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Chronology of developments in connexion
with Berlin, Germany and disarmament

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CHRONOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNEXION WITH
BERLIN, GERMANY AND DISARMAMENT
FROM 1 TO 19 MARCH, 1959

1 March It was reported that the USSR had opened official talks with East Germany on the conclusion of a peace treaty and the end of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell urged the Western Powers to accept "straightaway" the USSR's proposal for a summit meeting.

Marshall Peng Teh-hui, Deputy Premier and Defense Minister, warned that the People's Republic of China would regard any "imperialist" assault on East Germany as an "attack on the whole socialist camp". He said his country would give East Germany "all-out support".

2 March M. Andre Francois Poncet, former Ambassador to Germany, stated that in his opinion the Berlin issue could be dissociated from the rest of the German problem. A solution for Berlin could be sought in the United Nations Security Council with Mr. Hammarskjöld being invited to organize control over communications between West Berlin and the German Federal Republic.

Speaking on Soviet television, Mr. Macmillan stated the following principles for establishing confidence between countries:

"First, we should each avoid acts which disturb the existing position anywhere in the world to the other's disadvantage; for such acts must, to use your Prime Minister's words, produce dangerous situations.

"Secondly, let us recognize that each side needs concrete reassurances. Words are not enough. Deeds count.

"Thirdly, let us see if we can make a start and go forward step by step. Agreement on one thing leads to agreement on another. It is the first step that counts. That is why I am here.

And at a reception in the Kremlin, Mr. Macmillan referred to the non-aggression treaty proposed by the USSR:

"I would just say, as I told you earlier today, I am prepared to declare at once our agreement that:

- (a) In all matters of dispute our two countries should act in the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.
- (b) Neither Government should seek unilaterally to prejudice the rights, obligations and vital interests of the other.

(c) On the basis of these principles, our Governments agree that disputes should be settled by negotiation and not by force.

"This in no way prejudices our firm resolution to stand by our defensive alliances until the happy time comes when the world can give up these protective measures."

The USSR replied to the Western Notes of 16 February in almost identical terms. (For relevant text, see "Selected Excerpts...", PSCA/DAG/98, pp. 6, 11 and 17).

3 March

Upon his return to London, Mr. Macmillan stated that there would be continued negotiations with the USSR on the three-point declaration he had made in a Moscow broadcast.

The communique issued at the end of the talks between Prime Minister Macmillan and Premier Khrushchev stated the following with respect to disarmament:

"The Prime Ministers agreed that an advance toward a solution of the problem of disarmament would be a major contribution to the maintenance of peace. It would help to increase international confidence and to reduce the burden of military expenditure. They agreed to continue their efforts to make progress in this field.

"Their common objective remains the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes.

"They recognized, however, the great importance of achieving an agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of international inspection and control.

"They reviewed the course of the work of the Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and resolved to continue their efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement.

"They considered that such an agreement would reduce tension, would eliminate the possible danger to health and life resulting from nuclear weapons tests and would help to avert the further development of nuclear weapons.

...
"...they agreed that further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection."

(For other parts of communique, see PSCA/DAG/98, p. 6).

4 March

In a Saturday Evening Post article former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended the mobilization of NATO, an increase in U.S. forces in Europe, the return of British and French divisions to the Continent, reinforcement by Turkish and Italian troops and a crash programme in the U.S. for producing ICBMs. He advocated these measures to impress the Soviet Union with Western determination not to be forced out of Berlin.

At his news conference, President Eisenhower made the following comment on Mr. Acheson's recommendations:

"Did you ever stop to think what a general mobilization would mean in a time of tension? This is to my mind not only futile; this would be the most disastrous thing we could do."

Referring to the problem of German reunification, the President said:

"Our policy and our agreement in 1955 at Geneva was that Germany would be reunited by means of free elections. For the moment, that has certainly been thrown overboard by the Soviets. They say the only possibility is by negotiation between these two separate Germanys. Well, I don't see how that can possibly be—a feature of any proposal made now... Our policy is that the uniting of Germany ...should be by free elections."

With respect to Berlin and a peace treaty:

"Within the whole field of a peace treaty, there could be very many different types of solutions, propositions, advanced and I think all of them would have to be discussed in, as far as you could, in a constructive manner."

(For comments on USSR Note of 2 March and on disengagement, see PSCA/DAG/98, pp. 7 and 25).

