

Middle East conflict - Lebanon. Correspondence, statements, resolutions: Mi...

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Middle East conflict 1958 - Aug.

Preliminary papers regarding Lebanon special session

(internal Secretariat papers in preparation of August session

1958

L 179: 1059

SECRET

1 August 1958

SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. I think it better to put down my tentative views in a separate paper.

2. General

(a) Declarations by the Great Powers should, as far as possible, be in the form of what they believe to be United Nations' interests in the Middle East. They should not try and make 4- or 5-power declarations of the type of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

(b) An Arab declaration on the lines of the Five Principles would help to stabilize the situation and make it easier to deal with particular problems. This surely is the best framework for an attempt to stop the radio propaganda war.

(c) It is desirable to have a declaration in a United Nations framework that it is a general interest that the pattern of Middle East oil production, marketing and consumption should be developed on present lines.

(d) Our ideas of economic development could perhaps be best promoted by a declaration of general United Nations support for assistance to an inter-Arab organization, established for promoting economic development in the Arab States. Then work could begin privately on the lines hitherto contemplated.

(e) I believe an Arms Embargo to be unworkable.

3. Israel

Should we not try for a new United Nations declaration of the importance of maintenance of the Israeli-Arab Armistice Agreements and of their not being changed by force? With this could go a strengthening of UNTSO machinery, as you propose. I think this declaration is an essential complement to a 'Five Principles' declaration of the Arab States.

4. Yemen

Since the Yemen-Aden dispute is on the agenda of the Security Council, should we not try for a resolution urging the parties to fix the boundary by themselves or with United Nations assistance?

5. Jordan

Jordan fears a coup d'état supported from Syria. Can we work up to a United Nations declaration of the importance to the United Nations of Jordanian independence and integrity during the currency of the Armistice Agreements? On the basis of this, the United Nations could establish a commission in Jordan, perhaps as part of the UNTSO machinery, which could develop in any direction required for the purpose of maintaining Jordanian independence and integrity in this period and with the intention of providing conditions for the withdrawal by agreement of British troops. I do not think that we can say at present that what you propose will be enough to obtain withdrawal of British troops, though the matter should be approached on a gradual and pragmatic basis.

6. Lebanon

- (a) In the case of Austria, the occupation provided a practical basis for the establishment of the new Austrian status, formally noted by the Powers. No such basis exists in the case of Lebanon.
- (b) I am doubtful whether it is wise to promote the idea of a 'Special Status' for the Lebanon, if we are going to try for a 'Five Principles' declaration among the Arab States, since the other States will seem to fall into the category of not so independent States.
- (c) What does a 'Special Status' mean? How could it be enforced? If Lebanon is going to remain independent, it won't need a special status. If it is not going to remain independent, a special status will not help.

- (d) In any case, no declaration of Lebanese wishes can be expected for some time. Without a Lebanese initiative it will be difficult for the Conference to do more than make a general declaration of their readiness to support Lebanese integrity through the United Nations on the basis of the resolution of 11 June, so long as this is necessary.
- (e) The ^{maximal} ~~partial~~ requirement is isolation from outside influences by
- (1) The 'five principles' declaration.
 - (2) In this context, stopping radio propaganda.
 - (3) Prevention of infiltration by UNOGIL or a rump UNOGIL, so long as the Lebanese Government want it.
- (f) If there is to be a Commissioner, he can be a rump UNOGIL. If not, what will be his precise functions? He could perhaps be a special political representative of the Secretary-General in the Middle East, accredited to all Middle Eastern countries, resident in Beirut and in charge of a rump UNOGIL Mission, so long as it is there.

7. Oil Transit

We should encourage in principle inter-Arab treaties registered with the United Nations, between producing and transit countries, to safeguard transit by pipeline. These would affect Iraq and Saudi Arabia as producers and UAR, Lebanon and Jordan as transit countries.

Finer

Note for S-G

- 1) This is a hasty and probably incomplete analysis which suggests that the UN "preparation" should be for two alternative results
 - a) eventual summit
 - b) Assembly solution
- 2) I doubt whether (b) could be changed easily or tidily but we may have to live with it.
- 3) You are probably aware that G.P. is meeting with Canada, Sweden, Japan and the two Latins at noon today. A Canadian-Japanese-Latin gathering last evening was a little frozy and Mr Ritchie is not sure his Govt will go along if U.K. cannot be persuaded to play along - at least to acquiesce.

A.S.

6 August 1958

Middle East

1. Our previous consideration of the current situation in the Middle East has been based on a main assumption that the subject would be discussed by Heads of Government in a relatively small meeting, either as a separate conference for that purpose or as a consequence of proceedings in the Security Council. The nature of the problems to be met in the area is such that they should probably receive most serious and detailed consideration by those most directly concerned. There has been, however, the problem of selecting the group, especially representatives from the area, who should be involved in the main discussion.

