

**Middle East conflict -
Lebanon. Correspondence,
statements, resolutions:
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HS L 179:104



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Beirut, 1958 - June 10-16

Observations on the possibility of a UNEF operation
in Lebanon

L 179:104

POSSIBILITIES FOR LEBANESE MISSION

OBSERVERS

The required number might be drawn from the following who are scheduled for early arrival to UNTSO:

Canada	- Lt. Col. Haley (replacement for Col. Reekie, due 4 July)	1
Italy	- 3 Majors and 1 Captain (standing by, ready for departure - these are not replacements)	4
Netherlands	- 4 Captains due in area 1 July (these are not replacements)	4
Norway	- Major Vester - due 20 June Major Ingerbrigtsen - due 15 July	2
Sweden	- Lt. Col. Lagerquist - due momentarily	1

The following might be drawn from UNMOGIP:

Canada	- 3 majors arriving in New York 11 June en route to mission	3
Denmark	- 1 major due in the course of the month	1

From UNEF:

Sweden	- 1 Swedish Lt. Colonel, Liaison Officer in Pisa - could be drawn for mission and could be easily replaced from UNEF, Gaza	<u>1</u>
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Total possible military observers 17

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ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

William Sie (Chinese), P-4, has just been relieved as Administrative Officer in Pisa and is ready to depart within week. Excellent finance background, has had several missions, all very successful.

Franz Frerker (Netherlands) P-4, is now en route for home-leave. Has been member of Field Operations Service, thoroughly experienced in handling missions. Could be diverted for a month.

MOTOR VEHICLES

A. - Jeeps and little passenger cars not equipped with radio -

20 to 25 could be pulled out of UNEF without creating any hardship; UNEF has now received a large shipment of small Citroen cars.

B. - Jeeps equipped with radio -

Approximately 10 to 12 could be made available by UNTSO. This would represent a certain amount of hardship, but it might be possible to replace some of these jeeps by non-radio-equipped jeeps from UNEF.

C. - UNEF has apparently sufficient radio equipment surplus to equip some of the ordinary jeeps with temporary radio equipment. The presence of our Chief Radio Operator, Mr. Baumgarten, in the area would greatly facilitate this project.

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RADIO EQUIPMENT

- A. - Government House has equipment for two stations ready to be set up at once. In addition, there is sufficient equipment to set up two more stations and to strengthen the power output of a station in Beirut so as to make it possible for it to broadcast direct to Geneva without going through Jerusalem. This additional equipment would be taken from UNEF surplus.

RADIO OPERATORS

- A. - The Chief Radio Operator, Mr. Baumgarten, has just arrived in the Middle East to survey radio communications needs of UNEF and UNTSO and to recommend reduction in manpower. It is believed that some seven operators could be made available within a few days. In addition, Mr. Baumgarten could be instructed to stay in order to set up the equipment above.
- B. - UNMOGIP could make available within one week some four to six radio operators. This depends to some extent on the availability of radio-telephonic equipment which has been ordered to replace morse transmitters.

Chatterfield

16 June 1958

OBSERVATIONS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A UNEF OPERATION IN LEBANON

1. UNEF is established as a force with only paramilitary and police tasks. It operates on the territory of one Member State with its consent and is fully accepted by the Member State on the other side of the border. Although UNEF was established under the United Nations Peace procedure and with a background in an at least potential situation of the type envisaged in the initial paragraph of Chapter VII of the Charter, its functions as defined may be regarded as procedures of the type envisaged in Chapter VI. An operation on the Lebanese-Syrian border following the "UNEF" type would be possible, from a practical point of view, only if accepted by both the Lebanese and UAR Governments. If it were not accepted by the UAR Government, it would become a force, acting in support of the Lebanese Government and therefore implicitly a combatant force in relation to the UAR in case of persons or forces crossing the border. A force with such a position would fundamentally differ from the UNEF.

2. On the other hand, if the force were to be largely engaged in "inland" operations, where much of the fighting appears to be taking place, it would be facing rebel groups of Lebanese nationality in various places in the country, including Beirut itself. Such a

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situation might involve either a purely local rebellion, or elements of indirect aggression ^{1/} on the part of the UAR. In the former case the question would be raised of the propriety of the United Nations intervening in an internal conflict. In the latter case it might mean that the United Nations force would have eventually to face elements from the UAR. In either event the force would differ in character from a "UNEF"-type force. A decision to use a force might be considered as setting a precedent in other situations such as those of Algeria, ~~and Cyprus~~.

3. From the practical point of view, it is obvious that if the UNEF pattern of recruitment were to be followed serious difficulties would arise in obtaining the necessary units for a force to deal with the situations envisaged above. For obvious reasons, one would have to apply the rule approved by the General Assembly in the case of UNEF,

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^{1/} The following definition of indirect aggression is contained in the draft definitions submitted by the USSR to the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression:

"That State shall be declared to have committed an act of indirect aggression which:

- (a) Encourages subversive activity against another State (acts of terrorism, diversionary acts, etc.);
- (b) Promotes the fomenting of civil war within another State;
- (c) Promotes an internal upheaval in another State or a change of policy in favour of the aggressor."

Another definition submitted by Paraguay classifies, inter alia, as armed aggression:

"The organization by a State within its territory of armed bands intended to take action against other States, either within or outside the territory of such States; or the encouragement, support or the mere toleration of the formation or action of such armed bands in its territory."

namely that there should be no participation by any of the Permanent Members of the Security Council. In the light of the experience from UNEF, it can safely be assumed that none of the Governments taking part in the UNEF operation would put troops at the United Nations disposal with a potentially military task involving firing also at Lebanese nationals. We have noted a very restrictive attitude generally by participating Governments as to the use of their troops for military purposes.

4. The difficulties set forth in the previous paragraph suggest that if potential military action in support of the Lebanese Government is to be undertaken by the UN, it would be feasible only in a form similar to the one used in Korea. This would presume a finding of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression on the part of the UAR. I leave open the question whether a resolution which would imply the use primarily of American and British Forces under the UN flag could, in this situation, be adopted by the Security Council or obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.

16 June 1958

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON

Countries from whom Military Observers
have been requested: Number requested

Brazil	10
Burma	5
Canada	10
Ceylon	5
Chile	5
Denmark	8
Finland	4
India	10
Italy	10
Nepal	5
Netherlands	10
Norway	10
Peru	5
Sweden	<u>8</u>
Total	105