Speaking in the House of Commons, Mr. Macmillan stated that "a great gain" from his visit to Moscow was the agreement reached with Soviet leaders "on principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiations." Authoritative sources in London indicated that this statement implied that the Soviet Union's agreement to attend a Foreign Ministers' Conference was largely the result of Mr. Macmillan's prodding Soviet leaders on the need for negotiations.

Mr. Macmillan also said that during his conversations in Moscow, "tentative ideas had emerged on some matters such as the control of nuclear tests." Diplomatic sources in Washington interpreted this to mean that they had discussed the "threshold" principle whereby underground tests of relatively small yield below a limit still to be defined, would be permitted under a test ban agreement, thus eliminating the need for "on site" inspection.

(For his comments on disengagement, see PSCA/DAG/98, p. 25).

Speaking in Leipzig, Mr. Khrushchev said that:

"If the Bonn Republic does not want to sign, there will be a treaty for the German Democratic Republic alone."

Following conversations that took place in Paris between President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, French diplomatic sources expressed the belief that an East-West summit meeting prepared briefly by the Foreign Ministers would be the most likely sequence of diplomatic events in the context of the Berlin situation.

It was reported that French and West German Government circles viewed military disengagement as a further consecration of the status quo of a divided Germany. They were reported to be "dismayed" that Mr. Macmillan had opened the door to such proposals.

5 March

Speaking in Leipzig, Mr. Khrushchev indicated that the USSR would retain its occupation function and control of Western access routes to West Berlin until a peace treaty was signed. He reaffirmed that the peace treaty would be signed before long and that if West Germany would not enter into it, the USSR would sign a separate treaty with East Germany.

(For Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion that Moscow might extend deadline of transfer of Controls beyond the May 27 date, and for the State Department's comment, see PSCA/DAG/98, p. 15).

Following a regular meeting at the National Security Council "to consider the evolving situation in Berlin and the broader question of Germany." Defense Secretary McElroy, stated that if fighting developed over Berlin, he didn't quite see "how you would avoid involving Russian forces; it would be very difficult to keep it a limited war." Mr. McElroy virtually ruled out the possibility of a "Soviet surprise attack even with missiles", because the complications of coordinating the various preparations for such an attack would assure the U.S. of advance notice.

Adlai Stevenson, speaking in Boston on the "Berlin crisis",

"When the President says, we will not give in to force, he speaks for all of us. I pray that there are no illusions in Moscow on this vital score..."

"While under no circumstances will we forsake the people of free Berlin or compromise on the question of free access, we must face the fact that no Russian withdrawal can be secured without a modification of the Western position."

As regards any modification of U.S. military position, he said:

"The deterrent in Europe today is not just the six American divisions in Germany but the knowledge that a Russian attack means retaliation by America's strategic Air Force."

And on the question of a possible Soviet-East German Peace Treaty or of a transfer of control of functions, he said:

"I cannot see that any great harm is done."

In a radio interview Senator Fulbright suggested that meetings of top Western and Soviet leaders be held at least twice every year.

6 March

The leaders of both parties in the United States Congress proclaimed support for a policy of "firmness" in the Berlin crisis.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that as a result of his visit there was "general agreement on both sides that we should not talk under the threat of an ultimatum but we should pursue the path of negotiation." He conceded that on the "great issues of European security, of Germany and of Berlin we found our views were very different."

The West German spokesman, Felix von Eckardt, said at a news conference that Chancellor Adenauer and President de Gaulle looked on disengagement now with as little favour as in the past. With respect to non-aggression pacts, he said "there can be no doubt that it is the task of the West to resist these attempts."

7 March

In a speech at Leipzig Premier Khrushchev declared "we shall never allow the workers' and peasants' state to be liquidated by capitalism through unification... If there is a new war - one could start in a small way - it will end with the downfall of capitalism.... The situation now is neither side is ready to give in, therefore the frontiers can be changed only by war. The two sides must be reasonable to prevent a conflict."

James Reston reported that at a meeting at the White House between leading members of the Executive Branch and congressional chairmen of committees on foreign affairs and the armed services, the President expressed confidence that while the Berlin crisis was serious, the United States had enough atomic and conventional forces to deal with it. He was determined to carry out his plan to cut the ground forces as outlined early this year. He did not think it was wise to give an impression of emergency action in connection with Berlin, and did not want any Congressional resolution to be passed in support of his position.