2. Now there is a possibility that the preceding steps toward the Summit may have to be retraced. While this may be welcomed in some quarters, it does not help to deal with the urgent problem presented in the Middle East nor does it rule out the possibility that the Summit may again be approached in a relatively short time from a different direction. This may be all to the good, if the main premise is accepted that to reach a detente in the current circumstances in the Middle East it will be necessary for those directly concerned to reach a more or less precise understanding on a modus vivendi. In view of these considerations the meeting in the Security Council tomorrow should not be regarded as a scramble for the adoption of one proposal or another in order to hasten the convening of an emergency special session of the Assembly. Time is required not only to reassess the possibilities for bringing about a detente but to restore order in the procedure leading to any meeting and to consider positions of substance.

3. Several possibilities suggest themselves:

(a) There could be a move in the Security Council either tomorrow or on Friday to request the Secretary-General to "pursue consultations" about a Summit meeting on the Middle East question. This would imply a continuation, but with modification, of informal discussions which have already taken place. It is by no means certain that this move, even if it could be accomplished in the Council, would produce fruitful results. Nevertheless, it would buy time.

(b) If the pressure for an emergency session should prevail there could be a move in the Assembly to bring about a Summit meeting. It is doubtful whether, in the extravagant atmosphere of an emergency Assembly, it would be sufficient simply to request the Secretary-General to pursue consultations. There would undoubtedly be a far-flung debate, much of which would be sterile. It could be, however, that some speeches would provide the basis for a set of principles which might be set forth as a guide or as terms of reference for a Summit meeting on the Middle East.

(c) Another possibility is that the Assembly itself would not only agree upon the principles but could make recommendations for the solution of specific problems in the area. This might well happen if the emergency

session could be kept going and the energies of delegations could be directed into constructive channels. Nevertheless, it remains a question whether recommendations on the current situation in the Middle East could be formulated with sufficient precision to meet the needs and any recommendations which did emerge would require almost unanimous approval. It would seem preferable to have any Middle East modus vivendi based more securely on declarations or agreements among those immediately affected because, through a process of interpretation or reservation, an Assembly recommendation, even though supported, might be whittled away. In this regard, however, an Assembly resolution might be the means of evoking the required declarations or agreements.

4. The indications are that whatever may be the modus vivendi, it is likely to involve a considerable degree of UN "supervision" in the broadest sense. It may be possible to achieve this through the fuller implementation or extension of existing machinery. It may be desirable, however, to establish some co-ordinating body. For example, if the arrangements could have been worked out under Security Council auspices, the Council could have been a kind of Court of Appeal, functioning more or less as it does in relation to UNTSO. Currently, however, there is the strong trend away from the Council which might make it desirable to set up a new co-ordinating and supervisory committee. This does not rule out the possibility that the whole UN operation in the Middle East could be brought within the purview of the Advisory Committee on UNEF, although in this event it would be preferable to have a formal endorsement by the Assembly.

5. A real and urgent problem in all this may be the deteriorating situation in Jordan with its implications elsewhere. The situation in that country may have to get worse before it can be improved. If the current indications are correct, not even a substantial UN police force could maintain the status quo although it would probably prevent drastic repercussions. The situation is greatly aggravated, however, by the developing chaos in Jordan's economy so that any plans for strengthening the UN hand in Jordan would necessarily involve an economic element. This might not be as difficult as at first appears in view of the large proportion of refugees who are already wards of the UN.

Note for S-G

- 1) I hope I am correct in assuming it to be within my function to volunteer ideas.
 - 2) The attached is not a philosophical Treatise in that I have a candidate in mind.
 - 3) There are some further considerations regarding him which we could perhaps discuss, if you wish to pursue the matter
- 19 Aug
- A. J.

19 August 1958

UN Representation in the Middle East

1. Draft resolution A/3878 may well be, as its leading sponsor has said, the best obtainable in all the circumstances of the present Assembly debate, and especially in view of the Presidential invocation. However, like the second resolution of 2 February 1957, the present one falls considerably short of the "requirements" of the current Middle East situation and if adopted will leave the UN, and particularly the Secretary-General, in a rather precarious position not only in any negotiations with Governments but as regards reactions within the UN membership at large. In addition to reactions, there are also motives to be considered. There are those whose political bankruptcy prompts them to grasp at straws and ride on backs; there are those who would not shrink from piling the last straw on the long-suffering camel; there are those well-intentioned who believe in wizardry; there are those who out of envy and pique might welcome failure; and there are those who would not hesitate to question UN impartiality. There is nothing particularly new in all this but it is now in sharp focus.

2. The actual situation is potentially much more dangerous than in 1956. To the long-standing stresses in the area a new element of danger has been added. Perhaps with unsure hands and probably on the basis of short-term assessment, the Western leaders have attempted to draw on the shifting sand of the Middle East ill-defined lines which, so they say, must not be crossed without the risk of war. This may be perilous nonsense in the prevailing conditions of nationalist turbulence but wars have usually started from nonsensical situations. On the reassuring side it can be said that some sober and influential persons in the area see the danger in its true perspective and may be prepared to go to some lengths to avert the danger. Again, as in 1956, the need is to capitalize on the genuine anxiety and try to move forward rather than fall back on some temporary expedient which at best might only stave off disaster for a time. Moreover, in addition to the compulsion of anxiety, there are now constructive elements which could, perhaps sooner than might have been expected, be drawn together to form a solid basis for a "new deal" in the Middle East.

