

Small files: Israel - Doron case, Boy incident, Jerusalem parade, Flint inc...

HS L 179:183



National Library
of Sweden

Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

L 179 : 183

Israel

Israel and her neighbours 1956
(as put together by D. H.)

19 September 1956

I thank you for your letter of 14 September which I have studied with great care. It was useful to have your evaluation of the situation.

I am in full agreement with you on most of the points raised. We have to live with the fact that, for the time being, all our problems will develop in the shadow of the Suez crisis and that we will find various stands twisted by considerations going beyond the problems of the region.

The Israeli raids last week lead me to believe that they are keen on using incidents occurring during the present enforced passivity of the Arab countries to the full, in order to demonstrate their strength by actions of "intimidation" - at the same time scoring such minor military advantages as the erasing of a few strong points on the Arab side of the border - but that, on the other hand, they are not likely to go to more overt acts of war than those we have just witnessed. Therefore, I agree with you that the maximum to be feared from their side might be an operation in the El Arish area, but scarcely an attempt to revise the Gaza situation. What seems to me so tragic is that with such a policy they will build up a complex in the Arab minds which is likely to lock all doors to constructive approaches for a considerable time; the Arabs will not forget the humiliation and what, in their view, now again has been revealed of Israeli thinking.

Major-General E.L.M. Burns
Chief of Staff
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
Jerusalem

I also agree with you that, whatever Eban may have said, it is most unlikely that Ben-Gurion will give up anything which to him has a bargaining value for the future, or protects his immediate freedom of action. The only pressure just now available is my threat - which is a very real one - that I will stop all further efforts in the region, unless I have reasonable guarantees for progress and a background of less contempt of the Security Council stand.

The present situation may change when the Suez question has been brought openly to the Security Council, which I guess may happen soon. I am watching carefully for the proper time for a presentation of the unavoidable report on recent developments. A factor, which must be known to Ben Gurion, is that his policy makes him lose ground with influential Jewish groups in the United States (this may be even more so when the 12 September report on observers' activities etc. is published.) What importance this may have as a pressure on him for a reconsideration of his policy, is difficult to say, but he has to watch out.

Whatever our anticipations, it is, of course, now our duty to keep the record straight and to see to it that the United Nations does not lose ground, legally or politically - and is not made ridiculous. This is difficult enough. It will not yield any immediate results, but will, at least, maintain our base line for future operations.

You are only too right in pointing out the complications which may well arise in case of an emergency: the whole question of neutrality of observers might come up in what is likely to be a most complicated form. However, in such a situation, we would have to grapple with even worse problems.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to manoeuvre these various questions, as for the present I cannot rely on either the Security Council or the big powers for explicit support. This, in fact, explains why, last week, I had to resort to a kind of diplomatic manoeuvring which really meant that I acted in a sense for the Security Council; the final paragraphs of the notes verbales of 14 September were intended to reserve the rights of the Security Council later to condemn, or in other forms to establish the responsibility, in spite of the fact that it now had to let certain developments pass in silence.

If incidents of the latest type were to be repeated, I am not clear on what form for a reaction would be most adequate. After an official protest, such as the one of the 14th, I think I have only one step left before requesting a Security Council discussion, and that is to address the President of the Security Council directly, "drawing attention" to the new incidents; under Charter procedures this means more than the circulation of a report, although it naturally is much less than a request for an urgent meeting. (In a sense it is surprising that it has so far been possible to vary the reactions so as to avoid flat repetitions which could not but have caused a weakening of our stand.)

The present situation is threatening, indeed, There is no possibility for us to change it radically by any of the means which we have at our disposal, but we can, at least, stick to our guns. Again, I repeat that I was most grateful for your letter which, as you will have seen from what I have written, reflects an evaluation rather similar to my own.

3 August 1956

I was most sorry that my short stay in Jerusalem developed so as to render it impossible for me to get in touch with you. You will have noted that I was tied up in very long meetings and between those meetings I had a few things to settle at Government House.

I would have appreciated having a chance of talking with you, less about those problems which took most of our time in April than about questions worrying me more in general. Quite apart from that, however, it would have been a pleasure to see you again.

I think that the talks were useful as they helped to maintain the human contact necessary as a basis for our joint efforts. Certainly, I learned a lot also this time.

I have reserved time for a new visit to the Middle East in October. If it comes about I should then have more time and I therefore hope, on that occasion, to renew our personal contact.

