

**Middle East conflict -
Lebanon. Correspondence,
statements, resolutions:
Mi...**

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Middle East conflict 1958 - July 11

Notes on meeting with Dobrynin (amb. of USSR)
and Loutfi.

With the compliments of

Omar Loutfi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

and has the honour to send

With the compliments of

Omar Loutfi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

herewith the original of Dr. Fauci's
letter of the 28th inst.

[Faint, illegible handwriting, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

~~DRAFT~~

SECRET ("odds")

11 July 1958

After the regular morning meeting with the Under-Secretaries I had a word with Dobrynin about the Lebanese situation. The immediate background was some rather strong words he had used in the meeting about my "fantastic ~~operation~~ operation" which seemed to indicate that he had his own sourced of information.

Dobrynin told me that he was very fully ^{briefed} briefed from an understandable source about the Cairo demarche. Nasser had declared that he was "greatly impressed". He felt that I obviously knew the facts but that I would not use them contrary to the interest of an effort to straighten out the situation. Without any promises on either side, he would for that reason act firmly on the lines he had indicated to me. The implication of what Dobrynin told me was ^a ~~the~~ confirmation from the Soviet side that the orders had been given, as indicated to me and as confirmed by what we know from the rebels' leaders but also through the US intelligence.

Dobrynin asked me what I felt should be done to Unogil once we had passed elections. I said that as an entirely private thought I considered that there should be a new Security Council decision which did not liquidate Unogil but changed it into a UN representation on a smaller scale and with ~~A~~ ^{wide} general terms of reference. The presence of such a small group would serve as a brake on a situation which simply must not be permitted to break ^{to pieces} ~~out~~ again. Dobrynin said that it was his view that such a development would be very wise and indeed necessary.

~~SECRET~~

11 July 1958

SECRET ("odds")

When I saw Loutfi this morning regarding the recent observations of convoys, I added to the direct demarche, the substance of which I described in today's cable to Plaza, the following observations.

It was from my point of view obvious that the responsibility for the well organized operations which were going on rests with Damascus. In this respect, if I could evaluate the situation, Damascus was not only completely out of line with the Cairo intentions, but probably also out of line with what the USSR would be willing to cover ^{or} with support. The time had come when Sarraj - if his name might be used as a symbol - ~~Simply~~ had to be solidly disciplined.

Loutfi said he felt it ^{would be} ~~were~~ necessary ^{to} ~~that~~ Cairo ~~would have~~ to send Egyptian troops to guard the border. I said that such a move would have very heavy political overtones, and that it seemed to me to be ^a much better ~~via~~ way if Cairo were to consider quickly my suggestion of an invitation of the ~~Six~~ Observers to Syria. The placing of Observers on the Syrian ~~side~~ ~~border~~ side of the North border at an UAR invitation would have two ~~aspect~~ effects: ^FFirst of all, I felt sure that it would put an end to the present operations at the border. But, further, it would have the political significance of fully clearing Cairo from a suspicion ^{to} ~~from~~ breaking promises and condoning Syrian policy. I made this observation with sufficient emphasis to be sure that it will be transmitted to Nasser.