

Nuclear Weapons Conference, Geneva 1958-61 ; SECCO after Summit Conference ...

HS L 179:91



Dag Hammarskjöld's samml.

Nuclear Weapons Conference, Geneva

8 Nov. - 17 Dec. 58

Lloyd, Selwyn (Principal Secy of State,
England)

- 2 letters from D.H.

8 Nov.

(Informally given to Sir Pearson)

Through my representative in Geneva I have learned about the suggestions of Mr. Ormsby Gore regarding the administrative side of the test control system. I understand that in discussing the possible statute of the necessary organ, he referred to the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and talked about the possible need for a general conference, a smaller directing body etc., etc. He seems further to have referred to the possible need for preparatory bodies to work out detailed agreements with regard to matters such as voting procedures, budgetary provisions etc. From these observations I conclude that London may have in mind what for all practical purposes would be a specialized agency. Assuming that this approach is only tentative, I feel that I should give you a few comments inspired by our own experiences. The main conclusion of these comments is that I consider it most inadvisable at the present stage to move in the direction of a specialized agency in this field and for this purpose.

1. A control agency would have a very limited, highly specialized field of activities. Our experience of the Atomic Energy Agency is that an international organization equipped with a general conference and all the other constitutional ornaments, is not adequate in such a situation because of a discrepancy between tasks and structure. As in the case of the Atomic Energy Agency, it could be expected that the governing body and the secretariat would start out in search for new tasks in order to justify an existence for which the original task would not provide a sufficient basis. Were a specialized agency to be created, there is thus a considerable risk that we would have given ourselves a new and unnecessary headache.

2. I think that you are just as reluctant as I to see a further expansion of the international bureaucracy. However, there is no worse form of such an expansion than the creation of new agencies as that means also a creation of new vested interests under Parkinson's Law. A new agency would involve Member Governments in completely unnecessary costs caused by duplication and administrative inflation. It would further create new coordination problems etc., etc.

3. Were a specialized agency to be created for test controls, you would, in fact, have tied your hands regarding the development in the field of disarmaments control in general. The step would mean that we would be heading towards a disarmament administration in the hands of a specialized agency. I fail to see how such a development could be reconciled with the existence of the United Nations. Would the general conference of such a new agency be barred from discussing the political problems of disarmament and limited only to the hard facts? This seems to me to be impossible.

However, were they to discuss the political aspects of disarmament, you may well ask what the General Assembly is supposed to do in the future. Apart from the risks pointed out in 1. and 2. above, I thus see a considerable danger of confusion and sterile competition, with new chances for Governments to demonstrate their schizophrenia.

4. The United Nations Secretariat which serves the General Assembly as the body who has the main political responsibility in the field of international disarmament, is perfectly capable of absorbing new tasks and of taking the final responsibility for new administrative operations with small or no additions to the staff. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that we have been running - even simultaneously - the UNEF and the UNOGIL which, with other pressing duties in mind, might well have given rise to the question whether such operations did not require the creation of a new specialized agency. Likewise we have absorbed such very exacting enterprises as the two Atomic Conferences. I don't see why the Secretariat should not be able to be the central administrative organ back of a subordinate organ charged with test controls. If we were to be in that position, the difficulties mentioned above could easily be avoided.

5. In my view the right line in the case of atomic energy, would have been to create something fairly similar to UNRWA or the High Commissioner for Refugees (In fact, the UNRWA operation is a more extensive one than that entrusted to the Atomic Energy Agency). Both these subordinate organs have a constitutional position which fully utilizes for their purposes the UN Secretariat and subordinates their decisions to the General Assembly. If the line of which these two subordinate organs are examples, had been followed in the case of atomic energy, I think we would have been a lot better off. I feel in the same way about the situation confronting us in the case of test control. Were the organization later to prove too small or in other respects inadequate, it is much easier to go from a subordinate organ of the UNRWA type to a specialized agency than it would be to go in the opposite direction if we had started out too magnificently and later on wanted to retreat.

6. Generally speaking I feel that there are strong administrative and political reasons to begin with test control administration in a fairly low key, learn from experience and proceed to decisions on the general structure as well as on the administrative details only when we know more about the practical problems. Also, has not the control aspect generally speaking been somewhat overplayed, and is there, politically, a decisive difference of safety with a big, independent administration compared to a situation with a modest and smooth-sailing one, within an already established framework?

8 November 1958

17 December 1958

PERSONAL

I would like to find the time to send you some comments on recent developments within my field of activities. However, after the end of the General Assembly things have been very rushed, and tomorrow I am leaving again for the Middle East. So I think I shall wait until I can give you also my impressions from talks in Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo. I do not particularly like the smell of the situation, but probably we shall have a solid lid on at least as long as I am roaming around in the area.

The absence of newspapers in New York has been a blessing in all respects but one. I feel curiously out of touch with developments regarding Berlin. Maybe that what is to be found in official exchanges and communiqués, which are reprinted by the agencies is sufficient, but I can't help feeling that that is not the case.

If I am cut off from a lot of all those various pieces which we usually put together into our personal picture of current trends, I am, on the contrary, well briefed on the discussions in Geneva. I have been struck by the extremely useful and constructive role which has been played by Ormsby-Gore. If you permit me to say so, I think that he has managed to place himself in a position which has considerably added to the chances that the other two, together with him, may get somewhere.

In present circumstances, I am attaching great significance to a full exploration of the possibilities of progress in the test-ban talks. You will understand, therefore, that I do not feel out of order when I express to you a strong hope that Ormsby-Gore's other duties will permit him to get back to Geneva after the recess. I guess that it is increasingly difficult for you and for the Cabinet to let him be away, but I feel sure that you would wish to weigh against that inconvenience the importance of his contribution in Geneva. Personally, I would, in the present situation, not hesitate to give the second part of the Geneva talks a high priority, indeed, fully justifying all the efforts the Western Governments can make toward their success.

His Excellency
the Rt.Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
London, England.

./.

The "cold war" developments during the General Assembly would merit a close analysis. I am not agreed with the official American interpretation which, I think, underestimates the symptoms of an increased mobility, though not flexibility, on the Russian side, and overlooks the significance of the lack of mobility which has been shown on the Western side. If the results of the 13th session are rather meagre, the Western governments must carry their part of the responsibility. I give you these personal reactions because they are an obvious part of the background for my reaction to the Geneva efforts.

With my very best wishes for the holidays, which I hope you will be able to spend in some quiet together with Joanna,