With kind regards,

Mr. Moshé Sharett
c/o Permanent Mission of Israel to
the United Nations
15 East 70th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 August 1956

Dear General Burns,

.... As indicated to you by cable, I am transmitting herewith the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and Ben Gurion.

Regarding the rumours that Jordan plans a démarche against you, I may note the following:

1. Jordan has, in fact, not made any approach to us regarding the matter. All that we know about it is derived from the press.
2. From the first day when the press carried the information, the Egyptian Delegation made it known here to the press that it did not share the views of the Jordanians.
3. Yesterday Asha and Loutfi had separate conferences with the Secretary-General on general Palestine matters, and each of them voluntarily raised the question of the rumours of Jordan's démarche against you. Both of them raised the question in the same manner, that is, in support of you and against the Jordan position. The Secretary-General made it clear in some detail that there were no foundations to the charge, and that he would regard any démarche as one directed against him and not against you.
4. It is clear that both Cairo and Damascus will intervene at Amman, and in those circumstances the matter can be regarded as being under control. I have informed the Canadian Mission here of developments regarding this matter. The question will probably rise in the Secretary-General's press conference this morning.

We were very sorry about the death of Rasmussen, but are very happy about the continuing improvement of the observers. In fact, several of

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General E.L.M. Burns,
Chief of Staff,
UNTSO,
Jerusalem,
Palestine.

them were so severely wounded that we were most doubtful that they would pull through. I have kept the appropriate Delegations informed of developments in these cases.

....

I enclose copies of my itinerary. I am leaving New York on Sunday next for an official visit to nine new Member countries including Jordan. You will note that I shall be in Jerusalem on Thursday, 23 August, at 4.45 pm, JE flight 005 from Amman, and that I shall leave Jerusalem for Cairo on Friday, 24 August, at 4.10 pm, AIR JORDAN flight 203. Travel here has made a reservation for me in the King David hotel.

I look forward to seeing you.

With warm regards,

Very sincerely,

Andrew W. Cordier
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary-General

24 May 1956

Dear Gunnar,

My attention has been drawn to an article in the issue of Svensk Tidskrift No. 4 called "Israel - ett nytt Tjeckoslovakien?"

.....
Instead of personal comments I would like to send you the enclosed copy of the first paragraph of an article in the Jewish Observer (as you know the leading Zionist organ in England) on the report. I would like you to ask the unknown author of the article in Svensk Tidskrift how he reconciles that Jewish stand with his own twisted and shockingly uninformed theories.

Excuse me for using emotional language, but to anybody who knows on the one side the problem, on the other hand the general attitude of you and some of the others on the Editing Board, it is impossible not to protest in the strongest words when I read for example a sentence like this one:

"Det säges, att Dag Hammarskjöld funderat på ett projekt att förse "ingenmansland" med taggtråd, vilket i Israel framkallat den bittra reflektionen, att nu skall vårt ghetto också bli ett koncentrationsläger!"

Does the author know that the proposal in question was first made by the Government of Israel?

I hope you will understand this letter. I also hope that for the future the review will check more carefully the sources before taking a stand.

Mr. Gunnar Heckscher
Svenska Institutet för Kulturellt
Utbyte med Utlandet
Kungsgatan 42
Stockholm, Sweden

The full text of the Hammarskjold report on his Middle East mission is a remarkable and reassuring document. Strictly within the framework of the existing Armistice Agreements, the U.N. Secretary-General has succeeded in clarifying the legal responsibilities of all the parties to the Agreements, in obtaining definite reaffirmations from the parties that they will comply unconditionally with the fundamental clauses of the Agreements, and in precisely interpreting the sovereign role of the Security Council in relationship to the Agreements.

It now becomes clear that none of the Middle Eastern countries concerned can legally decide when an act of non-compliance with the Agreements has been committed that allows it to break the cease-fire under the reserve of self-defence. This can be decided only by the Security Council.

But the most valuable feature of the report is in its overall significance. The success of the Secretary-General's mission opens up hopeful prospects for a Middle East settlement. It is a foundation on which further diplomatic efforts can be built.

22 May 1956

Dear Loutfi,

.....

Enclosed please find a strictly personal letter to Dr. Fawzi. I would be grateful if you would see to it that it is sent on to him at your earliest convenience. I wish to explain that when I send the letter closed, it is because it covers a point which was reserved for that kind of treatment in our talks in Cairo.