Asked by Senator Fulbright what would happen if the United States tried to send an armed convoy through to Berlin and the East Germans or the Soviet army blew up a bridge, the President said they would repair the bridge. Asked by Senator Fulbright "what would we do if they used armed force at that point to prevent us from repairing the bridge", the President replied "that is a \$64,000 question."

Prime Minister Macmillan stated at a news conference that there had been an "alleviation of the situation" in regard to Berlin. "I think it is quite clear to me that what a few months ago had been the danger of something like an ultimatum is now thrown upon the table as a matter for negotiation."

8 March Premier Khrushchev pledged to work for the ending of the cold war if the Western Powers agreed to withdraw from West Berlin. He said in Berlin that a peace treaty must be concluded with Germany and the occupation of Berlin must be ended.

9 March Following the meeting between Mr. Macmillan and President de Gaulle it was reported that the British Government's position was fundamentally opposed to the idea of disengagement, or the mutual withdrawal of armed forces from an agreed area. What was seen as worth further study was a limitation of forces and arms in a specified area to take "some of the sting" out of the military confrontation. In the British view the area so thinned out should not coincide with any national boundary since it was desired to avoid any suggestion of arms limitation or neutralization on a national basis. This point of view was reportedly tailored to counter German fears that any form of disengagement or arms limitation would entail discrimination against Germany.

[For Premier Khrushchev's statement and President Eisenhower's comment on four power occupation of West Berlin, see PSCA/DAG/98, p. 11.]

10 March Senator Fulbright said he thought the West should suggest four power occupation of all Berlin.

Following meetings between British and French leaders, reports from Paris summarized the French view as being the same as the German view with respect to the thinning out of forces in Europe. Such a thinning out of forces would be desirable to the French and Germans, only if it were based on real progress toward a political settlement of the issue of German reunification. Otherwise, the French experts reportedly hold, relaxation of military tension would simply be a step toward recognition and consecration of the status quo of a divided Germany. It was further reported that it would not be possible to set up a NATO shield West of the Rhine instead of in West Germany because of consequent diminution of the military "hinterland".

11 March For relevant extracts of USSR-East German Communiqué of 11 March, see PSCA/DAG/98, pp. 7, 12, 13 and 22/.

For relevant statements by President Eisenhower at his press conference, especially with regard to ground war in Europe, see PSCA/DAG/98, p. 18/.

12 March Senator Hubert Humphrey in a letter to President Eisenhower urged that the government make two concessions to the Soviet Union in an effort to salvage the nuclear tests negotiations in Geneva. One concession would give the West and the East two votes each on a proposed 7 nation control commission, and the other would limit the number of annual "on site" inspections.

It was reported from Bonn that Chancellor Adenauer restated to Prime Minister Macmillan, West Germany's opposition to any reduction of allied forces in Central Europe, except within a general disarmament agreement.

13 March It was reported from London that the British Government expected that a foreign ministers conference, even if unsuccessful would be followed by a meeting of heads of government. A qualified source was reported as saying a failure of a ministerial meeting would make mandatory a heads of government meeting to attempt to avoid further deterioration of the world situation.

A Spokesman for Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer stated in Bonn that there was full agreement between the two on Berlin, the German question and European security. There was also agreement on a thinning out of military strength in some sufficiently large controlled and inspected area as a first phase towards general disarmament. The German spokesman said that this would have to include Soviet territory and would be undertaken only if there were corresponding agreements on political disputes between East and West.

Dr. Willard P. Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission declared in a scientific paper that in the period September 30, 1958 to October 25, 1958, the Soviet Union, by exploding 14 nuclear weapons, virtually doubled the amount of radioactive debris in the earth's atmosphere. He further reported that there was scientific belief that this "tremendous" amount of radioactive material would fall to the earth at an extremely rapid rate and could result in a sharp increase of strontium 90. He observed that underground testing would "greatly reduce worldwide fallout."

14 March

In a report on his talks with Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Ollenhauer said he was convinced the Soviet Union would not force the Berlin crisis to a war.

It was reported from East Germany that officials here were "noticeably unenthusiastic" about the omission from the final USSR - East German communique of a promise of a separate treaty. On the other hand, observers noted repeated references by Mr. Khrushchev of reassurance that the possibility of ending the Communist regime in Germany was not negotiable.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, told a Senate Committee that the West was capable of waging and winning prolonged conventional ground warfare in Central Europe as long as Soviet forces were not committed.

