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Conference of Non-aligned states
at Belgrade

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Foreign Report

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Clouds Over the "Neutral Summit"

The outlook for the "neutral summit" meeting at Belgrade on September 1st has been clouded by the prolonged dispute about the heads of government to be invited. This dispute is bound to affect the "slant" of the conference; in what direction is still uncertain, because:

1. The originators of the Belgrade meeting—Jugoslavia, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic—have clearly sought to pick and choose the guests in such a way that their own ideas would prevail in the debates; but
2. An enlargement of the guest list has already been rather grudgingly conceded, and further enlargements may yet follow. If the upshot is the appearance at Belgrade of a number of governments that received belated and obviously unenthusiastic invitations, their annoyance at this treatment is liable to recoil upon the originators' heads.

A committee of ambassadors of eight countries has been sitting in Cairo to try to smooth out the unresolved questions left after the preliminary meeting of ministers and officials held in Cairo from June 5th to 12th. The committee has made slow progress, particularly over the question of the list of invitations. But present indications are that the Belgrade "summit" will duly take place, though the atmosphere may not be very harmonious.

Twenty-two governments were represented at the preliminary talks, thirteen of them by foreign ministers or others of cabinet rank, one (Brazil) only by an observer. They were: *Asian*: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Nepal; *Arab*: Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAR, Yemen; *African*: Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Somalia; *European*: Yugoslavia; *Latin American*: Cuba, Brazil; and the Algerian rebels' provisional government.

Since then, it has been agreed to invite to Belgrade six more: Bolivia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Nigeria, Togo and Volta. Notable among those who have not yet been invited are Malaya, Tunisia, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and such major Latin American republics as Argentina, Chile and Mexico.

The argument over the guest list has gone as follows:

(i) President Sukarno of Indonesia originally wanted a conference on the lines of the 1955 Asian-African meeting at Bandung, which included communist China. But Tito and Nasser insisted on excluding members of either the western or the Sino-Soviet block. (Western-allied Turkey, Pakistan and Siam were at Bandung.)

(ii) Cuba and Guinea tried to slant the Belgrade conference in an unmistakably pro-Sino-Soviet direction, objecting, during the preliminary talks in Cairo, even to the choice of Belgrade for the site of the "summit." ("Revisionist" Yugoslavia is more dangerous in Peking's view than a "bourgeois" Asian or African country.) Guinea eventually acquiesced, but Cuba objected to the very last. Cuba then set itself up as sole judge of the Latin American republics to be invited, and showed a strong inclination to veto the lot.

(iii) India proposed, at the Cairo talks, that only recognised United Nations members should be asked to Belgrade. This formula would exclude not only communist China, but also (a) the Algerians, and (b) the Stanleyville government in the Congo led by Mr. Antoine Gizenga. After the Cairo talks, the participants gave conflicting versions of what had been agreed on these points. The Egyptians claimed that it had been agreed to invite "the Congo"—without specifying which of its rival governments, although the UAR backs Gizenga. The Indians said they could not agree to invite Gizenga. The Indonesians said that, while a majority favoured inviting Gizenga, this dispute had been passed to the committee of ambassadors. It is still undecided whether the final formula will limit the "summit" to UN members.

(iv) According to the Egyptians, an "uncommitted" country must qualify for an invitation to Belgrade not only by not belonging to "any military pact set up as a result of the cold war" (this wording saves Arab countries from being disqualified by pacts between themselves), but also by (a) having no foreign bases on its territory, (b) pursuing an active policy of non-alignment, and (c) supporting liberation movements. Condition (a) apparently disqualifies most of the ex-French African republics, Tunisia, Malaya, Cyprus and Libya, but not Saudi Arabia or Morocco, where there are still American air bases. Condition (b) is presumably meant to exclude most of the Latin Americans and such outspokenly anti-communist states as Jordan and Liberia. No reason has been given for not inviting Finland, Ireland and Sweden, which might be assumed to pass all the Egyptian tests.