H.E. M. Omar Loutfi
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations
900 Park Avenue
New York 21, N.Y.

22 May 1956

Dear Loutfi,

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H.E. M. Omar Loutfi
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations
900 Park Avenue
New York 21, N.Y.

11 June 1956

With reference to our conversation regarding the situation on the Jordan-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line, I have been informed that Colonel Hommel, the Acting Chief of Staff, had a discussion with General Nawar this morning and received the assurance that Jordan forces will be given orders not to fire across the Demarcation Line, even if fired upon, unless the fire is effective. General Nawar defined "effective fire" as that resulting in casualties.

Mr. Mordecai R. Kidron
Deputy Representative of Israel
to the United Nations
15 East 70th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

11 June 1956

With reference to our conversation of this morning, I have been informed by Colonel Hommel that an investigation of Hagovrim and Sussita in the Demilitarized Zone has been set for Tuesday afternoon.

The Chairman of the Syrian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission will personally attend both investigations.

Mr. Rafik Asha
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations
515 Park Avenue, Apartment 6
New York 22, N.Y.

21 May 1956

I have raised the question of the leaks with Burns. He has now replied and I wish to give you the substance of what he says.

When Burns cabled his reply to my question, he had so far only seen the New York Times story 15 May. He says that he has positive information that Bigart's tip-off came from an Israeli newspaperman and that the story emanated exclusively from Israeli sources and had been published in part at least in one Hebrew language newspaper.

My letter to Ben-Gurion was of the 16th. After that Bigart saw Burns, saying only that he had the Foreign Ministry's side of the picture. In view of this, Burns thought it proper to clear up some points for him.

I did not ask Burns whether he had seen Bigart. There is in his reply no reference to any meeting previous to 16 May. However, from Burns' reply follows that, if he has seen Bigart on earlier occasions, he does not feel that he has given Bigart the information on which the leak was based.

Mr. Mordecai R. Kidron
Deputy Representative of Israel to the United Nations
15 East 70th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

DH:dg

OUTGOING CABLE

TO: BURNS, JERUSALEM
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: 8 MAY 1956
NUMBER:

NOTING ISRAELI ATTACKS ON UN OBSERVERS IN JORDAN CASE, AND ON AFTERTHOUGHT, I HAVE CHANGED MY MIND AS TO REACTION TO SHARETT. INSTEAD OF TRANSMITTING FORMAL MESSAGE SENT MY NUMBER 221 PLEASE SEE SHARETT PERSONALLY, ALSO ON MY BEHALF, AND EXPRESS TO HIM THE FOLLOWING:

THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS RECEIVED HIS CABLE AND ALSO COMMENTS FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF. HE HAS FURTHER RECEIVED PRESS REPORTS OF CRITICISM AGAINST UN OBSERVERS IN THE JORDAN CASE.

AS A MATTER OF COURSE HE RESERVES HIS OPINION UNTIL HE IS IN POSSESSION OF FULL REPORTS GIVING RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS. WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN HOWEVER GIVES HIM REASON FOR GRAVE CONCERN. IN THE GAZA CASE, WHATEVER THE STORY, SO MUCH IS CLEAR, THAT ISRAELI ARMED VEHICLES HAD CROSSED THE DEMARCA-TION LINE AND PENETRATED INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. THAT INDICATES THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE HAD NOT OBSERVED ORDERS COVERING THE SUBSTANCE OF ARTICLE 2 (2). IF IT IS MAINTAINED THAT ACTION WAS TAKEN IN SELF-DEFENCE, THE OBVIOUS REPLY IS (AS STATED IN MY REPLY TO MR. BEN GURION TO HIS CEASE-FIRE ASSURANCE) THAT SELF-DEFENCE CANNOT DEROGATE FROM THE CLEAR STIPULATIONS OF ARTICLE 2 (2), OR IN OTHER WORDS THAT SELF-DEFENCE DOES NOT PERMIT PENETRATION INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. I CONSIDER THAT TO BE OBVIOUS EVEN IF SOME ATTEMPT WERE MADE TO JUSTIFY THE PENETRATION INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AS A CASE OF QUOTE HOT PURSUIT UNQUOTE.

