in reality on the order of things and I would want to be more sure than I am now that Mr. Molotov is fully in agreement with us in thinking that the elections ought to precede the formation of the government and not the government preceding the elections.

On the other hand, the statements of the Soviet delegation according to which it would be desirable to grant the government of a reunited Germany—during the period preceding the conclusion of a peace treaty—a total liberty of action in the domain of internal and foreign affairs, have seemed encouraging to us to the extent in which they coincide with a thesis which the Western powers have maintained in the notes they have addressed to the Soviet Union for about two years. The Soviet delegation will remember that we have constantly insisted on assuring to the government, issuing from free elections, a complete liberty of action.

There is no reason, as I see it, why this liberty should not extend equally to the domain of foreign relations.

Also, when the Soviet delegation demands the application, in the period preceding the peace treaty, of a clause which it has until now reserved for the peace treaty itself and by which a united Germany would be required to pledge herself by contract not to participate in any coalition or alliance, we fear that such a pledge will only result in transforming the promised liberty into real subjection.

## Molotov Is Said to Err

The chief of the Soviet delegation, as has already been emphasized, seems to be mistaken on the sense of proposals made by my British colleague in this respect.

It is not at all a question of extending automatically to all Germany the international commitments made by the (West German) Federal Republic.

It means, on the contrary, giving to the Government of a united Germany a full liberty of choice.

In other words it will be up to the German Government itself to decide if it desires to assume the international obligations previously contracted by the Federal Republic or by the (East) German Democratic Republic.

There is nothing to insure a priority that this decision will be necessarily favorable to the obligations which interest France, the United States and Great Britain and not to the obligations which interest the Soviet Union.

Certainly in line with the considerations which I have presented previously and taking into account my conviction that the destiny of democracy in Germany is tied to the association of Germany with a united Europe, I would want to be sure that the Government of a united Germany would not put European unification again in question.

I understand, equally, Mr. Molotov would like to be certain events will take another turn.

I should, nevertheless, like to observe that the only way for us to agree on this subject is to agree on both sides and to hand our decision to the German people.

In other words, and I would like to be perfectly clear on this point, France does not demand as a condition for German unification the entry of Germany—all Germany—into the European community; but it is quite evident that we should, on our side, assert our refusal to allow our (Soviet) partner's demand of an opposite condition; that is a prohibition for Germany to enter into such a community.

## By Mr. Eden

Our main task is to reach agreement on the reunification of Germany, and the conclusion



**MINISTERS MEET IN SOVIET SECTOR:** Conference room in Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, where the Foreign Ministers of the U. S., Britain, Russia and France are now

meeting. Seated with assistants are John Foster Dulles, U. S., (1); Georges Bidault, France (2); Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Union (3), and Anthony Eden, Britain (4).

of a peace treaty with an all-German government resulting from free elections. But I would be the last to deny that a German settlement is closely linked with the problem of European security. That is a point on which Mr. Molotov has laid stress, and I entirely agree with him. The solution of the German problem must be one which safeguards European security.

The Soviet delegation has said that our aim should be to aid a peaceful and democratic Germany to become once more a great power in Europe. I suppose, therefore, that the Soviet Government would agree that the new Germany must have the right to defend herself. This must clearly be so. For the Soviet draft of a German peace treaty, first presented in March, 1952, and put forward again in August, 1953, provides for Germany to have her national armed forces (land, air and naval) as necessary for the defense of the country. But at the same time—and this, I hope, is common ground between us—there must be safeguards against any renewal of German aggression. After two world wars all our peoples have a right to insist upon this. Broadly speaking, therefore, our objectives are the same.

We do not believe that an imposed settlement is practical politics, or can lead to anything but disaster in the future. Therefore it is our purpose to associate Germany so closely with other peace-loving states that she will neither seek nor be able to use her regained strength for aggressive purposes. It is our conviction that this can best be achieved through the European Defense Community.

The treaty which sets up the European Defense Community lays down that the community is designed to contribute to the maintenance of peace, and that its purposes are exclusively defensive. There will be no national armies, and the individual countries will not have the power or the means to engage in war on their own.

This is a revolutionary conception. It is the heart of the whole matter. It is essential that we should all understand its significance. It means that if one of the countries (and I take Germany as an example, since we are discussing the future of Germany) wished to violate its pledges under the treaty, it would not in fact be in a position to do so. It would not have the necessary national forces at its disposal. Its soldiers and airmen, integrated in international formations and dependent on a common system of production and supply, would be in no position to act independently.

I believe, therefore, that the European Defense Community provides the true answer to the fears which the Soviet delegation has expressed regarding the revival of German militarism.

We have no intention of demanding that the new German government should be bound in advance to accept the E. D. C. Treaty or any other international obligations. We think that it will wish to do so, and it is our strong conviction that in such an organization Germany will be safer for herself and a safer neighbor for all Europe.

## By Mr. Molotov

Do the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America present here agree that the primary responsibility for unleashing both the First World War and the Second World War rests with German militarism? Our task is to prevent such a state of affairs arising where aggressive German militarism could again disturb peaceful life in Europe and unleash a Third World War.

The Soviet people constantly keep that in mind. They cannot forget the immense sacrifices made by our people in the past. Facts and figures can provide only a pale reflection of those sacrifices.

Can we forget the fact that as a result of Hitlerite aggression 1,710 towns and over 70,000 villages in our country were fully or partly destroyed or burned down? It will be recalled that financial estimates of the losses sustained by the Soviet Union show that the direct damage inflicted on the Soviet territory that was under Hitlerite occupation is estimated according to incomplete data at \$123,000,000,000.

Can we forget that as a result of the aggression of German militarism the Soviet Union lost irrevocably in battle, or due to the fact Soviet citizens were ruthlessly driven out of their country, about 7,000,000 of its population? Great sacrifices have also been made by other peoples of Europe, and not only of Europe.

But everyone knows that it is the U. S. S. R. that suffered most of all and bore the brunt of the struggle against aggression and for a just peace. The Government of the U. S. S. R., expressing the deep-

## Support for Atom Pool Plan Said to Ease Soviet's Stand

### Moscow Call for Mere Pledge to Bar Bomb Termed Reaction to Eisenhower Aim

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON  
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

**UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Feb. 1—**The world-wide applause for President Eisenhower's atomic speech here last December apparently has forced the Soviet Union to play its hole card—a demand that the atomic powers, while continuing to produce atomic bombs, pledge themselves not to use them.

This, according to reports from the Berlin conference, is the proposal that Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, has begun discussing with John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State.

Actually, the new version of an old Soviet plan was first outlined in the Soviet Government's statement of Dec. 21, in which it announced its willingness to discuss President Eisenhower's proposal that the atomic powers set up an international pool of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Since the world has been listening for seven and a half years to minor variations of the Soviet demand for the unconditional prohibition of the manufacture, possession or use of atomic bombs, the significance of this change was not realized at first. However, Mr. Molotov repeated the new version in his speech at the opening of the Berlin conference. All signs indicate that this will become a major thesis of Communist propaganda.

## New Approach Indicated

Certainly any country that can dispel the fear of atomic destruction that hangs over the world will earn the gratitude of mankind. President Eisenhower's proposal, though it did not affect the basic question of atomic weapons, evidently convinced the Kremlin that it, too, must try a new approach.

For the underdeveloped countries of the world, on which the Soviet Union is now concentrating its propaganda efforts, have shown understandable enthusiasm over the possibility that they will be given a chance to benefit from what is known here as "an atomic Point Four."

At first glance it may appear that there is little difference between prohibiting atomic weapons and merely prohibiting their use. Either way, the layman might argue, he will be spared the horrors of destruction by atomic and hydrogen weapons if another world war comes.

However, the United States had succeeded pretty well over the years in convincing public opinion that the prohibition of atomic weapons, without effective controls to guarantee that no outlaw country continued to make them, would be a snare and a delusion.

But the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons is much easier to justify. Moreover, it is in line with the Soviet Union's argu-

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

The Soviet delegation suggests that we proceed from the assumption that the German problem is primarily a problem for the Germans themselves to solve. The German people cannot be just an object of decisions or actions of other states. Only the German people, only the Germans themselves can achieve a genuine settlement of the German problem. Any other settlement would be unreasonable and unfair to the German people.

On the other hand the circumstances arising out of the second World War have brought us to a state of affairs where the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the United States of America cannot stand aside from the settlement of this problem. They cannot remain passive on the sidelines. Since the end of the war they have played an active and particularly important part in the settlement of the German question.

It is certainly relevant only to the present period when a peace treaty with Germany has not yet been concluded. As soon as

vanchists in Europe and in Germany herself.

This policy would be disliked by the German militarists—but they are a small, though influential, minority of the German public. It would, however, find support among the widest sections of the German people. And this, in the long run, will prove the decisive factor in favor of a lasting peace and security in Europe.

The most ardent champions of a creation of a West European army are, as is known, the American ministers. It is easier for them to do so, in so far as the U. S. A. does not intend to include its own troops in that army.

And another question arises, namely, what is meant by the words of Mr. Dulles that the "European Defense Community" will allegedly "make Europe healthy, more prosperous." It is known that the "European community" includes only six countries. Luxembourg also is included in that number. It is also known that Europe counts not six but thirty-two countries. How could it happen that six countries forming "the community" will make healthy the whole of Europe where there are thirty-two countries? Will not these six countries overstrain themselves in such an undertaking?

The Bonn-Paris agreements turn West Germany into the main base of the preparations for a new war in Europe. West Germany will become only the main but not a single military base for new aggression. She will only be an addition to the network of American military bases in Europe, North Africa, the Near East and Middle East and on many islands of the Atlantic.

It is not difficult to understand that all this has nothing to do with making Europe healthy and more prosperous. The aims of all this are directed against the U. S. S. R. and the people's democracies. Therefore we cannot ignore this.

Inspection Demanded

The United States has already given its answer in the United Nations to a similar Soviet demand that the United States ratify the Geneva Convention prohibiting germ warfare. While strenuously denying Soviet charges that the United States had used germ warfare in Korea, the United States refused to pledge itself against using it in the future.

Instead, the United States insisted that all such weapons should be regulated or prohibited only as part of a comprehensive disarmament atomic plan—complete with inspection and other safeguards.

The Soviet proposal comes at a particularly awkward time because the new United States budget shows clearly that the Eisenhower Administration will rely principally on atomic weapons if another war comes. This policy was stated explicitly by Mr. Dulles in a speech just before the Berlin conference. He said that in the event of Communist aggression the United States would confront any aggression "with a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."

From a military point of view there is no question of the fact that the United States, and the free world as a whole, would gain from the use of atomic bombs. But the fear of atomic weapons is so great that the Asian nations, not to mention a considerable body of opinion in Western Europe, apparently would prefer defeat by the Communists to a victory achieved at the cost of the destruction that would result from the use of atomic weapons.

Therefore Mr. Molotov's proposal will require careful consideration by the makers of United States policy.

Both France and the Soviet Union, should not pursue a policy of isolation in regard to each other, but they should seek persistently to strengthen Franco-Soviet relations, and to create conditions of normal cooperation among the U. S. S. R., France and Germany, and at the same time, to isolate the German militarists and re-

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

The Soviet delegation suggests that we proceed from the assumption that the German problem is primarily a problem for the Germans themselves to solve. The German people cannot be just an object of decisions or actions of other states. Only the German people, only the Germans themselves can achieve a genuine settlement of the German problem. Any other settlement would be unreasonable and unfair to the German people.

On the other hand the circumstances arising out of the second World War have brought us to a state of affairs where the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the United States of America cannot stand aside from the settlement of this problem. They cannot remain passive on the sidelines. Since the end of the war they have played an active and particularly important part in the settlement of the German question.

It is certainly relevant only to the present period when a peace treaty with Germany has not yet been concluded. As soon as

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

est feelings and the will of its people, considers it is its duty to do everything it can to prevent another world war. It is precisely for that reason that it will oppose any attempts to revive German militarism. Those who are now promoting the resurgence of German militarism bear a grave responsibility for the fate of the world, and first and foremost for the fate of the nations of Europe.

treaty with Germany will establish stable conditions of peace for the German people, will facilitate Germany's development as a united, independent, democratic and peaceable state in accordance with the Potsdam decisions, and will enable the German people to cooperate peacefully with other nations.

Accordingly, the governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France have decided to proceed at once to draw up a peace treaty with Germany.

The governments of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., the United Kingdom and France consider that the peace treaty should be prepared with the participation of Germany, as represented by an all-German government, and that the treaty should be based on the following principles:

## PARTICIPANTS

The United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the U. S. A., France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands and the other states which participated with their armed forces in the war with Germany.

## POLITICAL CLAUSES

1. Germany shall be re-established as an integral state. This will put an end to the partition of Germany and make it possible for a united Germany to develop as an independent, democratic and peaceable state.

2. All armed forces of the occupying powers shall be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the coming into force of the peace treaty. Simultaneously, all foreign military bases on German territory shall be liquidated.

3. The German people shall be guaranteed democratic rights and all persons under German jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sect, language or religion, shall enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, press, religious worship, political opinion and public meeting.

4. Democratic parties and organizations in Germany shall be guaranteed freedom of activity, with the right freely to decide their internal affairs, hold congresses and meetings, and enjoy freedom of press and publication.

5. The existence of organizations hostile to democracy and the maintenance of peace shall not be permitted on German territory.

6. All former members of the German army, including officers and generals, and all former Nazis with the exception of those who are serving sentences of court for the commission of crimes, shall be granted civil and political rights on an equal footing with all other German citizens, enabling them to participate in the building of a peaceable and democratic Germany.

7. Germany shall undertake not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any country that participated with its armed forces in the war with Germany.

8. No obligations of a political or military character, arising out of the treaties or agreements concluded by the governments of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic prior to the signing of the peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of Germany into a single state, shall be imposed on Germany.

## TERRITORY

The territory of Germany shall be determined by the boundaries fixed in the decisions of the Potsdam conference of the great powers.

## ECONOMIC CLAUSES

1. No restrictions shall be imposed upon Germany in respect to the development of her peace economy, which must serve to promote the welfare of the German people. Nor shall any restrictions be imposed upon Germany in respect to trade with other countries, navigation and access to world markets.

2. Germany shall be exempted from payment to the U. S. A., the United Kingdom, France and the U. S. S. R. of state postwar debts with the exception of debts arising out of trade obligations.

## MILITARY CLAUSES

1. Germany shall be permitted to have such national armed forces (land, air and naval) as shall be required for the country's defense. These armed forces shall be limited to meet tasks of an internal character, local defense of frontiers and anti-aircraft defense.

2. Germany shall be permitted to produce war materials, but only in the quantities and of the types required for the armed forces sanctioned by the peace treaty.

## GERMANY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The states which sign the peace treaty with Germany shall support her application for admittance to the United Nations.

# Remarks by Dulles, Eden and Bidault at Four-Power Berlin Parley

BERLIN, Feb. 2 (AP)—Following are the text of a statement by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and excerpts from statements by Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, at the four-power conference in Berlin today:

## By Mr. Dulles

Yesterday, Mr. Molotov delivered himself of a major polemic. Apparently, he felt that we had left far behind us the first agenda item. That item dealt with the relaxing of international tensions. But, since we were on the second agenda item, Mr. Molotov felt moved to intensify international tensions, so he made bitter accusations against France, the United Kingdom and the United States. He charged us with conspiring to start a new world war with the help of revived German militarism.

If it is desirable to relax international tensions, and I think it is, I wonder whether it is not desirable for us to seek this all the time, and not merely as Item 1 of an agenda.

I have said that I was prepared to assume, at least for the purpose of this meeting, that the Soviet Union honestly wants peace.

I do not know what the Soviet Foreign Minister really thinks about us. Whatever his judgment is, he must know that he is not infallible. He has sometimes been wrong, and he might have been wrong when he accused us yesterday of being the enemies of peace.

I recall that Mr. Molotov was wrong in October, 1939, when he condemned France and Britain as being aggressors and praised Hitlerite Germany as being the peace-seeking country. I have in my hands a speech which the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs made in Moscow Oct. 31, 1939. Already the war was on and, in Molotov's words:

"It needed only one swift blow to Poland first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty."

## Praise of Nazis Recalled

In that speech, Mr. Molotov boasted of the "rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U. S. S. R. and Germany." He then said that "as far as the European great powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, whereas Great Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favor of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace."

"It is," said Mr. Molotov, "not only senseless but criminal to wage such a war—a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism' camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy.'"

Perhaps Mr. Molotov would admit that he then made a mistake—we all make mistakes. That fact should lead us not to be so confident of our judgment that we hurl across the table accusations of criminal intent.

It is quite natural that we should disagree with each other and reason with each other in an effort to get agreement. But I suggest that we should not here recklessly attack each other's motives.

I should like to reason with Mr. Molotov about his plan for solving the German problem with major dependence upon the so-called German Democratic government of East Germany.

The Soviet Foreign Minister made yesterday one statement with which we completely agree. He said:

"The German problem is first and foremost a problem to be solved by the German people themselves," and that Germany should participate "at all stages of the peace treaty's preparations."

Precisely for that reason we believe that the first task is to establish a single German Government which can speak authentically for the German people as a whole. It will not help us to have a tumult of conflicting opinions.

It is the thesis of the Soviet Union, if I understand rightly, that in the making of the peace treaty we are to consult through what the Soviet Foreign Minister calls "the representatives of Eastern and Western Germany."

## West German Vote Cited

We know that in West Germany there is a government which draws its authority from the German people as a result of free and vigorously contested elections. The people

## Molotov's Proposals on Germany Said to Aid European Army Plan

### Western Observers Believe Soviet Stand Will Help Win French Ratification—New Prestige for Bidault Is Noted

By MICHAEL L. HOFFMAN

Special to The New York Times.

BERLIN, Feb. 2—Western delegations to the four-power meeting here are beginning to believe that its proceedings may improve the chances of the French Parliament's ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty.

Since yesterday a few Western officials believe the improvement in those chances might be considerable.

One United States source said he thought the criticism of the French yesterday by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, showed that the Russians had decided the defense community was going to be established no matter what they did.

Other equally well informed sources, however, including several French diplomats, said it could be maintained as easily that Mr. Molotov had decided the defense community was going to fail and there was no need to make concessions on Germany to please the French.

Whatever the Russians may think, what they have said so far is regarded in United States, British and French circles here as helping the partisans of the defense community in France and also in Italy and Belgium where ratification of the treaty is still in some doubt.

The Netherlands has completed ratification and in West Germany and Luxembourg there are no further political obstacles to final adoption of the treaty.

Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, is among those who believe the Russians have helped him in his political battle

of the West German Republic had an opportunity to hear all the issues debated from opposing viewpoints and to vote for candidates of their own choosing.