(v) It is known that India in particular has pressed hard for a less narrowly circumscribed attendance. It is not satisfied with the addition of Nigeria and five others, listed above. India has proposed that at least a dozen more should be invited: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Finland, Ireland, Jordan, Malaya, Mexico, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tunisia, Uruguay. This would mean a conference of more than 40, if all the invitations were accepted.

Several governments on this proposed list of additions are, however, in two minds about agreeing to attend. Before deciding, they want to know more precisely who else will be at Belgrade. Some might settle for sending observers. Others, however, dislike the idea of observer status, foreseeing that (a) they would thus be publicly linked with a gathering whose decisions they would not be able to influence, and (b) that they might be regarded as "outsiders" who had gate-crashed the meeting but been given second-class seats.

India's position is crucial. Delhi was not originally enthusiastic about the "summit" idea at all, and had to be coaxed to send a representative—Mr. R. K.

Nehru, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry—to the Cairo talks in June. While the Indians agree that the uncommitted countries ought to press for reconciliation between the great-power blocks, they doubt whether a display of political fireworks on top of a “neutral summit” is the best approach. Mr. Nehru (the Prime Minister) has not committed himself personally to going to Belgrade. He probably will—much as he went, after similar hesitation, to the United Nations Assembly last September, after learning that 18 other heads of government would be there. But his present “uncommitted” position about Belgrade is a useful lever with which to induce the Cairo group to extend the list of invitations.

NO COMFORT FOR EAST OR WEST

The tentative agenda for Belgrade that the Cairo talks produced is wide enough to accommodate a varied content. Apart from a general exchange of views on the international situation, it envisages debates on (a) problems of uneven economic development and international economic co-operation, and (b) the strengthening of peace and security. Under (b) are listed these items:

1. Respect for national self-determination; struggle against imperialism; liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Racial discrimination, including *apartheid*.
4. General and complete disarmament; ban on nuclear tests; problem of foreign military bases.
5. Peaceful co-existence among states with different political and social systems.
6. Role and structure of the UN and application of its resolutions.

On colonial and related issues, racialism, and foreign bases, the “summit” meeting is bound to say things painful to many western ears, condemning South Africa, denouncing Portugal over Angola, either openly or by implication backing Indonesia’s claim to western New Guinea (Irian) and the Algerian rebels’ struggle for independence, and probably demanding the removal of all military bases. But, as in the case of the 1955 Bandung declaration, the Belgrade gathering is likely to use terms of general condemnation applicable not just to old-style western imperialism but also to Chinese actions in Tibet and on India’s borders, and to Soviet actions in Hungary and elsewhere. The Yugoslav party paper *Borba* has already denied in advance the criticism that the conference is liable to be purely anti-western because of anti-colonialism.

Russian unease about the “neutral summit” has been marked. The Soviet press has ignored it so far, though it must eventually break its silence over the embarrassing spectacle of an assemblage of Asian and African leaders in defiant Belgrade. East European commentators have made a few references, such as the Bulgarian *Rabotnichesko Delo*’s article at the end of the Cairo talks warning the neutral states against “pretending to have a non-bloc policy.”

At the same time, intensive Soviet feting of neutralist leaders continues—current visitors to Moscow including the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mr. Koca Popovic, and Dr. Nkrumah. Moscow is undoubtedly concerned that the Belgrade meeting should not reach conclusions that conflict with Soviet policies. This will apply particularly to agenda items 4 and 6, listed above:

- (i) It is a foregone conclusion that the Belgrade gathering will strongly demand a

fresh start toward general disarmament and a renewed effort to outlaw nuclear testing. But if its pronouncements on disarmament are anything more than generalities, they may not please Moscow. At the recent Commonwealth conference, Ceylon, Ghana, India, Malaya and Nigeria lined up with Britain and other "committed" countries on a fairly specific disarmament formula.

