

**Laos 1959-1961 -
correspondence, official
documents, press clippings,
chrono...**

HS L 179:87



Dag Hammarskjöld's samul.

Laos - 1959

10 - 21 Nov.

D. H.'s trip to Laos

U. N. Press Releases and cables (chronologic.)

2 Memoranda by D. H.

27.

? Nov. 59

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

The Government of Laos has extended to me an invitation to visit Vientiane in the near future. In considering this invitation, I have taken into account my obligations under the Charter and all the information at present available regarding the difficulties facing Laos.

I have concluded that it is highly desirable that I avail myself of this opportunity to get, at first hand, as complete a picture as possible of conditions and developments in Laos of relevance from the point of view of the Secretary-General with his special duties.

I have therefore decided to go to Laos within the next few days for a short visit in order to inform myself about the present problems of the country. Were my experiences to indicate that such an arrangement would be warranted - and this seems probable - I would, with the consent of the Government, ^{temporarily} station a personal representative in Vientiane through whom I could maintain contact after my departure. The task of this representative would be to report to me, as appropriate, on such further developments and conditions as might be of importance in the light of the obligations of the Secretary-General. He would also transmit messages and information which the authorities in Laos wish to send to the Secretary-General, as well as messages from the Secretary-General to the Government. Other tasks, if any, would have to be decided upon by the Secretary-General within the strict limits of his authority.

On my return to New York, it would be my intention to report to the Security Council on arrangements of the kind indicated, with the comments which I might find necessary.

The proposed visit, obviously, would be inadvisable if the Security Council were to take up the report of the Sub-committee regarding Laos before I could return to Headquarters. A condition for my journey, therefore, would be that no Member would wish to request that the Council be convened for that purpose until I had had an opportunity to report on my visit. Thereafter, the question of a meeting of the Council, naturally, would have to be considered in the light of the circumstances then prevailing.

My visit would have no implications as regards the Geneva Agreement, its validity or consequences. It may also be noted that an individual stationed in Vientiane as my personal representative would be under the exclusive authority of the Secretary-General; constitutionally, he would, thus, be in a position different from the one held by ^{United Nations ~~missions~~ missions,} for example, the Special Representative stationed in Amman under a resolution approved by the General Assembly, or the Observation Group in Lebanon the mandate of which had been decided by the Security Council. The legal basis for a decision to leave a personal representative in Laos [?] would be the general responsibilities of the Secretary-General regarding developments which may threaten peace and security, combined with his administrative authority under the Charter.

I, apart from the consent of the government of Laos,

S R III - 3 - Laos II Sf.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

27 November 1959

12 November 1959

Arrival in Vientiane late afternoon. Met by Phoui and Khampan. We did not discuss any substance that evening.

13 November 1959

Together with Engers I paid a call in the morning on Phou in his home (and office). Khampan was present. I said to Phoui that we had an immediate problem: what should be done now, once the Sub-committee phase was over? However, we also had a long-term problem into which I felt that we should go during my visit. To this long-term problem I counted also, in a sense, the question of the trial.

Regarding the short-term problem I could best approach the matter by showing them the draft of a press release which I had dictated the previous night and which in a condensed form set out both what I intended to do and how I intended to present it, subject, of course, to their approval.

Phoui was agreed with the general plan for discussions. He had no observations on my immediate plans or on the text of the press release, but was, as usual, rather inarticulate. Khampan gave a vague impression of disappointment but had only one proposal: that the last paragraph should be put first.

After ~~the~~ a quick exchange in Lao between Phoui and Khampan, Phoui said that they would have to consult the Cabinet and would give me its reaction before the end of the day.

Later in the morning I saw the King alone. He stressed the non-ideological character of the recent conflict. In his view, the fact that the UN had got seized of the ~~problem~~ problem explained the "miracle" of early September: there was, according to him, a complete line-up, military, on both sides (both on the Vietmin-Lao border and on the Vietmin-Vietnam border). Thus, it was a question of who might

shoot first. Diem would have gone forward the very moment something happened on the Lao frontier. The King added: I have gone beyond the point ⁱⁿ of my experience where I attach importance to what they say about who carries the responsibility (in the context the significance was the obvious one, that he would not have hesitated to start). Now, however, he was anxious that what was done would be cut loose from their complaint, and represent a new start. The complaint was ~~timed~~ ^{tied} to a given historical situation which was a thing of the past and which, he hoped, would not be repeated. It was not good, through actions taken now, to revive or freeze the past. Talking about what had to be done, he emphasised the economic plight and the lack of integration.

I had the impression that the King had been briefed by Phoui on the line of my thinking, as what he said somehow presented a perfect framework for what I wanted to bring up. When I did so the King showed ~~enthusiasm~~ and said that this corresponded entirely to his own thinking, adding "et du point de vue politique, je trouve ce que vous proposez d'une très grande finesse", thus showing his complete awareness of the political ["]windfall["] in the form of a UN presence in an unassailable form.

Late in the afternoon, Khampan came to inform me that the Cabinet had "unanimously" approved my proposal of the text, wishing, however, to add the words "in an appropriate form", which I accepted and which are to be found in the published text. Instinctively, I felt that the stand of the Government had been strongly influenced by the King, and later hints in various conversations seemed to lend some support to this view.

The same afternoon I saw Amb. Smith. He let me read his most recent instructions which reflected strongly ^a ~~the~~ beginning convergence of Washington's views with ~~my~~ mine. I said that, apart from the nuances, I was on the whole agreed with the present Washington line. He ~~claims~~ ^{ed} that it was his line since more

than a year ago, for which, however, he had not found any support until now. In the ~~light~~^{rest} of the talk he was mostly interested in ~~in~~ the constitutional manoeuvring around the prolongation of the mandate of the Assembly on which he volunteered various procedural innovations.

In the evening Phoui had his official dinner with the Cabinet, with the exchange of speeches on neutrality. I had seen the text of his speech before the dinner, but I had had no time to write the reply. Without using some notes I had jotted down, I therefore replied off the cuff and dictated what I said at the dinner afterwards.

14 November 1959

I had a long joint session with Phoui and Khampan, where the main point I brought home was that the value of what we had agreed upon would depend entirely on what kind of policy Laos pursued in other respects. Especially, I referred to the trial, to the Commission and to the elections, saying that I felt convinced that the pressure on the border would be largely determined by the stand taken on these issues. However, apart from this linking of the three points of the triangle - the new UN line, the three specific questions mentioned, and the border pressure - I did not go into the matter, intending to leave, for ~~the~~ a later stage, a more detailed discussion of the three specific questions, as the time did not seem ripe for me to expound my own views until the Laotians had mellowed into inviting me to express such views.

In reply to what I said, Phoui gave a long exposé of their stand in various respects, which, however, did not add anything to what I already knew.