The government of the West German Republic is without question, entitled to speak for that large majority of the German people who reside in the West German Republic and we do not doubt that it reflects the overwhelming judgment of the East Germans as well.

But how about the so-called "government" of the German Democratic Republic which rules in East Germany? According to the Soviet Foreign Minister, it was "called to power by the overwhelming majority of the population of Eastern Germany."

It is true that 98 per cent of the eligible voters appeared at the polling places. They came because they had been told that, if they did not come, they would be treated as "enemies of the peace" and subjected to grave penalties as such. The entire population of many villages was forcibly rounded up and marched to the polls.

It is also true that 99.7 per cent of the voters were recorded as having "elected" the government of the German People's Republic. The story behind this is that after the voters arrived at the polls, they were handed a ballot. It was a ballot which had been secretly printed, and it was not made public until election day.

## Copy or Eastern Ballot Shown

I have a copy of that ballot here. It is simply a list of names. No place is provided on the ballot to indicate approval or disapproval. There was no way to vote "no." There was not even a way to mark the ballot with "yes," a privilege, which I recall, even Hitler conceded to his subjects. The voters were merely ordered to put the ballot in the ballot box.

It might be noted in passing that the name which heads the list on the ballot which I hold here in my hand is the name of Mr. Ulbricht, a one-time Soviet citizen.

I wonder whether Mr. Molotov really believes that this type of so-called "election" gives the so-called "government" a mandate to speak for the people of East Germany.

I myself doubt that that performance provides the means of finding out what the East Germans really want. That doubt springs not only from the character of the so-called elections

themselves, which I have described, but also from what has happened since.

Since the October events that I describe, nearly 1,000,000 East Germans have fled the East zone to the West zone and West sector of Berlin. Does that prove the popularity of the rulers and their capacity to speak for the ruled?

Last year hungry Germans under the rule of their so-called government sought and obtained 5,000,000 food parcels from the West. Does that prove that the people are satisfied with their rulers?

In the Eastern area there is an armed force of 250,000 to keep order. That is one guard for eighty persons. In West Germany there is one policeman for 330 persons. Does this shocking discrepancy prove that the East Germans freely accept the order that their rulers impose?

## Dulles Implies Other Proof

If the facts I mention do not suffice to prove to Mr. Molotov my point, I can mention more. But I hope it will not seem necessary to do so.

As I understand the proposals of the Soviet Union they treat it as of the essence that the four of us should accept the so-called German Democratic Republic as one of the principal organs whereby the German problem is to be solved.

We cannot accept that position.

We know that the German people would regard as contaminated any decisions which were fastened upon them through the interposition of the "German People's Republic."

Mr. Molotov has said: "Only they themselves, only the Germans, can really solve the German problem. Any other solution of the German question would be unreasonable and unfair to the German people."

Because we believe that premise, we are compelled to reject the Soviet proposal and return to that which the three Western powers support.

We urge that Mr. Molotov agree to create quickly by free, all-German elections, a German government which can genuinely speak for all of Germany and thus provide the indispensable basis for a peace that will last, because it will be a peace of consent.

In his speech yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Minister sought to divert us from the serious discussion of this urgent topic by injecting a series of charges against the United States, Great Britain and France, which he claimed "are trying to form a military bloc directed against the Soviet Union."

I will not take time at this conference to reject these charges in detail. There is nothing new in them. The same familiar charges have been made year after year in the United Nations. They have been refuted time after time, year after year.

## Subversive Fund Disavowed

For example, Mr. Molotov says that \$100,000,000 was appropriated by the United States Congress for "subversive" activities within the Soviet satellite countries. That charge, often made, was completely rejected when raised by Mr. Vishinsky in the United Nations. I refute it again as being totally untrue.

That legislation has been utilized solely for the purpose of

assistance to refugees fleeing from the Soviet bloc, such as the 1,000,000 who, as I mention, fled from East Germany to the West.

It is elementary kindness to assist these refugees to make a new start in life.

Perhaps there would have been fewer of them if, in 1948, the Soviet Union had allowed its satellites to share the thousands of millions of dollars which the United States made available to relieve conditions of economic distress abroad. Perhaps then, too, a Soviet mistake was made.

I would recall to the Soviet Foreign Minister that the United States is one of the nations which paid a very heavy price for two German aggressions. We came into World War I, and we came into World War II, when it seemed that German militarism might gain decisive victories in Europe and dominate the Eurasian Continent.

It would not be profitable for us here to engage in unseemly competition as to the importance of our relative contributions to the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. That defeat required blood and steel, and the United States contributed both. There was a time when the Soviet Union paid tribute to that contribution.

In the light of that history, the United States feels that it has earned the right to shrug off, as foolish chatter, the accusation that it now seeks to recreate the very force that has twice so cruelly hurt it.

The United States is dedicating its material, intellectual and spiritual resources to building a world of peace.

## U. S. Role in U. N. Recalled

We took a leading part in creating the United Nations. We take seriously our obligation under that Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. That obligation will apply to Germany when she becomes a member of the United Nations.

We take seriously the undertaking of that organization to insure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with that principle. That undertaking applies to Germany until she becomes a member.

Mr. Molotov has claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty is aimed at the Soviet Union. That treaty, made pursuant to the United Nations Charter, contemplates the use of force only if there is an armed attack against one of the parties. I hope that Mr. Molotov does not imply that the Soviet Union intends to bring that tragedy to pass. If it does not, then it need not fear the treaty.

The Soviet Union, which dominates a military bloc of 800,000,000 people, seems to be fearful if any other nations combine for their defense. The reasons for such combination are simple, and the combination conceals nothing sinister.

If any one of the Western European nations were alone to be strong enough to defend itself against possible attack from the Soviet bloc, it would from an internal standpoint endanger its economy, and from an external standpoint, endanger its neighbors.

The Soviet Union proposes that Germany should be allowed to have defensive strength on a national basis, but if Germany had national forces strong enough to defend itself from external attack it would be so strong that it would threaten all of Western Europe.

## Joint Defense Plan Praised

The only way in which nations can obtain the necessary defensive strength without themselves becoming an aggressive menace is by community efforts. Under those circumstances no single nation is strong enough to attack alone but the combined strength deters aggression. This system, it is true, sometimes involves one member of a community helping to maintain deterrent forces on the territory of another member of the community.

Mr. Molotov had particularly complained of this aspect of the security arrangements participated in by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in cooperation with their associates. The fact is that such arrangements are a mighty safeguard against aggression. They mean only that the combined will of many nations can set the defensive system into action.

The greatest danger to world peace lies in the fact that in some cases a vast military establishment can be made to attack by the decision of a single nation, sometimes, indeed, by the decision of a single man. This is a situation which is understandably terrifying.

But where a military establishment cannot act without the combined will of many countries then only a clear defensive need can bring about the necessary concurrence of wills.

Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to get adequate defense without forcing the people and particularly the workers to suffer by requiring them to toil unproductively. It is understandable that the Soviet Union should want to force on the free nations a system which will drag down their higher standard of living. But we shall have none of that, Mr. Molotov. We shall have both security and human welfare.

When I spoke here a week ago I pointed out the United States' course of conduct following World War II. We promptly

withdrew our vast armies and air and naval forces from Europe. We largely dismantled our military forces to a mere fraction of about one-tenth of their World War II strength.

## Change Attributed to Korea

We reversed that course only when the Communist aggression in Korea aroused us to the fact of danger. Then, in concert with the many others who shared our fear, we undertook to recreate a reasonable defensive posture.

Now that that position is in sight we are leveling off our national expenditure for military purposes and the NATO countries are doing the same. This conduct cannot be reconciled with any aggressive purpose. The Soviet Minister knows that fact. If he does not admit it, it can only be because he believes that to misrepresent the truth will serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Molotov has rightly said that we live in a modern age and should take into account lessons or models of modern history. That is precisely what we are trying to do. We are seeking to apply in the international field those principles which every civilized community applies among its members to get peace and security at bearable cost. That is the effort in which the United States wholeheartedly joins with those who are like-minded.

No single act, that the United States has taken or will take carries any threat to the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union itself abides by the principles of the United Nations to which it has solemnly subscribed.

Let this conference now get back to the problem of Germany and of how to welcome and nurture the desire of new Germany to find for her energies an outlet which, better than unbridled nationalism, will serve the needs of Germany, of Europe and indeed of all the world.

## By Mr. Eden

I confess to having been deeply disappointed by Mr. Molotov's speech.

We have come here, the foreign ministers of the four powers, to meet for the first time for five years. Our purpose is to deal with the main problem dividing Europe, the problem of Germany as it confronts us today. This is not a problem which one of us has invented for the discomfiture of the others. It is a problem which exists. Each one of us has an interest in finding a solution to it.

Each one of us knows that so long as Germany remains divided there can be no stability in Europe. Therefore, surely it is our duty to apply ourselves at once to the task of procuring German reunification. That means a single Germany under a single German government. That is the first essential. And, all four of us have agreed that the single German government must result from free elections in all Germany.

Why, then, will the Soviet delegation not deal with the realities of the problem of free German elections? It is because we want to make progress at this meeting that we [the Western powers] have produced our plan. It is, therefore, distressing to find the Soviet delegation still marking time on the old, well-trodden ground.

The plan which we had worked out with a great deal of care could, I believe, bring about at an early date all-German elections and a government to speak for the whole of Germany. I hoped that this would be taken seriously as a basis for our discussion, but Mr. Molotov scarcely made any reference to it whatever.

## Molotov Omissions Noted

In the whole of his speech I could find no effort to face the main difficulty which confronts us all in dealing with the

problem of Germany. Mr. Molotov admits—and I was glad to hear this—that an all-German government should be the result of free elections. But he has not yet applied himself to how to get these free elections. Every suggestion he makes seems to be designed to postpone and delay them as long as possible. Is it that he fears the results of free elections throughout Germany?

He also seems to be most anxious that the peace treaty with Germany should not be negotiated with an all-German Government resulting from free elections. Rather he wants the negotiations to take place with representatives of the two existing regimes.

As regards the part to be played by the all-German government, Mr. Molotov apparently proposes that they should only participate—and I quote his words—in "the final consideration and adoption of the treaty." In other words, apparently everything would be arranged and agreed in advance of the participation of the all-German government.

Surely this is to treat the existing regimes as if they could between them speak for the whole German people. It is also to treat the freely elected all-German government which will truly represent the choice of the whole German people merely as a rubber stamp.

## By M. Bidault

I deny the allegation according to which the Bonn and Paris treaties must replace the peace treaty. I must on the other hand maintain with equal force the impossibility to admit the thesis according to which these treaties would prevent the re-establishment of unity of the German state.

If Mr. Molotov wishes to say that in this way he poses as a prerequisite to any organization of free elections in Germany the denunciation of these treaties by the Federal Government, I find that he subordinates restoration of German unity to a condition which is foreign to the problem which fundamentally interests the people of Germany.

Mr. Molotov tried to demonstrate that this is the policy followed by the West and in particular by France and which is responsible for the partition of Europe and which makes impossible the reunification of Germany. It is impossible for me not to re-establish the facts.

The division of Europe results flagrantly from policies followed by the Soviet Union since 1945. While we in the West had demobilized our forces and searched painfully to build a foundation of peace settlement we were confronted by a bloc of states progressively welded together and completely integrated politically, economically and militarily.

The Soviet Union is now allied to the states of Eastern Europe by a closed network of military pacts which all have been concluded between 1945 and 1948.

The French Government, as I have said many times, continue to consider that our present objective must be a proper German settlement to prevent a renaissance of militarism and all aggression in Europe. I have already said to Mr. Molotov that we were in agreement as to ends but disagree as to methods.

What we are asked to do again this time is to relive the time between the two wars. Germany of 1919 also only had a limited force which in principle was only used for internal security of the country. It did not participate in any military coalition. It submitted during an initial period to a system of control particularly strict. Nevertheless it quickly passed from a Reichswehr of 100,000 men to a Wehrmacht and from Gen. Von Seeckt to Adolf Hitler.

From this tragic experience the French Government draws the unshakable conviction that a reconstitution of a national German Army was dangerous for democracy in Germany and incompatible with security.

# Remarks by Molotov and Dulles at Four-Power Talks in Berlin

BERLIN, Feb. 3 (AP)—Following are excerpts from the speech by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, today at the Big Four conference and the text of remarks by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State:

## By Mr. Molotov

Today we must give some more attention to the question which is connected directly with the problem of European security. We must obtain clearness in the question of the so-called European army, which officially is called the European Defense Community.

We know from various facts that this is not an easy question. Not by accident, for instance, have the Parliaments of France and Italy attached serious importance to the question, and have not hurried to take a decision.

In my first statement on the German question I already had to state that the plan for general free German elections submitted by Mr. Eden [British Foreign Secretary] does not secure real freedom to the German people, neither in preparation nor in carrying out of elections.

This is why this proposal does not open a way for free development of a democratic Germany.

It may suffice to recall that according to the Bonn treaty, the three Western powers reserve the right to interfere for decades at a given time with the internal affairs of West Germany and even to declare martial law if they consider this desirable.

This alone proves that after signing the Bonn pact West Germany does not enjoy freedom in internal affairs. Nobody so far has answered my remarks on this question. One says some times that the Bonn and Paris [pact] obligations were valid only until a peace treaty is signed.

### Length of Treaty is Cited

Why, then, were the Bonn and Paris treaties concluded for a duration of fifty years? Does not this mean that the promises of the Western powers that they would speed up the conclusion of a peace treaty are of no serious importance in so far as one actually reckons that the Germans are to wait for decades for a peace treaty? Of no lesser importance is it that, according to provisions of the Paris and Bonn treaties, West Germany will also not be free in her foreign relations?

Moreover, I think the Anglo-French-American plans prepared \* \* \* to extend the Bonn and Paris pacts to all of Germany, including also its Eastern part.

This would mean to include East Germany in these treaties, which firstly are incompatible with guaranteeing European security and secondly clearly contradict the interests of the German people and are incompatible with recognition of its freedom.

Mr. Eden and M. Bidault [French Foreign Minister] have

stated here that a unified Germany, according to provisions of the Paris and Bonn treaties, would not be bound to these treaties and that it could decide freely whether to assume these or those obligations including especially the obligation concerning membership in the E. D. C.

M. Bidault said on this that France by no means is making a condition that unified Germany join the E. D. C. Is it not so?

To answer this question let us turn to the text of the Bonn agreement, Article 7, point 2 of this treaty says: The three powers—the United States, Britain and France—and the German Federal Republic shall act jointly to realize with peaceful means their common aims: the creation of a unified Germany which—like the German Federal Republic—will have a free democratic constitution and be admitted into the E. D. C.

### Forced Army Entry Suggested

The Bonn agreement therefore aimed at taking in advance a decision to drag, through the joint efforts of the three Western powers and West Germany, a unified Germany into this "community"—into the European army.

To prove that in this question no withdrawal is admissible, there is a third point in this article of the Bonn treaty which says: In case the signatory states cannot reach an agreement, the German Federal Republic will not conclude treaties or enter groups which would prejudice the rights of the three powers, rights deriving from the above mentioned treaties, or which could reduce the obligations of the German Federal Republic based on these treaties.

This makes it evident that the Bonn Government is bound to an obligation not to join such a unified Germany which does not provide for inclusion of a unified Germany into the system of the E. D. C.; that is, into the European army.

Where, then, is a genuine freedom of choosing the ways to the unification of the presently divided Germany? The Bonn agreement is aimed at binding now, that is in advance, the hands of a unified Germany. If the Bonn treaty remains in force, the reunification of Germany would be possible only on one condition, that is only if West Germany acts jointly with the United States, Britain and France concerning the inclusion of a unified Germany into the European community whose edges are pointed against the U. S. S. R., Poland, Czechoslovakia and other peace-loving states of Europe.

From this it follows that the authors of the Bonn agreement practically do not want the unification of Germany, they render such unification impossible. German authorities in West Germany, if they have signed the Bonn agreement, are not free; they are not even free at the present moment, which

## Tortoise and Hare Race In Berlin Theatre Skit

BERLIN, Feb. 3 (Reuters)—Diplomats and Berliners packed a West Berlin theatre tonight to see the first vaudeville show poking fun at the four-power conference.

The main satirical item was a skit presenting race between the tortoise (Russia) and the hare (the United States).

A commentator said the hare—looking like Uncle Sam—had "the fastest legs, the longest ears and the strongest constitution in the world."

The tortoise wore a red scarf and seemed to resemble Soviet Premier Georgi M. Malenkov.

Michel, personifying Germany, trying to sum up the contest, asked, "How will it end?"

The chorus replied bitterly: "How do you think?"

could be described as a period of preparations of general German elections.

It follows, further, that West Germany's obligations through the Bonn and Paris treaties are incompatible with the holding of really free general German elections and with recognition of genuine freedom for a unified Germany.

### Allied Stand Challenged

All that has been said proves the declarations of Mr. Eden and M. Bidault, that Germany would be free to decide whether a unified German Government should become a member of the European Defense Community or not, do not agree with the facts.

These statements are in contrast to the obligations that bind West Germany through the Bonn and Paris treaties. Per Mr. Dulles [United States Secretary of State] refrained from making such statements, which obviously cannot be supported by facts and documents.

In connection with the German question, the foreign minister of the United States mentioned yesterday a statement I made in the spring, 1939. Incidentally, he did not say under what international conditions the statement was made. One must not forget that during all 1939 the Soviet Government conducted negotiations with the Governments of Britain and France and sought to reach an agreement to prevent war and Hitler's aggression.

Everybody knows that at that time the well-known Neville Chamberlain was by far the strongest representative of Anglo-French circles. He found support also in the United States. The policy of Mr. Chamberlain was aimed at pushing Hitler onto the road of attack on the U. S. S. R. This was unsuccessful then. One must not forget, however, that Mr. Chamberlain and his French colleagues did not want an

agreement with the U. S. S. R. to tie Hitler's hands.

Thus, they enabled Hitler to speed up the attack on Poland and this was why they bear their part of the responsibility for the extension of the war in 1939.

Mr. Dulles attempted to prove that the rulers of West Germany are authorized [by the people] but he does not recognize the legitimacy of East German authorities.

In my opinion, he seriously is erring in this case because he possesses one-sided, unobjective information. Why can one not believe how the matter really stands?

It is well known that West German authorities are for the Bonn and Paris treaties and do not hasten to go about a peace treaty. But at the same time we know the Government of the [East] German Democratic Republic presses for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty and is unconditionally opposed to the Bonn and Paris treaties.

Should one not propose to hold a people's plebiscite throughout Germany to determine on whose side the German people stand: on the side of the Bonn and Paris treaties or on the side of a peace treaty?

Then we would have a clear answer to the question of who is the true representative of the feelings of the German people in our time.

