

**Middle East conflict -
Lebanon. Correspondence,
statements, resolutions:
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Beirut, [1958] - June 17

Notes on Meetings in the Sec. General's Office

17/6 1958

Notes on Meeting with Mr. Lodge, in the Secretary-
General's Office, from 5:30 to 6:30 p.m. on 17 June
1958

Present: The Secretary-General
Mr. Lodge
Mr. Barco
Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Cisco
Mr. Cook
Mr. Bunche

1. Mr. Lodge said that the State Department was so concerned over the situation in Lebanon that Mr. Rockwell and Mr. Cisco had been sent up to present the State Department's view of the situation, and that with Mr. Dulles' consent they had been brought over to present it to the Secretary-General.
2. Mr. Rockwell emphasised U.S. concern for the independence and integrity of the Middle East states and their special concern for Lebanon. He said that the dominant issue of extending Chamoun's tenure has been seized upon by the U.A.R. He stressed the belief of the U.S. that Lebanon has a right to settle its internal affairs as it sees fit, and, accordingly, the U.S. has afforded assistance to Lebanon in the form of security equipment, has speeded up the delivery of tanks, and has provided three landing craft on a loan basis. For the same reason the U.S. is supporting the UN Observation Group in Lebanon. He went on to say, however, that the U.S. has always recognised that the UN Observation Group effort would not prove sufficient, and that Lebanon would appeal for direct intervention. The U.S. feels, however, that everything possible should be done to preserve Lebanon before any resort to the extreme measure of direct military assistance.
3. Mr. Rockwell went on to say that it has been necessary to decide what the U.S. will do if the situation deteriorates to the point where UN or extra-UN military intervention becomes necessary. He observed that Mr. Dulles had said that if there were outside military assistance, either UN or other, on the request of the Lebanese Government, this would result in the fall of the Governments in Iraq and Jordan. On the other hand, he pointed out that if the Lebanese Government publicly requests outside military intervention, and this is refused, the Governments of Iraq and Jordan will fall and also those of Turkey, Iran, Afghan and Ethiopia. Mr. Rockwell remarked, however, that this was not the "final" view of Mr. Dulles who felt that the utmost effort must first be made through the UN before any such intervention could be contemplated.

4. Mr. Cisco asked what the UN action should be in order to avoid U.S. direct intervention. He answered his question by stating that there should be a UN "police force" to stop infiltrations and seal the border. This, he said, would be necessary to obviate the U.S. need to honour a request from the Lebanese Government.

5. The Secretary-General outlined the way in which the Observation Group would function, as he saw it, and indicated that it need not be assumed in advance that this operation would be inadequate. He pointed out that the conditions for a UNEF type force were not present in Lebanon and that a change in the function and character of the force in the Lebanese situation would really convert it into a Korea type operation, since the UN force would have to fight its way against rebels, who are mainly Lebanese, in order to reach the frontier. He stressed that he had no authority to embark on any such operation under the Security Council resolution. On the other hand, there was a reasonable chance that the UN Observers, who had already begun to move about within some of the areas under opposition control, could, by peaceful tactics, be quite effective in limiting infiltration. The obvious risks in any direct military intervention were emphasised: the inevitably emotional reaction of the Moslem world generally to any attack by outside forces, whether or not under UN aegis, on the predominantly Moslem insurgents in Lebanon; the probable end of any UN effectiveness in the Middle East, including the collapse of the UNEF and UNTSO operations; the end of western position and influence in the Middle East except as it could be maintained henceforth by force and for so long only as that force remained in occupation.

6. Mr. Lodge and his colleagues stated that these risks were all too well understood and that, therefore, they hoped for the success of the UN effort and of the Secretary-General's trip.

Notes on Meeting with Mr. Charles Malik, in the Office
of the Secretary-General, from 12 to 1:30 p.m. on
17 June 1958

Present: The Secretary-General
Mr. Malik
Dr. Azkoul
Mr. Bunche

Mr. Malik stressed the following points:

1. It had now been six days since the Security Council resolution was passed and nothing had been done which could be considered as ensuring against illegal infiltration.
2. The situation in Lebanon was deteriorating as a result of continued UAR intervention.
3. Lebanon was a victim of an act of aggression. If the means adopted by the Security Council were inadequate, as they appeared to be, the Security Council should be informed so that it could take stronger measures.

It was pointed out to Mr. Malik that everything that it was possible to do under the Security Council resolution was being done, and as quickly as possible. It was noted, however, that the key factor affecting the UN operation, ^{which} was not known to us at the time of the adoption of the Security Council resolution, was the fact that most of the Lebanese frontier was not controlled by the Lebanese Government. In the situation, the UN must either try to reach the frontier by peaceful penetration of areas hostile to the Government or by shooting its way to the frontier,

which would mean attacking Lebanese people.

Mr. Malik at first professed to see no objection to UN armed forces fighting their way to the frontier against the opposition of hostile insurgent Lebanese but, later, admitted that it would probably be fatal for the Lebanese Government to sanction any such extreme action.

4. The Secretary-General observed that there were two approaches possible: the mobile operation and the "cordon sanitaire". Our people in the field favoured the mobile operation, stating that it would take one or two divisions of armed men to seal the frontier and that this would arouse intense antagonisms. Mr. Malik stated that it might be too late to seal the frontier, citing the analogy of "closing the windows and taking other precautions after the young lady's lungs had already absorbed a fatal dose of tuberculosis microbes", since more than enough arms, ammunition and personnel may have already crossed the borders. He said that the week of delayed action in the Security Council pending consideration of the Lebanese charge by the Arab League had been one in which a virtual flood of materiel and men crossed into Lebanon from Syria. He claimed that there are 5,000 Syrian infiltrators in Lebanon, 1,000 of them being in Beirut.

5. Mr. Malik agreed, however, that the United Nations Observation Group should have another week in which to determine what it could do.

17 June 1958

Following are the responses so far received to requests for Observers for UNOGIL :

- NORWAY - Full quota of 10 left on 16 June arriving in Beirut on 17th.
- FINLAND - Full quota of four are leaving on 18th June, arriving Beirut on 19th.
- Netherlands - 6 Netherlands officers leaving 18th, arriving Beirut morning of 19th.
An additional 2 will be appointed urgently, making a total, at this stage, of 8.
- SWEDEN - 2 officers will arrive Beirut on 18th June; 6 officers will arrive on 19th.
- ITALY - 10 officers being sent this week.
- INDIA - 10 officers will be sent on 19th June.

Canada - 10 to leave on 19th June.