The same morning I saw the French Ambassador, Gassouin, and the British Ambassador Lincoln. Nothing of any great interest emerged.

The "remnants" of the Sub-committee had left early in the morning, unwept also by the Laotians.

Saturday lunch and afternoon were to a very large extent spent with Khampan in a warming-up exercise without substantive interest.

15 November 1959

Thao Luang

The day was in its entirety taken up by the ~~T~~... festival. It was indirectly surprisingly useful as it led to an increasingly relaxed relationship between Phoui and myself, apparent especially at an improvised Government dinner ~~in~~ at the Pagoda in the evening.

16 November 1959

At 12.30 the King had a luncheon ~~at~~ which only Phoui, Khampan, I and Engers attended. It was a charming exercise marked by the King's very high culture. During the first hour the discussion turned mostly around the economic and social situation in Laos. Thereafter I got an opening which made it possible to devote the last part of the lunch, which lasted some three hours, to an 18th century discussion of the key problems of the Lao policy.

On the first point the King developed his views about the ~~decent~~ descent of the Lao tribes in the Mekong Valley pressing back an ethnologically different population to the mountains. His phrase for the present state of affairs was that those foreign racial elements (in fact, probably as numerous as the Laotians) just had got tired of being ruled by the ~~late~~ Laotians, and that thus the "rebellion" was an outbreak of tendencies which I had had a chance to register both in other places in Asia and in Africa. He described the customs of the Meo people and related tribes, using the expression that there was, of course, no doubt that conditions had led to a de facto discrimination against these other racial elements. In this context, the King outlined his ideas about a settlement of the tribes and a re-conditioning of their lives to rice cultivation on the plentiful land available on the plain.

Regarding relations to Vietmin, he applied a long perspective, taking about the century-old urge of the people of the plain to get down to the sea and of the people at the sea to get into the plain. Again, he stressed that both the "rebellion" and the part of the Vietmin in it, was basically not of an ideological character, although recently it had been given ideological overtones. He made some rather typical references to Scandinavian history, saying that similar conflicts ~~from~~^{from} in the Middle Ages ~~under~~^{up to} Charles XII in Sweden had been of a tragic category, while the same concept could not be ~~implied~~^{applied} to the strifes within the Indo-chinese world.

After a transition involving also a declaration of love for classical French diplomacy, ^(Philippe Serthelin) etc, he noted that nowadays one had to deal only with "des inspecteurs de finances". He said that it seemed to him that I ~~seem~~^{appeared} to have a certain preference for techniques of the 18th century, after which we both happily embarked on an intense discussion of the acute problems of Laos without ever mentioning them by name. The main theses from my side in that discussion was, that the ~~main~~^{predominant} interest for Laos must be to act in all respects in such a way that it would have an unambiguous support of their friends, without the split minds which would follow, were Laos externally or internally to seek solutions or apply methods which were less than acceptable to the Western ~~mind~~^{democratic thinking}. I felt that this was the main guiding principle and much more important than the desirability of avoiding actions which might be used by the other side as excuses for this or that kind of intervention. (Si le loup veut manger, il trouve toujours des arguments); this, of course did not mean that I did not have the strongest views as to the desirability of avoiding anything which would be clearly provoking, the worst of all being actions which would be provocative and, at the same time, doubtful as to their character in the light of Western standards.

During this long discussion which ^u clicked beautifully, Phoui and Khampan did not say one word, but the King drove home the points to them with the most

uninhibited face-making. Engers seemed to have had a most wonderful time.

After the meal I felt that the road was open to the right kind of talk with Phoui, and, not unexpectedly, the morning of the next day Khampan asked me what was "my frank and sincere personal view on the trial".

17 November 1959

The question Khampan thus put to me was the only reference to the reason for my visit (in the course of Tuesday). He put it to me as an aside in the course of ^a ~~the~~ talk about other matters. Until late in the afternoon we were all invited together with Phoui and Khampan and the Minister of Finance up to a couple of villages to which we went with the only helicopter which had so far arrived, using the only ^(French) pilot which they so far had. They, obviously, were very anxious to show off this treasure, the modest range ~~of which~~ and the modest capacity of which the trip amply demonstrated. Again, the social contact with Phoui proved very useful on the psychological level. He was happy as a school-boy, got more and more relaxed and more and more simple in his contact with me.

Soon after our return Tuomoja and U Nyun arrived. They were together with Engers, Bill and me invited for dinner with Khampan, together with the Minister of Finance. There was no shop talk during that dinner.

18 November 1959

I had arranged for a two hour session with Phoui and Khampan in which, this time, I took up and stated my views in as clear-cut a way as possible on the Commission, the trial and the elections. I got across what I wanted to say without any emotional reactions. The points I made were roughly as follows:

a) The Commission.

Although I had felt bound to act on and defend their stand on the Commission, this had been done with the kind of loyalty a lawyer shows to his client, with mental reservations as to the strength of their case. ^A ~~The~~ Lawyer could argue, ^{their case} but

a lawyer could also argue the opposite case, and with a free choice I would have found it easier to argue the opposite case. The weakness of their stand was that the Commission had to supervise the implementation of the Geneva Agreement and that, therefore, it could be said that whatever steps had been taken for implementation, the Commission had to function as long as those steps had not succeeded. It was not a very good point to maintain that, once the formal decision had been taken on integration, the question was ~~not~~ ^{and the tasks of DCC completed} solved, even though later on the agreement had broken down; this was a rather formal stand in what was basically a purely political context.

Phoui repeated their well-known argumentation, but added that Sisouk had proposed from New York that the Commission come back symbolically for four or five days. This was unacceptable, but they might consider a return of the Commission if they could trust the objectivity and neutrality of the Indian delegate. I said that I intended to take this matter up in some form with Nehru, naturally without in any way involving Phoui.

(S) seen -
ned from
S. in
New York
that this
idea had
been launched
by (Hemson)

Summing up our exchange of views on the Commission, I said that my practical conclusion was that the Government of Laos should not make any ^{further} public statements on the Commission, if they could avoid to do so, and that further they should, also in other respects, in their private considerations, keep the road open to ^a renew ^{ed} contact with the Commission.

b) The Trial

I said that it was my firm personal conviction that as a minimum they should not go any further in the direction of ^a the trial. As an optimum they should set S. free. I was aware of how this latter line of action was ~~tried~~ ^{tried} up with the question of the Assembly.