## By Mr. Dulles

I think that we can take satisfaction in the fact that Mr. Molotov's remarks have gone to the heart of the problem which we are discussing here today. I would have preferred that this discussion would have been preceded by a more clear statement of the Soviet proposals, which I had thought Mr. Molotov had promised us. But, even without that, I would be glad to give a few impromptu reactions to the remarks which Mr. Molotov has made.

We face the fact that Germany has been divided now for nearly nine years. Part of Germany has been identified with the Soviet system—the Eastern part of Germany—and the Western part of Germany has been identified with the Western system. All the Germans, East or West, now have a very good idea as to what is the meaning and significance of our respective systems.

We believe that the time has come when that division cannot be continued without very great peril to all of us, and that the next step is to unite Germany through free elections, and give united Germany a genuine choice as to what it wants to do.

One of those choices may be the choice of becoming a member of the contemplated European Defense Community. We do not disguise the fact that we hope that that choice will be available to Germany. We do not disguise the fact that some

of us, at least, hope Germany will make that choice.

But I do want to emphasize, in categorical terms, the fact that we do intend that a united Germany should have a real choice in the matter. If I have not expressed myself earlier, it was only because it seemed to me that the remarks which had already been made by M. Bidault and Mr. Eden were so clear and so obviously based upon the terms of the proposals which Mr. Eden had made there could not be any real doubt about the matter.

If the Soviet Foreign Minister feels that the language in the proposal tabled by Mr. Eden is not entirely clear in that respect, I have no doubt that Mr. Eden would agree to whatever clarification is necessary so as to eliminate any last trace of doubt on that proposition.

### Free German Choice Stressed

It is basic in the thinking which the United States has—and I believe it is shared by France and the United Kingdom—that a united Germany should in fact have a free choice in this matter.

I suspect, however, that the problem which Mr. Molotov has posed here could not be really settled in the simple way I just described, simply by clarification of the text which we are considering. I am afraid that what is really giving Mr. Molotov concern is the fear that the choice which we would offer Germany would be exercised in a sense favorable to adhesion to the [European Defense] community, which apparently the Soviet Foreign Minister fears, and it is that which is primarily causing him concern.

There has unfortunately developed among us a deep-rooted suspicion that any result which is sought by the Western powers is automatically something which is undesirable or dangerous toward the Eastern powers and vice versa. I hope that that suspicion can to some extent be dispelled and that it could be recognized here that the result which we are seeking is a result which, while it would be beneficial to the Western powers, would equally be beneficial to the Soviet Union.

I have spent some time in my earlier presentations trying to present as persuasively as I could the reasons why I believe that the participation of Germany in a European Defense Community—which would mean no national army for Germany and no general staff for Germany—would produce most effectively the result which all four of us around this table want desperately to assure; that is, a Germany which for the future will be committed to ways of peace and that there would be no repetition of the disastrous past.

I hope that as a result of our talks here there will come to the Soviet Union a genuine realization that what we are seeking here is something which is in the common interest, that therefore they should not fear giving the Germans a really genuine opportunity to choose it, if that is their desire.

# Remarks by Molotov, Dulles and Bidault and Soviet Proposal

**BERLIN, Feb. 4 (P)—**Following are excerpts from the speech of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, today at the Big Four conference and the texts of a Soviet proposal on Germany and of remarks by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister.

## By Mr. Molotov

The British proposal supported also by the United States and France and which was submitted by Mr. Eden [British Foreign Secretary], is unacceptable for the following reasons: Such a proposal means an attempt to put holding of German elections into the hands of the occupation powers and in fact to exclude Germans from organizing and holding all-German elections.

Nothing good can arise out of that.

The proposal of the three powers does not insure real freedom of elections and does not provide for the exclusion of political pressure on the elections by foreign countries.

This proposal provides that the present position of the occupation troops on the territory of Germany be maintained while elections are held.

This is not good. The proposal of the three powers not only does not insure freedom of action of an all-German government after elections.

On the contrary, it limits the rights of this government from the beginning and provides that after the all-German elections the government is bound to conditions of the treaties of Bonn and Paris which have a disastrous character for the German people and maintain the obligation of German participation in the West European army and in the aggressive North Atlantic war pact.

## Rise of Nazis Recalled

The Nazis found not a few supporters and followers of their cause who made the way free for their seizure of power. All this was done under observation of parliamentary rules, under formal observation of the German constitution and this despite the fact the Nazis commanded only 32 per cent of the votes of all deputies in the Reichstag [Parliament].

The details of Hitler's way to power are well known now. The main consequence is the following: one must not pay one-sided attention to Parliamentary formalities and the technical organization of this matter [the reunification of Germany and elections]. This side of the matter has been sufficiently considered by our governments at the Potsdam conference.

One cannot close one's eyes to the fact that Hitler has his followers in Germany. We cannot permit the Fascist monster to regain the dominating position in the central organs of a unified Germany, including the use of Parliamentary procedure. The German people themselves are interested in prevention of this.

Mr. Eden for some reason is not interested in this side of the matter. The five stages of his plan contain no precautions in this respect. But it could happen that, as in Hitler's time, evil-meaning anti-democratic elements would use the temporary difficulties of the German people in a post-war period and gain the helm.

## Western Proposals Assailed

The proposal of the three powers on the order of holding all-German elections leads to the creation of such a situation in which these elections can be exploited by German aggressive circles against the interests of peace in Europe. That means the support of a seizure of power by those who seek a revival of German militarism.

One should pay special attention to this because such all-German elections have been already once held in history of Germany, especially in 1932 when German militarists and Fascists paved their way to power by making possible the formation of the Hitler government.

Therefore, the proposal of the three powers for all-German elections, in its present form, does not only not insure the continued development of Germany toward peace-loving and democratic aims but opens a road to power, especially to those elements in Germany who already now no longer hide their aggressive and revengeful plans.

This means a direct threat to maintaining of peace in Europe and especially a threat to the security of the countries neighboring Germany.

The Soviet Union, which has carried on its shoulders the main burden of war against Hitler Germany, cannot allow that seizure of power in Germany by these forces which have produced war against peace-loving states in the past and could mean a threat by new military adventures of new German militarism.

## Soviet Proposals Offered


The Soviet Union submits its proposals on the question of the unification of Germany and of all-German elections. The essential part of these proposals consists in the fact that thereby a contribution will be made toward creating a united Germany on a democratic and peace-loving basis.

Common efforts of the four powers must serve this aim. We can attain those aims only if we lean on the democratic powers of the German people.

To insure really free all-German elections it is necessary that the preparation and holding of these elections is in the hands of the Germans themselves and not in those of the occupation powers.

Therefore, we should cooperate in a rapprochement of East and West Germany and help them in a solution of the question of the formation of a provisional all-German government which takes its support from all democratic forces in East and West Germany.

To exclude pressure by a part



Associated Press

**DULLES' QUANDARY:** Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who is in Berlin for the Big Four foreign ministers' conference, faces the problem that is familiar to many a guest—which one to choose from a platter of hors d'oeuvres.

of the occupation powers it is necessary to withdraw occupation troops from East and West Germany before the elections are held.

In this case only limited contingents could remain on the territory of Germany which are necessary to fulfill security functions resulting from control tasks of the four powers; for the Soviet Union in regard to East Germany, for the United States, Britain and France in regard to West Germany.

The Soviet delegation submits for discussion its own project of proposals on the question of the formation of a provisional all-German Government and on the holding of all-German elections.

Acceptance of this proposal would place on firm ground the questions of German unification on a democratic and peace-loving basis.

The sense of the Soviet proposals is simple and clear. If we recognize the necessity of creating a provisional all-German Government now, then this would be a real step toward the unification of Germany.

The formation of a provisional all-German Government will mean that democratic forces in East and West Germany can already begin today to act in the interest of real German unification.

Germans should take into their own hands the preparation and holding of all-German elections. Our four governments must give them their confidence as well as their support.

## Soviet Resolution

Recognizing the need to put an end to the division of Germany and in conformity with the existing four-power agreements to implement the national reunification of Germany along democratic and peaceful lines, the Governments of the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have come to the following agreement:

[1]

The formation of a provisional all-German government by the parliaments of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic with wide participation of democratic organizations shall be considered an urgent task.

The provisional all-German government can be set up in place of the existing governments of East and West Germany or, should this prove difficult at present, with these governments being maintained for a certain period of time.

[2]

The principal task of the provisional all-German government shall be the preparation for and the holding of all-German elections, i. e.:

(A) To prepare a draft all-German electoral law that would ensure a genuinely democratic character of the all-German elections, participation in the elections of all democratic organizations and the carrying out of the elections under conditions of genuine freedom which would preclude pressure upon voters by big monopolies.

(B) To verify, should they consider this to be advisable, the existence throughout Germany of conditions necessary for holding democratic elections and to take measures to provide such conditions.

(C) To hold free all-German elections as a result of which the German people, without the interference of foreign powers, shall decide upon the social and state structure of a democratic Germany and on the basis of which an all-German government shall be formed.

[3]

The tasks of an all-German government shall also be the following:

(A) To represent Germany during the preparation of a peace treaty and in international organizations.

(B) To prevent the involving of Germany in coalitions or military alliances directed against any power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Hitler Germany.

(C) Matters pertaining to German citizenship.

(D) To ensure the freedom of activity for democratic parties

and organizations and to prevent the existence of Fascist, militaristic and other organizations hostile to democracy and the cause of peace.

(E) To develop economic, trade and cultural relations between East and West Germany, matters pertaining to transport, post and telegraph communications, freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout Germany and other matters affecting the interests of the German people as a whole.

[4]

To ensure for the German people the right to manage their national affairs themselves, it shall be recommended to the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the German Federal Republic to call promptly a meeting of plenipotentiary representatives of East and West Germany to agree upon the procedure to be followed in the formation of the provisional all-German government, its composition, functions, tasks and powers.

[5]

The Governments of the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America for their part, shall take measures to create conditions which will contribute to the successful fulfillment by the provisional all-German government of its tasks and which will preclude any interference and pressure by foreign powers during the all-German elections.

To this end the Governments of the four powers have agreed to withdraw the occupation forces from the territory of both East and West Germany even prior to the elections with the exception of limited contingents left to perform protective functions arising out of tasks of control by the four powers: for the Soviet Union in regard to East Germany and for the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in regard to West Germany.

## By Mr. Dulles

I have been told that the zig-zag was an essential part of the Soviet practice. If so, I think that the discussions of the last few days form a classic example.

I seldom have been as confused in my life as I am at this moment. We have been debating for several days a plan which you tabled, Mr. Chairman [Mr. Eden] and we discussed a section to which Mr. Molotov devoted his attention. And after we finally had agreed, the three of us, to amend it to meet what we understood were Mr. Molotov's views, then he said he rejected the whole plan.

I wonder why we spent so long debating one paragraph of the plan if the whole plan was unacceptable.

Then Mr. Molotov, as I understood, attacked our proposal on the ground that it did not give the Germans sufficient freedom of choice as to what they would do in relation to their future international relations.

And when we had painstakingly explained that the plan did give them complete freedom of choice in that matter, then, apparently, the plan could not meet Mr. Molotov's approval because it gave the Germans too much freedom.

He explained at great length the Germans could not be trusted with freedom, how they had abused freedom in the past, and from that it is to be inferred they should not have the freedom that they had in the past. And there again I am completely confused and bewildered.

## Supervision Discussed

Then there was a question of all-German elections. The plan which you tabled, Mr. Chairman, provided for careful supervision of elections, not only supervised by the four occupying powers but also possibly by neutrals to be sure there would be true freedom of elections.

But Mr. Molotov says that that proposal indicates we do not trust the Germans and the elections are not sufficiently free.

And in the same breath he also says the elections must be so conducted that what he calls "non-democratic" elements in Germany are not going to be allowed to vote.

I am curious to know as to how that can be accomplished without supervision of elections.

I cannot but believe that what he really has in mind is that there must be conducted in all of Germany a type of elections, which I described earlier, which had brought the "government" of East Germany into power where everybody was compelled to put in a ballot which was prepared in advance by authorities so as to assure there be no possibility of any "undesirable" person being chosen.

We discussed at great length

the Paris and Bonn treaties yesterday and again today and explained in simple words—words of one syllable—that unified Germany would have a choice as to whether or not to adhere to those treaties.

Nevertheless the Soviet Foreign Minister continues to make the assertion that they still would be bound by these treaties and he insists upon his formula which would as he interprets it, prohibit adopting such treaties.

The fact is there is compulsion on the part of the Germans to align themselves with the Western European community.

It is not compulsion of law or treaty.

We have made that perfectly clear.

It is a kind of compulsion which draws, inevitably, the East Germans toward the West.

## Flights of Refugees Cited

It is the same compulsion that has drawn 1,000,000 East Germans to seek sanctuary in the West and it is that compulsion Mr. Molotov would prohibit by legal and military action because despite what he says about wanting the Germans to have freedom of choice the fact is his formula would deny them that freedom which they seek by themselves—which are irresistible attractions unless held back by military power.

I speak only of compulsion of the spirit, of the human aspirations which under the plan we have proposed would enable the Germans freely to seek their own future.

I, of course, will study carefully the proposal which has been submitted by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

But certainly, on the basis of his own explanation of it, I am regretfully compelled to feel it indicates that the conditions attached to the German elections and the establishment of an all-German government are such that they are calculated to make them operative only if there is an extension of the system of the East German Republic to all of Germany.

If that is in fact the interpretation which his proposal seems to bear, that would indeed be a very tragic conclusion for this conference to have to end on as far as Germany is concerned.

I felt, however, that after all the zigging and zagging perhaps the Soviet Foreign Minister's last words about troop withdrawal from Germany indicated an object to which all else had led up to—namely, the ending of any defense of Western Germany, its complete exposure to the vast forces that lie to the east.

And we must also recognize that if all of Western Germany is so exposed that exposure also endangers all of Western Europe.

## By M. Bidault

The obstinacy employed by Mr. Molotov to the question of the treaties of Bonn and Paris and to the demand for modification of them would be surprising in a debate which bears on elections and unification if it would make clear to us what he seeks to attain.

In reality what the Soviet delegation would seem to wish is, in a way, previous acceptance of its theses without being able to support them with valid reasons.

I have said, and I repeat, that a reunited Germany would not be bound and cannot be bound, this being an absolute regulation of international law that Mr. Molotov knows as we do, by political commitments concluded either by the Federal Republic or by the Popular Republic.

We have showed that conventional obligations of the German Federal Republic and of the Democratic Republic would not bind united Germany.

This reasoning is more especially valuable than any expression of intention.

As to the aim of Paragraph 3 of Article 7 it concerns an obligation of the Federal Republic and of it alone of which the sense is solely that the Federal Republic will not pledge to conclude any agreement which would prejudice the right of a unified German government in regard to European institutions.

The day the government of

united Germany must take a decision to accept or refuse the obligations of former governments this clause will be no more valid than other political obligations of the Federal Republic.

## Dulles' Text Is Proposed

If Mr. Molotov continues to have doubts let him accept the text proposed by Mr. Dulles to which, for my part, I give my agreement.

The Soviet delegation feels, however, that Article 128 of the Treaty of Paris is incompatible with the freedom of choice accorded to the German Government.

This incompatibility would only exist if one admitted, as the Soviet delegation seems to do, that this freedom of choice ought only to play in one sense, that is to refuse.

I have already stated to Mr. Molotov my conviction that the destiny of democracy in Germany was tied to the entry of it in close association with the people of Europe.

I have told him also my considered conviction that the people of Germany themselves would understand that their future is in this community.

The clause of fifty years expresses an evident fact—that is to say, that the constitution of the community of European states is an enterprise that we wish to see last and not an ephemeral enterprise.

But I have already said we intend to impose on nobody our views on this point.

After the explanations that Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and myself already have given last night to Mr. Molotov I deem it impossible that one can maintain any longer the thesis according to which a future united Germany would not be a free Germany and would find itself bound by contracts undertaken by the Federal German Republic.

It is not true. I have just shown it.

## Delaying Tactics Applied

But I fear that one continues to affirm it, for any pretext is good when it is a question essentially of setting aside general elections and of attempting to postpone an expression of the popular will.

Why does the chief of the Soviet delegation use all the dialectic expediency, for which he is talented, to stretch out consultation which constituted normal means, I would even say classic, of expression of the desires of the people?

Why will he not take this same risk that we, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have assumed?

What would there then be to fear from these general elections which we know constitute today the most ardent wish of the whole German population? Is he not then willing to await with the same calm as ourselves the judgment of the electoral body?

What we all ought to wish is that the German population can in independence and liberty make the choice dictated to it as it little by little becomes conscious of its future peaceful vocation and becomes jealous of its democratic evolution.

The thing that makes me fear our conference risks falling into such bickering is that, not content with trying to make the German people believe they will cease to be free on the very day

they get liberty to make the decision, the chief of the Soviet delegation is simultaneously trying to persuade other peoples, including my own, that liberty accorded to the German people should prompt these others not to take any decisions of their own pending the continually delayed decision of the German people.

## Molotov Stand Analyzed

Mr. Molotov told us in substance, "undo what you have done in the West or otherwise there cannot be free elections."

I note here that once again Mr. Molotov is posing conditions.

These conditions are unjustified, since, as I have said, repeated and demonstrated, the accords signed with the Federal Republic in no way constitute an obstacle to German unification and cannot bind the future government of a united Germany.

Mr. Molotov does not even tell us what would happen after such a referendum.

As for us we tell him it is not a question of putting inquiries to Germany but of unifying it and concluding a treaty with it.

We can see in his proposal only the desire to maintain the [East German] Pankow Government in power.

If such is his intention it would be desirable if Mr. Molotov would simply tell us so clearly and we would know where we stand, but let him not invoke juridical obstacles which do not exist to prevent free elections.

Finally I will return very briefly, since I have an impression we are getting away from the essential subject of our business here, to the statement by Mr. Molotov that the agreements we signed in 1952 risk producing the division of Europe.

There exists, as I indicated the other day, an Eastern bloc formed between 1946 and 1948.

## Soviet Influence Is Cited

This bloc was formed and I do not believe there is any doubt on this subject, under the direction of the Soviet Union with the support of the Soviet Army.

It is not merely a military bloc, but political and economic as well.

Political, because the Communist parties run it in each country, and economic because a common system of planning has been established.

I do not discuss the merits of this system, I merely point out its existence.

I do not believe either you can deny that the Democratic German Republic should have its place in this system.

It (the Republic) is without doubt integrated politically and economically since it adheres to the economic intra-aid committee called "Komkeon" and militarily since she possesses armed forces organized after the model of East European armies.

We are not questioning all that, although it has great importance for all of Europe and for Germany. We are not questioning relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union, even though they constitute a serious obstacle to unification.

