

**Middle East conflict -  
Lebanon. Code cables from  
UNOGIL to UN: Middle East ...**

*HS L 179:103a*



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Beint, code cables 1958

From: UNOGIL

to: UN

OCTOBER

L179: 103a

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BINCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1958 1205  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1077

Re your 902.

Four Harvards departing Beirut 2 October 0800 LT. Schedule as per UNOGIL 1053. Will notify you of any schedule changes as flight progresses.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO:           FIELDSERVICE  
FROM:         AHMED, BEIRUT  
DATE:         2 OCTOBER 1958     0437  
NUMBER:       UNOGIL 1085

Reur 903.

We have not received any tool kits locally from U.S. sources for which  
U.S. assist procedure in any case necessary.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO:           FIELDSERVICE  
FROM:         AHMED, BEIRUT  
DATE:         2 OCTOBER 1958     0437  
NUMBER:       UNOGIL 1085

Reur 903.

We have not received any tool kits locally from U.S. sources for which  
U.S. assist procedure in any case necessary.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 2 OCTOBER 1958 0820  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1086

Have received following cable from Brodnax "Understand UNRWA dependents are authorized to return to Lebanon. We also authorizing UNTSO dependents to return to the general area and wish to advise dependents of Security Officer Wang are presently out of area on UNTSO travel authorization. Assume you will handle on basis of UNOGIL's rules "

Wang was transferred to UNOGIL from UNTSO.

Does policy of not permitting UNOGIL dependents to come to Lebanon apply in such cases where dependents, previously in the area, would otherwise be now allowed to return?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE for MCDIARMID  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, Beyrouth  
DATE: 2 October 1958 1249  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1088

Reur 904. \$12.50 honorarium will be paid Palta  
five days per week in addition to present \$12.50 per diem  
seven days per week. Please have clear instruction sent  
to Finance Officer for reference.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE for MCDIARMID  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, Beyrouth  
DATE: 2 October 1958 1249  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1088

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INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 3 OCTOBER 1958 0449  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1090

Reference your 886.

Following is reply of General Bull to your queries:

1. "At the present moment, with the exception of one of the smaller stations, all Commanders are Lieutenant Colonels.

2. "While there is at present a surplus of 4 Lieutenant Colonels, 3 of whom have been promoted by the one Government since they have arrived here, none is at present found suitable for the command of a station although they may have other attributes. Of these 4, one is an excellent Staff Officer and two others are highly qualified pilots. United Nations Headquarters should be informed that the selection of Commanders and Senior Officers should be a military responsibility and the privilege of the Senior Commanders".

Underlined as per copy

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 3 OCTOBER 1958 0634  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1091

Re your 909. Rooms used as offices in Biarritz and Riviera as follows:

In Biarritz: 12 June 1 room, 13 June 2 rooms, 14 June 7 rooms, etc increasing to 17 rooms by 4 July when we transferred UNOGIL Headquarters to Riviera; total cost \$3,547.28.

In Riviera: 4 July 38 $\frac{1}{2}$  rooms, increasing by 31 July to 41 $\frac{1}{2}$  rooms; total cost \$7,488.74. By 31 August 64 $\frac{1}{2}$  rooms; total cost \$12,670. By 30 September 67 $\frac{1}{2}$  rooms, total cost \$13,714.99.

Use of Riviera rooms as of 30 September:

Military Headquarters: Logistics 5, Personnel 2, Ground Operations 3, Air Operations 6, Information (evaluation) 4; C.O.S. 2, D.C.O.S. 1, C.M.O. 1, Chief Clerk 1, Medical 3, Hq Patrol 1, total 29.

Civilian: Principal Secretary and Political Officer and Code Secretaries 5, Administration 5, Finance 4, Procurement 2, Personnel 3, Information 2, Interpreters 1, Radio 3, Chief Security Officer and Mail Room 1, Registry 1, Mimeograph 1, Transport 3, total 31.

In addition: one private office each for Plaza, Dayal, Bill adjacent to living quarters; storage and radio workshop equivalent to 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  rooms.

In addition to above headquarters space rentals, main stations and some substations office rentals amounted to \$1,904.82 for September.