3. Furthermore the UN may have to be the instrument of action. Notwithstanding the momentum of the earlier drive to the Summit, the emergency session seems to have had the effect of diverting that movement. For the moment there can be, it seems, no public demonstration of 4-Power intention to exercise self-restraint. This does not rule out the possibility of a tacit understanding in this regard, based loosely on a recognition of the risks of head-on collision and on informal exchanges during the Assembly. But the cement of any tacit arrangement might be the effectiveness of UN action pursuant to the current resolution.

4. Much may depend therefore on the "practical arrangements" made by the Secretary-General, as has frequently been the case in the past. Perhaps the key to those arrangements may be the appointment of a UN representative in Jordan but in practical terms for the area as a whole. Concerning the

qualities which this representative should have, the following might be said inter alia:

(a) He should be respected and trusted by the Arabs. He should be sensitive to their hopes and fears, especially as regards Israel. He should have sufficient stature to impress and to calm the Arabs throughout the region. However, Arab susceptibilities should not be overriding.

(b) He should be respected by the Israelis and be sufficiently renowned to make it virtually impossible for them to ignore him. He should be unimpeachable by the world Zionists.

(c) He should be respected and trusted by the Western Governments but slightly beyond their control. He should be at least respected by the Soviet Government if they cannot quite trust him. He should have an unassailable reputation for honesty and frankness both in international affairs and in public opinion.

(d) He should be thoroughly imbued with UN lore and loyal to the institution and the Secretary-General. He should inspire confidence among the various UN agencies in the Middle East.

5. What appears to be wanted is an angel of peace and preferably a full-blown angel. But he should not be so much an angel that he could not play a political tune by ear or recognize political chicanery. He should have an ear attuned to propaganda and a voice which could be used, if necessary, and which could serve to reduce noisy radio campaigns. He should have recognized international wisdom and integrity which could not be questioned in any quarter. His presence in Jordan should be worth a brigade or so of UN policemen. This all sounds like a very large order but surely the intention should be, in view of the circumstances outlined at the beginning of this memorandum, that this angel would not only stand against all the drift toward evil consequences in the Middle East but would stand for an about-face in the direction of long-term solutions.

Internal Secretariat
Notes in preparation
of Report Series 58.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary-General

1. Below are a few thoughts on future political developments in the Middle East, not touching the special problems of Lebanon and Jordan.

2. There now seems to be again a chance of an adjustment of the relations of the Western Powers with the Arab world provided neither side pushes too much and an atmosphere of *détente* is maintained. On the western side the opportunity to push is now much less. Egypt cannot any longer justifiably fear a policy designed to isolate it and the Baghdad Pact can no longer be a legitimate concern in Arab politics. The most hopeful signs are that inter-Arab relations may be stabilized on the basis of the retention of the sovereignty of existing Arab States (I am not here concerned with the special case of Jordan) coupled with a revival of the Arab League and the Arab League Security Pact. On this basis, adjustment of western relations with the Arab world should be possible.

3. It will, however, still be a severe temptation to certain elements in Cairo to press for changes of government in the Sudan, Libya and Tunisia and for revolution in the Gulf and Aden. Can Cairo be induced to show moderation and to realize that it cannot plausibly maintain the thesis that Arab nationalism is the equivalent of political subordination to Cairo? The Sudan seems to me to be a crucial case.

4. The Gulf can only be transformed safely if time is given for its political evolution. One might contemplate the possibility of an independent Kuwait with its independence guaranteed by the Arab League. Qatar is likely in the future to look to Saudi Arabia. The Buraimi question is essentially a matter of the reconciliation of the Saudi Arabian Government and the Sultan of Muscat. It is not primarily a British question. Bahrein and the Trucial Sheiks are not easy problems, but their future for some time seems to lie in a progress towards independence of a kind, perhaps in federation, and perhaps even with their independence ultimately being assured by the Arab League. One cannot see very clearly what the lines of development will be, but the essential point at the moment is that these developments should take place in quiet and should be given time.

5. It is desirable that the Sterling connections of the Arab world should be maintained. An attempt to push the Gulf States and Iraq out of the Sterling area would upset the prospects of the political adjustments required.

6. Aden and the Aden Protectorate will remain a difficulty, but I do not despair of political evolution there provided the pressure from Cairo and the Yemen is relaxed and time is given for an improvement of western relations with the new Arab world, on the basis of which adjustments in the outlying portions can take place peacefully.

7. There remain Egypt and Africa. Here again what is essential, to avoid serious political complications with international danger, is that Cairo should modify its political attacks on the radio and concentrate upon its cultural interests in Africa.

8. I am not very hopeful that matters will go smoothly, but, if I was still in Cairo I would be urging that the British are well accustomed to adjusting their political relationships in accordance with developing situations provided there is a peaceful atmosphere and sufficient time.

Russell

20 August 1958

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
NORWAY

S-G.

Possibly I have been
listening to too many
gloomy stories but
I thought you might
be interested in this.

The factual side
is reasonably well
founded, I believe.

W.

JORDAN

The problem facing the UN in Jordan is perhaps the most delicate in the Middle East series. It is at the same time of growing urgency. The timetable for UN action may have to be foreshortened either because of pressures within the country or because of new developments from outside.

