

# Foreign Ministers Conference, Geneva 1959 ; Berlin question 1959 ; Outer sp...

*HS L 179:90*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Disarmament

8 April 60

Excerpts from D.H.'s press conference  
at Geneva.

*Plenty*  
CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE

YZ14 NY 1307 8 2020Z =

PRESS

UNATIONS

GENEVA =

606 PROTITCH FROM SECRETARYGENERAL STOP FOLLOWING EXCERPTS  
FROM TODAYS PRESS CONFERENCE ARE OF IMPORTANCE TO YOU:  
QUOTE MR BURKE (CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION) :  
MR SECRETARY-GENERAL, DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE  
SUGGESTION THAT THE UN DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION SHOULD BE THE  
BASIS OF FURTHER =

P2 =

DISCUSSIONS IN THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT TALKS? THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL: ISNT IT THE BASIS? I THOUGHT IT WAS UNQUOTE  
QUOTE MR LASH (NEW YORK POST) : THE DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS  
IN GENEVA INVOLVE THE PRESENTATION OF A WESTERN PLAN WHICH,  
AMONG OTHER THINGS, TALKED ABOUT AN =

P3 =

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION, AND OUR COLLEAGUES,  
IN REPORTING FROM GENEVA, SAID THAT THIS ORGANIZATION WOULD  
NOT BE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, OR AT LEAST, THAT PEOPLE  
SEEM TO BE IN SOME DOUBT ABOUT THIS THING. HOW DO YOU  
VIEW SUCH A PROPOSAL IN TERMS =

P4 =

OF UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT UNDER THE  
CHARTER?? THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: FIRST, I DO NOT KNOW IF  
THERE IS ANYTHING THAT CLEARLY INDICATES WHETHER THOSE WHO  
TALK ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION INTEND  
IT TO BE WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS. IT SEEMS  
TO ME =

P5 =

THAT THAT QUESTION HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN IN THE DEBATES,  
TO THE EXTENT THAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FOLLOW THEM. ALL  
THE SAME, OF COURSE, YOUR QUESTION IS A VALID ONE SEMICOLON  
IN FACT, IT REPEATS A QUESTION LAST TIME TO WHICH I GAVE =

P6 =

A VERY BRIEF REPLY. I SAID ON THAT OCCASION THAT I FELT  
THAT, WHEN THERE WAS TALK ABOUT LINKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS,  
THERE WAS IN THIS CASE A STRONG INDICATION FOR A SOLUTION  
WHICH MEANT THAT THE ORGAN WOULD BE WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS  
SEMICOLON THAT =

P7 =

IS TO SAY, IT SHOULD BE AN ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS.  
YOU ASK ABOUT MY VIEWS AS TO UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY

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P7 =

IS TO SAY, IT SHOULD BE AN ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS. YOU ASK ABOUT MY VIEWS AS TO UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE. I DO NOT LIKE REALLY TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS. I SHOULD LIKE =

P8 =

TO TRY TO REPLY TO YOUR QUESTION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WHAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF DISARMAMENT AND, THEREFORE, LIKELY TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT. I WOULD SAY IN THAT RESPECT THAT, ON THE ONE SIDE, IT IS NECESSARY, IF WE ARE TO =

P9 =

GET AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL ORGAN FOR DISARMAMENT, TO SEE TO IT THAT IT HAS CONSIDERABLE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY. THAT IS RATHER OBVIOUS SEMICOLON WE COULD NOT OVERBURDEN THIS ORGANIZATION BY A VERY WIDE FIELD OF NEW ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE VERY INTERESTS =

P10 =

OF DISARMAMENT, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO SEE TO IT THAT SUCH AN ORGAN, ALTHOUGH ADMINISTRATIVELY AUTONOMOUS, IS TIED IN WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PROVIDE FOR INTEGRATION -- I MEAN REAL INTEGRATION -- OF DISARMAMENT POLICIES IN THE BROADER =

P11 =

SENSE OF THE WORD, ONE END BEING THESE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A SPECIAL ORGAN, THE OTHER END, OF COURSE, BEING FINALLY WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IF WE ARE TO GET SUCH AN INTEGRATION, WHILE MAINTAINING =

P12 =

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY, I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST FIND A FORM WHICH IN FACT MAKES THE ORGAN AN ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS, BECAUSE ALL EXPERIENCE UP TO DATE SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT INDEED TO GET THE PROPER KIND OF POLICY INTEGRATION WHEN AN ORGAN =

P13 =

IS INDEPENDENT NOT ONLY ADMINISTRATIVELY, BUT ALSO POLITICALLY. IN OTHER WORDS, I WOULD SAY IN REPLY TO YOUR QUESTION THAT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ONE SHOULD THINK IN TERMS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVELY INDEPENDENT ORGAN WHICH, HOWEVER, WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNDER THE FINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF =

P14 =

THE UNITED NATIONS. THAT IS, IN FACT, WHAT I CALL AN ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IT MAY BE THAT, WHEN YOU COME THAT FAR AND TRY TO STUDY WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE, YOU WILL FIND THIS OR THAT KIND OF SNAG, THIS OR THAT KIND

