

**Middle East - Suez story No  
7-14: Middle East - Suez  
story No 7-14 - 21**

*HS L 179:110*



National Library  
of Sweden

Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Middle East / Suez story - 8

31 Oct. 55

Programme of actions to relieve situation  
in El Auja, by E. L. M. Burns, Gen., Chief of Staff.

31 October 1955

PROGRAMME OF ACTION TO RELIEVE SITUATION IN EL AUJA

In the light of the continuing deterioration of the situation in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone, I propose the following measures as a minimum requirement to achieve the necessary stability and reduce the prospect of serious armed clashes:

1. Withdrawal by Israel of all personnel, obstacles and mines in the Demilitarized Zone except the inhabitants of Kibbutz Ksiot and the approximately 30 civilian police who were supposed to be in the zone prior to the event of 26 August, in accordance with the terms of the withdrawal supposed to have been effected by 2 October;
2. Simultaneous withdrawal by Egypt of their checkpoints, or defended posts, which are now within the Demilitarized Zone;
3. Completion of the survey and permanent marking of the international frontier, to be undertaken by UNTSO alone, without observation from either party.

This programme, modest as it is, cannot be achieved without timely and vigorous diplomatic support from the three powers, parties to the 1950 guarantee pact. If there is agreement to the above programme on the part of the three powers, attention should then be given to the timing of the approach to Israel and Egypt to secure assent to the programme and to the timing of the implementation of the various phases of the programme. While the fact that the survey already has been carried out and checked by UN Military Observers makes, in my view, this matter less urgent than the withdrawal, I realize that in order to

/.....

negotiate the whole of the above programme, which to my mind is a minimum for improving the situation, it may be necessary to secure agreement on this point as a first step.

This programme represents a compromise, from which both parties derive small advantages in turn for certain sacrifices.

Necessary legal reservations should be made since the end result of its implementation would still leave the status of the Kibbutz and the so-called civilian police in the Demilitarized Zone unresolved. While these seemed on the face of it to be civilian in character when they entered the Zone, their subsequent conduct demonstrated that both are para-military, and their presence in the Zone is in violation of the General Armistice Agreement.

Our immediate objective must be, however, to reduce the prospect of an inflammation of the present very serious military situation. The programme seems feasible if a proper concert of effort can be achieved on the part of the Chief of Staff, the three powers, and the Secretary-General in securing agreement of the parties and assuring its step by step implementation.

E. L. M. Burns,  
Major-General,  
Chief of Staff