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Middle East conflict - UNOGIL - 1958

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HQ UNOGIL - Military staff Report

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CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut, 9 December 1958

HQ UNOGIL

MILITARY STAFF REPORT

(A Staff Study of UNOGIL's Military Operations)

AIM

1. To examine the functioning of UNOGIL Military Staff and to make recommendations for organisation for similar future missions so as to avoid the discrepancies and improvisations of which the Mission was a typical example.

PREAMBLE

2. It is agreed that basically the final organisation as it functioned in Lebanon is sound. At the same time, it is pointed out that the field operation is fundamentally an Intelligence undertaking. Therefore, some changes in the organisation of Headquarters and in the functioning of patrols in the field are considered necessary.

PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF THE SECTION

3. (a) G-1 is responsible for all personnel matters, e.g., briefing, posting, transfers, leave. It is operated in close co-operation and co-ordination with the civilian secretariat pertaining to personnel.
- (b) G-2 is responsible for the collection, evaluation and internal dissemination of operational information, the preparation of intelligence summaries, perintreps, and such intelligence as may be required for the compilation of Group reports.
- (c) G-3 comprises both ground and air components.
- (i) G-3 ground is responsible for
- Information Summaries, Operations, Orders, Standing Orders and Military Staff Instructions to carry out the operation
 - Working of the Military operations registry and manning of the duty room, including "message centre"
 - Liaison and training and staff procedures for all ground operations.

(ii) G-3 Air is likewise responsible for all air operations, including planning, liaison and training and staff procedures and works in co-ordination and co-operation with G-3 Ground.

(d) G-4. Supply and issue and accounting of all equipment (except wireless and vehicles, which are, strictly speaking, controlled by the civilian administration according to requirements of G-3). It works in close co-operation and co-ordination with civilian secretariat procurement of equipment.

4. Owing to the rapid expansion of the organisation, some difficulties were experienced in co-ordination between G-2 and G-3. In view of the special type of this operation which is primarily concerned with collecting and evaluating information, some change in relations between G-2 and G-3 might be considered.

5. It is further noted that, in effect, the functions of G-3 consisted of routine staff work, manning the duty room, including message centre, coming in on the question of ground operations only to implement the siting of installations in conjunction with G-2. The operation of the message centre and registry is something which would more properly come under the aegis of the Administrative Branch mentioned in the case of G-1. The planning office maintained by G-3 was a very necessary function, and in view of the inevitable fluidity of such an operation as UNOGIL, should be maintained.

6. Logistics. The mission started with (practically) no military logistics organisation or procedure, and supply was dealt with by the Administrative Staff. As the mission expanded specialist logistics officers, mainly Canadians, were recruited and a complete military logistics system was evolved. The structure and procedures of this system are contained in Logistics Orders and Instructions as shown in Annex I. A MT repair plan was also worked out but was not implemented owing to the approaching termination of the mission. The main lessons from the logistics point of view may be summarised as follows:

- (a) It is desirable that logistics staff should be all selected from one country or from countries using the same procedures so that there is a common method. This principle also applies to such specialised activities as vehicles and aircraft maintenance and stores services. However, where complete units are not involved and provided trained personnel are available they may be drawn from different countries.
- (b) Specialised personnel should be brought into the mission at the earliest stage.

- (c) Development of a UN system allowing for greater participation of the military logistics staff which proved such a success in the mission might be considered.
- (d) There is a necessity also for a United Nations military logistics manual defining responsibilities and procedures in the field.
- (e) The shortage of subordinate staff of NCO type such as storemen, clerks and typists was a serious deficiency and placed much additional work upon UNMOs who were often not the best qualified or satisfied at being asked to do the work. This shortage was aggravated in this mission as the political situation prevented us employing local staff extensively.
- (f) Military logistics staffs are normally accustomed to assuming responsibility for transport and communications equipment. In a small mission of short duration it is felt that any change in the present system would hardly be warranted, but the possibility of transferring those services might be worth considering where officers and NCOs are available.

PROPOSALS FOR HQ ORGANISATION

7. This HQ should be organised in four branches (see Annex 2).

(a) Administrative Branch

Under control of one Administrative Officer and should consist of two sections, Personnel and Adjutants.

(i) Personnel

To operate as at present and be responsible for processing, briefing, posting and transfer of all military personnel.

(ii) Adjutants (or Camp Commandant)

To be responsible for the operation of a central registry; the registry will operate a central filing system, but responsible for all incoming and outgoing correspondence, and the operation of the message centre; internal control and administration of Headquarters staff.