We have proposed a practical method for ending the division in which Germany herself could do something.

We have not posed any prior conditions. We have not developed any condemnation of the policy of the Soviet Union in Germany.

# Remarks by Dulles, Bidault, Eden and Molotov at Big 4 Talks

BERLIN, Feb. 5 (AP)—Following are the text of the statement of John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and excerpts from statements by Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, at the four-power conference here today:

## By Mr. Dulles

Since our meeting yesterday, I have read the transcript of Mr. Molotov's remarks and have studied his proposal. I can still find no encouraging interpretation of what we heard yesterday afternoon.

The basic impression which strikes me is this: Mr. Molotov is afraid of genuinely free elections in the East Zone. He is afraid that the 18,000,000 Germans in the East Zone, if given a chance to speak, would overwhelmingly reject the present imposed regime. Mr. Molotov has good reason to be afraid.

Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister had categorically rejected the proposals for genuinely free elections which have been put forward by the Western powers. In its place he proposes his own blueprint. In the name of peace, he proposes a method of extending the solid Soviet bloc to the Rhine. In the name of what he calls democracy, he has set forth the classic Communist pattern for extinguishing democracy as that word has been understood for 2,000 years.

The corner-stone of the Soviet proposal is the so-called Government of the German Democratic Republic. That Government was put in office by Soviet power. It was confirmed in office by Soviet power. If it had not been for elements of twenty-two Soviet divisions, including tanks and armored cars, it would have been forcibly ejected from power by the workers who in their desperation rose up against it last June.

It is that regime which under the Soviet plan would negotiate on a basis of equality with the Government of the German Federal Republic. However, the scales are to be still further weighted in favor of the Soviet puppet regime, because it is provided by the Soviet plan these initial negotiations shall also involve "wide participation of democratic organizations."

In the Soviet dictionary the words "democratic organizations" have a clear, precise meaning. They mean those front organizations—captive trade unions, youth organizations, women's organizations—which promote the Communist purposes without openly presenting themselves to the people in their true guise.

## Type of Elections Visualized

It is under these auspices that there would be prepared the "all-German electoral law," and the establishment of election conditions.

We can visualize in advance the type of elections upon which the East German regime would insist, because we already know those conditions from its past. I have already told of the election conditions which were established in East Germany where the voters were compelled by armed force and penalties to go to the polls and, when there, were compelled to put in the ballot box a list of names which had been previously prepared for them and which was made public only on election day.

Indeed, the Soviet plan expressly stipulates in Communist language that the election conditions would in fact be what they were in the Soviet zone. The election must be so conducted as to assure its so-called "democratic" character. It must provide for the participation "of all democratic organizations." It must preclude "pressure upon voters by big monopolies," and it must exclude from voting privilege any organizations which by Soviet standards are of a Fascist or militaristic nature.

If we take the tragic pattern which has spread all over East-

ern Europe in the wake of the Red armies, it does not require much wit to see what that means. It means that anyone who dares to express the slightest doubt concerning communism is automatically deemed a Fascist or a militarist or a monopolist.

If this system were to be applied to Western Germany, no organization opposing the Communists or the policies of the Soviet Communists, which are the same thing, would be permitted to take part in the elections.

It would only be the Communist party and the Communist-front organizations which under Mr. Molotov's plan would participate in the elections.

I have no doubt that the Soviet Foreign Minister would protest that his plan does not really involve the sovietization of Western Germany.

I recall that in the October, 1939, speech to which I have already referred, the Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the mutual assistance pacts which he had recently negotiated with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania "no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union . . . as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. We declare that all the nonsensical talk about the sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs."

## Memory of What Happened

The memory of what happened within a few months to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and of having seen that same pattern extend to the countries of Eastern Europe by the use of the methods which the Soviet proposal prescribes for Germany, will, I hope, explain some skepticism at the Soviet proposals for restoring freedom to Germany.

Mr. Molotov is too intelligent to believe that the people or Government of West Germany would accept his proposals or that the three Western powers would suggest that they do so. The Western German Bundestag, representing 70 per cent of the entire German people, has unanimously refused to accept the East German people as having any legitimate status or right to speak for the people of East Germany.

One can only conclude that the Soviet Foreign Minister does not submit his proposal with any expectation that it might be acceptable. His purpose is quite different. He is actually attempting to hold on to the Soviet position in East Germany by preventing free elections.

We can well understand the dread with which Soviet leaders view any prospect of really free elections in East Germany, elections of the kind set out in the proposals which have been presented and supported by the three Western powers. Those proposals, call for "freedom of movement throughout Germany," "freedom of presentation of candidates," "immunity of candidates," "freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization," "freedom of association and political meeting," "freedom of expression for all," "freedom of the press, radio and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.," "secrecy of the vote," "security of polling stations and ballot boxes."

Thus, could anyone doubt the effect of elections of that kind on the future of the East German regime? Clearly the Soviet proposal is a maneuver designed to protect this puppet regime in Eastern Germany, from being subjected to the test of what the 18,000,000 people who live there would say if they were ever given the right to say it.

The four of us came together two weeks ago for the first time in five years. We met before the whole world, a world to whom a certain promise was implicit in our meeting. That promise was that world tensions should somehow be eased by the good will and common sense of the participants. The three of us accepted the Soviet proposal that we should meet in Berlin, a

city which symbolizes the division of Germany. We hoped that solutions could be found here for the problem of German unity.

So far at this conference, Mr. Molotov has adopted a different approach. First, he devoted his efforts to delaying, for as long as possible, our discussion of German unity.

Now, his proposal shows that he has no intention of seriously seeking German unity with freedom.

I would say to Mr. Molotov that it is late, but not too late to redeem the promise of Berlin.

## By Mr. Bidault

With a desire of finding a basis for understanding between us, I have studied with much care the plan which Mr. Molotov submitted to us yesterday. This study has led me to my regret to the conclusion that the proposals of the Soviet delegation lack any possibility for practical application.

The statements of my Soviet colleague permit us in any case to see clearly on one point. I was wondering yesterday if the principal aim of the Soviet delegation was not to maintain as long as possible the present situation in the Eastern zone.

Mr. Molotov has confirmed this belief. He has not disguised his conception of German unity as being under the form of juxtaposition of the Federal Republic and of an Eastern Germany whose interests he thinks necessary "to consider in reasonable manner." I will say right now that such a conception is opposed to ours.

Features of the Soviet proposals appear striking to me. The first is that the three Western powers are to recognize the legitimacy of the authorities of the East zone in accepting the principle of creation of a provisional government in which representatives of both Germanies would sit.

The second is that the Federal Government of Bonn is to agree to sit at the same table with representatives of a regime which it considers as a regime of oppression against 18,000,000 Germans.

The third is that Germans of the West and East are to agree on the text of an election law and on the conditions under which elections would be held throughout the country, it being moreover understood that no guarantees will be placed on them by the institution of an impartial international control.

## Omission of Referendum Noted

Fourth is that the government of the Federal Republic is to denounce the accords of Bonn and Paris and to quit the Western community while the government of Eastern Germany would maintain lines which unite it to the popular democracies and to the Soviet Union. I note in this respect that the new Soviet proposal no longer mentions a referendum of which Mr. Molotov was speaking only yesterday.

The fifth condition would be, I suppose, the introduction into Western Germany of reforms which would break what my Soviet colleague calls the power of the trusts and the junkers.

Finally, there is a sixth condition whose novelty was emphasized yesterday by my Soviet colleague, considering no doubt that this was the principal element of attraction. I can well see the advantages for the Soviet Union in withdrawing part of its troops a few dozen kilometers to the rear, if it could by this achieve the disorganization of the Allied defense establishment in Western Germany and the departure of American and British troops from Europe.

I must tell my Soviet colleague this: on such a basis I do not think accord nor compromise possible. The Western powers and I think the German people themselves want unity, but unity in freedom.

We have indicated several times that the plan presented by us was open to discussion and amendment. In view of the fundamental differences which separate this plan rejected by

Mr. Molotov and the plan which Mr. Molotov has in turn submitted, the question now is whether there is any possibility of narrowing the gap between us on the urgent and essential problem of reestablishing German unity through free elections. I do not wish to resign myself too quickly to seeing our spirit of conciliation condemned to remain without response. But I am certainly obliged to note that up to now nothing has happened on this point to encourage our patience and our hope.

## By Mr. Eden

I put forward a plan a week ago for the holding of genuinely free elections throughout Germany. Its purpose was to suggest how an all-German government could be brought into being with which we could then negotiate a peace treaty as quickly as possible. I am not saying that this plan was perfect, or that it could not be improved in many details. But it had the merit, I think, of being a practical plan.

Now, Mr. Molotov has not addressed himself to the practical aspects of this plan. He has described it as nothing but parliamentary formalities. Instead he has produced another plan which, whatever else we may say about it, is plainly unworkable.

It has been suggested that elections along the lines we propose will enable the aggressive forces of German militarism, of nazism, of the monopolies, and of every other kind of reactionary, to seize power and enslave the German people.

Of course, none of us wants that. I can understand Mr. Molotov's fear of any such revival. All of us share it. Of course, we want to guard against any Nazi revival. That is precisely why we propose free elections. The only recent free elections held in Germany resulted in a decisive defeat for the extremists.

My plan was intended to provide against these dangers. Where it fails to do so, I am sure we can improve upon it. I hope that Mr. Molotov will still feel able to suggest ways in which this can be done. So far, both his argument and the counter-proposals that he has put forward seem designed to avoid rather than to face this issue. He seems unwilling to run the risks involved in free elections.

## Election Freedom Stressed

We all admit there are risks in free elections. That is something no politician in any free country will deny. But we believe that you reduce the dangers of extremism by giving the people as a whole the genuine opportunity to express their will and decide their own future. That is fundamental to our thought.

The implication after yesterday seems to be that Mr. Molotov cannot want free all-German elections to be held. No doubt he realizes that the regime in Eastern Germany would be swept away.

Therefore he proposes tactics to delay the elections. He makes proposals for negotiations between East and West Germans for the formation of a provisional government, which he well knows can lead to no practical or acceptable results.

The Soviet delegation seems determined that if elections are ever held they shall not be really free. Mr. Molotov said that before one holds elections one must consider what the results will be. In other words, you do not have elections until you have made sure how they will go.

That is not what we mean by free elections. With us, people decide the result and they are free to choose between candidates. We could not accept pretexts for depriving citizens of their political rights which would make all-German elections similar in character to those which have taken place in Eastern Germany.

Maybe the real purpose of this seemingly ingenuous suggestion is to weaken or destroy the

security of Western Europe and to leave Western Germany defenseless.

We, therefore, find the Soviet delegation's latest counter-proposals quite unacceptable, whichever view we take of the motives underlying them. The arguments adduced in support of them were certainly contradictory and inconsistent.

In conclusion, let me say Mr. Molotov's plan seems to me to be in direct conflict with our own. I can see little prospect of making real progress.

## By Mr. Molotov

We have serious differences of opinion and we must seriously consider them.

Our proposals have been doubly founded: on one side by facts and on the other by documents which we have all signed.

It has been said here that the Soviet Union allegedly is against reunification of Germany and free all-German elections. In reality, the Soviet delegation wants reunification of Germany as soon as possible and free German elections.

The question of all-German elections is a serious one. Experiences of history have been taken into consideration.

Does the plan of the three Western powers guarantee free elections?

It has been proposed to us that we should agree to a plan providing for free elections carried out by the hands of the occupation powers.

We of the Soviet delegation propose that all-German elections shall be carried out through the Germans themselves. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation this would be real, free elections.

We have already simplified this question so much we are talking here in Berlin on the question of free elections without the Germans present. This is not right.

Some people do not like the regime of the German Democratic Republic. We do not like the regime of West Germany. But this is not the problem.

## June 17 Riots Recalled

The events of June 17 have been mentioned here. We know these events were arranged from without and that they were carried out by foreign hands. We have learned our lessons from these events and the events will not be repeated.

What has the Soviet Government proposed?

First, to help Germans from East and West Germany to come closer together and to create an all-German Government to guarantee free all-German elections.

Second, that occupation troops from both East and West Germany should remain to perform necessary control functions.

If we are really for free elections then we cannot understand why the Soviet proposal cannot be accepted.

Concerning a provisional all-German government, it was said here that it is impossible to create it. Why? It would be only provisional and created only for a short time. If it is created, then elections will be in the opinion of the Soviet delegation carried out by the Germans themselves and not by the occupation powers.

Why is there so much fear of the German Democratic Republic? After all, the object is to reach agreement on the question of peace, on questions touching upon the national interests of the German people.

It has been said here that the withdrawal of the occupation forces would leave West Germany and Western Europe without protection. But this fear is unfounded. After all, it is proposed that forces be withdrawn simultaneously from East and West Germany, which would be approved by the German population.

Some of the declarations of the ministers can be understood as a refusal to continue efforts to search for an agreement. The delegation of the Soviet Union is of the opinion that the search for an agreement should be continued.

# Texts of Statements by Big Four Foreign Ministers and of Proposal by Molotov

BERLIN, Feb. 6 (AP)—Following are the texts of speeches today at the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting by Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary; John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, along with a proposal by Mr. Molotov:

## By Mr. Eden

It was clear yesterday that we are approaching the point where there is little more to say on either side, without repetition, on the subject of German reunification. Two widely different concepts are before us. Each has been fully explained and defended. On the one side we have the plan supported by the three Western ministers. This provides for early elections throughout Germany as a preliminary to the formation of an all-German government with which a peace treaty could be negotiated.

On the other side, we have the Soviet delegation's plan. I hesitate to summarize this plan for fear of being accused of over-simplification. But I can safely say that it is a plan which puts the order of events quite differently. First, it would bring the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic together in an attempt to create a provisional government for all Germany. Then that provisional government would agree upon an electoral law and prepare for elections. Then the Allied occupation forces would be withdrawn. All these processes would undoubtedly require a great deal of negotiation and discussion. When all that was completed, there would be elections.

I do not think there can be any dispute that the Soviet plan is the more complicated and arduous of the two. Difficult, and some might say impossible, agreements have to be reached before elections take place. But apart from that, the plan is unacceptable to us, as we have explained, for three clear reasons.

## Incompatible Theories Noted

First it necessitates agreement between the two existing regimes in Germany, which as we all know are based on fundamentally incompatible theories of government. Mr. Molotov suggested yesterday that since it is possible for us four to sit round this table and talk, it ought to be possible for the East and West German authorities to do so too. Certainly it is a great pleasure to sit round this table with Mr. Molotov, even though the regime he represents is widely different from ours.

But I wonder whether our discussions would be quite so fruitful as I hope they are going to be if we were called upon to set up a provisional government drawn from amongst ourselves. I can imagine there might be some difficulty over the allocation of portfolios.

The second point is that Mr. Molotov's plan provides for elections on a basis quite foreign to our democratic concept of free elections. I need not repeat my reasons for saying that.

Thirdly, the demand for the withdrawal of the Allied occupation forces before the elections are held would introduce a new obstacle to the early exercise by the German people of their right to choose an all-German government. We cannot agree to that preliminary condi-

8:05 to 10 Tonight

**RICHARD STRAUSS'**  
**"SALOME"**

For the Best in Music

**WQXR** 1560 on your dial

**WQXR-FM** 96.3 on FM dial

The Radio Station

of The New York Times

**NEWS BULLETINS FROM THE TIMES**

Every hour on the hour

Except at Noon, 4 and 9 P. M.

tion for the reasons which were given yesterday. Is it not also clear that there would be endless argument and discussion regarding the terms of withdrawal, the nature and scale of the forces to be left behind for "protective functions" as Mr. Molotov has called them? Are not all these factors introduced by the Soviet proposals certain to delay the holding of elections? I really think there can be no doubt about it.

Finally, Mr. Molotov wishes us to agree that the future all-German government should be bound in advance not to associate itself with the Western European community. We cannot agree. Once again I repeat that in our view, the all-German government must be free to make its own choice.

Therefore, I can only see one possible contribution that I can still make to this discussion. I make an appeal to Mr. Molotov. Cannot even he now agree to the holding of free elections throughout Germany under conditions guaranteed by impartial supervision? If he could agree to this, we could, as I indicated yesterday, get down to fruitful discussion of how the elections should be held.

Take the electoral law, for example. If only Mr. Molotov could accept the principle of free elections, I am sure that we could make progress on an electoral law. He mentioned the Weimar law. Well, let us discuss it or any type of law which my colleagues think might help us.

Then there is the problem of supervision. Mr. Molotov does not like four-power supervision, nor apparently does he wish neutrals to take part. Well, I'm prepared to consider other solutions. M. Bidault has just suggested one which I could accept. All I want is to discuss the problem. Why can we not do so?

There is another question. Mr. Molotov knows that we would never be associated with any aggressive Germany. I speak, of course, for my own country. But I can say for my other Western colleagues here that the purposes which lie behind our defensive plans in Europe are wholly opposed to any idea of encouraging militarism or national revenge in Germany. This is not an empty phrase designed to calm legitimate fears. I speak with what I know to be the convictions of the British people and of their allies. We will never turn our defensive alliance into aggression against the Soviet Union. The basis of consent on which our action depends, the will of our parliaments, the peaceful purposes of our peoples, all make this utterly impossible. None of us would claim that parliamentary institutions are an absolute guarantee against warlike or aggressive policies. Certainly not. They may be overthrown or abused. But as parliamentarians

of some experience, we are entitled to say that you cannot in this day and age lead democracies into an aggressive era.

## Peaceful Goals as Guide

When, therefore, we say that we hope Germany will decide to be associated with us in our European community, we mean that we hope she will accept the same peaceful purposes that animate us. Mr. Molotov has himself expressed his confidence in the democratic instincts of the German people. Cannot we then at least agree to allow them expression in the ballot box? Can we not even now allow the people of Germany to elect a government of their own choice as the first step toward a peace settlement and the relaxation of tension in the world? Must 18,000,000 East Germans continue to be separated from their fellows? Can we not allow them to join with their brothers in the West to choose their government?

The essential problem is to combine freedom in Germany with security in Europe. Our answer to this is clear. We do not want an imposed settlement which would repeat the mistakes of the pre-war years. We seek to create a new Germany in which the events of the Nineteen Thirties would not be repeated. We cannot do this by a new system of controls which will be deeply resented by the German people and will lead automatically to the very dangers which Mr. Molotov, and indeed all of us, wish to avoid. We propose that Germany be reunited and associated as a peaceful member in the European family. We propose that Germany become a member of the United Nations, bound by the provision of the Charter.