15 March

It was reported from Washington that the State Department did not like the emphasis on possible withdrawal or reduction of East and West forces, that resulted from Mr. Macmillan's trip to Moscow. But officials emphasized that the U.S. was willing to talk about disengagement if that meant mutual and progressive thinning out of forces, accompanied by agreements on disarmament within the framework of a general settlement of the German problem.

Chancellor Adenauer told a political meeting that the West must be ready for a series of summit meetings with the Soviet Union drawn out for several months after the opening session, which probably would take place this year. The Chancellor said he thought the current Soviet political offensive in Europe was the result of the final phase of a struggle over the succession to Stalin. He also thought that the export potential of the common market countries had aroused Soviet "interest in ruling all of Germany."

16 March

In discussing the Berlin situation and the state of the nation's posture on defense, in a nationwide broadcast, President Eisenhower said that, by insisting on a Western withdrawal from Berlin, the Soviet Union had presented the United States with three fundamental choices: (1) to abdicate the U.S. rights and responsibilities; (2) resort to war; and (3) negotiation. The United States could not abdicate its responsibilities because to do so would undermine the "entire system of collective security". As to war, the risk was minimized, he said, if the United States stood firm; "whatever risk and armed conflict may be inherent in the present Berlin situation it was deliberately created by the Soviet rulers". As to negotiations, he stated:

"We will do everything within our power to bring about serious negotiations and to make these negotiations meaningful.

16 March

"The Soviet note of March 2 appears to be a move toward negotiations on an improved basis. We would never negotiate under a dictated time limit or agenda, or on other unreasonable terms. We are, with our allies, however, in view of the changed tone of the Soviet note, concerting a reply to that note.

"It is my hope that thereby all of us can reach agreement with the Soviets on an early meeting at the level of foreign ministers.

"Assuming developments that justify a summer meeting at the summit, the United States would be ready to participate in that further effort."

But the negotiations, he said, could not sacrifice the free people of Berlin. Further the United States could not agree "to any permanent and compulsory division of the German nation", nor for the sake of demonstrating "so-called flexibility", accept any agreement or arrangement which would undermine the security of the United States and its Allies.

It was reported from London that Prime Minister Macmillan was certain of two factors in the current situation (1) Mr. Khrushchev wanted a summit conference and (2) Mr. Khrushchev was the only Soviet official who could negotiate.

In a Senate speech Mr. Fulbright, in an effort to prevent miscalculations on the part of Soviet leaders, declared that the United States was united on the following propositions: (1) no separate or unilateral deals with the Soviet Union; (2) the United States would not be driven from Berlin or from West Germany, but would withdraw from Berlin as a result of agreement on issues larger than Berlin; (3) the United States "cannot accept even tacitly any proposition designed to formalize the subjugation of the once free satellites people." He added, however, that there should be negotiations between the Soviet Union and the West. He thought that it would be useful to agree "to move back an equal distance, however slight the distance", in Germany.

Robert S. Allen reported from Washington that Acting Secretary of State, Christian Herter, was planning to lay the Berlin question before the United Nations "before" the proposed conference of foreign ministers. The United Nations would be asked to reaffirm the West's right of access, and would be expected to help deter the Soviet Union from creating an incident.

17 March

A Tass report on President Eisenhower's speech of 16 March noted that he had expressed his readiness to attend a summit conference this summer, and criticized his assertion that the Soviet Union had threatened to use force in the Berlin crisis. Diplomats in Moscow were reported to have noted the moderate tone of the Soviet reaction.

It was reported from Washington that the Western Powers would include an offer to meet the Soviet Union at a summit conference this summer in their replies to the Soviet note of 2 March. It was noted that the President's statement on 16 March regarding summit negotiations was considerably softer than previous demands for solid guarantees that progress would be made at the summit. The problem for Western diplomats, it was reported, was to find a formula to describe the new position without committing themselves unconditionally to a heads of government meeting. Some observers expected this formula to consist of the suggestion that the foreign ministers meet in May to arrange details of the summit gathering and to seek general agreement on its agenda.