(b) Information and Evaluation Branch

It is recommended that the functions of this branch should be expanded somewhat to enable it to make requests and orders directly to other agencies. Based on broad directives issued by the Group on the type of information required, the Branch would plan the collection of information and be empowered to issue requests and instructions to the agencies available.

It is further suggested that the Chief Evaluation Officer would report directly to the Group on all the evaluation of the information received.

(c) Operations Branch

This Branch should deal with plans and staff studies in close co-operation with other Sections of the staff. It will prepare and issue Military Staff Instructions, Standing and Operational Orders, and make recommendations in the allotment of vehicles and wireless sets.

(d) Logistics Branch

It is not proposed that the organisation or functions of this Branch should be altered from those set out in paragraph 3(d) above, except that:

- (i) Internal supply and accounting should be done by the adjutants or Camp Commandant's Section. See paragraph 7(a)(ii).
- (ii) Further study might be given to responsibilities for transport and communications equipment.

8. Air Service. The inclusion of an Air Service and the co-operation and co-ordination between ground and air was considered a big success. Starting from 11 aircraft and 12 officers and men, the air organisation eventually expanded to 18 aircraft and 91 officers and men. One thousand one hundred and seventy-six (1,176) missions were flown, covering 2,850 hours. A well-established supply system for spares is of great importance to such a Unit but the flow of spares for various reasons never became effective. The main lessons resulting from air operations may be summarised as follows:

- (a) Air Staff Officers must be sent out at the commencement of the mission or even before the arrival of aircraft. Lists of such officers should be kept at UN HQ.
- (b) A large initial stock of tools and spares is necessary.
- (c) In order to avoid aircraft standing idle, rapid provision of essential spares is important. The Chief of Air Operations recommends that direct requisitioning on appropriate sources with simultaneous notification of UN HQ for control purposes.
- (d) A Senior Air Logistics Staff Officer should be consulted as early as possible when it has been decided to organise the Service.
- (e) There should be an Air Logistics Officer in G-4 Branch.
- (f) Stations should nominate an assistant operations officer to deal with air support.
- (g) UNMOs should be given training in air/ground communication.
- (h) Adequate communications test equipment and spares should be available.
- (i) It was felt that ground station frequencies were too close to those of aircraft and interference occurred.

- (j) Observers should be provided in addition to pilots.
- (k) All personnel should speak English as the working language of the mission. Provided air crews can do this, nationalities may be mixed.
- (l) The Cessna and Bell craft as used on this mission were considered suitable. Facilities, however, for night photography are required.

9. Administration - General Comments

(a) Per Diem

This was considered to be satisfactory.

(b) Leave and Time-Off

In practice it will usually be difficult in the early stages of a mission for UNMOs to use their time-off during the first few weeks. Some discretion might be left to the local authorities during that period so as to permit some accumulation of time-off.

(c) Travel

When international relations permit and where UN have a number of missions, in the same general area, the facilities of any one mission might be made available between mission areas provided such arrangements do not cause undue interference and expense.

(d) Special Staff Officers

Consideration might also be given to the provision of a military signals officer and a welfare officer. The main duty of the former would be to advise the Chief of Staff on all signals matters, including training and enforcement of voice procedure. Both of these officers might be directly under the control of the DCOS.

(e) Transport

The availability of transport for officers on liberty is considered essential on such a mission. It would appear, however, that under UN vehicle regulations, an observer on liberty and using a UN vehicle who is involved in an accident through no fault of his own is responsible for all damage except third party. This imposes an undue hardship on observers which could be overcome by providing comprehensive insurance coverage for all observers, whether on liberty or on duty. A perusal of the accident rates of the mission shows that in those Stations where a high standard of transport discipline was enforced and where steps were taken to keep UNMOs aware of the necessity for care, the rate was considerably reduced.

(f) Accommodation

It is recognised that because of the nature of the mission, observers were forced to occupy uncomfortable, and in some cases, primitive quarters. It is suggested that in the case of missions which it is known will last for some considerable time, some type of pre-fabricated structure be provided for accommodation, where no better quarters can be used on the site. This is especially important during winter conditions.