The question of installing stabilizing machinery may be complicated by the following:

(a) the disruptive elements within Jordan are not controllable from without. There have been clear indications in Cairo of anxiety at the highest level just because Palestinian Arab elements cannot be controlled from there. The activities of Palestinian leaders are suspect;

(b) the Israelis are voicing opposition to any strengthening of UN machinery. They cite constitutional objection to the strengthening of UNTSO. They are opposed to a UNEF-type police force for Jordan. They insist that territorial guarantees for all small States in the area will cover the situation;

(c) King Hussein and Rifai have been calling for increased UK military assistance and for USA reinforcement. If UK troops should become embroiled in local disturbances, the USA might consider it necessary to extricate the UK. The present Jordanian rulers are said to be sceptical about, or even opposed to, UN assistance in lieu of Anglo-American;

(d) the UK expectation about what the UN can do may be extravagant and unrealistic. There has been talk about preventing interference in Jordan's affairs and preserving its independence. In view of the current circumstances, it would surely be wiser to think in terms of extricating the UK troops and of bringing stability to the Jordanian scene.

In view of the foregoing, some possibilities are that:

(a) UK and possibly USA forces might become involved in fighting in Jordan which could be very dangerous in the circumstances prevailing in the Middle East today;

(b) any attempt to establish a UN force in Jordan might be resisted both by the Jordanian Government and opposition elements. This development might be beyond the control of outside influences;

(c) with or without either of the foregoing, the Israelis might decide to establish themselves along the West bank of the Jordan river in order to reinsure their position.

In view of these possibilities, the question of the timing of any UN initiative as regards Jordan becomes most important. If the assessment is that the UN could establish itself in strength in Jordan in time to

prevent deterioration from whatever source, the obvious choice would be to press ahead with plans for this with all possible energy and speed. Because of the parliamentary situation in the Assembly, however, and because of the need for careful preparation, the programme for Jordan could probably not be implemented quickly. This leads to a second alternative. If delay in the programme is unavoidable and if deterioration in the situation is inevitable, it might be desirable to let the deterioration run its course before taking any UN initiative. The risk in the latter alternative is great, because the degree of deterioration might be such that it could not be brought under control. Nevertheless, if the possible eruptions (internal, external or both) could be localized, the *raison d'être* for UN "intervention" might be more firmly established than would be the case in current circumstances, in which, although the need for preventive action is undoubtedly great, the accompanying factors make it more difficult to focus the proper attention on that need. In short, it might be politically difficult to justify at present the replacement of UK troops with a UN force. This would not be the case in a deteriorating situation, especially if the Israelis should decide to act militarily. It is difficult to dismiss entirely the view that the Jordanian situation needs to get worse before it can get better.

Quite apart from the foregoing assessment which may be too pessimistic, there could be a parliamentary situation in the General Assembly which would make action on Jordan not easily attainable. The possibility of a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to explore the situation exists but the desirable sponsorship and required support for such a resolution might not be readily forthcoming in all the circumstances. Who would be prepared, for example, to propose that the Secretary-General should explore the situation? On the record, at least, there has been no case established for any kind of intervention in Jordan. The exploration might be justified on the basis of facilitating the withdrawal of UK troops but this might not be acceptable to the UK. The well-worn question would be raised, and with some force, about who was threatening whom in Jordan. The prohibition of Article 2 (7) of the Charter would be invoked. In essence, the difficulty is that the situation in Jordan has not been sufficiently internationalized to provide the Assembly with a basis for action. This may be a purely formal situation but it may be difficult to overcome.

Banding like
on purpose but
also reflecting
Tripartite Declara-
tion 1950

• Requirements "
15 key formulation

SECRET

Draft Resolution

The General Assembly,

Having considered the situation in Lebanon and Jordan in the wider context of international relations in the Middle East,

Recognizing that continuing tension in the area urgently requires concerted and positive efforts on the part of Member Governments concerned to dispel the fears and apprehensions that exist today and to restore confidence in the area,

Considering that the United Nations can continue to be of assistance in achieving these ends:

1. Believes that the political independence and economic well-being Agrees of the nations concerned would provide a solid foundation for the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and that progress in this direction would be facilitated if the following requirements were met:

(a) a solemn reaffirmation on the part of the Arab Governments concerning mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs together with renewed assurances of their desire to co-operate for mutual benefit in the field of economic development;

(b) a formal affirmation by Member Governments outside the area that they would respect and uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in the Middle East, would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any of those States and would seek only to improve their relations with them through

the orderly pursuit of legitimate interests;

(c) an assurance on the part of States in the area that they would seek to strengthen and improve existing economic relations with States outside in order to ensure the continued and beneficial employment of the natural resources of the area.

2. Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with Governments concerned to recommend measures designed to strengthen and improve the efforts which the United Nations is already making to achieve the underlying aims of this resolution and to assist in the fulfilment of the requirements mentioned in the preceding paragraph;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report as appropriate to all Member Governments concerning the matters dealt with in this resolution.