Future costs at Headquarters should not greatly fluctuate though we may be able to obtain reduction in Riviera room rate. Rentals in field will probably increase with expansion plans. All cost figures above represent bills as actually paid.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 3 OCTOBER 1958 1258  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1096

Among newly arrived Danish vehicle workshop personnel the following have no qualifications for this type of work: Captain E.L. Rasussen, Lt B. Moller, Corporals B. Hansen, E.B. Hansen, H.K. Mortensen and H. Errenbjerg.

General Bull recommends that the two officers be employed as Military Observers and the four Corporals be returned to Denmark.

General Bull requests that Government be informed of necessity of selecting trained personnel for workshop duty.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1958 1436  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1105

Reference your 931. Regret any difficulties created here concerning workshop personnel. After considerable consultation, situation here appears as follows:

1. From the beginning there has been misunderstanding between civilian administration and military logistics staff regarding workshop, latter assuming that total transport responsibilities of Mission were to be turned over to military. Original "workshop" requirements given you 10 September by Major Erik Juul and Ahmed were drawn up on this basis. It now has been made clear to logistics that civilian Field Service responsibilities are to remain unchanged except that actual mechanical work on vehicles/<sup>in workshop</sup> will be carried out by Danish personnel under direct Danish direction. Field Service Chief Transport Officer retains control over maintenance schedules, use and assignment of vehicles, vehicle regulations, etc.

2. Thus, there is no need for the two officers previously requested and arrived. This, in addition to the fact that they themselves state they have insufficient experience for assignment for which they were recruited, means that they should be used as Military Observers to which I hope you can agree.

3. Original requirements also assumed assignment of Danish mechanics to main stations. Field Service subsequently disapproved this plan and proceeded with recruitment of Field Service mechanics. Original requirements could therefore be revised on assumption that recruitment Field Service mechanics can be expedited.

(Message continued in UNOGIL 1106)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : BUNCHE  
FROM : BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE : 4 OCTOBER 1958 1527 DST  
NUMBER : UNOGIL 1106

(continuation of UNOGIL 1105)

4. On above basis, total Danish workshop personnel requirements would be as follows [in Danish]: one motorskriver (OF eller FR); one garagemester (FR eller OS); sixteen FKF motormekanikere (OF, FR, OS eller KP); two motorreserveredelsekapedienter (KP eller KS).

Qualified personnel received so far is as follows: one garagemester (OS); sixteen FK motormekanikere (1 OF, 3 OS OG, 12 KP); one FKF motorreserveredelsekapedient (KP).

Outstanding requirements are therefore one motorskriver and one FKF motorreserveredelsekapedient. It is indispensable that both have working knowledge of English in their respective technical fields.

5. In view of your cable 931, para 5, the four corporals will be retained here for assignment as despatch riders or other useful duties.

6. Above comments reflect situation as seen from here. We make no suggestion from here as to whether your relations with Danish Government lead you to maintain your request for Danish personnel for assignment to main stations rather than recruit field service personnel.

TOP SECRET

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BULL, BEIRUT  
DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1958, 1753 DST  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1127.

Reur 947.

We think we can do it with present available personnel.  
Will give this further study and will cable details tomorrow.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, Beirut  
DATE: 7 October 1958 ]  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1126

Reference your 922. Lehmkuhl will leave for Gaza Monday 13 October if possible. Arrangements for departure delayed because of difficulty liquidating apartment rent with landlord absent from Beirut and unable return because of barricaded roads.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE  
FROM: BUCKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 8 OCTOBER 1958 0736  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1128

Reference your 946.

We have not yet been informed by you as to whether you have obtained United States agreement to authorize Holloway to deliver supplies to us here. Please advise what action you have taken and present status of this matter. When we are informed that necessary instructions have been issued to Holloway we will approach him for taking delivery.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 8 OCTOBER 1958 1513  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1134

Ref your 947. We feel function could be undertaken by selected UNOGIL Air personnel. Preliminary check shows we have 2 Swedes, 2 Irish, 1 Italian, 3 Norwegians, 1 Dane with technical qualifications.