(g) Supply

- (i) When UN missions operate in areas where climatic conditions are extreme and where the time length of the mission is extensive, the provision of standard supplementary clothing should, when necessary, receive consideration.
- (ii) Standard items of equipment and scales of issue have been worked out for this mission and may be of use in the future. These are to be found in the archives of the mission. (See Annex 1.)
- (iii) Provision should be made for issues of the following protective items:
 - bullet-proof vests
 - bullet-proof plates for aircraft
 - mine probes and detectors
 - sand bags

10. Operations

(a) Standardisation of Operations

The method of conducting operations differed to some extent in each Station area. While it is recognised that Station Commanders must have a certain degree of freedom in the conduct of operations, it is considered that more standardisation would make for greater efficiency. In this connection the preparation of an operations manual by qualified and experienced personnel for a mission of this type should be given consideration. A certain amount of raw material is already available in the form of Military Staff Instructions and Standing Orders for UNMOs. (See Annex 1)

(b) Rotation of UNMOs

(i) In the matter of rotation of UNMOs within a station area, there were two methods: in one case a team manned a Sub-station and remained there permanently; in the other rotation of the entire team was carried out approximately weekly. While a certain amount of latitude was given to OICS in this matter to meet the circumstances in different areas, it is considered that a happy medium, say a stay of about one month in each place, would overcome the difficulties inherent in too long or too short a stay.

(ii) With regard to rotation of UNMOs between Station areas, this should be left to individual requests for transfer, and each request should be considered by HQ on its merits. Should the mission exceed a period of, say, six months, then enforced rotation between Station areas should be considered.

(c) Protection for UNMOs

In the case of shooting incidents against UNMOs during the conduct of an unarmed mission such as UNOGIL, the strongest possible protests should be made to the Government of the country and to the local leaders. It is considered that the policy of UNMOs during this mission not being armed was correct and gave the best results. During the mission, UNMOs were fired on from the ground on 67 occasions and ~~from~~ⁱⁿ the air on 70 occasions.

(d) Training

Every effort should be made even from the earliest stages to start training courses in

- (a) Conducting investigations
- (b) Making clear, concise reports
- (c) Wireless procedure
- (d) Language and customs of the country in which the mission is operating
- (e) Developing the personal qualities required of an UNMO such as judgment, objectivity, tact, persistence and capacity to accept hardships.

Pressure of operations is, however, likely to hinder extensive training. Nevertheless, the provision of a manual as referred to in paragraph 10(a) above would be of assistance. In addition, consideration should be given to having member countries of the UN include the study of these subjects on their staff courses.

11. Personnel

(a) In view of the fact that we had 21 different nations functioning at the mission, speaking many different languages and using many different procedures, it is felt that there have been remarkably few serious difficulties.

(b) Orientation. Observers in Substations were out of touch with the general situation in the country. The perintreps did not fully meet the demand for up-to-date information. It is recommended that greater use be made of the Station Liaison Officer to acquire general information at HQ and make it known to the Substation Commanders at the daily briefing at Station HQ. It is also felt that as UNMOs have frequent dealings with the civilian population, the provision of one radio for each Substation for receiving news reports is a requirement. The provision of some form of information service either military or civilian for keeping UNMOs informed is a requirement. Booklets containing information of various countries like the small book used by U. S. Armed forces might be provided.

(c) Confidential Reports on Each Officer. Owing to language difficulties, differences of background and lack of knowledge, it is felt that in many ways reports by OICs on every officer are not entirely satisfactory. This will be remedied to some extent by preparing the following lists. (See Annex 3.)

- (i) Key personnel and other UNMOs who have positively been recognized as being exceptional and who are suitable for holding the more senior appointments;
- (ii) Those UNMOs who have been definitely established as being unsuitable; and
- (iii) UNMOs who have seriously misconducted themselves.

(d) Selection of Observers. It was noted and commented on that many observers did not possess the qualifications demanded by the UN.

- (i) Language. It is essential that observers have a reasonably good knowledge of the language required for the mission, in this case, English.
- (ii) Driving. More rigid tests of driving ability are necessary to ensure the safety of drivers and other road users and to save wastage of vehicles.
- (iii) Age and Medical Category. Officers reporting on the mission should be, in general, within the age limits prescribed and should have a reasonably good standard of physical fitness.
- (iv) In this connection, the following statistics for this mission are pertinent:

UNMOs without adequate knowledge of English:	40
UNMOs who failed driving tests:	58
Total number of driving accidents:	100 (approx.)
UNMOs over 45 years of age:	42
UNMOs of low medical category are shown separately (see Annex 3).	

In addition, it is recommended that countries detail volunteers rather than select by compulsion. It is also stressed that such volunteers should be tactful, impartial, persistent and willing to accept hardships according to UN requirements.

- (v) The necessity to undergo hardship is in fact nothing other than what military personnel should by their training be prepared to accept. UNMOs must be capable of accepting austere living conditions, difficult climates and physical danger and violence. They must also be prepared to accept a certain amount of psychological stress in the way of unjustified and unpleasant reports to the press.