Phoui said that he was animated by his scare of communism. Setting S. free would mean to give him a chance to rally the rebellion^{us} forces and to make pernicious propaganda. If the rebellion at present was disorganised and broken, it was in the main because of the lack of leadership. "S. is very dangerous. As opposition leader he rallied his supporters in the gallery of the Assembly and then he made a violent speech applauded by them". I hinted that that was not unknown in parliamentary systems and rarely was considered a crime. My feeling was, however, that I had made a solid impression on them regarding the desirability regarding avoiding further noises on this point.

c) The Assembly - elections

I could see that they felt that^{under prevailing conditions,} elections must be postponed one year by an extension of mandates. I felt, however, that a decision to this effect must be taken in^a clearly constitutional forms^{ing}, or in forms closely conform^{ing} to the spirit of the constitution which I had not read. I ~~thought~~ guessed that the preferable method would be that the Assembly itself decide on the prolongation of its mandate from 4 to 5 years, thus^{unburdening} ~~making~~ the King and Cabinet from the responsibility for^t his formal departure from the written constitution. If the Assembly were convened for this purpose, I knew that it would automatically have to set S. free. Thus, there seemed to be two ways to go about ~~this~~ a solution, provided that they consider^{ed} prolongation unavoidable. Either they could set the Prince free and then convene the Assembly, or they could convene the Assembly and accept the legal consequence that, in these circumstances, the Prince had to be set free. With the limited knowledge I had of the situation, the latter line seemed to me the tactically preferable one.

Regarding all these observations which, strictly speaking, were questions of domestic policy, I said that I expressed my views only because they had asked me to do so. I did not want to give any advice and had no sufficient basis for advice, but I felt that I could meet their demand in ~~some~~ the way I did, because, in the intimate cooperation established, it was ~~being~~ but right and fair that they had on record my personal views on all questions of direct interest to them.

In the afternoon, the Foreign Office had a reception including also the ambassadors. It emerged during that reception that the poor boys had been assailed regarding the elections and the trial also by the British and US ambassadors the very same day, an unplanned and most unfortunate coincidence. The US Ambassador showed off as ~~very fussy and~~ ^{somewhat over-keen,} having gone into details of legal and constitutional manoeuvring, practically, it seems, writing the text of their decisions for them. The evening was marked by a dinner given by the P.M. for me with the diplomatic corps invited. An exchange of speeches at the dinner was insignificant.

~~19 November 1959~~

19 November 1959

At the ~~following~~ fare-well audience with the King, to which I brought Tuomioja in order to introduce him, the King made only two points of significance ^{regarding previous discussion} ~~of~~ ^{talks}. Although, of course, he must have been fully briefed on my ~~discussion~~ of the 18th, ^{he} demonstrated very clearly his distrust of the Indians which, by the way, included Nehru. On the other hand, he emphasised, in the form I remembered ^e from my visit in March, that he considered the return of the Commission impossible to reconcile with the full ~~exercise~~ sovereignty of the country. He did not mention the trial or the elections.

DCC
would be,

In reply to my argument regarding the Commission, that it would be ~~very~~ ^{in which it is valuable} unwise to say "never", as ^{a/} the situation might arise ~~as it was legal~~ in order to ~~assist~~, at least symbolically, assist in the creation ~~between~~ of a direct link between Hanoi and Vientiane, he gave the new and rather surprising information that he had been, and was, in frequent correspondence with President Ho Chi Minh. When I mentioned Minh's cable at the accession of the throne, he smiled and said that this was only one communication in a long chain. He added that Minh's stand was perfectly clear. Laos he regarded as "un pays ami". He would be willing to open negotiations any time regarding outstanding problems with delegates from Laos. However, the negotiations would have to be conducted on the basis of ~~the~~ ^{the} status quo as established (including occupation of the small territory of last winter). Further, he made it clear that he objected ^{to} against the King's present Cabinet as "anti-populaire". The King made the obvious comments that, of course, he could not accept negotiations on those two assumptions, implying that, otherwise, he might, (and that he did not see any reason for a role for the Commission or any outside party).

It was agreed that Tuomioja, in due time, would see the King personally for a progress report.

, as Bangkok,

In the evening I managed to put in a couple of hours with Khoman. He said emphatically that he had been very happy with the formulas worked out in Vientiane. He felt that they represented the best and, indeed, ~~that~~ all the UN could usefully do at the moment. This did not mean that it would be sufficient to avert new serious troubles, but if such troubles arose, they would be caused by factors outside our control and could not be countered by any other means short of ~~other~~ solid military ~~action~~ intervention. As such an intervention was out of the question for the time being, we must play on the hope that what I had started would prove sufficient.

He had no doubt about the restraining influence of Mosk~~ow~~^e, but said that he felt that Peking was not dependent on Mosk~~ow~~^e. Peking was facing two alternatives if they wanted to act in Laos. Either they could ~~go~~^g in without meeting US resistance; if so, their military forces were quite sufficient for an occupation of the whole country. Or else, the US got involved, and if so, the US would force the hand of the Russians. The ~~confusion~~^{conclusion}, obviously, was that Russia had ~~no~~^{real or decisive} say in the matter. He shared, however, my feeling that the quiet which had prevailed for the last few months was significant and seemed to indicate that ~~people~~^{Peking} had not more far-reaching plans for the moment. We agreed that several factors must have contributed to the, at least temporary, pacification: pressure from Mosk~~ow~~ in view of the Summit; the involvement of the UN (irrespective of the "presence"); the fact that Laos, at best, would be a very heavy burden to carry for Vietmin, because of its disintegration and economically weak situation; and, perhaps, an unwillingness to undercut the new King before knowing what could be achieved with him.

UNITED NATIONS
Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/868
8 November 1959

SECRETARY-GENERAL ACCEPTS INVITATION FROM GOVERNMENT OF LAOS

As already indicated by a United Nations spokesman, the possibility of a visit to Laos, in response to an invitation from the Government, has been under consideration by the Secretary-General for several weeks.

Taking into account his duties under the Charter and all the information at present available regarding the difficulties facing Laos, the Secretary-General has decided to accept the invitation. His visit would aim at providing him with independent and full personal knowledge of the problem of which the United Nations has become seized through the appeal from the Government of Laos. Thus, in its purpose, it is strictly limited to the fulfilment of duties incumbent upon the Secretary-General under the Charter, and has no implications as regards the internal situation in Laos, the external relations of that country, or the arrangements agreed upon in Geneva in 1954.

The Secretary-General intends to leave for Laos on Tuesday, 10 November and will return to New York towards the end of the following week.

He will be accompanied by his personal aide, Mr. William Ranallo.