It was reported from Bonn that Mr. Macmillan and Dr. Adenauer had reached a thorough understanding on the following lines:

1. No withdrawal of East and West forces that created a military vacuum between the great Powers in Europe would be acceptable.
2. Zones of limited troops and armaments could be agreed to only if the Soviet Union accepted foolproof inspection and if the establishment of the zones did not change the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union.
3. This precluded any arrangement whereby nuclear armaments would be withdrawn, and therefore precluded the Rapacki plan in which this possibility was inherent.

It was reported from London that according to informed sources, Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd were convinced that the Soviet Union was more interested in perpetuating the division of Germany than forcing the West out of Berlin. Diplomats were said to believe that it might therefore be possible to negotiate a new international status for Berlin to replace the present four-Power occupation. At an East-West Conference, it was speculated by the same sources, Soviet objectives would include the following: Acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe; recognition of East Germany with East Berlin as its capital; prohibition of nuclear weapons for West Germany; cessation of Western intelligence activities in Berlin; and cessation of the flow of refugees through West Berlin. In return, the Soviet Union might agree to guarantee Western communications with Berlin through East German territory.

Informed sources were reported as saying that this package would not be acceptable to the West, but they felt that the West might offer to negotiate a new international status which might be the political side of a twofold agreement, the other being a limitation and control of military forces in Central Europe.

It was reported from Paris that French representatives in the Western working group on Germany had strong reservations regarding the drafting of an all-German peace treaty as a step toward unification. It was reported, however, that France was clearly running against the prevailing current. The majority view, reportedly, was that some sort of temporary recognition of the status quo in Germany with suitable assurances to both sides against its violent disturbance, was the best that could be hoped for from an East-West conference. According to this view, the conclusion was that some sort of confederation of the two Germanys was an inevitable first step that would result from any confrontation of the maximum demands of both sides, i.e. Western insistence on the Geneva formula of free elections, and Russian action on a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

It was reported from Bonn that the foreign ministers of the four Western Powers would meet in Washington on March 31 and April 1 in connexion with a NATO meeting, and would consider a draft of principles for an all-German peace treaty. It was further reported that no detailed treaty would be drawn up until after the foreign ministers decided whether to counter the Soviet peace treaty proposal with one of their own. The work on the peace treaty was proceeding on the assumption that the West should not allow the question of the agenda prevent an East-West foreign ministers conference.

16 March

James Reston reported from Washington that according to officials the United States is prepared to give serious consideration to any new disposition of forces or weapons in Europe, provided these do not alter the existing balance of power. The Administration was said to be clear as to what it would not do over Germany and Berlin: (1) it would not agree to any reduction or relocation of Western Forces that would jeopardize the will to resist in Berlin and West Germany; (2) it would not negotiate any arrangement that leaves the NATO troops without atomic weapons; and (3) it would not risk a war over such technicalities as the time of free elections in all of Germany, or the stamping of allied convoy papers by East Germany.

It was reported from Washington that officials there wished to correct the impression that the Western Powers had settled on a unified policy. Most of the basic matters remained unsettled, it was said. These include policies on thinning out of forces; a German Peace Treaty; a Security pact for Europe; and even how to cope with a variety of contingencies when and if the Soviet Union turns over control over access to the East Germans.

18 March

It was reported from Ottawa that the Canadian Government supported Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestions aimed at lowering the political tensions over Berlin by negotiating with the Soviet Union, and to lower the military tensions in Europe by a freezing of armaments in a limited area of Central Europe under inspection and control. Further it was reported that Mr. Macmillan did not know the intentions of the Soviet Union, but had deduced them from his conversations with Mr. Khrushchev.

The United States Army announced that it would send another Redstone missile group to Germany early next month. The announcement said the move was planned "some time ago."

Two Social Democratic leaders of West Germany, Dr. Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler said that Mr. Khrushchev told them during their visit to Moscow that: "no one wants to unify Germany"; the disengagement of East and West forces in Germany would not lead to unification, at least "not in the immediate future"; "nothing will happen to Berlin so long as no peace treaty has been concluded", but with the conclusion of the peace treaty Berlin would be "a city of the German Democratic Republic"; the Soviet Union would not interfere in any territory from which foreign troops were withdrawn by agreement. The two Social Democratic leaders said they were convinced that Mr. Khrushchev would go ahead with a separate peace treaty for East Germany if negotiations for a peace treaty with all of Germany failed.

The United States disclosed that last September it exploded three atomic bombs more than 300 miles above the South Atlantic, as a result of which a thin curtain of radiation was drawn around the earth for a period whose duration is still secret. The results of the detonation were monitored by Explorer IV, a satellite launched as part of the IGY Programme.