(ii) As to the United Nations, the "neutral summit" is likely to urge that:

1. The changed balance of power since the UN was born 16 years ago must now be taken into account, and
2. A larger role should now be allotted to the "new nations" that have doubled the UN's membership. This could entail expansion of the 11-nation Security Council. (The western powers now favour expanding the Council, but Russia has blocked moves in that direction on the ground that communist China must be seated in the UN first.)

A pointer to the position the Belgrade meeting may take on UN reform is the recent suggestion, made by the Egyptian, Ghanaian and Indian members of a UN committee appointed to study UN staff problems (see *The Economist* of July 8th, page 133), that the Secretary-General should appoint three new chief assistants. They wanted him to choose these three "taking into account the main political trends in the world to-day." While this suggestion has been criticised by some westerners as being a concession to Mr. Khrushchev's "troika" demand, its effect would be quite different from the Soviet plan. The three chief assistants would be chosen by the Secretary-General, not thrust upon him, and would have no effective power of veto. If Belgrade were to back some formula like this, it would amount to a rejection of the Soviet plan by the neutralists, who are beginning to see that Mr. Khrushchev's troika is not meant to promote the neutral countries' interests, but to stop them from getting a dominant position in UN operations.

Washington, however uneasy about the attraction toward neutralism now being shown in countries such as Brazil and Japan, is observing a strictly hands-off attitude about the Belgrade meeting. One State Department official privately advised the ambassador of a European neutral country against participation in the "summit," on the ground that the majority there would be anti-western. However, this seems to have been a personal view. There would clearly be advantages for the United States in the presence at Belgrade of governments with even a modest pro-western inclination, to offset such regimes as those of Cuba and Guinea. One allied diplomat in Washington has predicted that "whatever happens, the Belgrade session will not be a one-sidedly pro-communist affair by any means."

Africa Bargains with the Six

Future relations between the Common Market countries and associated states in Africa and elsewhere overseas are now being discussed in half a dozen different forums. Thus:

- (i) The European Economic Commission (the executive of the Six) has been holding meetings with representatives of associated countries.
- (ii) The Organisation for African and Malagasy Economic Co-operation, set up by the twelve "Brazzaville" ex-French African republics, held a meeting in June at Ouagadougou, capital of Volta, and made recommendations on economic association with Europe and on the institutional form of the future relationship.

(iii) At Strasbourg in late June, the Ouagadougou recommendations were largely the basis of the debates held between parliamentarians of the Six and of the associated countries (including Mali, Congo – ex-Belgian, and Somalia).

(iv) As part of the British government's Commonwealth consultations, Mr. Hare has been discussing with the African Commonwealth governments the desirability of their association with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the form it might take if Britain decided to join.

(v) On July 17th, representatives of the 20 African states that took part in the Monrovia conference in May will meet in Dakar to discuss not only the prospects of establishing a common market among themselves, but also relations with the EEC. (These 20 comprise the Brazzaville group and Tunisia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Libya and Togo.)

(vi) In September, the Ministers of the Six are to meet representatives of the associated countries to draw up future articles of association. At this meeting, the Ouagadougou, Strasbourg and Dakar recommendations will be taken into account—as will the British decision on the Common Market if it is known by then.

The deadline for new arrangements is the expiry in 1962 of the validity of the transitional relationship that was provided in an annexe to the Six's Treaty of Rome, drawn up when the African territories were still dependent. This transitional relationship has applied to Somalia, the ex-Belgian Congo, the Brazzaville twelve and Mali, all of which, on becoming independent, agreed to remain in association (even Guinea has never actually turned the offer down). In response to the Six's offer of a \$530 million development fund and a progressive reduction of tariffs on the associated states' exports, the present 15 associates have carried out tariff reductions of the order of 20 to 30 per cent in favour of imports from the Six.

On the *European* side, there is readiness to make substantial concessions to ensure continued association, but the Germans and Dutch fear that too many concessions would antagonise non-associated countries like Ghana and Nigeria. This fear is prompting German and Dutch efforts to bring in not only Britain but also its former African dependencies. But Ghana and Nigeria have shown signs of being firmly set against the objectives of the EEC.