* *** *

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H E MR THANAT KHOMAN
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MANTANGDES BANGKOK

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR VERY KIND INVITATION TO VISIT YOU IN
BANGKOK. I SHALL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO VIENTIANE BUT MAY BE ABLE TO SE
YOU
ON MY WAY BACK TO NEW YORK AROUND 20 NOVEMBER STOP THEN I MAY
P2/47
POSSIBLY STAY OVERNIGHT IN BANGKOK STOP I SHALL KEEP IN TOUCH
WITH YOU REGARDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF THIS PART OF TRAVEL
ARRANGEMENTS STOP I AM GLAD YOU WERE PLEASED WITH YOUR VISIT
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WARM REGARDS

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

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P2/13

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UNATIONS NEWYORK

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P2

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P3

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P5

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P6/43

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P1/49

UNATIONS NY

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P2/18

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UNATIONS NY

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P2

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NONT PAS DE RESULTATS SPECTACULAIRES CMA CETTE VISITE NEANMOINS
PERMIS DE DEGAGER DES ELEMENTS NOUVEAUX DANS LA SITUATION DU
PAYS ET LE PROBLEME LAO STOP LA FERME VOLONTE DU SECRETAIRE
GENERAL DE METTRE DESORMAIS LE ROYAUME LAO

P3

SOUS LA PROTECTION DE LONU S'EST MANIFESTEE PAR L'ENVOI A VIENTIANE
DU SOUS COMITE D'ENQUETE EN SEPTEMBRE DERNIER CMA LE DEUXIEME VOYAGE
DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL A VIENTIANE CMA ACCOMPLIE CONTRE LE CRE DES
RUSSIS CMA ET L'INSTALLATION D'UNE MISSION ECONOMIQUE DE LONU
ICI CMA MISSION QUI POURRAIT A SON TOUR

PREPARER L'ENVOI AU LAOS D'UN NOUVEL ORGANISME DES NATIONS UNIES

STOP TOUTES CES DECISIONS SEMBLANT TEMOIGNER DE LA VOLONTE DELIBERE
DE LA PART DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE NE PAS ABANDONNER LE LAOS
QUIL ADVISENT ET DE LE SUBQUOTE PRENDRE EN

CHARGE UNSUBQUOTE CMA EN RISQUANT DANS CETTE ACTION CMA PARFOIS
P3

HARDIE CMA SA REPUTATION PERSONNELLE PARS LA VISITE DE MONSIEUR
HAMMARSKJOELD A AUSSI FOURNI LOCCASION AUX DIRIGEANTS DU GOUVERNE-
MENT ROYAL DE REITERER LEUR DESIRE DE POURSUIVRE LEUR POLITIQUE
DE NEUTRALITE STOP SES DERNIERS CEPENDANT ONT PRIS SOIN DE PRECISER
QUE LEUR NEUTRALITE EST PLUTOT SUBQUOTE MILITAIRE UNSUBQUOTE
QUIDEOLOGIQUE CMA DANS

P6/38

LE SENS QUE LE LAOS N'ADHERERAIT A AUCUN PACTE MILITAIRE CMA MAIS
NE SAURAIT NON PLUS ADMETTRE AU LAOS L'IMPLANTATION DU COMMUNISME
QUI SERAIT UN ELEMENT DESTRUCTIF DES CROYANCES ET DE LA CIVILI-
SATION MILLENAIRE DU ROYAUME UNQUOTE END

CFM 226

UNITED NATIONS
JAN 20 11:01
TELEGRAM UNIT

Confirmation

*no message
sent*

GLO3 S NEWYORK 93 18 1710EDT UNGOVT

UNATIONS

VIENTIANE (LAOS)

99 THIS MESSAGE BEING SENT BY NETWORK AND COMMERCIALY UNDER
SAME NUMBER STOP IMMEDIATE FOR SECRETARY GENERAL STOP YESTERDAY
IN VOTE SECURITY COUNCIL POLAND LED ON FIVE BALLOTS AND TIED
ON ONE STOP MUNRO HAS SUBMITTED QUESTION AS ADDITIONAL ITEM
STOP GENERAL COMMITTEE WILL MEET TOMORROW STOP HAVE

P2/43

ASKED SECRETARIAT TO REMAIN STRICTLY ALOOF FROM THIS MATTER
WHICH IS BEING BADLY HANDLED AND WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS DEBATE
STOP FIFTH COMMITTEE HAS JUST APPROVED THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
FOR OPEX STOP JUST RECEIVED WORD LESLIE CARVER KILLED IN AUTO
ACCIDENT BEIRUT

CORDIER

CFM 99 OPEX

PSE ACK

R 3 RD 514PM TU

UNITED NATIONS

1959 NOV 10 PM 5:15

TELEGRAPH UNIT

Platz

INFO COPY

NOV 19 1959

FILE NO.

ACTION

TO

Cordier

UNITED NATIONS

A SSS VIENTIANE 63 19 0243

UNATIONS NY

217

CORDIER FROM SECGEN STOP REYOUR 99 STOP SHOCKED AND GRIEVED
BY NEWS OF LESLIE CARVER STOP PLEASE TRANSMIT ON MY BEHALF
CONDOLENCES FAMILY WITH APPROPRIATE STRONG WORDS OF PRAISE
FOR HIS CONTRIBUTION STOP PARA OTHER POINTS NOTED CMA BUT
TIME MARGIN SUCH THAT ANY COMMENTS FROM ME WOULD BE USELESS +

CFM 217 99 +

54 ECAFE BANGKOK 744 19 1315Z

PRESS

OMNIPRESS NEWYORK

UNAFE 790 BERRY FROM ORTIZ BANGKOK NOVEMBER NINETEEN UNATIONS
SEC GEN HAMMARSKJOLD TODAY OFFICIALLY OPENED DASH BY CUTTING
TRADITIONAL RIBBON UNDASH OFFICES OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF MEKONG
COORDINATION COMMITTEE IN BANGKOK PARA DURING CEREMONY PREMISES
WERE PRESENTED TO MEKONG COMMITTEE BY FOREIGN MINISTER THAILAND
THANAT KHOMAN WHO DECLARED

P2

THAT RIVERS HAD TRADITIONALLY BEEN QUOTE AYE SOURCE OF LIFE
UNQUOTE AND WERE NOW BECOMING AS IN CASE OF MEKONG AN EXAMPLE
OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PARA HAMMARSKJOLD EXPRESSED HIS
GRATITUDE TO GOVERNMENT THAILAND ON BEHALF UNATIONS AND SAID
THAT ITS PRESENT GENEROUS GESTURE WAS ADDITIONAL PROOF OF ITS
COOPERATION WITH

P3

WORLD ORGANIZATION PARA HE AGREED WITH THAI FOREIGN MINISTER
THAT RIVERS HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN SOURCE OF LIFE AND ALSO
BE FIRST FORM OF COMMUNICATION AMONG PEOPLE THAT LED TO REGIONAL
AND WORLD COOPERATION PARA HE DECLARED THAT MEKONG RIVER AND
PROJECT FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT HAD NOW BECOME SYMBOL AND UNIFYING