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(b) a formal affirmation by Member Governments outside the area that they would respect and uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in the Middle East, would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any of those States and would seek only to improve their relations with them through

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JOINT STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTERS OF CHINA AND INDIA - June 28, 1954, Delhi

His Excellency Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, came to Delhi at the invitation of His Excellency Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Republic of India. He stayed here for three days. During this period the two Prime Ministers discussed many matters of common concern to China and India. In particular they discussed the prospects of peace in Southeast Asia and the developments that had taken place in the Geneva Conference in regard to Indo-China. The situation in Indo-China was of vital importance to the peace of Asia and the world, and the Prime Ministers were anxious that efforts that were being made at Geneva should succeed. They noted with satisfaction that some progress had been made in the talks at Geneva in regard to an armistice. They earnestly hoped that these efforts will meet with success in the near future and that they would result in a political settlement of the problems of that area.

2. The talks between the Prime Ministers aimed at helping, in such ways as were possible, the efforts at peaceful settlement that were being made in Geneva and elsewhere.

Their main purpose was to arrive at a clearer understanding of each other's point of view in order to help in the maintenance of peace, both in cooperation with each other and with other countries.

3. Recently China and India have come to an agreement in which they have laid down certain principles which should guide the relations between the two countries. These principles are:

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (2) Non-aggression;
- (3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit;
- (5) Peaceful coexistence.

The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security, and fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence.

4. The Prime Ministers recognized that different social and political systems exist in various parts of Asia and the world. If, however, the above-mentioned principles are accepted and acted upon and there is no interference by any one country with another, these differences should not come in the way of peace or create conflicts. With the assurance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country and of non-aggression, there would be peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace.

Paraphrase

5. In particular, the Prime Ministers hoped that these principles would be applied to the solution of the problems in Indo-China where the political settlement should aim at the creation of free, democratic, unified and independent states, which should not be used for aggressive purposes or be subjected to foreign intervention. This will lead to a growth of self-confidence in these countries as well as to friendly relations between them and their neighbours. The adoption of the principles referred to above will also help in creating an area of peace which, as circumstances permit, can be enlarged, thus lessening the chances of war and strengthening the cause of peace all over the world.

6. The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence in the friendship between China and India which would help the cause of world peace and the peaceful development of their respective countries as well as other countries of Asia.

7. These conversations were held with a view to help in bringing about a greater understanding of the problems of Asia and to further a peaceful and cooperative effort, in common with other countries of the world, in solving these and like problems.

8. The Prime Ministers agreed that their respective countries should maintain close contacts so that there should continue to be full understanding between them. They appreciated greatly the present opportunity of meeting together and having a full exchange of ideas leading to a clearer understanding and cooperation in the cause of peace.

(taken from Supplement to People's China, July 16, 1954)

Extracts from FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

A. Economic Cooperation

1. *This is the one which has the lead - being broader than Technical assistance*

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing international agencies.

....

F. Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation

1. ...

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end.

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and re-appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

G. Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation

The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war. The Problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection, all States should cooperate, especially through the United Nations, in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed, all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill towards each other, nations should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.

✓ 10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

✓ The Asian-African Conference declared its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference, in consultation with the participating countries.

Bandung, 24th April, 1955

Aug 4

Some Summit Reflections

1. In many ways the situation in which the Great Powers find themselves in the Middle East today is like the one which produced the Agreements of 1954. Then the Great Powers, mainly through their clients, had become too much involved and were alarmed at the prospect of direct confrontation. The West had suffered a severe setback at Dien Bien Phu and to some Western minds the recent events in Iraq would be regarded in the same light. In 1954 there were very real risks that the Great Power manoeuvring in Indo-China might lead to large-scale fighting, which once started might be difficult to control. There was a need for face-saving and breathing space. These are all elements of the current situation in the Middle East.
2. There is a significant difference in the two situations which has perhaps not been given sufficient attention in the West. It is that Arab nationalism is a strongly independent force and not one which can easily be assimilated or lined up by either side in the cold war. A popular conception in the West, thanks to many misleading press articles and public pronouncements, is that Arab nationalists can be categorized either as pro-Western or as pro-Communist. The plain fact is that the mainstream of nationalism throughout the area is pro-Arab and, in seeking relations with either the West or the Communist world, the Arab nationalists will be guided only by self-interest. It is perhaps fair to say, however, that the leading Arab nationalists have come to recognise the dangers involved in trying to play off the Great Powers against one another. Notwithstanding this important difference in the Middle East situation there may be precedents to be drawn from the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indo-China.
3. To prevent a conflagration then, the Great Powers and the States concerned gathered together and hammered out a bargain which gave full satisfaction to no-one but which was considered by all as preferable to a continuation of the dangerous situation. The essence of the Geneva bargain was to establish a kind of neutral status for Indo-China. It was not intended to be permanent; it was really an effort to put the area in cold storage for a while until the menacing fires could be put out.
4. The arrangements throughout the area were not uniform. In Viet-Nam, where the danger was greater, the country was cut in two with provisions for reunification by peaceful means. In Laos and Cambodia there was a clear prescription of neutrality as a more or less permanent feature of the State. In the case of all three States, there were provisions against outside interference and all those things which today in the Middle East are called "infiltration". For their part the Indo-Chinese States agreed not to join in any military pacts. The provision of neutrality for Laos and Cambodia according to the pattern of such typical South-East Asian States as Burma was specifically demanded in these terms by Chou-En-Lai as the price of a saw-off in Viet-Nam and accepted by Sir Anthony Eden.
5. All these provisions were drawn up in a series of agreements among the Great Powers and in accompanying declarations of intention. Even the

United States and South Viet-Nam, which for their own reasons were not formally associated with the arrangements, in fact have accepted and respected the provisions. The United States attitude was conditioned of course by the involvement of Communist China. The US should not be similarly inhibited in any dealings concerning the Middle East.