We in the United Kingdom, for our part, abide by our treaty with the Soviet Union. We signed that treaty for twenty years. We should, I am sure, be ready to prolong it if Mr. Molotov feels that this would give added security to the Soviet Union. If there are any other ways in which we could help to resolve the Soviet Union's anxiety about its security, I have already said that we should be glad to consider them.

## By Mr. Dulles

I am sorry that the Soviet Foreign Minister has not seen fit to continue the discussion about the problem of German unity which is imperative for the future peace and well-being of Europe and, indeed, all the world. I hope that means only that he will desire to give further thought to the subject, which I am sure is the desire of all of us. When I conclude these brief remarks I will want to summarize the position as I see it.

Before doing that I would just comment very briefly on the new line of discussion which the Soviet Foreign Minister has embarked upon.

We are, I am sure, very happy that the Soviet Foreign Minister is so concerned about the economic welfare within the Federal Republic of Germany. I have in my hand here a report on economic conditions in the Federal Republic of Germany which has been published by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. It shows that the economic improvement and economic welfare in the Federal Republic of Germany have been phenomenal, that the increase of production, the increase of consumers' goods, the

rate of rebuilding have been quite extraordinary.

And I suggest that perhaps the Western powers who have been associated with this great economic recovery of Germany are perhaps as concerned as the Soviet Foreign Minister is with the welfare of Western Germany, and that perhaps they have shown that concern in ways which indicate that our concern is more practical, more realistic and more beneficent than the concern which has been shown by the Soviets in Eastern Germany.

I might add that the striking economic recovery which has been made by the Federal Republic of Germany is the more remarkable because it has occurred despite the fact that the Federal Republic, with some help from the Western powers, has had to absorb a very large flow of refugees who have tried to get from the distressing conditions of East Germany into the infinitely better conditions of West Germany and who have been so attracted by these better conditions in Western Germany that they have been willing to abandon their homes, all their possessions that were left to them—not very much, I am afraid—in order to be able to make a fresh start under the free conditions of economy and of hope which exist in West Germany.

The rate of refugees is now about 200 a day. It has been as high as 3,000 a day, and the total is well over 1,000,000. The problem of absorbing these refugees from the East has been a very difficult one. And the fact that it has been successfully undertaken and achieved is a further tribute to the economic conditions which have been provided for West Germany by the three Western occupying powers.

During this period, the United States has advanced to the Federal Republic of Germany approximately 3,000,000 marks, the far greater part of which was an outright grant for which no return was asked.

I suggest, however, that it would be well before we break up today to summarize the position as it seems to stand with reference to the important central theme of the unification of Germany.

We have now had the plan which was tabled by Mr. Eden, which has been endorsed by the other two Western powers, and we have the terms which have been submitted on behalf of the Soviet Union by its delegation.

## Rejection in Principle Seen

As I understand it, the Soviet Foreign Minister has rejected not in any detail but in principle the proposal supported by the Western powers and has submitted his own terms as a substitute, which terms include the following provisions:

First—The Government of the Federal Republic must treat and deal with the regime of East Germany as a Government truly representative of the East Germans.

Second—The formation of an all-German government must depend upon elections under an electoral law to be agreed to by the East German regime and as to which that regime will have a veto power.

Third—Electoral conditions in accordance with classic Communist concepts must bar the participation of those who, because they are not Communist supporters, are classed automatic-

ally as monopolists, militarists or Fascists.

Fourth—That there must be no supervision of the elections either by the occupying powers or by neutrals in order to assure fair and free conditions.

Fifth—The united Germany must be perpetually barred from participation in any collective security system with its Western neighbors.

Sixth—The troops of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, except for token forces, must be withdrawn from West Germany, which would leave Western Germany defenseless and Western Europe exposed.

These terms, as they stand, are clearly unacceptable to the United States. I believe that Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden have expressed themselves to the same effect. We know that they would be unacceptable to the West German Federal Republic. It has expressed that view itself through its constitutional organs to that effect.

I doubt very much that the inhabitants of East Germany would want those conditions accepted—these 18,000,000 Germans that want desperately to be reunited with their 50,000,000 brothers of the West. But I don't believe that they want to be reunited under conditions which would merely involve the perpetuation and extension to all of Germany of the conditions which lead them so desperately to want to change.

I hope very much that the Soviet Foreign Minister, recognizing the position where we are, will, on reflection, reconsider his terms. I earnestly plead with him to withdraw these terms, or at least to bring them into conformity with the basic principles which are expressed in the document which has been tabled and supported by the Western powers.

The need which faces us to do something to effect, in just and reasonable terms, the reunification of Germany, that need is so compelling, so imperative, that I think none of us can likely let pass the opportunity afforded us by the meeting of the four ministers.

Therefore, I renew my plea to Mr. Molotov that he should find it possible to meet the point of view of the Western powers in these respects:

## By Mr. Molotov

Today the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to call attention to one question. In discussing the German question one cannot evade the question of the financial and economic obligations of Germany which are connected with the after-effects of the war.

In its note of Aug. 15, 1953, the Soviet Government submitted to the Governments of the United States, Britain and France the proposal to free Germany completely of reparations payments effective Jan. 1, 1954, and to free it at the same time of the payment of post-war national debts to the four powers, excluding debts arising from trade obligations.

Third—Electoral conditions in accordance with classic Communist concepts must bar the participation of those who, because they are not Communist supporters, are classed automatic-

Furthermore, the Soviet Government has submitted a proposal to reduce expenditures connected with the stationing of troops of the four powers on German territory, and a proposal to free Germany from payment of debts connected with external occupation expenses of the four powers which occurred after 1945. The necessity of realizing these measures is obvious if one considers that Germany already has fulfilled a considerable part of her financial and economic obligations concerning the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

At the same time one must properly consider the necessity of alleviating Germany's economic situation, creating favorable conditions for the development of her peaceful economy and improving the material situation of her population.

## Soviet Reports Action

Since the proposals for alleviating the financial and economic obligations of Germany have not been acted upon by the four powers and since it has not yet proved possible to take a coordinated decision on this question, the Soviet Government has carried out similar measures effective Jan. 1, 1954, to alleviate the financial and economic obligations of the German Democratic Republic.

As of Jan. 1, 1954, the Soviet Government has ceased the taking of reparations from the German Democratic Republic, turned over without charge Soviet plants in Germany to the German Democratic Republic and reduced occupation costs to a sum not exceeding 5 per cent of the state budget of the German Democratic Republic.

Moreover, the German Democratic Republic was freed from payment of post-war national debts to the Soviet Union, including obligations from external occupation expenses which occurred after 1945.

It would be unjust if the other part of Germany, that is, West Germany, continue to bear the burden of the expenditures from similar obligations. According to information from official sources, West Germany is obliged to pay to foreign states about 7,000,000,000 marks [\$1,666,000,000] in post-war national debts.

## 'Occupation Costs' Listed

Heavy burdens also arise for West Germany from the payment of occupation costs: In the budget year of 1953-54 9,600,000,000 marks [\$2,284,800,000] or 34.5 per cent of the budget income of West Germany, are to be spent for "defense expenditures," that is chiefly for occupation costs.

We cannot but note that West Germany has not yet been freed of the obligation to pay reparations, and according to the Bonn agreement the decision on this question has been postponed indefinitely until the conclusion of a peace treaty. Since the question of a peace treaty with Germany, as indicated by the point of view of the representatives of the United States,

Britain and France at the present conference, has been postponed indefinitely, the above-mentioned question is not solved.

All this makes it apparent that it is necessary to discuss the question of alleviating the financial and economic obligations of Germany at the present conference.

It is important that the German people now know clearly that no claims for reparations, postwar debts, external occupation costs and so on will be brought against Germany.

The delegation of the U. S. S. R. hopes that its proposal on the question of alleviating the financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with the results of the war will find proper consideration in the discussions of the conference.

## Mr. Molotov's Proposal

Whereas Germany has already fulfilled a considerable part of her financial and economic obligations to the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union arising out of the consequences of the war,

Recognizing that measures to

relieve the financial and economic obligations of Germany arising out of the consequences of the war will contribute substantially to the development of Germany's peaceful economy and to the rise of the living standard of her population,

The Governments of the U. S. A., France, the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. have agreed as of the first of January, 1954:

1. Germany shall be fully relieved of the payment of reparations in any form and of the payment to the four powers—the U. S. A., France, the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R.—of post-war national debts, with the exception of debts arising out of trade obligations.

2. The payment of expenses connected with the stationing of troops of the four powers on the territory of Germany shall be reduced to an annual amount not exceeding 5 per cent of the revenue of the national budgets of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.

3. Germany shall be fully relieved of the payment of debts connected with external occupation expenses of the four powers which occurred after 1945.

# Texts of Soviet Proposals on Europe and Remarks by Molotov and Dulles

BERLIN, Feb. 10 (AP)—Following are the texts of the Soviet-proposed European security treaty and an auxiliary Soviet proposal, plus excerpts of remarks by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, and the text of a speech by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State.

## Soviet Draft of Treaty

With a view to safeguarding peace and security and preventing aggression against any state in Europe.

With a view to strengthening international cooperation in conformity with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

Seeking to prevent the formation of groups of European states directed against other European states, which gives rise to friction and strained relations among nations, and to achieve concerted action by all European states in safeguarding collective security in Europe.

The states of Europe, being guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, shall conclude a general European treaty on collective security in Europe containing the following basic provisions:

[1] The treaty shall be open to all European states without regard to their social systems, which recognize the purposes and assume the obligations arising out of the treaty.

Pending the establishment of a united, pacific, democratic German state the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic can be parties to the treaty enjoying equal rights. It is understood that after the unification of Germany the united German state can become a party to the treaty on the general terms.

The conclusion of the treaty on collective security in Europe shall not impair the jurisdiction of the four powers—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France—in regard to the German problem which is to be settled in the manner previously determined by the four powers.

[2] The parties to the treaty undertake to refrain from any attacks against one another and also to refrain from having recourse to the threat or the use of force in their international relations and, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to settle by peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security in Europe any dispute that may arise among themselves.

[3] The parties to the treaty shall consult among themselves whenever, in the view of any one of them, there shall arise the danger of an armed attack in Europe against any one or more of the parties to the treaty, in order to take effective steps to remove the danger and to maintain security in Europe.

[4] An armed attack in Europe against any one or more of the parties to the treaty by any state or group of states shall be considered an attack against all the parties. In case of such an attack each one of the parties, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense, shall assist the state or states which had been so attacked by all the means at its disposal, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

[5] The parties undertake jointly to discuss and determine at an early date the procedure under which assistance, including military assistance, shall be rendered by the parties to the treaty in case there should arise in Europe a situation requiring a collective effort for the re-establishment and maintenance of peace in Europe.

[6] The parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Europe.

[7] The parties undertake not to enter any coalition or alliance or conclude any agreement, the purpose of which would contra-

dict the purposes of the treaty on collective security in Europe.

[8] For the purpose of holding the consultations among the parties provided for by the treaty and of considering the matters arising out of the problem of safeguarding security in Europe, the following shall be provided for:

(a.) The holding of periodical and, whenever required, of special conferences at which each of the states shall be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

(b.) The establishment of a permanent consultative political committee whose task shall be the drafting of appropriate recommendations for the governments of the parties.

(c.) The establishment of a military consultative body whose terms of references shall be determined in due course.

[9] Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the parties shall invite the governments of the United States of America and the Chinese People's Republic to send their representatives to the bodies set up under the treaty, as observers.

[10] The present treaty shall not impair in any way the obligations contained in the international treaties and agreements among the European states the principles and purposes of which are in conformity with the principles and purposes of the present treaty.

[11] The duration of the treaty shall be fifty years.

## Auxiliary Soviet Proposal

[1] The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertake to continue their efforts to reach an adequate settlement of the German problem in accordance with the principle of maintaining peace and national freedom and also to observe the rights of all other European states interested in preventing any state from violating their national interests and security.

[2] Pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of Germany along democratic and peaceful lines the following measures shall be carried out:

(a) The occupation forces shall be withdrawn simultaneously from the territory of both East and West Germany within a period of six months with the exception of limited contingents left to perform protective functions arising out of the control tasks of the four powers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to East Germany and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in regard to West Germany. The strength of such contingents shall be agreed upon by the governments of the four powers.

(b) The powers that at present are exercising occupation functions in Germany shall have the right to move in their forces in case the security of either part of Germany is threatened: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to East Germany; the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in regard to West Germany.

(c) For the purpose of maintaining internal order and defense of frontiers the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic shall have police units, the strength and armaments of which shall be determined by agreement among the four powers. Inspection groups comprising representatives of the four powers shall be formed in East and West Germany to supervise the implementation of this agreement.

[3] In accordance with the above provisions, the implementation of which shall assure the neutralization of Germany and the creation of conditions favorable to the settlement of the German problem in the interests of consolidating peace in Europe, the four powers shall take urgent steps to facilitate the conclusions of a treaty on collective security among the European states that shall provide for appropriate guarantees against aggression and the violation of peace in Europe. To this end the four powers have agreed to take the initiative of convening

an appropriate conference of European states.

## Remarks by Mr. Molotov

It is necessary to reach a solution of the German problem satisfactory to all our nations and all peace-loving countries of Europe. It must be in accordance with the principles of the preservation of peace and the national freedom of Germany and, simultaneously, with the guarding of the national interests and security of all peoples of Europe.

The split of Europe into military groups has to be avoided.

It depends on our countries whether there will be a World War III or not. If the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union decide to prevent another world war they are in a position to do so.

In the first place, we must do everything in our power to prevent the creation of military groups by nations opposing each other if we want to prevent a new world war and, by the same token, another war in Europe.

The events of recent years, which are all known to us, give evidence that the idea of creating military blocs—which are particularly opposed by the Soviet Union and the people's democracies—are beginning to be put into effect.

The way for this has been paved particularly by the North Atlantic pact, which was created five years ago with the United States and Great Britain at its head.

The North Atlantic bloc especially is pushing ahead by all means the plans to create military groups in Europe, Asia, in the Pacific area and also in India and the Middle East.

## Defense Community Assailed

At the present Berlin conference we have naturally devoted great attention to the German question and the securing of safety in Europe. In this connection, the Soviet delegation point out over and over again the dangerous character of the plans to create the European Defense Community. These plans cannot be reconciled with the necessity for guaranteeing the collective security of the people of Europe.

It was hinted that with the creation of the European Defense Community—that is, the so-called European army into which the remilitarized West Germany would be incorporated—the Soviet Union and other peace-loving European countries could be given security guarantees.

Is that so? Of course it is not so.

Due to the obstinate resistance of the people of the European countries, the Western powers have not succeeded in creating the European Defense Community.

The creation of a military bloc formed by six nations—West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—would mean that these countries would be placed in opposition to the remaining part of Europe. It would mean a widening of the split of Europe, an increase in international tensions and it would jeopardize the vital interests of all European nations.

The creation of the European Defense Community would result in an indefinite split of Germany and would prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

What would replace the European Defense Community if plans to establish it were dropped?

There is particularly great interest in this question in France, which we consider absolutely natural.

We reply to this question: Instead of the plans to create the European Defense Community, the idea of collective security for all people of Europe has to be put into effect by all means.

Security had to be guaranteed for all countries in Europe, regardless of the differences in their social structure.

The Soviet Union deems it necessary that some states in Europe are not placed in opposition to other European states but that an all-European system of collective security be established.

This system must provide for close cooperation among all European states and to prevent a breach of peace in Europe and provide for necessary defense in case of a violation of peace. It must at the same time include concrete obligations of the states, obligations of military character included, to make this system active and effective.

If the Government of France,

Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union will support this idea [collective security in Europe] then there will be no reason to effect plans such as creation of a limited military group as the European Defense Community.

The conclusion of an all-German treaty on collective security in Europe will be in line with the sincere striving of the people of Europe for the strengthening of peace. It will be an important contribution to the strengthening of world peace.

We are facing a task which is not simple but which can be attained.

We must continue our efforts to bring about a satisfactory solution of the German problem.

What we cannot achieve at this conference we can attempt to achieve later without postponing the peaceful solution of the German question because of this or that plan.

## Statement by Mr. Dulles

Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United States can be an "observer," I thought it would be in order to make some observations on his plan.

The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals primarily with Germany and the other of which represents the draft of a proposed European treaty on collective security.

The paper with reference to Germany contains the statement:

"That we shall continue our efforts to seek a settlement of the German problem" and that, of course, the United States is disposed to do.

Then the paper in its paragraph 2 goes on to repeat the proposal which has heretofore been made a number of times by the Soviet Union with reference to the withdrawal of so-called occupation forces from East and West Germany.

It makes it relevant, therefore, only for me to repeat what has been said before by me and others around this table: that the proposal would leave West Germany and consequently much of West Europe exposed to any threat of external aggression.

A third paragraph of this paper contemplates the calling of another conference, and it is perhaps in order for me in this connection to say what I have said before—namely, that it seems whenever we have a conference which is unable to settle anything the Soviet Union proposes that we have another conference, and a conference which can only breed other conferences is the best we can do. This is rather a disheartening conclusion.

The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would presumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain implications in it which do affect the United States.

## Scrapping of NATO Implied

It is perhaps implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the provisions of Articles 7 and perhaps 10, and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon the North Atlantic pact "as resembling in many ways the anti-Comintern pact which led to the unleashing of the Second World War."

He went on to say that "there are no reasons to doubt that the fate of the North Atlantic pact shall be any better than that of the anti-Comintern pact."

So I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should get together for their own collective security without the participation of the United States. The United States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future.

The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel that on that account we have any right to de-

mand participation in European affairs.

The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists represented by the Kaiser.

When the war was over, we took our troops home at once.

## World War II Events Cited

Then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger, not only to Western Europe but also the Soviet Union, was immense, and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made a gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany.

And after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany.

Now, for the third time in this century we have sent forces back to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe who were afraid and who asked us to do so.

That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state. Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge is not for me to decide.

It has been suggested that our participation in the present defense of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe. That is one of these strange reversals of history—the upside-down talk—to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe.

It cannot, I think, be forgotten that when the United States proposed the Marshall Plan, which involved the contributions of many billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was initially made available to all of the European states.

It was at that juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the division of Europe—or at least mitigated the division which unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action.

The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which considerably antedate the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and the proposed European Defense Community. It

goes back to the date when the Soviet control initially confined to the Soviet Union itself, was extended to a vast area which now includes one-third of the human race.

I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time described in language which is almost exactly the same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty.

The pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said on Oct. 31, 1939, "strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each others' affairs."

The second preamble to which

I refer speaks of the "respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs."

What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has gone on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviet Foreign Minister refers.

It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed.

Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States.

So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined that we will not be absorbed.