In trying already to visualize such an operation without knowing more details, the following points and questions arise which presumably would be clarified for us at an early stage if operation is undertaken:

1. Would UNOGIL personnel be responsible to Bull or Spinelli? Or would this be independent operation not under either's formal authority?
2. Would we not require UN Radio Network contacts between airports concerned to insure our free and confidential communication in all circumstances?
3. Is it necessary place UN personnel in Nicosia? This does not appear essential on purely technical grounds.
4. Do you have information on beginning date and period and rate of withdrawal flights? This would determine hours of coverage and personnel required at each airport.
5. Presume withdrawal planes are equipped to be able to maintain radio contact with ground control at any time during flight. If Jet planes involved would this also apply to them or would contact in airport vicinity be sufficient?
6. Presume basic negotiations with governments concerned would be conducted by UN Headquarters and that actual withdrawal schedule would be agreed without intervention by UNOGIL personnel. Enough latitude should however be allowed them in their part of the implementation so as to take into account necessary adjustments as conditions require (weather, mechanical, traffic, clearances, etc.).
7. Personnel mentioned above are reliable and competent; but if special-non-technical difficulties are foreseen, would you consider adding to Damascus team a good political officer?
8. At earliest stage would propose preliminary visit by Bull and/or Westerberg to Amman, Damascus and Nicosia.

Bull absent today but this message is based on discussions between him, Westerberg and myself.

INGOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1958 0514  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1137

Would appreciate receiving answer to UNOGIL 1086.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1958 0514  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1137

Would appreciate receiving answer to UNOGIL 1086.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BULL, BEIRUT  
DATED: 9 OCTOBER 1958 1028  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1141

TOP SECRET

Further to yesterday's UNOGIL 1134 I believe that after agreements in principle are reached, the technical details should be worked out between me and the responsible British officials in the area, and those of the other governments concerned.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: DAYAL, BEIRUT  
DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1958 0829  
NUMBER: UNOCIL 1155

As requested in your 954, I called on President Chahab today in order to raise question of resumption of regular air Jordan service between Beirut and Amman. He welcomed any steps towards the normalization of relations and expressed his agreement in principle to the proposal. Thereafter he referred me to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who would take further action in the matter.

Mr Tacla likewise expressed his agreement in Principle to the resumption and in fact welcomed it. As far as he knew, his government had not yet been approached by Cairo. He promised immediately to instruct the Lebanese representatives in Cairo and Amman to contact the governments there to ascertain the position. Thereafter, the Lebanese Government would take the necessary measures to enable the full resumption of the air service. He promised to let us know as soon as the various ends were tied up.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: DAYAL, BEIRUT  
DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1958 0938  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1154

During my discussion with President Chehab this morning on question of air service between Beirut and Amman, he volunteered frank estimate present situation in Lebanon. He stated that he had been unable to influence effectively leaders of the various factions towards a compromise settlement because of their ingrained confessionalism and factionalism. His subsequent proposal for a military Cabinet had been accepted by both Karame and Gemayel, but had been rejected by Chamoun and subsequently under mob pressure by Karame. The leaders after exciting their followers, were unable to retain control, while the danger of confessional strife intensifying was considerable. A military dictatorship did not offer a solution.

President Chehab stated that he had persuaded Karame and Gemayel to meet for the first time on the preceding day and that he would give the politicians until Monday mid-day to agree on a compromise government of national unity. If they did not, he said there was no choice for him but to resign.

I expressed the view that the suggestion of forming a military Cabinet might force the hands of the politicians to come to a compromise, adding the hope that the President would not find it necessary to carry out the intention which he had expressed as the Country looked up to him in its present extremity.

The President seemed glad to have the opportunity to discuss his troubles with a disinterested observer.

In my subsequent discussion with the Minister of Foreign Affairs I found him somewhat more optimistic than than the President that a compromise settlement would be reached.

he reached

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 13 OCTOBER 1958 0758  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1157

Group was informed today that Lebanese Army Headquarters has requested Bull to bring Marjayoun Station Commander to Beirut to be witness in an investigation they are conducting. We suspect subject of investigation may be case of former army commander at Marjayoun, Colonel Lahude, which you no doubt recall.