6. Under the Geneva Agreements there were established three International Control Commissions, one for each country, composed of a neutral chairman and one member from each side. Notwithstanding the difficulties this machinery has been made to work. Appeal has been to the two "co-Chairmen" of the Geneva Conference, the United Kingdom and Soviet Foreign Ministers. This provision was made necessary because the United Nations was not involved, a situation attributable only to the circumstances of Chinese participation. The Indo-China settlement would undoubtedly have been strengthened if it could have been brought under UN authority, provided however that the way was not left open to mischievous interference from the General Assembly.

7. In Indo-China the Control Commissions began with a heavy programme of direct control: watching over the separation of the combatants; the movement of refugees; border control against arms and armed forces; and supervision within the various areas to prevent reprisals. Only in the first task was there any great success. The border controls were inadequate to guarantee against infiltration on any significant scale. Moreover, the fulfilment of these specific functions has been less important than the "presence de la Commission". Currently efforts are being made to adjourn the Commissions in Laos and Cambodia and reduce their functions in Viet-Nam but to maintain some element of the machinery there as a symbol of the Great Power interest in preserving the spirit of the Geneva Agreements, despite a good deal less than 100% fulfilment of its terms.

Possibilities in present circumstances

8. In addition to the one already mentioned, there may be other important differences between the Indo-Chinese and Middle East situations. The Western Powers, for example, may consider that the dangers of a direct clash with the Soviet Union either are not acute or are risks which must be run in all the circumstances. The United States line in public has rather been to insist that the time has come to draw the line against "indirect aggression", with no very precise definition of either the line or the act. The Soviet Union, for its part, might not be in any hurry to provide a face-saving formula for disengagement. It may be content to let the sore point, caused by the presence of UK-US troops in Jordan and Lebanon, fester into an angry reaction against the West. There are grave risks, however, in letting matters drift. The key condition may be, however, that neither "side" has achieved a dominant position in the area, mainly because of the earnestly desired independence of the Arab national movement. As a matter of tactics, therefore, both "sides" in the Great Power contest might want both breathing space and elbow room. And, of course, notwithstanding the tough talk on both sides, both have a great deal to gain from exercising restraint.

9. Obviously arrangements for the Middle East could not be patterned exactly on those made for Indo-China in 1954. The Arab countries would not meekly

submit to any arrangement for either spheres of influence or an elaborate system of control. Any attempt at a rigid freezing of the status quo would quickly break down. There would have to be sufficient flexibility in the fabric of the agreements reached to permit easy acquiescence by all the Powers concerned in orderly change resulting from evolutionary processes within the area.

10. Perhaps the essential element in any Middle East detente of the moment should be to remove from the area the dangerous rivalries within and without. No-one would argue that the Geneva Conference of 1954 eliminated all rivalry. However, it did provide transitional arrangements and possibilities of evolution during a period of development which is still continuing. Because room for manoeuvre was provided, the Great Power rivalries, although they had continued to exist, have been contained by tacit mutual consent. Similarly no sudden agreement could exorcise Great Power (and Arab States) rivalry or activity in the Middle East, but what could reasonably be hoped for would be to reduce it to manageable proportions.

11. Thus the Great Powers would continue to seek friends, trade and influence in the Middle Eastern countries, which would want them to do so. Even these peaceful pursuits might give rise to suspicion. However, there could be an agreement, governing Great Power activity in the area, sufficiently flexible to allow those "normal" developments without their provoking either angry charges of bad faith or ultimately a return to the dangerous competition which in recent years has produced increasing tension and the risk of a head-on collision. In other words, instead of an unworkable "hands-off" agreement, the Great Powers should strive for a flexible arrangement permitting them to engage in restrained though perhaps competitive activity in the area.

12. A sensitive question in this regard would be the supplying of arms to the Middle East States. It is doubtful whether either "side" would accept an outright embargo. At the very least, Western Powers would insist on their right to send arms to Israel, on the one hand, and to the Baghdad Pact Powers on the other hand. The alternative might be to establish some system for controlling the import of arms. The three Western Powers have had an informal arrangement of consultation about arms shipments. A similar but more formal arrangement might be made to include the Soviet Union. The political difficulty of openly co-operating with the Soviet Union in this endeavour might be overcome by providing a UN screen, machinery for recording information about arms imports. Elaborate control machinery would be neither acceptable politically nor capable of effective operation. It should be possible, however, to combine a self-restraining ordinance, on the part of the Great Powers and others, with supervisory machinery which would be more symbolic than effective.