# Remarks by Figl, Molotov and Dulles and the Soviet Proposal on Austria

BERLIN, Feb. 12 (AP)—Following the text of the statement by Leopold Figl, Austrian Foreign Minister; excerpts from the speech of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister; the text of the Soviet proposal on Austria; and the text of the speech of John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, at the Berlin conference:

## Statement by Herr Figl

The preamble of the "draft of the treaty concerning the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria" states that the Austrian state treaty shall be concluded between the four Allied powers on the one hand and Austria on the other hand.

It seems, therefore, right and proper that Austria, which will have to fulfill the obligations of this treaty and to bear its burdens for many years, shall take part in its final formulation as an equal partner enjoying the same rights as the other contracting parties.

The Austrian Federal Government have at the request of the Austrian Parliament asked the four powers to invite them to take full part in the discussions. The Federal Government and the entire Austrian people have therefore noted with great satisfaction the favorable replies to this request, followed by the decision of the Allied powers to invite an Austrian delegation to this conference.

I trust that the four foreign ministers will now take a formal decision to meet my Government's request for full participation. I should like to declare today formally that on the Austrian side every thing will be done that appears likely to facilitate the negotiations and to bring about a speedy conclusion of the state treaty.

## Austria Treated as Colony

It must first of all be stated most emphatically that Austria was subjugated in 1938 by Hitler only by the massive use of military force after having for years resisted the National Socialist threats and made great sacrifices in this struggle. Deserted by the League of Nations, the Austrian people were in the end just as little in a position to prevent National Socialist oppression as other states which, though disposing of considerably larger economic resources and military power, soon fell into the same situation as ourselves.

During the occupation by National Socialist Germany, which treated Austria like a colonial territory, Austria was completely deprived of her international freedom of action.

The Austrian people, who during the Hitler occupation were hoping for the re-establishment of their liberty and sovereignty, were therefore overjoyed to learn of the Moscow Declaration of 1st November, 1943, in which the Allied powers declared the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany in March, 1938, was null and void and expressed their wish to see Austria re-established as a free and independent state.

Thereby, the Governments of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which were a short time afterward joined by the French National Committee—in pursuance of their protests against the oppression of our country voiced already at the time of the invasion of Austria by Hitler's forces—undertook the obligation to provide for the liberation of Austria and refused to condone the breaches of international law committed by National Socialist Germany since March, 1938. In April and May, 1945, the victorious Allied armies liberated the entire territory of Austria.

By this removal of Nazi despotism, Austrian sovereignty seemed in fact re-established. The Austrian people enthusiastically welcomed their liberators and in the beginning have regarded the occupation of their country by the four Allied powers as a provisional measure necessitated by the military exigencies of the immediate postwar period.

The Austrian Government speedily normalized conditions, re-established a well functioning administration, and made arrangements for the election of an Austrian Parliament in November of the same year. In December, 1945, a Government formed on the basis of free, general, secret and direct elections assumed its duties.

## Government Efforts Praised

This Government was, like the preceding provisional state government, a coalition-government which, as I may emphasize, obtained very remarkable results, in particular in the field of reconstruction of the destroyed economy. Austria can with good reason point out that her political conditions enjoy particular stability and that thanks to the efforts of all classes of the population the major part of war destruction has been repaired. I will not omit to thank in this place the four Allied powers for the assistance which they have given us in this work of reconstruction.

The negotiations on the Austrian state treaty, which began as early as 1946, have still not been concluded owing to circumstances upon which neither Austria's people nor Austria's Government had any influence. Precisely seven years ago I had myself the honor to lead the Austrian delegation which then, in Lancaster House in London, was allowed to present its point of view on the state treaty though they were not considered as a party to the negotiations.

When in 1949 the negotiations, at first in Paris and later on in London and New York, made substantial progress the Austrian people had good reason to hope for a speedy recovery of her full freedom and sovereignty. The few articles of the draft treaty that are still open are by no means of such importance that they could not immediately be settled—given good will on all sides.

The fact that the state treaty has not yet been concluded has now led to the strange situation that the country which was the first to be victimized by the Nazi aggression will be the last to obtain its full freedom and sovereignty, and that for reasons for which this country it-



PRESENTS AUSTRIA'S CASE: Leopold Figl, second from right, Foreign Minister of Austria, as he met with the Western Powers' Foreign Ministers on Wednesday in Berlin to discuss a state treaty for Austria. The Foreign Ministers are, left to right, John Foster Dulles of the United States, Anthony Eden of Great Britain and Georges Bidault of France.

self is not in the least responsible.

While the former enemy states of the Allied powers have received their peace treaties a long time ago—and we do not begrudge any state a speedy return to normal conditions—Austria, which at the time of the declaration of war had already been deprived entirely of its liberty of action, today is still occupied.

The continuation of this occupation has imposed heavy burdens on the Austrian people. Apart from the sacrifices which are in direct connection with the occupation, the Austrian economy suffers great material losses by the continuous hindrance in the utilization of its resources, which result in a prejudicial and retarding effect on the reconstruction of the Austrian economy.

We were always, and are also today prepared to take sacrifices and burdens upon ourselves for our liberty and sovereignty. It must, however, be stated the Austrian people and their Government feel that the economic terms as laid down in the draft of the state treaty so far agreed upon, above all in Article 35, are particularly hard.

The Austrian Federal Government hold the opinion that the burden provided for in the draft treaty should be consistent with the economic and financial capacity of our country. Thus, after all the losses and sacrifices which we have already sustained, the amount provided for redeeming German assets and its payment in dollars instead of payment by supply of Austrian goods appears to us harsh and inequitable.

## Change in Draft Requested

This all the more so since agreement was reached on this article in 1949 Austria has to make further extraordinary sacrifices during the following five years. Furthermore, I should like to refer to the clauses concerning the Austrian mineral oil deposits in Article 35, and point out that they are hardly consistent with the full economic sovereignty of our country. It cannot be contested that this precious raw material flows from most ancient Austrian soils. Is not the disposal of its country's own mineral deposits an inalienable right of every free people?

May I refer in this connection to Resolution No. 626 (VKK) of 21 December 1952 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was unanimously adopted and which states that the right of every nation freely to use and exploit its natural wealth and resources is inherent in its sovereignty and is in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The General Assembly in this resolution has further recommended that member states should refrain from all acts impeding the exercise of these sovereign rights. I, therefore, propose on behalf of the Austrian Federal Government, in the light of my arguments, the revision of the economic terms of the draft treaty, in particular Article 35, in a sympathetic and generous spirit.

Austria's only desire is to recover as soon as possible her full freedom and sovereignty. In spite of all obstacles she has, as never before in the history of the republic, furnished proof of her will and ability to live. We therefore accept every term of the present draft of the state treaty which would secure Austria's independence, freedom and sovereignty in every respect.

I have, gentlemen, presented to you Austria's point of view. I think I can say that we have done everything to secure the definite freedom of Austria and her independent existence. On the occasion of the inauguration of this conference, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union stated that millions of persons expect an answer to the question whether the Berlin conference will contribute to the strengthening of peace, to the relaxation of tension in international relations and toward guaranteeing security in Europe.

With this in mind I now appeal to you, gentlemen: give Austria the state treaty and you will thereby not only give 7,000,000 Austrians the freedom long due them, but you will, beyond that, contribute to the strengthening of peace, to a true relaxation of tension in international relations and to the preservation of security in Europe.

## Remarks by Mr. Molotov

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to an immediate settlement of the Austrian problem.

The Soviet Government considers it an abnormal condition that seven years of negotiations have not led to conclusion of an independence treaty and that no agreement has been reached.

The greatest obstacle to the conclusion of the preparation of an Austrian treaty was the wish of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France not to deal with a question closely tied up with the

future independence and liberty of Austria.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary that the United States and Great Britain fulfill their obligations under their peace treaty with Italy in regard to the Free Territory of Trieste.

The Soviet Government did and does consider it impermissible that the United States and Great Britain have not fulfilled their obligations in this respect and that they have practically converted the Free Territory of Trieste into an Anglo-American military base.

In view of this situation, it is most natural that the Soviet Government makes an effort to prevent the same thing from happening to Austria.

For this reason, the question of the Free Territory of Trieste cannot be by-passed.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France in March, 1952, unexpectedly worked out without participation of the Soviet Union the so-called project of an abridged independence treaty for Austria. We see here a practice common in the last few years, a practice of separate action.

## Curb on Alliances Included

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to include in the treaty with Austria an article preventing Austria from any coalition or military alliance with any state which fought against Hitler Germany and had thus participated in the liberation of Austria, and an article prohibiting establishment of foreign military bases in Austria.

In the view of the Soviet delegation, this would mean that Austria would become an important stabilizing factor in Central Europe, which would in turn be an important factor for strengthening European security.

The Soviet Government cannot ignore the fact that the three Western powers are in no hurry to conclude a peace treaty with Germany which would guarantee the peaceful and democratic development of all of Germany.

We must not forget that in the last few decades German militarism started aggression in Europe by including Austria in military blocs aimed against other European nations. The result was that the human and material potential of Austria was abused for the aggressive aims of German militarism.

All this makes it necessary that effective measures be taken to prevent an Anschluss by West Germany.

On behalf of the Austrian Government, Herr Figl expressed the wish that payments [to Russia] of the sum stipulated under Article 35 be paid not in dollars but in goods.

The Soviet Government agrees that Austria pay the Soviet Union the sum stipulated in Article 35 not in dollars but in goods.

As far as the other remarks [by Herr Figl] on Article 35 are concerned, it must be taken into consideration that new discussions would only bring up new complications and would merely delay the conclusion of the Austrian independence treaty.

We have heard here about the sacrifices by Austria during and after the war. It should not be forgotten, however, that Austrian troops fighting as part of the Hitler Army did great damage to the Soviet Union, and not only to the Soviet Union.

For this reason, especially, the Moscow Declaration on Austria of Nov. 1, 1943, said that Austria was fully responsible for participating in the war on the side of Hitler Germany.

## Soviet Proposal on Austria

Conclusion of the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the United Kingdom and the United States recognize that the interests of consolidating peace in Europe and the need to insure the national rights of the Austrian people require an early re-establishment of a free and independent Austria, and that the settlement of the Austrian question should conform to the existing four-power agreements.

Accordingly the Governments of the four powers have agreed:

### [1]

To instruct the deputy ministers for foreign affairs to draft within a period of three months a final text of "the state treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria," being guided by the following:

(a) To conclude the preparation of the draft state treaty with Austria which was in the main agreed among the four powers in 1949 and according to which Austria shall be re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state, shall be relieved of the control of the four powers, and the existing control machinery—the Allied Commission for Austria and all its bodies—shall be abolished and the occupation of Austria shall be terminated.

(b) To insert into the text of

## Statement by Mr. Dulles

We are here today in a meeting which may have historic consequences. From it may come the kind of accomplishment which the whole world has been expecting of this conference, but which after nearly three weeks has not yet been forthcoming.

Some may explain and even excuse our failure to date on the ground that the problems and tasks we have previously undertaken have been vast and complex.

Such is not the case today. In Agenda Item No. 3—the conclusion of an Austrian state treaty—we have a problem of completely manageable magnitude.

In the occasional moments of mediation which this conference has permitted, I have given thought to the dilemmas which seem to confront our Soviet colleagues. I try to see their problems from their viewpoint, and admit that they face hard problems.

But no stretch of philosophical speculation can bring me to believe that Austria constitutes a really fear lest 7,000,000 peace-loving Austrians should have freedom. Nor can I believe that the economy of the 800,000,000 people within the Soviet-dominated bloc depends upon being able to continue to bleed the economy of the small and naturally poor Austrian state.

It seems incredible that a Soviet grocer's bill for some dried peas should have stood in the way of honoring the 1943 signature of the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Moscow Declaration of Austria's independence.

We have just heard the statement of the Austrian Foreign Minister.

## Immediate Solution Urged

We agree that the Austrian problem does not simply call for eventual solution, it cries aloud for immediate solution, no matter what measurement of politics or economics or humanity or international decency is applied to it. What is asked for is nothing more than what was solemnly promised over ten years ago—the rights of sovereignty we all insist upon for ourselves.

Furthermore, the gap which separates the Austrian minister's plea from realization is so small that this treaty could be signed here and now, if all four of us had the will to sign it. I, for one, do have that will, and I note that each of us has in statements at this conference recognized our obligation to act quickly.

Mr. Molotov put it well when on Jan. 25, 1954, he said "the interests of strengthening peace in Europe and the need to assure the national rights of the Austrian people demand the earliest re-establishment of a free and independent Austria."

The call of the Austrian Foreign Minister is a call to action to which we must respond quickly for many reasons.

Austria was the first victim of Hitler's aggression and if we have, as we say and know we have, a responsibility for re-making the Europe which Hitler so largely destroyed, the liberation of Austria from the bondage of occupation still stands after nine years at the head of the list of actions we should take.

## Soviet Actions Called Shabby

We should also respond quickly because only in that way can we eradicate the sorry record of past negotiations on the Austrian state treaty.

I have no wish at this time to enumerate the long and shabby story on delay, disillusion and lack of candor which has thus

far characterized the Soviet negotiations on Austria.

This time there should be a clear-cut end of all of that. Can we sit here as the foreign ministers of our four countries solemnly and seriously addressing ourselves to Agenda Item No. 3 and dare admit that the 374 previous discussions on this one item over a seven-year period have not explored every conceivable nook and cranny of the Austrian state treaty?

We should also respond quickly in recognition of the extraordinary performance of the Austrians themselves. Compare the Austria of today with the Austria that met our eyes in the spring of 1945.

At that time a provisional government struggled in the ruins left by Hitler. The economy—there was no economy. Today the Austrian people pursue their daily lives peacefully and industriously under the protection of their democratic Constitution.

Few Governments in the world today can present a record of real achievement comparable to that of the Austrian Government installed in 1945 after free elections and twice freely re-elected since then. This Austrian Government has brought the Austrian economy to a state of productivity and stability which it has not enjoyed for decades, despite the siphoning off, for the benefit of Soviet Russia, of the products of East Austria. To be sure, foreign aid has helped—and I am proud that much of it has been contributed by the United States—but foreign aid without national will could not have produced the Austria of today.

## Occupation Burden Noted

It can truly be said that the harmony of Austria's internal and external relations, created in nine years out of the ruins of aggression, are a model of what can be done when there is a will to do it. And yet despite this abundantly apparent demonstration of political maturity, democratic institutions, social peace and economic well-being, the Austrian people remain under the burden of occupation and exploitation. Some 60,000 foreign troops, over two-thirds of them under Soviet command, garrison Austria. That is practically one soldier for every 100 inhabitants.

We should also respond quickly because of the shameful economic burden which has been imposed upon Austria during the past five years by the delay on the treaty.

Since 1949 the Soviet Union has extracted from so-called "German assets" in its zone of Austria at least \$200,000,000 in net profits. This is a sum larger than the lump-sum indemnity which in 1945 was set by the Soviet Union as the price of the return to Austria of only some of these assets.

This is reason enough for acting on the Austrian Foreign Minister's request for alleviation of Article 35.

Austria was not an aggressor—Austria is not a defeated enemy.

Austria was a victim of aggression. Austria is, by our own statement in the Moscow Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943, a liberated and not an enemy country. As Dr. Figl has said, it is ironic that we have long since concluded treaties with all but one of the European nations which were our enemies.

## Russian Marshal Quoted

In a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna in March, 1945, the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian force in Austria, said, "The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops, and the liberation of Austria. The Red

Army backs the Moscow Declaration of the Allied powers on the independence of Austria."

To fulfill the pledge of the Moscow declaration, so eloquently underscored by Marshal Tolbukhin and reinforced by innumerable statements, declarations and resolutions since then, requires pathetically little. That was also true in 1949.

All that lies between the Austria of today and the Austria we promised in 1943 is agreement on five articles—actually only parts of five articles—of the present draft treaty, and consideration of Article 35 in the light of Austrian Foreign Minister's statement today.

The American delegation supports Mr. Eden's proposal listing the few points which need to be settled in order to reach the goal of an Austrian state treaty. After 374 discussions and ten years of unfulfilled pledges, I believe my colleagues will agree with me that these and only these steps need to be taken. No other issues are relevant to our task.

Last April President Eisenhower spoke to the world on the subject of world tensions. At that time he called for deeds, not words, to prove the will to peace, and, in fact, he cited the Austrian state treaty as just such a deed—a deed requiring only the simple will to do it. That deed will shine in a world which has become darkened by fear and disillusionment. If the Soviet Union will join us in doing this deed, the whole world will rejoice in the demonstration that our four nations can indeed cooperate to serve the cause of peace and justice. Out of that beginning greater things could come.

# Remarks by Austrian, U. S. and Soviet Foreign Ministers

BERLIN, Feb. 13 (AP)—Following is the text of remarks at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference today by Leopold Figl, Austrian Foreign Minister, and excerpts from remarks by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister:

## By Herr Figl

You gave me an opportunity to state how fervently the Austrian Government, and with it the Austrian people, hope that the Berlin conference may achieve at last the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty. I especially emphasized that we expect the restoration of the full freedom and sovereignty of our country from the treaty. I further declared that Austria, now as before, is ready to take on sacrifices and burdens in the state treaty for the sake of freedom.

Moreover, I stressed with the clarity I believe is necessary that Austria, above all, understands freedom as the end of the occupation, as is provided for in Article 33 of the draft treaty, according to which all foreign troops are to be withdrawn within ninety days after the treaty comes into force.

Unfortunately, I must express the deep disappointment not only of the Austrian Government but also of the Austrian people about the statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I wish to speak first of his proposal to postpone the withdrawal of the troops of the four powers stationed on the territory of the respective zones of Austria until a peace treaty with Germany is concluded.

This proposal would not only destroy all hopes of the Austrian people, but also delay indefinitely the prospects for the real liberation of Austria from foreign occupation. What, after all, does a state treaty mean which imposes heavy burdens on the Austrian people, but, at the same time, withholds from them the decisive benefit of again being master in their own house after the withdrawal of the foreign troops?

I ask you, my gentlemen Ministers, which of you, if he were in my place, would undertake to go before the people's representatives of his country with such a proposal?

The further stationing of troops in Austria, according to the declarations of Minister Molotov, is to prevent the alleged danger of a new loss of our state independence. The Austrian Government must categorically deny the existence of such a danger. Do you seriously believe that a people who have experienced the forced absorption of their country with all its terrible consequences could think in the slightest of striving for a repetition of this fatal event?

Austria's Government stands fully and completely behind Article 4 of the state treaty draft, which excludes any such political or economic union [with Germany]. This provision is as clear and unambiguous as

the will of the Austrian Government and the Austrian people to observe it. The motive behind the proposal for keeping troops in Austria is none other than to couple Austria's fate with one of the most difficult political problems [Germany] of the world, in the solving of which Austria is unable to exert any influence.