- (vi) A paper entitled Background Information for Governments was prepared during this mission and sent to UN Headquarters. It is suggested that a document along these lines should be issued for future missions.
- (vii) Personnel sent on missions must be absolutely trustworthy and competent in dealing with their own personal financial matters. Several cases occurred during this mission where UNMOs had cheques dishonoured and borrowed money from local firms without repayment. Such UNMOs are not considered suitable for UN work.
- (e) Appointment Qualifications
- (i) While for political reasons it may be necessary to distribute appointments among nationalities, the best basis is to pick the most suitable man. The provision of a list at UN HQ of officers from each nation who have special qualifications for senior appointments would enable the officers to be appointed from the beginning and at the same time meet the difficulty of having representatives from different nations. *used*
- (ii) The qualifications demanded of an observer by the UN in regard to rank should be rigidly adhered to. In particular, officers should arrive in the mission area with their substantive rank.
- (f) Discipline. The maintenance of discipline among military observers in an operation of this nature is of paramount importance if the respect and good will of the population is to be attained. Since efficiency depends to a great extent on good discipline, this factor affects the whole conduct of the operation. It is a requirement that where serious breaches of discipline occur, the offending observer should be returned to his country forthwith.
- (g) Welfare.
- (i) Welfare should receive consideration from the beginning. Some difficulties were experienced in the case of mail and the PX largely due to the disturbed conditions in the country. In the latter stages of the mission, these difficulties were overcome. In future missions attention should be given to establishing good mail and PX services.
- (ii) Attention should be given at an early stage in the operation to the provision of amenities, such as national newspapers, radio receivers, indoor games, books in the languages of the countries serving on the mission. The main difficulty in providing welfare facilities is lack of funds in the early stages of operations. Consideration might be given to the provision of a monthly per capita grant by UN. This grant could be taken into account when calculating the per diem allowance.

UNMOs selected for a mission such as this must not expect elaborate welfare services. They should be willing to accept rugged conditions and other hardships, be independent and capable of making use of their own resources.

12. Annexes. A list of Annexes is included at the end of this paper and will serve for the purpose of reference and further study.

13. Conclusions. It should be remembered that a period of 5 months is a very short time for the perfecting of an organisation amounting to nearly 600 UNMOs with no common background, doctrine, training or experience of a mission of this kind. A multitude of lessons may be learned and might be summarised in the following main recommendation.

- (a) The principal types of specialized activities such as logistics, repair, air, etc., should be allotted to national groups or to those nations who would have a similar background experience (procedures).
- (b) A useful purpose would be served by the preparation of a military manual or manuals based on the material available from this mission and covering the three main aspects of military operations, logistics and personnel.
- (c) Selection of and an early appointment of a good staff is most important. It is suggested that UN HQ should keep a list of well qualified officers and arrange with their countries that they would be available at short notice.
- (d) Member nations of the UN might be acquainted with the requirements and qualifications of a good UNMO and be asked to consider training in these qualifications as a subject on their staff courses.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THE ARCHIVES OF
THE MISSION OF USE TO FUTURE MISSIONS

The following is a list of important documents which may be of use to future missions or for reference purposes. The reports shown are made by the principal staff officers and station commanders and are NOT edited. These documents are all contained in the archives of the mission.

PERSONNEL

1. Personnel Instructions
2. Special Orders for Posting Personnel (including list of UNMOs)
3. G-1 Branch Report
4. Medical Officer Report

OPERATIONAL

5. Military Staff Instructions
6. Standing Orders for UNMOs
7. Operations Orders Nos. 1 and 2
8. Radio Telephone Procedure (Pocket-Card)
9. G-2 Branch Report

LOGISTICAL

10. Scales of Issue
11. QM Stores and Accounting Instructions
12. Instructions on Loss or Damage to Stores (Log. Order No. 2)
13. Station Accounting and Storekeeping Instr. (Log. Order No. 3)
14. Stores Accounting Procedure - Air Wing (Log. Order No. 4)
15. Use of Emergency Rations (Log. Order No. 5)
16. Clearance Procedure - Personal Issues (Log. Order No. 6)
17. A Study of the Maintenance and Repair Problem
18. G-4 Branch Report


AIR

19. Air Service Report

STATIONS

20. Station Report - General
21. - TRIPOLI
22. - BAALBEK
23. - CHTAURA
24. - MARJAYOUN
25. - SAIDA

PROPOSED RE-ORGANISATION



Annex 2 to
HQ UNOGIL
Staff Report

Annex 3 to
HQ UNOGIL
Staff Report (To follow)