13. It would be unreasonable to assume that the march of Arab nationalism could be brought to a halt or diverted in some way. An achievable aim might be to ensure that the movement would proceed in an orderly way and that it could and would be restrained from within when further or too hasty advance might be perilous. US strictures on "indirect aggression" would

presumably find expression in the proposed agreement or declaration by the Great Powers to exercise self-restraint. But the notion would have to be carried over into the arrangements affecting the Middle East States themselves, because clearly the US regards as almost equally dangerous the "subversive" influences within the area. The task would be to find a formula of non-aggression which would not only tend to mitigate US apprehension but would, in fact, be based on a real understanding among the Arab States about how far and how fast they could go in promoting pan-Arabism among their neighbours.

14. Perhaps the best means of heading-off undesirable eruptions of Arab nationalism would be to direct its attention to positive co-operation among the Arab States. It need hardly be said that economic development would provide the most fruitful field. This would be the positive counterpart of an Arab agreement on non-aggression. Nevertheless, it should not be taken for granted that the recent events in Iraq have removed all the obstacles to co-operative economic development in the area. There are already indications that an attempt might be made to renew the rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo, although it would seem dangerous folly even to think in these terms.

15. Broadly speaking, if there could emerge from the Summit the two main sets of agreement, one self-restraining by the Great Powers and the other self-restraining by the Arab States, it should not prove insuperable to fit in the supplementary arrangements for the special status of Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza (including Sharm-el-Sheikh); and for restricted and largely commercial arrangements concerning a continuing oil supply for Western Europe. The crux of the whole arrangement may well depend on three factors, however:

- (a) the assessment on the part of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union of the risks of a head-on collision in the Middle East;
- (b) the appreciation on the part of the leaders of Arab nationalism of the needs in order to avoid a conflagration in their area and to reassert their independence from both sides in the cold war;
- (c) the willingness of the Western Powers to accept a neutral, independent and stable Arab world not only as inevitable but as not necessarily harmful to Western interests.

At the moment only (b) among these factors shows any sign of development in the desired direction. As regards the other two, the main contenders seem to be clinging whether slavishly or forlornly to policies which have led to the current mess.

16. Primarily the possibilities suggested in this memorandum could not develop as UN initiative because they should properly have their origin with the parties most directly concerned. Nevertheless, at some stage in the highly confused atmosphere in which the Summit meeting is likely to take place, UN advice might be either solicited or required. This might provide an opportunity to exert influence on the substance of discussions at the Summit. Alternatively, if the proposed Summit meeting under UN auspices should, far from making progress, result in a marked increase in international tension in the Middle East (largely because the Summit proceedings had turned into a propaganda free-for-all), the UN might be required to engage in salvage operations. This might come, for example, as a result of a widely supported appeal from the General Assembly. These possibilities give good and sufficient reason for developing in detail a UN approach to the Middle East question.

5 août 1958.

FICHE D'INFORMATION PERSONNELLE ET SECRETE

a/s Problèmes du Moyen-Orient.
Position française.

Dans la lettre qu'il a adressée le 26 juillet à M. Khrouchtchev, le Général de Gaulle a indiqué que le Gouvernement français allait se concerter dès à présent sur les problèmes du Moyen-Orient avec d'autres Etats qui y sont intéressés, et notamment des Etats européens. C'est à cette fin que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères s'est rendu personnellement à Rome et à Bonn. Aux mêmes fins, le Secrétaire général du Département se rend maintenant à Tunis et à Rabat. M. Couve de Murville a eu lui-même un long entretien le 1er août avec l'Ambassadeur de Belgique à Paris. Enfin M. Joxe se rendra prochainement à Madrid et à Lisbonne.

L'intention du gouvernement français, telle qu'elle s'est exprimée depuis le début de la crise libanaise et la première réponse du Président du Conseil à M. Khrouchtchev, est de chercher s'il est possible d'arriver à atténuer la crise du Moyen-Orient (celui-ci englobant en l'espèce les Etats arabes et Israël, la Turquie exclue). Peut-on concevoir l'établissement d'un modus vivendi dans cette région ?

Au départ de la crise, nous trouvons évidemment ces deux facteurs essentiels qui sont le nationalisme arabe et

les rivalités des Puissances extérieures à la région. Parmi celles-ci figure en bonne place l'URSS qu'il paraît aujourd'hui impossible de prétendre exclure de la politique au Moyen-Orient. On ne peut nier le fait qu'elle est engagée dans cette région et, à ne pas admettre ce fait, on risque de ne pas traiter les problèmes dans un esprit réaliste.

Ces problèmes concernent les pays arabes dans leur ensemble et Israël. Le Liban et la Jordanie sont des questions spécifiques qui ne sont, en définitive, que des conséquences de la crise générale. En sens inverse, doit être écartée résolument toute discussion des autres problèmes qui séparent l'Ouest et l'Est et qui doivent être évoqués au sein de la conférence au sommet dont on parle depuis plusieurs mois et qui en est toujours au stade des travaux préparatoires.

C'est dans cet esprit que le Gouvernement français a pensé qu'une réunion des Chefs de gouvernement serait souhaitable maintenant, en vue de traiter du Moyen-Orient dans son ensemble.