P4

FORCE STOP IT WAS HE FELT AYE MAGNIFICENT EFFORT FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE EXAMPLE TO OTHER REGIONS
STOP UNATIONS PARTICIPATION IN PROJECT WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF
ORGANIZATIONS WORK IN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT SOME HAD SAID
COULD NOT BE DONE PARA SAID QUOTE UNATIONS HAS AYE

P5

HISTORY OF DOING THINGS THAT JUST CANNOT BE DONE UNQUOTE STOP

ORGANIZATIONS WORK IN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT SOME HAD SAID
COULD NOT BE DONE PARA SAID QUOTE UNATIONS HAS AYE

P5

HISTORY OF DOING THINGS THAT JUST CANNOT BE DONE UNQUOTE STOP
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION HE CONTINUED SET DOWN MANY TARGETS
SEMICOLON ONE OF THEM WAS TO RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING PEOPLE
EVERYWHERE STOP IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO MOVILIZE OUTSIDE HELP FOR
TH^{OSE} COUNTRIES QUOTE THAN THROUGH THE CHANCE OF

P6

HISTORY HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND UNQUOTE IN THE GENERAL STREAM
OF DEVELOPMENT PARA HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED
THAT UNATIONS EFFORTS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT WERE
REAL PROOF OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS PARA SAID QUOTE REAL PROBLEM OF
OUR TIME IS BASICALLY THAT REPRESENTED BY WORLD POVERTY STOP
THE

P7

GREAT PROBLEM FOR UNATIONS IS PROBLEM OF SOCALLED UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES UNQUOTE PARA IN HIS VIEW THERE WAS NO OTHER EFFORT OF
ORGANIZATION MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED AND IT WAS AYE BASIC ASPECT
OF GENERAL EFFORT FOR BUILDING THE PEACE PARA HAMMARSKJOLD
DECLARED THAT HE WAS HAPPY TO BE PRESENT AT THIS UNIQUE OCCASION
WHEN THAI GOVERNMENT WAS PRESENTING PREMISES OF

P8

MEKONG COORDINATION COMMITTEE PARA SECGEN THEN CUT TRADITIONAL
RIBBON LEADING TO MEKONG OFFICES CMA WHICH ARE SITUATED AT TOP
FLOOR OF SALA SANTITHAM HEADQUARTERS OF UNECAFE PARA EARLIER
IN PRESENTING PREMISES TO DR. CCC HART SCHAAF EXECUTIVE AGENT
OF COMMITTEE FOR COORDINATION OF INVESTIGATION FOR LOWER MEKONG
BASIN FOREIGN MINISTER

P9

THAILAND THANAT KHOMAN WELCOMED SECGEN AND SAID HIS GOVERNMENT
WAS PLEASED THAT BANGKOK WAS SERVING AS HEADQUARTERS OF COMMITTEE
STOP HE HOPED THAT THAI COOPERATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE
SUCCES OF MEKONG PROJECT PARA DECLARED QUOTE TO OUR PEOPLE AS

INDEED TO THE PEOPLES OF THIS REGION CMA RIVERS CMA

P10

OR MOTHER OF WATER AS WE CALL THEM IN THAI COMMA HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED ONE OF SOURCES OF OUR PEOPLES DAILY LIFE AS WELL AS UNIFYING FACTOR WHICH LINKS PEOPLES OF MANY REGIONS OF OUR HOMELAND STOP NOWADAYS WITH SETTING UP OF COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF LOWER MEKONG BASIN

P11

THIS GREAT RIVER OF SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS ACQUIRED ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND BROADER SCOPE BEYOND TRADITIONAL MEANING SINCE THIS PROJECT HAS SUCCEEDED IN UNITING NOT ONLY EFFORTS OF FOUR RIPARIAN COUNTRIES BUT ALSO GENEROUS ASSISTANCE OF MANY NATIONS OUTSIDE REGION UNQUOTE PARA THAI FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT CEREMONY WAS AUSPICIOUS NOT

P12

ONLY DUE TO ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF SECGEN AND OF FOREIGN MINISTER OF LAOS KHAMPA PANYA PARA CEREMONY BEGAN WITH STATEMENT BY EXECSEC ECAFE UNYUN WHO SAID THAT SECGENS PRESENCE GAVE EVENT SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE PARA ADDRESSING SECGEN HE SAID QUOTE IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT

P13

YOU HAVE AYE WEAK SPOT IN YOUR HEART FOR UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR FOR FOUR RIPARIAN COUNTRIES OF MEKONG UNQUOTE PARA UNYUN SAID HE CONSIDERED MEKONG PROJECT AYE UNIQUE EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ACTION IN PROMOTING PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES STOP IT WAS FIRST COOPERATION AMONG FOUR

P14

RIPARIANS AND SECONDLY IT WAS BROADER COOPERATION THROUGH GENEROUS ASSISTANCE OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REGION STOQ IT ALSO REPRESENTED COOPERATION BY UNATIONS CMA SPECIAL FUND CMA TAO AND SEVERAL SPECIALIZED AGENCIES PARA HE DECLARED QUOTE WE NEED MORE PROJECTS LIKE THIS

P15/44

IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD STOP PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL

PARA ADDRESSING SECGEN HE SAID QUOTE IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT

P13

YOU HAVE AYE WEAK SPOT IN YOUR HEART FOR UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR FOR FOUR RIPARIAN COUNTRIES OF
MEKONG UNQUOTE PARA UNYUN SAID HE CONSIDERED MEKONG PROJECT
AYE UNIQUE EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ACTION IN
PROMOTING PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES STOP IT WAS
FIRST COOPERATION AMONG FOUR

P14

RIPARIANS AND SECONDLY IT WAS BROADER COOPERATION THROUGH
GENEROUS ASSISTANCE OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REGION STOQ
IT ALSO REPRESENTED COOPERATION BY UNATIONS CMA SPECIAL FUND
CMA TAO AND SEVERAL SPECIALIZED AGENCIES PARA HE DECLARED
QUOTE WE NEED MORE PROJECTS LIKE THIS

P15/44

IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD STOP PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF NATURAL
RESOURCES THAT IN TURN LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND TEND
TO EXPEDITE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL UNQUOTE PARA FYI
SECGEN RETURNING NEWYORK TOMORROW FRIDAY VIA TOKYO STOP POUCHING
TAPES FOR UNRADIO ENDALL

CFM790 DR. CCC

UNITED NATIONS
1959 NOV 19 AM 11:30
TELEGRAPH UNIT

26 858 VIENTIANE 291 14 11107 *

UNATIONS NY *

204 IMMEDIATE

CORDIER FROM ENGBERG FOR YOUR INFORMATION FOLLOWING DISPATCH WAS
PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S LAO PRESSE BULLETIN QUOTE DES LE LENDemain
DE SON ARRIVEE A VIENTIANE M DAG HAMMARSKJOLD CMA SECRETAIRE
GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES CMA COMMENCA HIER SES CONSULTATIONS PAR
UNE LONGUE ENTREVUE AVEC S E PHOU SANANIKONE *