I appeal once more to the conference to do everything to reach an agreement on the state treaty which would do justice to our call for real liberation and restoration of Austria's independence.

## By Mr. Dulles

Yesterday afternoon the Soviet Foreign Minister presented us with a rather peculiar sandwich. The top and the bottom of his remarks stressed the necessity for the early conclusion of an Austrian state treaty, which would re-establish a free and independent Austria. But in between the top and bottom he inserted some poisonous proposals. They meant that the treaty, instead of re-establishing a free and independent Austria, should establish an Austria without freedom and without independence.

I earnestly hope that these new proposals will be withdrawn, so that we may in fact conclude an Austrian state treaty at this very meeting, as promised in 1943.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's statement completely confirms the view I expressed yesterday that if we adhere to the present draft of the Austrian state treaty there remain only minor differences between us. As the Soviet proposals state, that draft treaty "was in the main agreed among the four powers in 1949." Only five articles remain partially unagreed, and I am confident that with good will those articles could quickly be agreed upon. It will not take, as the Soviet Union suggests, three months to reach that agreement. It can be reached in three days or even less, so that we can in fact conclude the treaty at this conference in accordance with the proposal made yesterday by the three Western powers.

However, the Soviet Union has now introduced new proposals which would totally alter the situation. They would cut the heart out of the proposed treaty and turn the clock back, not to 1949, not to 1947, not even to 1943, but to the darker earlier period, when by Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly doomed to be forever the victim of alien occupation.

The Soviet Union proposes to continue the military occupation of Austria "pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."

Since the Soviet Union has rejected all proposals for the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections, and by its own latest German proposal treats the division of Germany as a semi-permanent condition, the Soviet Austrian proposal would mean an indefinite occupation of Austria. By requiring the withdrawal of all Allied troops from Vienna, while retaining

Soviet forces in the Soviet zone, the capital of Austria would thus be left as a defenseless island, surrounded by a sea of Russian soldiers.

If the Soviet proposal were adopted, it would pervert the Austrian state treaty and require its being rewritten from the preamble to the end.

How could we any longer in the preamble describe the treaty as being one designed to liberate Austria and to make it a free and independent state?

How could we any longer stipulate by Article 1 that "Austria shall be re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state"?

How could we any longer declare in Article 2 that we "will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria"?

Article 33, entitled "Withdrawal of Allied Forces," would be obliterated and have to be replaced by an article entitled, "The indefinite Military Occupation of Austria."

The treaty would thus become not a treaty for the liberation of Austria, but a treaty for the subjection of Austria.

A second major and related change in the treaty is proposed by the Soviet Union in terms of subjecting Austria to "neutralization."

## Honorable Neutrality

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian state treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation.

However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral. It is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.

It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union, at this moment when an Austrian state treaty seemed to be on the point of realization, should now propose provisions which would basically alter the entire character of the treaty and which would violate the Moscow declaration on Austria of Nov. 1, 1943, whereby the three powers, with the subsequent adhesion of France, undertook "to see re-established a free and independent Austria." If the Soviet proposal were accepted, there would be not a free Austria but an enslaved Austria, not an independent Austria but a subject Austria.

If this four-power meeting accepted the Soviet proposal, we would expose ourselves before the world as being morally and politically bankrupt. We would have forfeited all right to the confidence of others in our willingness to fulfill our solemn pledges.

We do not know, we can only suspect, the reasons which prompt the Soviet to make its present proposal. The reasons given are grotesquely inadequate.

It is given as a reason that there is lacking a treaty with Germany whereby Germany undertakes to respect the independence of Austria. It is said that until that undertaking is given, Austria must remain occupied.

The Soviet Foreign Minister would have us believe that during the period when Germany is occupied and totally disarmed—at least in the Western zones—the danger to Austria from Germany is so great that Austria must be occupied to protect it against that German danger, but that once Germany is restored to a unified and independent status, with a national army of its own, then it will be safe to end the occupation of Austria. Such reasoning will not carry conviction anywhere.

## 'Plausible Explanation'

A plausible explanation is the fact that Article 22 of the treaty of peace with Hungary and Article 21 of the treaty of peace with Rumania provide that the Soviet Union may maintain its armed forces on the territory of these countries so long as this is needed for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.

I can understand that the Soviet Union fears a withdrawal from Austria which would also require it to withdraw its Red armies from Hungary and Rumania.

Is it, however, really decent that little Austria should have to continue to be an occupied state so that the Soviet Union will have a pretext for continuing to occupy also Hungary and Rumania? So cynical an attitude will surely shock the conscience of the world.

We have heard from the Soviet Foreign Minister many words condemning "militarism," but everything which he proposes, whether it be in relation to Germany or in relation to Austria, or indirectly in relation to Hungary and Rumania, shows dependence on military power. No considerations of humanity prevail as against naked force.

The Soviet Minister has introduced in his Austrian proposal a proposal for the four of us to consider the question of Trieste. That proposal is unacceptable to the United States. In any event, it has no proper relationship to the Austrian question. I hope that its introduction does not mean that it is the intention of the Soviet Foreign Minister to make a conclusion of a state treaty with Austria dependent upon the prior solution of all other European questions, so that the first victim of Hitlerite aggression would automatically be the last to be relieved of the consequences of that aggression.

## By Mr. Molotov

I want to explain the basic idea of the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation [on Austria]. I am all the more forced to do this because my colleagues have done all they could to make the idea as little clear as possible, to confuse matters and to delay the discussion.

These proposals of the Soviet Union are a project and require not only close attention but concrete discussion item for item. Without this discussion we cannot reach our aims. In all serious questions words alone are not sufficient. We must have proof that action is in accordance with the words. We must not forget this.

The Soviet Government proposes to conclude a state treaty with Austria within a short time.

The Soviet Government proposes:

First—The ending of the occupation of Austria.

Second—The handing over of German assets in Austria as provided in the draft treaty.

Third—Temporary stay of some military units in Austria.

We are being told that the last proposal is not only unacceptable but that it makes the whole Soviet proposal not acceptable.

The situation arises that when the Soviet Government proposes to withdraw all troops from Vienna—American, British, French and Russian—that is bad. For whom is it bad? Maybe for the civil servants we have in Vienna but not for the Austrian people.

When we propose the withdrawal of foreign troops from Vienna, then we propose at the same time the signing of the Austrian treaty.

## 'No Foreign Troops'

Then, at the same time, Austria has the right to have its own army but no foreign troops in Vienna.

We have been told if some military units remain in Austria it is equal to occupation. He who argues in such a way must answer the following question. The United States of America has eight military bases in France. What is this? Is it an occupation? In Italy, it has several bases. In Greece, three bases, and also bases in Norway and Iceland. What is this? Is this an occupation. No one says this is an occupation. But truly this is a limitation of sovereignty.

If the four powers reach agreement of the stay of some limited troop contingents in Austria, it means no occupation but a certain limitation of sovereignty dictated by necessities.

Approximately 100 American military bases have been established on or near European territory. We have to take interest in this as we are concerned about the security of our country and other peace-loving nations. The European Defense Community, which results in a rebirth of militarism in West Germany, has been created.

If the United States, France and Great Britain would write off creation of E. D. C., if they would write off revival of militarism in West Germany, the situation would become easier. But we do not know so far whether they have spiked plans to revive militarism in West Germany.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation is a practical step for an early decision on the Austrian question. True, it might not solve the problem 100 per cent. Maybe four-fifths but in any case more than 50 per cent.

## Text of Statement by Dulles at Berlin Parley

*BERLIN, Feb. 17 (AP)—The text of a statement by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State at the big four conference today follows:*

I will comment on the observations made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

He supports his proposal for troop withdrawal in East and West Germany on the basis that this would give satisfaction to the Germany people.

I am sure he can speak with authority as far as the Eastern zone is concerned, I doubt whether he can speak with the same authority as far as the Western zone is concerned.

I can say that there has been no intimation of any kind received from the authorities of West Germany, or from the people of West Germany, that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops of the Western powers which are in Germany.

On the contrary, there is evidence that there would be very considerable concern if these troops were withdrawn, given the situation which exists in the East.

Therefore, I am afraid that, while the proposal might give satisfaction in the Eastern zone, it would not give satisfaction in the Western zone.

### Withdrawal From Austria Urged

If the Soviet Union is eager to give people satisfaction by troop withdrawals, I would suggest that a good place to begin would be in Austria, where there is no question but what all the people eagerly desire all the troops to be withdrawn. There we are assured of a chance to give satisfaction. The Soviet delegation might give further consideration to that matter and perhaps indicate their acceptance of the Austria state treaty when we take that up tomorrow afternoon.

There is, however, a reason more fundamental than any I have indicated so far why the United States does not feel itself able to accept the Soviet proposal which is entitled, "on

ensuring European security." That is the paper which calls for the final withdrawal of forces.

What the Soviet Union asks the Western powers to do, presumably in the name of European security, is what we did under very analogous circumstances in Korea immediately preceding 1950. Our withdrawal in that case did not produce security; it produced war.

Korea, like Germany, was divided. Korea, like Germany, was divided under conditions so that roughly two-thirds of Korea was occupied by the non-Western forces.

The analogy is closed because the indigenous forces in North Korea, like the forces in Eastern Germany, were highly organized and trained, whereas those in Southern Korea and in Western Germany were only police forces.

Mr. Molotov has questioned Mr. Eden's statements with reference to the East German military personnel. The United States has very reliable information to reveal that the East German military personnel now total 140,200 men under arms. Of this number 100,000 are in the ground forces, with an additional 25,000 serving in security formations. There are seven organized divisions of which three are mechanized. Air forces constitute sixty jet fighters manned and trained by 5,000 effectives. These forces are commanded by ex-officers of the Nazi Wehrmacht and of the SS [Elite Guard]. They are additional to 100,000 East German police.

I can assure the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is nothing comparable in West Germany.

There are ample means of access to information so that anyone can ascertain that fact readily for himself.

### Western Police Put at 150,000

There is in West Germany a total of 150,000 police, none of whom have any more than normal police armament. That number is to be thought of in terms of the population of the Western zone, which is, of

course, many times that of the Eastern zone.

The situation in Germany is thus comparable to the situation which existed in Korea prior to 1947. Up to that time the United States had its own armed forces in South Korea, and there was peace. The United States took its troops out of South Korea in 1949, and in 1950 there was war.

It is not necessary at this point to indulge in argument as to just where the responsibility for that war lay. No one can dispute the two facts: first, that the United States troops were taken out, and, immediately following that, there was war.

Therefore, I am sure that Mr. Molotov will understand, even if he does not agree with, our state of mind, when we say that we are highly skeptical of a proposal put forward in the name of peace which involves our following the same course of action which, under remarkably similar circumstances, in fact led to war.

It is to fly in the face of the teachings of history, and indeed of elemental reasoning, to seek peace by continuing the disunity of a people who are bound together by sentiments of patriotism and by ethnic unity.

The way to get peace and promote peace in Europe is not simply to think of various devices whereby we can mitigate the dangers of a disunited Germany. We should seek a united Germany.

### Soviet Digression Is Noted

That is why I regret that in this topic of Item 2 the Soviet Union has gotten lost in its great grandiose scheme, piling words upon words, and it has left the central problem, which is the peaceful unification of Germany.

It is not an accident that the three Western ministers, under this Item 2, have concentrated their attention on the problem of Germany and the creation of a united Germany through free elections. It is because we believe that this goes to the heart of the problem of security for Europe.

We are also convinced that a united Germany should be allowed to develop along peaceful lines of its own choosing. A Germany which is coerced, which is told what it cannot do, is a Germany which almost surely will follow the same course that was followed by the Germany which succeeded the Treaty of Versailles. There the restrictions which were imposed were the very thing that enabled the extreme nationalists to come to power.

Therefore, our second point is that Germany must be allowed to pursue her inclinations so long as these are peaceful and compatible with the security of the rest of us. Since, in fact, Germany wishes to associate herself with the Western countries of Europe, it is essential to peace that she be allowed to do so.

If she had wished to associate herself with the powers of Eastern Europe, we would not have wanted to force her otherwise. The main point is that we should not attempt to apply such a coercion to Germans that they will not feel that Germany is an independent sovereign state. In that way, I repeat, lies great danger.

It is a fact, which all of us who really want peace should eagerly welcome, that certainly the greater part of the Germans want to adopt a course which will end, for at least fifty years, and I believe for all time, a distinctively national army, and equally end the German General Staff. The fact that the Germans want to do this gives us a unique opportunity to go to meet them, and to consolidate that present will.

That will may not always be with us. If today we reject that will of the German people which goes in the direction of peace, if we try to substitute provisions which will be forcibly imposed upon Germany, if we perpetuate the division of Germany, if we impose limitation and controls of the nature of the Versailles treaty, then I say we would be accepting a heavy responsibility before history.

# Text of Big Four Communique and Remarks by Dulles and Molotov

## Big Four Foreign Ministers End Their Conference in Berlin

BERLIN, Feb. 18 (AP)—Following are the text of the communique issued at the close of the foreign ministers' conference today, the text of the statement by John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State, and excerpts from the speech by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister:

### Ministers' Communique

A meeting of the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—John Foster Dulles, Georges Bidault, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov—took place in Berlin between Jan. 25 and Feb. 18, 1954. They reached the following agreements:

[A]

The foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea (South), the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North), and other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea and which desire to attend shall meet in Geneva April 26 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China shall also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to nor the holding of the abovementioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

[B]

The Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Convinced that the solution of international controversies necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations resolution of Nov. 28, 1953.

The four ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security and on the Austrian question; but they were unable to reach agreement upon these matters.

### By Mr. Dulles

As I speak for the last time at this conference, I cannot but record a large measure of regret. We have failed to satisfy the hopes which many throughout the world placed in us. I refer particularly to the peoples of East and West Germany and of Austria.

It seems to me that our failures are not, however, due to lack of effort, or to inadequacies of detail. Our failures are of a kind which could not have been avoided by mere diplomatic or negotiating skills at this conference.


We encountered a fundamental difference between the views of the East and the West.

This is not the time or the place to discuss philosophies or creeds. It is, however, important to observe that all of our basic differences here have revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed safe, to give man and nations a genuine freedom of choice.

The Western powers were willing to place trust in the German and Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not. Its delega-



John Foster Dulles, left, United States Secretary of State, and Foreign Ministers Anthony Eden, center, of Great Britain and Georges Bidault of France listen to speeches during farewell ceremony in West Berlin for the Western diplomats.



Leopold Figl, right, of Austria, greeting Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Union's representative, before final session of conference yesterday. Russia rejected Herr Figl's offer to extend the occupation rights of the Big Four powers to June 30, 1955, if they would grant her independence at once. Big Four set Asian peace conference for April 26 at Geneva.

tion pointed out that the German, if given freedom, might again follow such warlike leadership as was represented by the Kaiser and by Hitler and that the Austrians, if left alone, might not abide by their solemn engagement to maintain their independence and to avoid absorption by Germany.

The Western powers realize that no one can know with certainty the use to which men and nations will put their freedom. History records abuses of freedom. Doubtless it will do so again. Nevertheless, we were convinced that no social system has ever been invented which is better than that which puts its trust in human freedom, guided by education and by religion.

### Soviet Said to Fear Freedom

The Soviet delegation in multiple ways has made manifest its fear of freedom and its determination through its occupation forces and its control of election processes to try to make certain that freedom cannot be

exercised in a way which might be prejudicial to it.

That is why it seems the Soviet Foreign Minister found it impossible to agree to the unification of Germany through genuinely free all-German elections as we proposed and why he has insisted that Soviet troops must remain indefinitely in Austria.

Our discussion of European security has revealed that the Soviet Union believes that its security depends upon maintaining such a huge preponderance of power that every other country of Europe will in fact be subject to its coercion.

The Soviet Union opposes any integration of the Western European countries or any association with the United States which would create sufficient defensive strength so that the peoples of Western Europe would in fact feel that they are masters within their own homes and can develop their own distinctive ways of life.

The Atlantic Charter to which

we all subscribed called for "freedom from fear." Today, unhappily, the dominant note in much of the world is "fear of freedom." It is the conflict between those two concepts which has made it impossible here to achieve any large measure of agreement.

### Dulles Is Still Hopeful

We are confident that the impasse which we reached here will not be permanent. We do not believe that the peoples of Germany and Austria, or for that matter of other neighboring nations, need to bury their hopes. The Soviet leaders will surely come to see that freedom is not so greatly to be feared. It develops in men a basic respect for the rights of others, a sense of human dignity, a longing for fellowship and community welfare, which are the most solid props of peace.

I am confident that if these basic realities become better understood by the Soviet Union it will become possible to achieve the free and independent Austria which we promised in 1943 and the unified Germany which we said in 1945 was a purpose of our occupation.

Despite our conflicts of basic principle, we have made some progress here.

The four of us have reached an agreement, which we hope will be acceptable to the others concerned, which will permit the holding of a Korean political conference. The possibility

emerges of effecting the unification of Korea in freedom as had been promised.

There is also provided the chance, if Communist China wants it, of restoring peace and order in Indo-China, and thus enabling the three Associated States of Indo-China to have freedom and enjoy it in security.

We have agreed to pursue the Four Power search for agreement on a reduction of armaments as recommended by the United Nations.

We shall pursue means to alleviate the plight of the peoples of Germany and of Austria.

### War Threat Said to Be Eased

In addition to what we have done here, we have learned much that has a value which is not to be ignored. It makes it less likely that any of us should by inadvertence and miscalculation do what would risk another war.

This does not mean that the Western nations will suspend the doing of what strengthens freedom and makes apparent its glorious potentials. If this conference were to result in a paralysis of freedom, then indeed it would be a tragic failure.

The three Western ministers, each acting freely for his sovereign and independent nation, have found agreement on every aspect of our work. Thus, we have exemplified a society of consent. If in that spirit our nations go on with others of like mind to build the strength of freedom, then we shall win everywhere respect. It will be shared by all who look to us for leadership, for we will be guarding and serving their freedom with our own.

Let me in conclusion say a personal word. I thank each of my three colleagues for the clarity and candor of their participation in this conference and for the uniform courtesy and consideration which each has shown me.

### By Mr. Molotov

The exchange of views of the conference have contributed to a better understanding of the positions of the nations represented here.

The differences of the opinions of our governments have been clearly expressed here.

At the same time the ways to lessen these differences became clearer.

At this conference agreement was reached that the Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, take steps to contribute to a fair solution of the disarmament problem or at least to a considerable reduction of armaments.

There was also agreement on the calling of a conference at Geneva of representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese People's Republic and of nations directly interested in this question (Korea).

At this conference a contribution is to be made to a final settlement of the Korean question.