Quite apart from questions of principle, testimony by UNOGIL officer in such a case would have most harmful effect on status and reputation of this mission. I would appreciate a cable for use by group in discussion of this question, stating UN attitude and policy in such matters. Dayal and Bull both fully understand necessity for consultation with UN Headquarters on this and know I am cabling you about it.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF  
DATE: 14 October 1958 [1149]  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1165

In connexion with your study of advisability establishment motor workshop, you may be interested in following figures representing payment to local garages for work on vehicles exclusive of spare

parts costs:	July	\$2600
	August	3808
	September	4306.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF  
DATE: 14 October 1958 [1149]  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1165

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in following figures representing payment to local  
garages for work on vehicles exclusive of spare

parts costs:	July	\$2600
	August	3808
	September	4306.

TOP SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BULL, BEIRUT  
DATE: 14 OCTOBER 1958 1401  
NUMBER: UNOUIL 1167

Reour 1134 and 1141. I was approached today by British Embassy in order to find out who should obtain permission for British troops withdrawal transports from Jordan to overfly Lebanon. British Embassy understood that U.N. would have certain responsibilities in the operation. Would appreciate knowing what is present position in this question.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE (INFO BRODINAX JERUSALEM)  
FROM: AHMED, BEIRUT  
DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1958 1414  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1171

Reference your 980.

Agree to accept Bernard Rebeiro as replacement for Rodiadis. We will schedule Rodiadis departure on leave within week after Rebeiro arrival.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE (INFO BROENAX JERUSALEM)  
FROM: AHMED, BEIRUT  
DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1958 1414  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1171

Reference your 980.

Agree to accept Bernard Rebeiro as replacement for Rodiadis. We will schedule Rodiadis departure on leave within week after Rebeiro arrival.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 16 OCTOBER 1958 1229  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1178

General Bull is anxious to know of decision taken regarding promotion proposed for Netherlands Major Cornelis Blom, reference our 1040 and 1090.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 16 OCTOBER 1958 1229  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1178

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INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 16 OCTOBER 1958 1223  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1179

Re Our 1157. Greatly appreciate your 976.

Upon inquiry, we find that subject of investigation is Colonel Lagoud who is apparently endeavored to explain reasons for his contacts in Syria, claiming in one case that purpose was to negotiate release and return to Lebanon of PPS prisoners. Lt. Colonel Pasqua, UNOGIL Marjayoun station commander, did have conversations with Lagoud on this subject and Lebanese Army Headquarters desired obtain his confirmation. At group request, Pasqua is preparing for group's information a complete statement on the question. General Bull and I today called upon Lebanese Army Chief of Staff to explain UN position regarding testimony so that he would not place wrong interpretation on our reluctance to provide the testimony requested. Will forward to you soonest full statement on all facts in this matter for your consideration and decision.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: OBSERVATION GROUP, BEIRUT  
DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1958 1050  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1182

1. After three weeks of indecision and fruitless negotiations and increasing sectarian bitterness and violence which threatened the disruption of the country, a 4-man "Cabinet of Public Safety" has been set up. This has been universally hailed with a sigh of relief as offering a respite from the violence and anarchy into which the country had been plunged. The tension has been immediately lowered, the shops have all reopened for the first time in five months, life has the appearance of normal in Beirut, and there are prospects of lifting early next week of the curfew, which has already been relaxed.

2. The Cabinet is a finely-balanced Sunni Moslem-Maronite Christian affair and represents the two main protagonists of the "revolution" and the "counter-revolution". It is a frankly interim arrangement, and the primary responsibility of the new government is to bring about a general return to sanity and the restoration of law and order. Because of the disparate views of the members of the government, a special responsibility devolves on President Chehab to give firm leadership and to resist any pressures that might develop to expand it to include other sectarian groups and factions, until normal conditions are restored.

3. Developments during the coming weeks, including the U.S. withdrawals which are proceeding apace and are likely to be completed by October 25, will thereby affect the nature and duration of UNOGIL's mission.

URGENT CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: BRIGHTSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1958 1247  
NUMBER: UNOCYL 1186

Ref your 989.