On the *African* side, not all the present associates are sure that the obvious advantages of continued association would be worth the political price of close identification with the European group. The Brazzaville countries have few doubts, though they will use the political argument to help them get the best possible terms from the Six. Mali, however, showed at Strasbourg that it may well have second thoughts about continuing association after 1962. Mali is a key state, being the only present associate that also belongs to the Casablanca group of strongly nationalist African governments. Its withdrawal from association with the EEC would deepen the present division in Africa; if it does not withdraw, it could help to bridge the division.

On *both* sides:

1. The problems of under-developed countries outside Africa are being studiously ignored, and American ideas about world-wide solutions for commodity marketing problems and development financing are dismissed as impracticable.
2. There is no readiness to make big concessions to get Britain to come in, bringing its former dependencies in with it. Britain is clearly

expected to apply for membership first, and discuss terms afterwards.

The African associates, for all their talk of African unity, really fear that the association of Commonwealth African states may reduce (a) their present market advantages in Europe and (b) their share of the EEC development fund.

The African associates, at the time of writing, are agreed on the following minimum demands:

(i) Final terms to be negotiated individually with EEC by each associate, unless associates choose to group themselves. This is a concession to Mali; most of the Brazzaville twelve would be willing to negotiate a standard relationship, though Volta may jib at this in the end.

(ii) Participation in EEC policy decisions affecting Africa through a Council of Association; appointment of ambassadors to the EEC (Senegal has already appointed one); EEC representation in Africa: regularisation of the Strasbourg parliamentary gathering, with alternate meetings in Europe and Africa.

(iii) Guaranteed European outlets for tropical products at remunerative prices.

(iv) Compensation for eventual loss of preferential arrangements between France and ex-French territories.

(v) Progressive reduction of the high sales taxes that Germany in particular imposes on coffee, cocoa, etc. These taxes are so heavy as to nullify the expansion of demand that ought to result from the Six's tariff reductions. (Indeed, studies have shown that while these sales taxes remain, tariff preferences for associates will not hurt other exporters.)

(vi) A larger EEC development fund, administered quicker and more liberally, with associates having an equal say in its administration and in execution of approved projects, in return for nominal contributions to it. Mali wants each associate to have a share of the fund to use freely however it pleases; but this demand will not be accepted.

(vii) Technical training to be speeded up.

Several difficulties arise in satisfying these demands. For example:

1. France is reluctant to lose altogether its special relations with former French dependencies, and in any case it may be difficult to devise compensatory measures for this loss.

2. Under pressure from outside countries, the Brussels commission is already considering proposals for *reducing* the preferential tariffs for the African associates.

3. Sales taxes on tropical imports are a substantial source of several European governments' revenues; to reduce them would involve political as well as economic problems.

4. The Africans want the development fund used for (a) industrialisation, and (b) support for their present agricultural crops. They suspect Europeans of reluctance to promote industry in Africa, and sometimes fail to understand European insistence on agricultural diversification.

5. If Britain joins the Common Market, it will be very difficult for the African associates of EEC to go against their own professions of African unity, and exclude the British territories from the association. In that case the preferences would have to be shared.

6. Once that happened, United States pressure for a complete removal of the preferences, in the interests of Latin America, would probably grow. Although the United States has not yet tried to force the pace in the associated African capitals, it made formal proposals in Brussels this week for a sweeping away of the preferences and the substitution of new world-wide arrangements.
7. In the reshaping of the association which would follow, the British territories would have a say. The African grouping might well be more independent of Europe than the present closed association.

Fidelismo's Persistence

President Kennedy's decision to attend the meeting in Uruguay next month of the economic council of the Organisation of American States was doubtless influenced by the warning of the "worsening economic situation and rising discontent" given by Mr. Adlai Stevenson on June 23rd after a tour of ten South American countries. A FOREIGN REPORT correspondent who has just visited Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean republics reports that in this region, although Fidelismo has lost many supporters in recent months, the ferment produced by it continues. While the governments of these republics are now tending to adopt a much cooler attitude toward Cuba, public opinion remains more favourable to Dr. Castro than one might think from the reports of American correspondents who are currently emphasising the extent to which Fidelismo has lost ground in the Caribbean area.