P2 *

CMA PREMIER MINISTRE CMA M KHAMPHAN PANYA CMA MINISTRE DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES CMA ASSISTA A CET ENTRETIEN QUE DURA PLUS
DUNE HEURE STOP PARA INTERROGE PAR LA PRESSE CMA M LE MINISTRE
DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES CMA DECLARE QUE M HAMMARSKJOLD A
S E LE PREMIER MINISTRE CMA APRES AVOIR ECHANGE *

P3 *

LES COURTOISIES USUELLES CMA ABORDERENT AUSSITOT LE PROBLEME QUI
AVAIT PROVOQUE LA VISITE DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE LONU A VIENTIANE
A SAVOIR COMMENT ETABLIR AU LAOS LA PRESENCE PERMANENTE DE LONU
SOUHAITE A LA FOIS PAR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ET LE GOUVERNEMENT
LAO CMA QUI SACCORDERENT POUR CONSTATER QUE CETTE *

P4 *

PRESENCE AVAIT ETE BENEFIQUE ET CONTRIBUERAIT CERTAINEMENT A
RAMENER LA PAIX DANS LE ROYAUME STOP PARA LE MINISTRE PRECISA
QU'APRES UN ECHANGE DE VUE APPROFONDI SUR CETTE QUESTION CMA DES
DECISIONS FURENT PRISES QUI NE POURRONT ETRE RENDUES PUBLIQUES
QUE DANS LE DEBUT DE LA SEMAINE PROCHAINE STOP PARA LES *

P5 *

MILIEUX BIEN INFORMES DE VIENTIANE PENSENT QUE CES DECISIONS CONCERNERAIENT PRINCIPALEMENT LA NOMINATION PAR M DAG HAMMARSKJOLD DUN DE SES REPRESENTANTS PERSONNELS QUI RESIDERAIT EN PERMANENCE AU LAOS ET LE TIENDRAIT INFORME DE TOUT DEVELOPPEMENT NOUVEAU DE LA SITUATION STOP CES MEMES MILIEUX SE DECLARENT PERSUADES QUE LA PRESENCE AU *

PG/40 =

LAOS DUN DELEGUE DES NATIONS UNIES NE MANQUERAIT PAS CMA GRACE AU PRESTIGE DE LORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DONT CE DELEGUE SERAIT INVESTI CMA POUR FAIRE REFLECHIR TOUT AGRESSEUR EVENTUEL ET AIDER A MAINTENIR LA PAIX DANS CE PAYS STOP UNQUOTE END +

CFM 204 IMMEDIATE +

INFO COPY
NOV 12 1964
FILE NO.
ACTION
TO *Cordier*

27 SSS VIENTIANE 48 12 0904

UNATIONS NY

193 CORDIER FROM ENGERS STOP SECGEN IS BEING ESCORTED FROM
BANGKOK BY NGON SANANIKONE CMA AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO SAIGON
CMA WHO SERVED AS SPECIAL ENVOY IN NEWYORK IN AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER STOP THIS LAST MINUTE DECISION COUNTERMANDS
DESIGNATION OF OUDONE SANANIKONE REPORTED IN MY 187 END
CFM 193 187

U N I T E D N A T I O N S

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N.Y.

(For use of information media -- not an official record)

Press Release SG/870/Rev.1
12 November 1959

SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD ARRIVES IN VIENTIANE

(The following has been received from the Secretary-General's party, Vientiane.)

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold arrived at Wattay Airport, Vientiane, Laos, at 5:30 p.m. (local time) on 12 November in a special airplane from Bangkok which was placed at his disposal by the Royal Government of Laos.

He was welcomed at the airport by Phoui Sananikone, Prime Minister; Khamphan Panya, the Foreign Minister; and other Cabinet members and high military and civilian authorities. Members of the diplomatic corps, headed by Ambassador Olivier Gassouin of France, were also present.

After inspection of the honor guard, the Secretary-General received the traditional Laotian flower offerings from some 50 women and children.

Earlier, when the Secretary-General arrived at Bangkok, Thailand, at 1 p.m. (local time) on 12 November, he was met at the airport by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand; Ngon Sananikone, representing the Prime Minister of Laos, and other officials of the Government of Laos; Rashid Ibrahim, Acting Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; and representatives of UN offices in Bangkok.

Mr. Hammarskjold left New York on Tuesday evening, 10 November.

* * * * *

46 SSS VIETIANE 124 12 12227

UNATIONS NY

194 MOST IMMEDIATE CORDIER FOOTE FROM ENGERS STOP SEC GEN ARRIVED AT WATTAY AIRPORT VIETIANE AT 5:30 PM LOCAL TIME IN SPECIAL PLANE FROM BANGKOK PLACED AT HIS DISPOSAL BY THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF LAOS STOP HE WAS WELCOMED AT THE AIRPORT BY THE PRIME MINISTER MR PHOUI SANANIKONE

P2

CMA THE FOREIGN MINISTER MR KHAMPHAN PANYA CMA OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND HIGH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES STOP THE MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS CMA HEADED BY THEIR DEAN MR OLIVER GASSOUIN CMA THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CMA WERE ALSO PRESENT STOP AFTER INSPECTION OF THE HONOR GUARD MR

P3/24

HAMMARSKJOLD RECEIVED THE TRADITIONAL LAOTIAN FLOWER OFFERINGS FROM SOME FIFTY WOMEN AND CHILDREN STOP THE SEC-GEN IS STAYING AT THE HOTEL PRESIDENCE DU CONSEIL

CFM 5.30

47 SSS VIETIANE 83 12 1333Z

UNATIONS NY

195

FOOTE FROM ENGERS STOP AT THE AIRPORT THE SEGEN MADE AN IMPROMP-
TU SPEECH IN FRENCH OF WHICH NO TEXT IS AVAILABLE BUT WHICH NO
DOUBT WILL BE REPORTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS

WHO WERE PRESENT IN GREAT NUMBERS STOP MAIN ACCENT WAS ON THE
VISIT

P2/13

AS A FOLLOW UP OF CONTACTS OVER THE WHOLE OF THE PAST YEAR

CFM 195

NOV 13 1959

FILE NO.