From the military point of view the knowledge gained, though inconclusive and subject to varying interpretations, appeared to have triple significance. 1) Such high altitude explosions might blank out early warning and tracking radars before a full scale attack of ballistic missiles. 2) They might interrupt normal communications. 3) They might lead to information regarding the possibility of a defensive radiation shield against attacking ballistic missiles.

As to political implications, it was assumed that the high altitude tests (known as Project Argus) were undetected. This was considered an additional argument in favour of the view that no monitoring system could possibly detect all test violations. It was pointed out that in view of the present stalemate on suspension of nuclear weapons tests further explosions in space would raise political problems. Some scientists want such experiments to be allowed under an agreement, if only by the unanimous consent of all concerned.

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It was reported from Washington that officials indicated that the United States would probably propose at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests (which was recessed until 13 April) that earth satellites be included in any international inspection system, particularly for the detection of explosions in space. As seen by administration officials, Project Argus had these implications for test negotiations:

1. Doubts had been removed about the possibility of setting off atomic explosions in outer space, which was one of the reasons for the omission of relevant provisions in the Experts Report of 1958.
2. The technical feasibility of detecting such explosions through the use of satellites and other instruments had been proved.

State Department officials emphasized that the United States intended to continue the Geneva negotiations indefinitely, observing that the information about Project Argus had been known to policy makers last fall.

At a Moscow press conference Premier Khrushchev said that he accepted in advance the expected Western proposal to convene a foreign ministers conference on May 11. However, he insisted that the meeting be confined to discussion on the German peace treaty and the future of West Berlin, and that it be followed by a summit conference.

He said the Soviet Union recognized the right of the Western Powers to keep forces in West Berlin until a peace treaty was signed; such a treaty, however, would abolish those rights. Mr. Khrushchev also said that the Soviet Union would not unilaterally withdraw its troops from East Germany or reduce their strength once a peace treaty was signed. That, he said, would have to be arranged by negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In a prepared statement Mr. Khrushchev emphasized his readiness to negotiate, and examine any "sensible proposals" the West would make.

While insisting that the six months deadline was not an ultimatum, he added that, if there was no reply by the end of May or if the Soviet proposals were rejected, then he would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

It was reported from East Germany that Premier Khrushchev's press conference statement about the legal right of the Western Allies to be in Berlin had been omitted from East German press reports. The East German position had been that the Allies had lost all rights by having broken wartime agreements.

The Social Democratic Party of West Germany announced a plan for the solution of the German problem calling for a phased programme of tackling first military aspects and then political problems. The military solution

19 March

calls for a zone in Central Europe in which both conventional and nuclear armaments would be limited and controlled, and eventually be free of all foreign troops and nuclear weapons. The zone would at first embrace East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The end result would be the establishment of a European security system, the withdrawal of West Germany from NATO and of the four Communist states from the Warsaw pact. The inviolability of the zone would be guaranteed by all interested states including the United States and the Soviet Union.

The present status of Berlin would be maintained "until regulation of the German question."

The political solution was divided into three phases:

First phase: The four powers with the aid of the Germanys would establish an all-German conference on the basis of parity. The conference would be advised of all legislative action by the East German and West German parliaments and would express its views on each piece of legislation. An all-German Court would be appointed by the Conference to "safeguard uniform interpretation of human rights and basic freedom".

Second phase: An all-German parliamentary council would be elected made up of an equal number of deputies from West and East Germany, with competence in the fields of communications and national production. Either German Government could contest laws adopted by the council and a 2/3 vote in the Council would be required to overrule protests.

Third and final phase: The parliamentary council would prepare basic legislation for all of Germany, particularly on financial matters, to reconcile conflicts in existing systems. If either Government rejects a law, a plebiscite may be repeated after one year and its results would be binding. The parliamentary council would be authorized to issue a law on the election of the constituent assembly at any time that a 2/3 majority favoured such a law. After the constitution came into force "general free and secret elections" would be held for an all-German parliament and government.

In an article in the April issue of Foreign Affairs, Paul Henri Spaak Secretary General of NATO declared that agreement with the Soviet Union on Germany is impossible "in the present state of affairs." Warning against appeasement, he wrote: "We must not allow Berlin to become the first act of a tragedy whose final act is a third world war."