La France n'est nullement hostile par principe à un recours au Conseil de Sécurité. Mais elle craint qu'un résultat positif ne puisse être atteint par cette voie, s'il n'y a au préalable entente entre les Grandes Puissances. De toutes manières d'ailleurs, si les Chefs de gouvernement se réunissent, une session du Conseil de Sécurité devrait suivre la conférence, ne fût-ce que pour permettre à tous les pays intéressés, pays arabes et autres, de se faire entendre.

Une participation des Chefs de Gouvernement au Conseil ne constitue pas un substitut satisfaisant pour une telle conférence. Elle permettrait éventuellement aux Russes d'exploiter les possibilités tactiques qui leur seraient offertes, amenant une riposte des Etats-Unis qui élargiraient le débat pour ne pas être mis en position d'accusés devant l'opinion mondiale. Elle provoquerait des prises de position publiques qui rendraient impossibles des concessions mutuelles ultérieures. Enfin, un tel débat permettrait à l'URSS de faire apparaître le retrait, inévitable à plus ou moins longue échéance, des troupes américaines et britanniques, comme la conséquence de son action aux Nations Unies.

Telles sont les préoccupations de la France devant le problème de procédure et les problèmes de fond qui se posent.

1. Procédure :

Les réponses du Président du Conseil français à M. Khrouchtchev ont suffisamment précisé la position de la France et les remarques exposées plus haut l'ont explicitée.

Le dessein du gouvernement français est d'éviter une manifestation de propagande sans résultats positifs. Il ne prétend pas qu'il n'y ait qu'une manière de régler les questions de procédure. Il veut simplement que soit bien compris l'objectif qui est le sien et que l'on s'efforce de rechercher les moyens les meilleurs d'atteindre celui-ci dans les conditions données.

Le Gouvernement français n'a dans l'esprit aucune critique contre les Nations Unies. Il admet fort bien qu'elles se saisissent de tout accord, pour le confirmer ou pour l'élaborer, un de ses soucis étant d'éviter de donner l'impression qu'un "directoire" est seul habilité à régler les problèmes mondiaux.

2. Quant au "fond", le Gouvernement français aimerait savoir si l'on pense généralement comme lui qu'une éventuelle conférence au sommet ne devrait pas hésiter à affronter, et à s'efforcer de résoudre, les problèmes de substance qui sont à l'origine de la plupart des difficultés actuelles et il a demandé à ses ambassadeurs dans les pays les plus intéressés par la question de le renseigner à ce sujet.

1/ Estime-t-on que la base même de toute détente au Moyen-Orient est la reconnaissance du statu quo territorial, c'est-à-dire des frontières actuellement existant en droit et en fait ? C'est, en effet, le problème fondamental si l'on veut parvenir à un modus vivendi acceptable par tous.

La reconnaissance de ce statu quo permettrait de mettre fin, dans une large mesure, à la politique de surenchère qui s'est malheureusement établie depuis quelques années entre les Grandes puissances et de retirer à la Russie le privilège d'être le seul défenseur des pays arabes contre Israël.

Dans l'esprit du gouvernement français, la formule de statu quo territorial ne signifie pas, par exemple, que la Syrie n'a pas le droit de se fédérer avec l'Egypte si sa

population en décide ainsi. Il reste évidemment qu'il est difficile de déterminer les cas dans lesquels de tels changements se réalisent sans intervention extérieure.

La presse a parlé d'une "neutralisation" du Liban. Il n'y a pas de plan français de ce genre, mais le Gouvernement français n'a pas d'idée préconçue en la matière.

D'autre part, pour régler en partie le problème israélien, il conviendrait probablement d'examiner dans un esprit réaliste une solution internationale à la question des réfugiés palestiniens.

2/ Croit-on que la conférence pourrait donner lieu à une déclaration par laquelle les Puissances intéressées s'interdiraient toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des pays du Proche-Orient, et particulièrement dans le domaine de la propagande ? Le problème des livraisons d'armes est aussi un problème qu'il faudrait traiter, car ces livraisons sont depuis plusieurs années une des manifestations principales des interventions soviétiques.

3/ Serait-on d'accord pour que la conférence jette les bases d'une action collective et complètement dépolitisée en vue d'un développement économique des pays du Proche-Orient, sous forme d'assistance technique ou autrement ?

Dans cet ordre d'idées, la France a en vue aussi bien une aide financière et économique que les possibilités commerciales qu'offre, dans les rapports avec le Moyen-Orient, la création du marché commun. La France, l'Italie, l'Allema-

.../.

gne et les pays du Bénélux peuvent évidemment proposer aux pays considérés des contrats à long terme assurant un écoulement de leurs productions essentielles dans des conditions qui faciliteraient beaucoup leur indépendance à l'égard du bloc soviétique.

L'association de l'URSS au développement économique du Moyen-Orient doit avoir pour résultat de limiter l'expansion soviétique dans cette région.

4/ A plus long terme, il faudra sans doute envisager un réexamen de la politique pétrolière au Moyen-Orient. Mais ceci peut-il faire l'objet d'une discussion avec les Russes, ou doit-il être considéré beaucoup plus sous l'angle des rapports qu'il sera possible d'établir avec les Etats arabes, en dehors de toute négociation au sommet ?

A cet égard, beaucoup de prudence s'impose !./.