ACTION

TO

Cordier

23 SSS VIENTIANE 39 16 0800

UNATIONS NY

211 CORDIER GRAY FROM ENGERS STOP AS MATTER OF COURSE CMA
WITH PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS SEC GEN RESERVATIONS EX BANGKOK FOR TUESDAY
SHOULD BE CANCELLED STOP RESERVATIONS FOR FRIDAY EX BANGKOK FOR
TOKYO AND NEW YORK SHOULD BE CONFIRMED

CFM 211

UNATIONS NY

205 IMMEDIATE CORDIER FOOTE FROM ENGERS STOP FOLLOWING ARE THE

TEXTS OF THE SPEECHES HELD AT OFFICIAL DINNER THIRTEENTH COLON
AAA BY PRIME MINISTER PHOU SANANIKONE OF LAOS QUOTE MONSIEUR LE
SECRETAIRE GENERAL CMA PARA LE ROYAUME VOUS ACCUEILLE CMA DE
NOUVAUX CMA AVEC LA PLUS GRANDE JOIE CAR

P2

VOTRE VENUE SIGNIFIE POUR NOUS CMA AVANT TOUTE CHOSE CMA LARRIVEE
DUN MESSAGE DE PAIX STOP PARA VOUS AVEC PU VOIR DEJA CMA COMMENT
CE PEUPLE QUON ACCUSE DETRE UN PERTURBATEUR DE LA PAIX MONDIALE CMA
A MANIFESTE SA GRANDE ESPERANCE DANS LACTION DES NATIONS UNIES STOP
MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE

P3

GENERAL CMA VEUILLEZ RECEVOIR CET HOMMAGE COLON IL SADDRESSE A LA
PAIX STOP PARA IL SADRASSE A LA PAIX VMA DIS JE CMA ET PERMETTEZ
MOI DAJOUTER AUSSI A VOTRE PERSONNE SEMICOLON CAR NUL DANS
FAIT POUR LA DEFENDRE SELON CE NOBLE ESPRIT

P4

DE LA CHARTE QUE RESTE POUR LES NATIONS LIBRES CMA ET SINGULIEREMENT
POUR LES PLUS PETITES DENTRE ELLES CMA LE RECOURSE SUPREME CONTRE
LES TENTATIVES DE FORCE ETRANGERES STOP PARA SANS LARRIVEE PROMPTE
ET EFFICACE DUS SOUS COMITE DINVESTIGATIONNON EN SERIONS NOUS EQUATION
MARK NUL DE LE SAIT CMA

P5

OU PLUTOT NOUS LE DEVINONS TOUS STOP DES EXEMPLES ENCORE FRAIS A
TOUTES LES MEMOIRES NOUS ONT MONTRE COMBIEN UN MECANISME BIEN MONTE
CMA OU LA SUBVERSION INTERIEURE ET LAIDE ETRANGERE CONJUGENT LEURS
EFFORTS ET LEUR COMPLICITE CMA POUVAIT FACILEMENT TRANSFORMER CMA
EN PEU DE TEMPS CMA UN PAYS LIBRE

P6

EN PAYS ENCHAINE STOP LE ROYAUME CMA MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL
CMA VOUS EST INFINIMENT RECONNAISSANT DE VOTRE DECISION CMA
CAR IL VOUS DOIT CE PRECIEUX REPIT ACTUEL ET L'ESPOIR QUE CMA
PROCHAINEMENT CMA DANS TOUS NOS VILLAGES CMA LA GRAND PEUR SERA
BANNIE STOP PARA DANS LE DIFFEREND ACTUEL

P7

QUI NOUS OPPOSE A UNE REPUBLIQUE CMA DONT LES FORCES ARMEES SONT
INCOMPARABLEMENT SUPERIEURES AUX NOTRES CMA NOUS PLAIDONS LA CAUSE
DU DROIT ET CELLE DE LA NEUTRALITE STOP PARA NOUS AVONS CONSCIENCE
DAVOIR SCRUPULEUSEMENT SUIVI L'ESPRIT ET LA LETTRE DES ACCORDS DE
GENEVE STOP LE ROYAUME A TENU A

P8

HONNEUR DE RESPECTER SA SIGNATURE ET LES CLAUSES QUI LIAIENT TOUS
LES CONTRACTANTS STOP PARA POUR MAINTENIR LA PAIX CMA POUR FAIRE EN
SORTE DE JOUER SA PARTIE DIGNEMENT COMME NATION LIBRE ET
NOUVELLEMENT INDEPENDANTE CMA IL A FAIT DES CONCESSIONS QUI
ONT FRISE LA FAIBLESSE CMA LE TOUT DANS

P9

LE DESIRE DE REALISER L'UNITE NATIONALE ET DE DETRUIRE TOUTES SEQUELLES
DE DEFFENDS CMA TOUS GERMES DE QUERELLES STOP PARA LE ROYAUME A
CHOISI EN POLITIQUE ETRANGERE LA VOIE DE LA NEUTRALITE VERS LAQUELLE
LE PORTENT SON GENIE NATIONALE CMA L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE SA RELIGION MILLENAIRE
CMA SON COUT DE L'ORDRE

P10

ET SON AVERSION DES AVERTURES STOP IL NEST LIE PAR AUCUN PACTE
MILITAIRE CMA AUCUNE TROUPE ETRANGERE NE FOULE SON SOL CMA AUCUNE DE
CES BASES PORTEUSE DE MORT NEXISTE A L'INTERIEUR DE SES FRONTIERES
STOP TEL EST CE ROYAUME CMA FEELE ET DESARME CMA QUI SE TROUVE MENACE ET

P11

QUI S'ADRESSE AUX NATIONS UNIES POUR SA DEFENCE STOP PARA NOUS
ESPIONS CMA MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL CMA QU'UNE SOLUTION

EQUITABLE SERA TROUVÉE POUR PRÉSERVER NOTRE LIBERTÉ ET NOTRE INDÉPENDANCE
STOP NOUS POACONS NOTRE ENTIRE CONFIANCE DANS L'ONU STOP CE L'EST À
DÉJÀ VOUS À NOTRE SECOURS STOP NOUS ACCEPTONS DE

P12

SA PART TOUTE SUGGESTION QUI NOUS PRÉSERVERA DES MAUX DE LA GUERRE
ET QUI RAMÈNERA LA PAIX DANS NOS FOYERS STOP POUR EXCELLENCE CMA
MESSIEURS CMA JE VOUS PRIE BIEN D'ALLER LEVER VOS VERRES POUR BOIRE
À LA SANTÉ DE NOTRE HÔTE ÉMINENT À QUI NOUS EXPRIMONS ENCORE UNE

P13

FOIS NOTRE TRÈS VIVE ET TRÈS PROFONDE RECONNAISSANCE STOP UNQUOTE
STOP BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL QUOTE EXCELLENCE CMA POUR PERMETTEZ
MOI TOUT D'ABORD DE VOUS REMERCIER DE VOS MOTS SI AIMABLES AINSI QUE
DU TOAST QUE VOUS AVEZ BIEN VU LU M'ADRESSER STOP JE TIENS À VOUS
REMERCIER AUSSI DE

