

# Middle East conflict - Lebanon. Correspondence, statements, resolutions: Mi...

*HS L 179:104*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Middle East conflict 1958 - July 19

Sec. Gen's notes on meeting with Foreign Min. G. J. Smith,  
present: Leger, Holmes, Ritchie

19 July 1958

SECRET  
(odds)

Foreign Minister Smith, Mr. Leger, Mr. Holmes and (later) Ambassador Ritchie saw me this morning after Smith's return from Washington. He told me the following: ( I limit myself to comments on the tactical position in Washington); Selwyn Lloyd and Alhand are both using as much pressure as they can on Dulles so as to stop him from getting out. They go very far in that direction. Lloyd talks about "ten years" in Jordan, Dulles about perhaps getting out October or November. (As to Iraq, Lloyd had shown obvious dissatisfaction with Mr. McMillan's statement which had been made while he was in the air. He felt that McMillan had tied their hands too much).

Smith said that Lloyd gave every impression of being a very happy man "on the top of the world". He had to ask himself if the explanation was not simply the feeling of "revenge for Suez."

Personally, Dulles was keen to get to a special session of the General Assembly, where he could define his grand design for neutralisation of the Middle East. I told Smith about the origin of the whole idea, and that I thought that I had made it clear to Dulles that, if that idea had to be ~~launched~~ <sup>launched</sup> ~~ledged~~, I thought it could not be done by the US.

In the course of the day I got two side-lights on this conversation with Smith. Hans Engen told me that Selwyn Lloyd had declared to their side that, because of the oil supplies, the UK would depend on the Middle East for "ten years", after which time the Middle East would become an area of secondary interest.

George Ivan Smith had had some contact with various English correspondents. They had told him (GIS did not know anything about my talks with the Canadians) that Lloyd's main concern was to stop America from getting out, as a US withdrawal would represent a disaster for Lloyd and the Government, the British not being able to stay if the Americans left.

The correspondents had further told him that Caccia, 22 May, had briefed the press to the effect that Selwyn Lloyd had told me that the UN had to do something about the situation if the other parties were not to go in (I told GIS that there was not one word of truth back of it, the first contact between Lloyd and myself on the issue having been established on my way out to Beirut).

*May be  
misunder-  
standing.*

In the morning I asked Lall to sound out - without reference to me - whether the Russians would abstain from a vote on their resolution on a special session, if the Americans would abstain from a vote on their resolution. Lall later called back and said that the Russians would not abstain. The reason was that they were convinced that the Western powers intended to stay in the Middle East, and that therefore they had to establish a maximum moral pressure, which could only be done in the GA.

(In this context I do remember that Dixon said in the Security Council that the UK did never anything for reasons of self-interest, but always only on the basis of principles.)