Such an agreement is in the interests in the strengthening of peace and in the interest of a solution of the question of the reunification of Korea.

At this conference the ques-

tion of the restoration of peace in Indo-China also will be discussed.

As to the discussion of the German problem, we have all agreed that a solution of this question is inseparably tied up with the problem of security in Europe.

That means Germany has to be reunified on a democratic and peace-loving basis and a revival of German militarism must not be permitted.

The present Berlin conference made it particularly clear that a solution of the German problem is a matter mainly for the Germans themselves.

The Soviet representatives are convinced that if we would have heard the Germans here, if we had listened to representatives of East and West Germany, it would have been easier to find a solution to the vital question in which all German people are interested.

We so far have not succeeded in going ahead with preparations for a peace treaty with Germany, yet the question has to be solved. The Soviet Government hopes the efforts of the four governments will be continued and aimed at a satisfactory solution of the German question in accordance with the interests of strengthening peace in Europe.

### Cite European Army Opposition

The Soviet Government has never made any secret about its rejection of the creation of military groups of these or those countries directed against other states.

The Soviet Government cannot help pointing out the particular danger of such a military group as the European Defense Community, formation of which means the rebirth of German militarism.

Therefore, the Soviet Government has submitted proposals to establish an all-European treaty of collective security.

Non-European states also could take part in bringing into being the collective security system in Europe.

The question of an Austrian state treaty could have been solved at this conference.

The plans mentioned earlier (the defense community) have prevented this, plans supporting danger of rebirth of German militarism.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Government is convinced there is a possibility to solve this question in the near future.

It is absolutely necessary that the Austrian Government realize this and that the Austrian people fully understand it.

The calling of the Berlin conference and the renewal of direct contact among the foreign ministers of France, Britain, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an under-current of conditions of particular importance.

The conference contributed to the discussion of some international problems, the solution of which is necessary for the further relaxation of international tension.

The problems which could not be solved at the Berlin conference are not wiped off the agenda.

The Berlin conference, we hope, will contribute to the development of cooperation of nations in international relations in the interests of the strengthening of peace.

The Soviet delegation expresses on its part gratitude to the foreign ministers of the United States, France and Britain for their cooperation at the conference.

The Soviet delegation thanks all the staff members of the four delegations for good and speedy work in the course of the conference.

## Text of Allied Communiqué

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19 (AP)—  
*Following is a communiqué on  
the recent Berlin Big Four con-  
ference, issued today by the  
United States, Britain and  
France:*

The major problem facing the Berlin conference was that of Germany. The three Western delegations urged that the reunification of Germany should be achieved through free elections, leading to the creation of an all-German government with which a peace treaty could be concluded. They put forward a practical plan to this end. Their proposals were not accepted by the Soviet delegation, even as a basis for discussion, and they were forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is not now ready to permit free all-German elections, or to abandon its control over Eastern Germany.

The three Western governments will continue their efforts to achieve German reunification in freedom and by peaceful means. In the meantime, they have suggested certain measures which could reduce the effect of the present division of Germany and its consequences for Berlin.

They have proposed that the three High Commissioners should study these questions with the Soviet High Commissioner. As regards Berlin, the three governments reaffirm their abiding interest in the security of the city as expressed in the tri-partite declaration of May 27, 1952. They will do all in their power to improve conditions in Berlin and to promote the economic welfare of the city.

The three Western ministers did their utmost to secure agreement upon the Austrian state treaty. They accepted the Soviet version of all the remaining disagreed articles. The Austrian Foreign Minister, who was present at all the discussions on

this question, declared himself ready to sign the treaty in this form.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, insisted upon adding new provisions to the treaty. The effect of these would have been to leave foreign troops in Austria for an indefinite period after the entry into force of the treaty, and to impair Austria's right to play her full part in international life.

The treaty could therefore not be concluded in Berlin, despite an Austrian offer accepted by the Western ministers, that troops of the four powers should remain in Austria until the 30th of June, 1955. The three governments are prepared to continue their efforts to conclude the Austrian state treaty, but progress depends on the Soviet Union's modifying its attitude. Meanwhile, they will continue to seek every means of lightening the burden of occupation on Austria.

The three governments remain ready to take advantage of any further opportunity which may arise to promote, by renewal of the contacts established at Berlin or by other means, a solution of the German and Austrian problems.

The three ministers explained and reaffirmed the purely defensive character of Western security arrangements.

Offers were made to discuss how the undertakings which already protect the Soviet Union against aggression could be reinforced. The Soviet delegation made no response to these offers. Their own proposals would have involved the dissolution of the Western security system, while the military power of the Soviet bloc in Europe remained intact. The three powers do not intend to be deflected from their efforts to develop the system of defense on which their survival depends.

# Text of Report by Dulles to Nation on Four-Power Conference in Berlin

Following is the text of the radio and television report on the Berlin conference by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, as recorded by The New York Times:

Last Friday evening I returned to Washington after four weeks of daily discussion at Berlin with the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union—Mr. Bidault, Mr. Eden, Mr. Molotov. Also, on the way back, I met with Chancellor Adenauer of Germany. I find on my return that there is some confusion as to what really happened. That is not surprising. It is difficult to grasp quickly the results of four weeks of debate on many different matters. Indeed, the full results cannot be clearly seen for many months. I can, however, say that this meeting had two results which will profoundly influence the future.

First, as far as Europe was concerned, we brought Mr. Molotov to show Russia's hand. It was seen as a hand that held fast to everything it had, including East Germany and East Austria, and also it sought to grab some more.

Secondly, as far as Korea and Indo-China were concerned, we brought Mr. Molotov to accept a resolution which spelled out the United States position that Red China might in these two instances be dealt with, but not as a government recognized by us.

You may ask whether it was worthwhile to go to Berlin and to make the great effort that the conference involved merely to obtain these results.

My answer is "yes," and I have no doubt about that. Berlin cleared the way for other things to happen. The unification and the strengthening of West Europe may now go on. In Asia there could be a unification of Korea and an end to aggression in Indo-China—if Red China wants it.

I do not predict that these things will happen. What I do say is that they could not have happened had it not been for Berlin.

## Events of Five Years Cited

Five years had elapsed since the Western ministers had met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. During those five years much had occurred.

A war had started and been stopped in Korea.

A war had reached ominous proportions in Indo-China.

Stalin had died and his successors talked more softly.

Six nations of Europe had created their Coal and Steel Community and planned to move on to a European Defense Community.

Communist China had emerged as an aggressive military organization, allying its vast manpower with that of the Soviet Union.

In the Soviet Union itself, industrial and agricultural strains were developing.

In East Germany, the spontaneous outbreak of June 17, 1953, revealed, in one enlightening flash, how much the captives crave freedom.

What did all of this add up to, in terms of world politics? Many speculated and no one knew. The uncertainty was leading to hesitation, wishful thinking and some paralysis of action.

There was only one way to find out—that was to meet the Russians and deal with them in terms of some practical tests.

We went to Berlin in the hope that Soviet policies would now permit the unification of Germany in freedom, or at least the liberation of Austria. Those two matters would, in relation to Europe, test the Soviet temper. We hoped to achieve those two results and we were determined to let no minor obstacles deter us.

The obstacles we incurred were, however, not minor, but fundamental.

The Soviet position was not at first openly revealed. It was masked behind ambiguous words and phrases. But as the conference unfolded and as Mr. Molotov was compelled to respond to our probing of his words, the Soviet purpose became apparent.

The seating and speaking order at the conference table were such that it always fell to me to speak first after Mr. Molotov. Then after me came M. Bidault of France, and then Mr. Eden of Britain. They carried with conspicuous ability their share of the task.

## Exposure of Soviet Aims

Between the three of us, we exposed what lay behind Mr. Molotov's clever words. For the

first time in five years the people of West Europe, America, and indeed all who could and would observe, sized up today's Soviet policy out of Mr. Molotov's own mouth, instead of by guess or by theory.

It amounted to this: To hold on to East Germany; To permit its unification with West Germany only under conditions such that the Communists would control the election machinery through all Germany; To maintain Soviet troops indefinitely in Austria;

To offer Western Europe, as the price of Soviet "goodwill," a Soviet-controlled Europe which would exclude the United States except in the nominal role of an "observer" along with Communist China.

This last Soviet project for what Mr. Molotov called "European security" was so preposterous that when he read it laughter ripped around the Western sides of the table to the dismay of the Communist delegation.

Laughter is a denial of fear and the destroyer of mystery—two weapons upon which the Soviet Union had relied far too long. Both of these weapons were swept aside in one moment of Western laughter.

But Mr. Molotov did more than just to furnish us with an occasion for ridicule. In that same breath, he told Germany that the price of unification was total Sovietization. He told Austria she was to be occupied until Germany paid the Soviet price. He told France that the Western frontier of communism was to be the Rhine and not the Elbe. He told all Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, that the price of momentary respite was for the Americans to go home.

His final utterances were harsh. When he called for the abandonment of a European Defense Community, the dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the scrapping of United States bases he spoke with no soft words. Gone was the post-Stalin "new look."

Thus he made clear what, to some, had been in doubt. The Soviet position admitted of no real negotiation. There is no middle ground between free German elections and the kind of elections which were carried out in the Eastern zone of Germany, where the people were forced to deposit Communist party ballots bearing one set of names alone.

There is no middle ground between a free and independent Austria and an Austria infiltrated with Russian soldiers. There is no middle ground between an Atlantic community defense system and "Americans go home."

There is no middle ground between freedom and slavery. For the clearest and sharpest and simplest exposition of these basic truths, all of us are indebted to Mr. Molotov.

In my closing statement before the conference last Thursday afternoon, I recalled that we had fought the second World War for goals expressed in the Atlantic Charter, to which the Soviet Union had subscribed. One of these was "freedom from fear." But, once victory was won, the dominant Soviet motive had been "fear of freedom."

## Soviet Said to Fear Freedom

There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet leaders genuinely fear freedom. They do not feel safe unless freedom is extinguished, or is defenseless. That Soviet attitude made it impossible to achieve any agreement at Berlin in relation to European matters.

I have referred to the efforts of the Western ministers to require Mr. Molotov to expose Soviet policies in their reality. That effort gave drama to every meeting of the four. There was another aspect which carried, too, its drama. That was the effort of Mr. Molotov to divide the three Western powers.

Mr. Molotov occasionally complained that he was at a disadvantage because we were three to his one. But from his standpoint, that was an advantage. It is much easier to divide three than it is to divide one. If Mr. Molotov had achieved that division, he would have won the conference. In that respect, he ended with a greater degree of unity between the three Western powers than had existed when the conference began.

That unity did not come about merely because there had been prior planning. There had been able planning, and our United States staff was one of which all Americans can be proud. But no planning could anticipate all the moves which could be made



FINGER ON THE PROBLEM: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles confers with President Eisenhower on the recently completed Big Four foreign ministers' conference in Berlin.

by so shrewd a diplomat as Mr. Molotov and which called for instantaneous response. The unity that emerged was a natural and spontaneous unity which came from the fact that the three foreign ministers stood for governments and nations which were dedicated to the concepts of human liberty and national integrity which Mr. Molotov attacked.

It is a tragedy for the peoples of Germany that Germany and Berlin must remain divided; and for the people of Austria that they remain occupied and economically exploited. It can be said, however, to the eternal honor of these peoples, that they would not have had us do other than we did.

## Austrian Delegation Praised

The Austrian bipartisan delegation offered the Soviet Union every concession compatible with national honor. They firmly refused to go beyond that point. We were constantly in contact with the government and political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany and we knew that they did not want us to buy German unity at the price of making Germany a Soviet satellite.

The Germans under Soviet rule had no government to represent them, but we saw them in East Berlin. They provided a startling and shocking contrast with the people of West Berlin. There we saw open countenances and everywhere welcoming smiles and gestures. In the Soviet sector of Berlin we saw only frozen and haggard countenances, as the people stood silently under the vigilant eyes of the ever-present and heavily armed police.

A few waved at me from behind a policeman's back and many wrote me through underground channels. They made clear that they passionately wanted unification with West Germany, but they did not seek that unification on terms which would not really have ended their own enslavement, but would have merely extended that enslavement to their brothers of the West.

The alien peoples under Soviet rule can know that nothing that happened in Berlin has made less likely the unification of Germany, or the liberation of Austria and indeed the restoration of freedom to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other satellite countries. At Berlin I did not conceal my views in this respect. In my closing remarks to the three other foreign ministers I said "I do not believe that the people of Germany or Austria or for that matter of other neighboring nations need to bury their hopes."

I am confident that in saying this I expressed the abiding sentiments of the American people.

The governments of France and Britain rejected, without hesitation, the Soviet proffer of

European "peace" at a price which would have meant Western European disunity in the face of the huge consolidation of Soviet power.

Thus it came about that, in relation to Europe, much has been revealed. The Soviet has offered its alternatives to Western planning and they are so repellent that there seems no choice but to proceed as planned. Certainly, that is the United States' conviction.

## Atomic Parleys Cited

I had two private talks with Mr. Molotov about advancing President Eisenhower's atomic energy plan. We have agreed on the next procedural step, which will involve communication between Moscow and Washington through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. I should note in this connection that the Berlin conference adopted a resolution to exchange views on limitation of armaments as contemplated by a United Nations resolution of last November. It was, however, made clear that these talks would not replace, or cut across, the independent development of President Eisenhower's atomic energy plan.

We dealt also with the matter of peace in Korea and Indo-China.

We wanted a political conference on Korea because we felt it a duty to ourselves, the Korean people and the United Nations to seek to replace a Korea divided by an armistice with a Korea united in peace.

The Korean armistice recommended such a conference to the Communists. But for over six months, the Communists had blocked agreement upon either the time or place or composition of that conference.

As far back as last September, in agreement with President Rhee of Korea, the United States had proposed that the conference be held at Geneva. That proposal had been rejected. We proposed, also in agreement with President Rhee, that the conference should be composed of Communist China, Soviet Russia, North Korea, and the United Nations side, the Republic of Korea and the sixteen United Nations members which had fought in Korea. This proposal had been rejected. The Communists insisted that a group of Asian "neutrals" should be present and that Soviet Russia would be among these "neutrals" and so not bound by conference decisions.

We were able at Berlin to settle all these matters. It was agreed that a conference will be held at Geneva, as we had long ago proposed, and that the composition will be precisely that which the United States, the Republic of Korea and the United Nations General Assembly had sought. There will be no Asian "neutrals" there.

Some profess to fear that the holding of this conference will imply United States recognition of Communist China. That fear is without basis. Those throughout the world who suggest that the prospective Geneva conference implies recognition are giving the Communists a success which they could not win at Berlin. The resolution adopted at Berlin explicitly provides—I shall read the text—"it is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding or, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded."

I had told Mr. Molotov, flatly, that I would not agree to meet with the Chinese Communists unless it was expressly agreed and put in writing that no United States recognition would be involved.

## Move Resisted by Molotov

Mr. Molotov resisted that provision to the last. He sought by every artifice and device, directly and through our allies, to tempt us to meet with Communist China as one of the five great powers. We refused, and our British and French allies stood with us. When we went into the final session last Thursday afternoon, I did not know what Mr. Molotov's final position would be. So far, he had not accepted my position. We were to adjourn at 7 o'clock. At 6 o'clock—just sixty minutes before the final adjournment—Mr. Molotov announced that he would accept our non-recognition proviso.

A Soviet concession of that order ought not to be ignored. My basic position with reference to Communist China was made clear beyond the possibility of misunderstanding. In my opening statement (Jan. 26), I said:

"I should like to state here, plainly and unequivocally, what

the Associated States of Indo-China are doing the actual fighting in a war, now in its eighth year. They have our confidence and our support. We can give counsel and that counsel is welcomed and taken into account. But just as the United States had a special position in relation to the Korean armistice, so France has a special position in Indo-China.

## Aware of Soviet Hopes

I recognize, of course, that the Soviet Union would not have accepted, 100 per cent, our terms for the Korean political conference, unless it expected to benefit thereby. But so do we.

I can think of some Soviet benefits that we would not like and should prevent. But I do not wholly exclude the idea that the Soviet Union might in fact want peace in Asia.

We can hope so, and we shall see. In the meantime, we shall keep on our guard.

There is, however, no reason why we should refuse to seek peacefully the results we want merely because of fear that we will be outmaneuvered at the conference table. No informed observers believe that we were outmaneuvered at Berlin.

We need not, out of fright, lay down the tools of diplomacy and the possibilities which they provide. Our cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so low, that our nation must seek security by sulking in its tent.

Berlin gave the free nations up-to-date, first-hand post-Stalin knowledge of Soviet intentions. That knowledge was not reassuring. It shows that the free nations must remain steadfast in their unity and steadfast in their determination to build military strength and human welfare to the point where aggression is deterred and the ideals of freedom are dynamic in the world.

We must continue to hold fast to the conviction that the peoples and nations who are today not the masters of their own destinies shall become their own masters.

If we do all of this, not beligerently, but wisely and soberly; if we remain ever-watchful for a sign from the Soviet rulers that they realize that freedom is not something to be frightened by, but something to be accepted, then we may indeed, as these eventful coming months unfold, advance the hopes for peace of the world, hopes so eloquently voiced by President Eisenhower last April, and again last December.

In all of this, we Americans

have a special responsibility.

Over recent years, the fearful problem of dealing with Soviet expansion has brought many to a truly disturbing emotional and moral state. In a sense, brains have been washed to such an extent that many are tempted to trade principles of justice for some sense of momentary respite.

Our ultimate reliance is not dollars, is not guided missiles, is not weapons of mass destruction. The ultimate weapon is moral principle.

George Washington, in his farewell address, called upon our nation to observe justice toward all others. "It will," he said, "be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation to give to mankind the too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice. The experiment, at least, is recommended."

That recommendation has, in fact guided us throughout most of our national life and we have become the great nation which Washington foresaw. This is not the moment to forsake that guiding principle. It is not a moment to flee from opportunities because we fear that we shall be inadequate. If what we stand for is right, why should we fear?

There are some in Europe who would have us forsake our friends in Asia in the hope of gain for Europe. There are some in Asia who would have us forsake our friends in Europe to hope of gain for Asia. We dare not be critical of them, for they are subject to strains which we are spared by our fortunate material and geographical position. Indeed, there are some Americans who would have us sacrifice our friends both in Asia and Europe for some fancied benefit to ourselves.

I do not argue that American foreign policy should be conducted for the benefit of others. American foreign policy should be designed to promote American welfare. But we can know that our own welfare would not really be promoted by cynical conduct which defies moral principles. In a world in which no nation can live alone, to treat our friends unjustly is to destroy ourselves. We must stand as solid rock of principle on which others can depend. That will be the case if we follow George Washington's advice and continue to be a people who are guided by "exalted justice."