Gen Bull, accompanied by Westerburg and Chief Fieldwork Communications Officer UNOCYL, departed via RAF plane this afternoon for Nicosia returning Beirut probably tomorrow. Have requested UNTSO plane for them to visit Jerusalem and Amman (Domestic also if your announced confirmation from Foreign Minister UAR arrives in time) departing Beirut Sunday afternoon.

British Embassy has consulted Lebanese Government for overflight clearances but no reply yet received.

Air route Nicosia to Amman via Sidon and Beirut appears unusual. Please confirm that this is the route agreed by UAR; British Embassy have uninformed on this point.

Can you inform, particularly for Damascus, name or title of informed official with whom Gen Bull should make contact on his visit to Amman and Damascus.

Full details regarding communications arrangements for Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jerusalem and Nicosia, together with requests for assistance from UNTSO in equipment and perhaps radio personnel will be cabled upon return of Bull's party from Nicosia.

WESTERN GOLF CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: BUCKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1958 1247  
NUMBER: UNOCYL 1156

Ref your 989.

Gen Bull, accompanied by Westerburg and Chief Fieldserv Communications Officer UNOCYL, departed via RAF plane this afternoon for Nicosia returning Beirut probably tomorrow. Have requested UNTSO plane for them to visit Jerusalem and Amman (Damascus also if your announced confirmation from Foreign Minister UAR arrives in time) departing Beirut Sunday afternoon.

British Embassy has consulted Lebanese Government for overflight clearances but no reply yet received.

Air route Nicosia to Amman via Sidon and Haifa appears unusual. Please confirm that this is the route agreed by UAR; British Embassy here uninformed on this point.

Can you inform, particularly for Damascus, name or title of informed official with whom Gen Bull should make contact on his visit to Amman and Damascus.

Full details regarding communications arrangements for Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jerusalem and Nicosia, together with requests for assistance from UNTSO in equipment and perhaps radio personnel will be cabled upon return of Bull's party from Nicosia.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1958 1448  
NUMBER: UNOOIL 1189

Bull and party returned from Nicosia this afternoon.

Conferences with Middle East Air Force 17-18 October led to a comprehensive plan for the air withdrawal which was handed over to General Bull. The plan is based upon the routing laid down in the UK Mission's letter of 16 October to the Secretary General and which has been approved by the Lebanese Government.

The route involves some difficulties such as the proximity to Israeli border at Banias and the lack of navigational aids at this breaking point on Syrian territory.

The MEAF has agreed to put a radio beacon at Bull's disposal to be placed in or near Banias. It will be manned by U.N. personnel.

Bull, Westerberg and UNOOIL communications officer will visit Jerusalem 19 October to arrange communications and to inform the Israeli Government (through Von Horn) about the British plan.

Amman will be visited 19-20 October to inform the local authorities of the plan and to make arrangements.

When we receive your confirmation from UAR Foreign Minister regarding visit and your confirmation that route via Banias was approved by UAR, it is planned to visit Damascus to inform the Damascus authorities of the plan and make arrangements. If the plan cannot be accepted by them it would be necessary to discuss any counter-proposals with MEAF and the other governments concerned.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BULL, Beirut  
DATE: 20 October 1958 [1514]  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1198

1. Talks in Jerusalem and Amman yesterday were satisfactory.
2. Talks in Damascus to-day revealed that Brigadier Kayal was not informed of our visit and had received no authorization to negotiate details with me. He had no information regarding British proposed routing airlift. He agreed to request instructions and stated that a reply from his Headquarters could not be expected before 48 hours. Request your strong pressure in New York to ensure that Damascus is authorized to negotiate immediately with me questions of routing and other technical details. This is urgent as time is running short.
3. Kayal's personal opinion regarding proposed route via Baniyas has that this route was completely unacceptable. He also stated that routing over Damascus is not likely to be approved. He suggested a preferable routing over Chahba.
4. In our Nicosia conversation, MEAF had stated that they considered route via Baniyas very unattractive from a navigational point of view, and because of its proximity to Israeli border.
5. In view of Kayal's comment I am therefore informing MEAF of the probability that route will be changed to overfly Chahba requesting them to draw up an alternate schedule to cover this eventuality.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATED: 21 OCTOBER 1958 0601  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1199

Reour UNOGIL 1198 and your 1014.