Country by country, the situation can be analysed as follows:

A.—*Mexico*. President Lopez Mateos's government has been keeping Castro at arm's length for some time. But Sr. Cardenas, the former president whose prestige still stands high among working people and peasants, does not hide his sympathies with the Cuban regime. A new fortnightly news magazine, *Politica*, is subsidised from Cuba. Factors working against Fidelismo, however, include:

1. The President's great political dexterity.
2. The absorption of the Indian masses in the problems of daily life.
3. The particularly strong influence of the United States, whose discreet support continues to prop up the Mexican peso.

It is when the President's term of office ends in two years' time that the US State Department fears that unrest may become serious.

B.—*Guatemala*. President Ydigoras Fuentes's government was the first in the hemisphere to break off diplomatic relations with Dr. Castro. The left-wing Arbenz experiment in 1954 has put Guatemalans on their guard. On the other hand, this republic would be the ideal stepping stone for Fidelismo in Central America, and Dr. Castro knows it. His supporters there number only a few hundreds, but are active and effective.



C.—*El Salvador*. The reformist junta that overthrew President Lemus in October allowed the formation of a Fidelista party. In January, however, it was in turn overthrown, and the new junta shows no wish to associate itself with Cuba.

D.—*Honduras*. President Villeda Morales's government recently broke off relations with Havana; earlier, it had already shown signs of turning against Dr. Castro, e.g. by the dismissal of its left-wing minister of housing. The President, with his cultivated European background, has more natural affinity with, say, Presidents Betancourt of Venezuela and Frondizi of Argentina than with Castro. But his mandate expires in 1963, and a question mark hangs over the next presidential elections, for (a) his own Liberal party's likely candidates all have close links with the Cuban communists; and (b) the Conservatives have no new young leader in sight. (The President is not likely to try to retain power by illegal means.) Already, Fidelistas and communists have full freedom of speech and assembly; the principal newspaper, *El Dia*, is resolutely pro-Castro, and Cuban radio propaganda finds many eager listeners.

E.—*Nicaragua*. Fidelistas are found in all, including the upper classes, and one of the most popular radio commentators is the pro-Castro Julio Vivas. President Luis Somoza, evidently worried by signs of Fidelista contagion, has shown a few signs of wanting to introduce reforms, but has invariably been frustrated by other members of his powerful family. The constitution bars all members of the family from seeking election in 1963. The President has pledged himself to respect the law, but critics point out that his brother Tachito Somoza, commander of the National Guard (which serves as both police and army) has been suspiciously active for several months. If the Somozas do try to hang on to power, they will almost certainly face an uprising.

F.—*Costa Rica*. This democratic oasis seems likely to continue on a stable course whether the 1963 elections bring victory to President Echandi's ruling conservative party or to ex-president Figueres's socialists.

G.—*Panama*. The Cuban ambassador has left, relations with Havana are very cool, and the propagandist efforts of pro-Castro groups are restricted by police raids and arrests. But a secret public opinion poll recently taken in a poor section of Panama City showed that 75 per cent of its people supported Castro. Pressure for social reform—mainly from students and a few left-wing deputies—is growing.

H.—*Haiti*. In some respects, President Duvalier, who flirted with communism in his youth, is in sympathy with Fidel Castro. But for Castro's example, he would hardly have ventured to bang the table when talking to the American ambassador and demand the withdrawal of unwelcome US diplomats. Several of his ministers have left-wing views. But Haiti's dependence on American aid tempers any revolutionary ardour he may still feel. Meanwhile, ill-defined unrest is growing—without any evidence of a communist origin.

I.—*Dominican Republic*. Trujillo's son has managed to maintain law and order so far, greatly to the surprise of many observers. But the younger Trujillo had given no previous sign of having inherited his father's political talent or staying power, and his success is not expected to last.

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