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OF DIFFICULTY -- MAY BE OF =

P15 =

A CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE, MAYBE OF A POLITICAL NATURE,  
MAYBE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE. BUT LET US LOOK AT THOSE  
DIFFICULTIES WHEN WE MEET THEM. IF THOSE DIFFICULTIES ARE  
INSURMOUNTABLE, THE BASIC APPROACH PERHAPS HAS TO BE REVISED.  
BUT, SHORT OF SEEING THAT THERE =

P16 =

ARE INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE  
TO FOLLOW THE BROAD APPROACH I HAVE INDICATED, IT SEEMS TO  
ME THAT THAT APPROACH REPRESENTS, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A REASONABLE FIRST GUESS, AND A FIRST  
GUESS WHICH, AS I HAVE SAID, =

P17 =

IS DICTATED, IN MY VIEW, NOT BY ANY WISH TO DEFEND THIS OR  
THAT KIND OF AUTHORITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT SIMPLY  
BY A WISH TO GET WHAT THE GENTLEMEN IN GENEVA WANT,  
NAMELY, AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT OPERATION UNDER DUE CONTROLS.

MR WIENER =

PQ1 =

(NEWARK NEWS) : SINCE SUCH A CONTROL ORGAN WOULD PERHAPS  
BE MEANINGLESS, IN THE VIEW OF MANY, UNLESS IT WERE VETO-FREE,  
WOULD THIS NOT PRESENT A DIFFICULTY IF THE CONTROL ORGAN  
WERE PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
WERE INVOLVED WITH IT ? =

P19 =

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: BUT YOU HEARD THE DISTINCTION I  
MADE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY AND ULTIMATE POLITICAL  
RESPONSIBILITY. I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE  
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD  
BE CANCELLED IN ORDER TO GIVE PLACE TO SUCH A NEW ORGAN.  
I DO NOT THINK =

P20 =

ANYBODY HAS THAT IN MIND. THAT IS TO SAY, THERE WILL  
ALWAYS BE SECURITY COUNCIL RESPONSIBILITY, AS SPELLED OUT  
IN THE CHARTER. I COULD PUT IT IN THIS WAY: I DO NOT SEE  
ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN SUCH RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WIDE  
AUTONOMY FOR A CONTROL =

P21 =

ORGAN WHICH IS ADMINISTRATIVELY INDICATED. EVEN IF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL MAINTAINED ITS OBLIGATIONS AND REMAINED  
IN THE SAME POSITION IT OCCUPIES AT PRESENT UNDER THE CARTER,  
THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO INTERVENE IN THE  
DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS: THEY ARE NOT OF THE CHARACTER SPELLED =

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P22 =

OUT IN SUCH AND SUCH AN ARTICLE OF THE CHARTER FOR THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL. I BELIEVE THAT, IF WE WERE TO COME TO  
THE POINT WHERE SUCH A NEW ORGAN WAS ESTABLISHED, RULES  
OF PROCEDURE WOULD HAVE TO BE LAID DOWN FOR THAT ORGAN  
SO THAT IT =

P23 =

COULD MEET ITS DUTIES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE FIELD, AND THEY  
NEED NOT AT ALL BE COPIED FROM THE RULES OF THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL. UNQUOTE QUOTE MR. HARRELSON (ASSOCIATED PRESS):  
SIR, THE REPORTS FROM GENEVA INDICATE THAT THE TWO SIDES  
ARE BACK IN THE OLD POSITION =

P24 =

OF HAVING REJECTED EACH OTHERS PROPOSALS, BUT THERE IS SOME  
TALK OF SOME SORT OF NEW APPROACH. HOW DO YOU VIEW THE  
SITUATION AT THE MOMENT? THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: WE ALL HAVE  
OUR EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL AND ESPECIALLY  
OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A FIELD LIKE THIS =

P25 =

ONE, WHICH IS A LITTLE BIT TIME-WORN AND HIGHLY COMPLEX,  
WITH DIFFERENT APPROACHES POSSIBLE AND AN EXTREMELY WIDE  
RANGE OF QUESTIONS TO COVER. IF WE TAKE THOSE EXPERIENCES  
INTO ACCOUNT, I DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS CONFERENCE, TIME-WISE,  
HAS PASSED THE INITIAL STAGE OF =

P26/57 =

PRESENTATION, OR, AS I USE TO CALL IT, THE DEFINITION OF  
BASELINES. AS THEY HAVE NOT PASSED THAT STAGE -- AND AS IT  
IS QUITE NATURAL THAT THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS  
CONSTITUTES SUCH A DEFINITION OF BASELINES OR ATTEMPTS  
AT A DEFINITION OF BASELINES -- I HAVE NO REASON FOR ANY  
DISCOURAGEMENT. UNQUOTE +

COL 606 +

READ IN PAGE 21 LINE 3 LAST TEXT CHARTER REPT CHARTER

UNITED NATIONS  
1950 APR -8 PM 4:15  
TELEGRAPH UNIT