1. UNTSO office, Damascus, is maintaining contact with Brigadier Kayal and will inform us immediately when Kayal is authorized to negotiate.
2. Regarding para 2 your 1015, situation as seen from here concerning route is as follows; it would have been useful to know the origin of suggestion for route via Banias. Was this a British decision? Was this routing part of a basic agreement between British and UAR? Or was it a decision by UAR and required by them? Neither British Embassy here nor MEAF Cyprus, knew the answers to these questions.
3. Our queries concerning Banias route were based on misgivings of our UNOGIL air personnel, and those of British Embassy Beirut, and of MEAF Cyprus. From navigation standpoint this route is difficult; in addition it skirts Israeli border and overflies Syrian prohibited zone. It would also require installation at Banias of a British non directional radio beacon; Syrian permission to do so in this prohibited ~~xxxx~~ zone would appear most unlikely. Furthermore, Banias area is reported to contain undisciplined well equipped elements that might fire on overflying aircraft despite any agreement of Damascus to overfly the prohibited area.
4. For these reasons we desired to know whether question of route was subject to negotiation by Bull in his British and UAR contacts. We now assume that Bull is authorized to negotiate an alternate route in agreement with Cyprus and Damascus.
5. New subject. As of yesterday radio contact is established between UNTSO Jerusalem and MEAF HQ at Episkopi, Cyprus. For technical reasons UNTSO Jerusalem will act as radio relay centre between Cyprus on the one hand and Amman, Damascus,

Beirut on the other hand. Direct radio communications will be maintained between Beirut, Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus. UNTSO is providing at Amman and Damascus motorola equipment for rapid communication between respective airports and UN radio stations. We propose use NY code settings for our communications between all points concerned including Cyprus. For Cyprus I propose sending one UNOCIL code clerk with the military observer team to be stationed there. If you have any objection please cable soonest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL  
FROM: BULL, Beyrouth  
DATE: 21 October 1958 [1246]  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1203

Information VON HORN, Jerusalem and SPINELLI, Amman.

1. For the Mission outlined in your cable 947, I suggest the following Organization. The Group will be known as "United Nations Control of British Air Withdrawal from Jordan (UNJAW)," effective of 18 October.
2. The Head of the Organization is assisted by Lt. Col. R. Westerberg, Sweden, as Deputy, by one staff officer Major B. Falk, Sweden, and a communications officer, Mr. P.M. Altorf, Field Service, UNOGIL.
3. UN Control officers (UNCO) will be assigned as follows: Damascus: Lt. Col. Westerberg, who will lead the Damascus Group. Major Higgins, Ireland. Captain Liddy, Ireland. Captain Hoyte, Norway. Amman: Major Johnston, Ireland, Captain Gabrielsen, Norway. Beirut: Major Dorfani, Italy, and Captain Andersen, Norway. Cyprus: Captain Moller, Denmark and N.S. Lakshminarayan, Fieldservice coding officer, UNOGIL.
4. Governmental authorities in Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Cyprus are being informed by me of assignment of personnel.
5. Await your confirmation<sup>on</sup>/this outline. Copies of instructions and other information regarding the working of the Control Group will be sent to UN Headquarters by pouch.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE  
FROM: BLICKENSTAFF, BEIRUT  
DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1958 0427  
NUMBER: UNOGIL 1208

1. Bull and Spinelli want a press release issued simultaneously in Beirut and Amman on withdrawal operation as soon as full agreement is reached on the plan. It will announce that agreement was reached, indicating beginning date for withdrawals, number of flights per day, and stationing of U.N. personnel in airports. Please cable soonest your comments if any on the above.

2. Bull, Westerberg and Altorf departing 0800Z today for appointment with Brigadier Kayal in Damascus.

3. Your 1021 fully clarifies the position concerning routing. Bull's negotiations on routing will probably be difficult unless Kayal has now received instructions differing from opinions he previously expressed to Bull on first Damascus visit. MEAF yesterday informed us that Kayal's suggestion of routing via Chakba was "most undesirable" and they request Bull to "press as strongly as possible" for Banias route. Situation is therefore somewhat confusion in view of MEAF original unfavourable comments regarding Banias route.

4. Will report further upon Bull's return from Damascus.