P14

LA RÉCEPTION PLEINE D'AMITIÉ QUE VOUS M'AVEZ ACCORDÉE STOP POUR
J'AI SUIVI AVEC BEAUCOUP D'ATTENTION LE DISCOURS QUE VOUS AVEZ
PRONONCÉ CMA CE DISCOURS SI ÉLOQUENT DANS LEQUEL VOUS AVEZ RÉSUMÉ
LES VUES DE VOTRE GOUVERNEMENT SUR LES POINTS IMPORTANTS QUI ENGAGENT
À PRÉSENT NOTRE ATTENTION STOP POUR J'AI RETENU

P15

SURTOUT CE QUE VOUS AVEZ DIT DE LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU ROYAUME
CMA CETTE POLITIQUE DE NEUTRALITÉ ENRACINÉE DANS LE CŒUR ET
L'ESPRIT DU PEUPLE CMA VERS LAQUELLE CMA EN VOS MOTS CMA VOTRE PAYS
EST PORTÉ PAR SON GÉNIE NATIONAL CMA PAR L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE SA RELIGION
AINSI QUE PAR

P16

SON AVERSION DES AVENTURES STOP TOUS VOS AMIS SE RÉJOUISSENT
DE CES MOTS ÉLOQUENTS DONT ILS CONNAISSENT LA VÉRITÉ STOP ILS SE
RÉJOUISSENT PARCE QUE CES MOTS CONTIENNENT LA RÉPONSE À BEAUCOUP
DE MALENTENDUS QUI PEUVENT METTRE EN DANGER L'EFFORT DU PAYS DE
FRAYER SON CHEMIN INDÉPENDANT ET DÉTABLIR UNE

P17

VIE QUI CORRESPONDE A SES VOEUX ET A SES INSTINCTS LES PLUS PROFONDS
 STOP CETTE ATTITUDE DU PEUPLE LAO LUI DONNE LA FONDATION SUR
 LAQUELLE SE BASENT SES EFFORTS DE DONNER AU PAYS LA VIE QU'IL MERITE
 STOP PAR LA BUT DU TRAVAIL DES NATIONS UNIES EST D'ASSISTER TOUTES LES
 P18

NATIONS MEMBRES DANS LEURS EFFORTS DE SE CREER UNE VIE INSPIRE PAR
 LES IDEES QUE VOUS AVEZ INDIQUEE COMME ETANT CELLES DE CE PAYS
 STOP L'ORGANISATION INSPIREE PAR LES PRINCIPES CMA COMMUNS A TOUS
 CMA QUEXPRIME LA CHARTE EN OFFRANT SON ASSISTANCE AU ROYAUME NE
 FAIT QUE DONNER EXPRESSION A

P19

LA CORRESPONDANCE ENTRE LES BUTS ETABLIS PAR LA CHARTE ET LE SENS
 PROFOND DE LA NEUTRALITE DU LAOS TEL QUE VOUS NOUS L'AVEZ
 INDIQUEE STOP PAR LA VISITE ICI NEST QU'UN PAS MODESTE SUR LA ROUTE
 SUIVI PAR L'ORGANISATION DANS SON EFFORT GENERAL D'ASSISTER TOUS
 LES PAYS MEMBRES A SAUVEGARDER

P2

L'INDEPENDANCE DANS LA PAIX CMA LA SECURITE ET LA COOPERATION
 STOP IL FAUT DANS CE TRAVAIL ETABLIR DES CONTACTS APPROFONDIS ET
 ENTIMES QUI PERMETTENT UN JUGEMENT SUR LES PROBLEMES A RESOUDRE STOP
 CEST LA RAISON POUR LES VISITES FREQUENTES QUE LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL
 DOIT RENDRE AUX PAYS MEMBRES STOP

P21

ICI COMME AILLEURS CE QUE JE CHERCHE CEST UNE COMPREHENSION PLUS
 SURE QUI ME PERMETTE DE METTRE A LA DISPOSITION DES PAYS MEMBRES
 LES POSSIBILITES D'UTILE L'ORGANISATION A LA MANIERE LA MIEUX ADAPTEE
 AUX BESOINS STOP L'ESPRIT HOSPITALIER ET L'AMITIE QUE J'AI RENCONTRES
 CHEZ VOUS A BEAUCOUP FACILITE CETTE TACHE

P22/23

DE COMPREHENSION ET NECESSAIRE POUR LA REUSSITE DE NOTRE OEUVRES
 STOP PAR MESSIEUR LE PRESIDENT CMA PERMETTEZ MOI DE PROPOSER A
 TOUS UN TOAST A VOUS QUI EXPRIME AUSSI NOS VOEUX LES PLUS SINCERES

POUR VOTRE SUCCES DANS LA TACHE SI LOURDE DE RESPONSABILITE
DONT VOUS ETES CHARGE STOP UNQUOTE END

CFR 205

UNITED NATIONS

Press Services
Office of Public Information
United Nations, N. Y.

(For use of information media--not an official record)

Press Release SG/874
19 November 1959

SECRETARY-GENERAL DEPARTS FROM LAOS FOR NEW YORK

(The following was received from the Secretary-General's party, Vientiane, Laos.)

United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold departed from Vientiane, Laos, at 1 p.m. today (local time) by special plane for Bangkok. He was accompanied by U Nyun, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and William Ranallo, personal aide of the Secretary-General.

From Bangkok, the Secretary-General will fly to Tokyo on Friday, where he will remain overnight, and then fly to New York on Saturday, via San Francisco. He is due to arrive in New York at 5:00 p.m. Saturday.

At the airport in Vientiane to see Mr. Hammarskjold off today were the Prime Minister of Laos, Phoui Sananikone, other members of the Government of Laos and all the members of the diplomatic corps.

Earlier, the Secretary-General and Sakari Tuomioja were received by the King of Laos, H.M. Seta Katya Savang Vatthana.

Mr. Tuomioja, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, arrived in Laos on 12 November at the request of the Secretary-General to review the economic situation of the country, particularly the role of UN economic and technical assistance for the furtherance of its economic growth and stability, and to follow up the discussions initiated by the Secretary-General.

The flight schedule of the Secretary-General for his return to New York is as follows:

Friday, 20 November	Lv. Bangkok KLM flight 863 at 0655 hours
Friday, 20 November	Arr. Tokyo at 2155 hours
Saturday, 21 November	Lv. Tokyo PAA jetflight 838 at 1300 hours
Saturday, 21 November	Arr. San Francisco, 0700 hours
Saturday, 21 November	Lv. San Francisco, TWA jetflight 42 at 0900 hours
Saturday, 21 November	Arr. New York at 1700 hours

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