WHEN, DISREGARDING THIS FACT, ISRAEL COMES OUT WITH A ONE-SIDED CONDEMNATION AND WHEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE, ISRAEL CONDEMNS JORDAN IN THE INCIDENTS RECENTLY ADJUDICATED BY THE MAC, GOING EVEN TO THE POINT OF DISCREDITING THE CHAIRMAN WHO HAS SIMPLY DONE HIS DUTY, I FEEL THAT ISRAEL IS NOT LIVING UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS TO OBSERVE NOT ONLY THE LETTER,

.../

DH:dg

OUTGOING CABLE

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JERUSALEM
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: 8 MAY 1956
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.../

BUT ALSO THE SPIRIT OF THE CEASE-FIRE ASSURANCES.

I CAN ONLY REPEAT THAT BY TAKING SUCH A STAND ISRAEL WEAKENS WHAT IS SOLID IN THE CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENT AND EXPOSES ITSELF TO CRITICISM WHICH I AM AFRAID IT WILL FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO COUNTER.

OUTGOING CABLE

TO: BURNS JERUSALEM
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: 8 MAY 1956
NUMBER: 221

Most Immediate
Urgent
Lacerte
SSS

THANKS CABLE 286 WITH VALUABLE COMMENTS ON MESSAGE FROM SHARETT TRANSMITTED YOUR 282. IF YOU AGREE WITH SUBSTANCE PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING TO MR. SHARETT:

"I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR CABLE CONCERNING VARIOUS RECENT OCCURRENCES ALONG THE DEMARCATION LINES. I HAVE ALSO RECEIVED COMMENTS ON THESE OCCURRENCES FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I MAY REVERT TO THE MATTER WHEN THE RESULT OF FULL INVESTIGATIONS HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO ME. FOR THE TIME BEING I NOTE ONLY THAT INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN MADE CONCERNING ITEMS ONE AND TWO SHOWING THAT ISRAELI VEHICLES HAVE CROSSED THE DEMARCATION LINE AND GONE SOME DISTANCE INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY IN CONTRAVENTION OF YOUR CEASEFIRE ASSURANCE AND YOUR UNDERTAKING AS TO PATROLLING VEHICLES. I MUST IMPRESS ON YOU YOUR DUTIES UNDER THAT ASSURANCE AND ALSO THE GENERAL MORAL OBLIGATION TO ABSTAIN FROM PREMATURE JUDGMENTS."

NEW SUBJECT. I FULLY AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW THAT RECENT CONTACTS DO NOT JUSTIFY A SWITCH FROM NORMAL METHODS OF PRESENTING COMPLAINTS WHETHER IT BE TO YOU OR TO ME. THE METHOD USED IN THIS CASE HAS A SMELL OF PROPAGANDA PURPOSES WHICH FRANKLY SHOCKS ME.

WHEN COULD I HAVE DEFINITE FULL REPORT ON THE GAZA STORY?

*sent to Lodge, Sir Pinson & Albrand
on 14 March 56.*

With reference to our recent conversations it may be useful if I put on record my reactions to the proposals discussed.

1. The present UNTSO machinery has proved useful for its immediate purposes and has the great advantage of basing its activities on the general armistice agreement, which means that the Chief of Staff has a legally defined position in relation to both parties. Over and above the immediate tasks, the Chief of Staff has proved increasingly useful as an agent also in discussions of more general political issues connected with the implementation of the armistice agreement. This has been true especially during the recent months when he and the Secretary-General made joint approaches to the governments concerned and in that direction were able, although slowly and with certain set-backs, to move forward. However, it is obvious that the Chief of Staff cannot and should not be used as negotiator on the major issues which should more appropriately be dealt with in a more definitive settlement, nor, obviously, can he enter upon debates concerning political problems of a more basic nature.

2. The relations of the two parties to the Secretariat and, more particularly to the Secretary-General are such that direct approaches from the Secretary-General are accepted as a matter of course. In the light of recent reactions it seems likely that an intensified and broadened contact by the Secretary-General with the Member Governments in the area

would be acceptable and in some cases may be even welcomed. However, it is not likely that opinion is yet mature enough to accept that the Secretary-General assume all the political responsibilities in the area which may naturally be fitted into the framework of his office.

3. If, in view of the present tension, special arrangements are considered necessary in order to provide for the most efficient handling of such key issues as fall outside the competence of the Chief of Staff and are not without further preparation, likely to be accepted as a personal function of the Secretary-General, such arrangements must meet certain conditions.

a) The operation must not be understood as imposed on the parties and for that reason should emerge as a natural development of the present machinery.

b) Action under the new arrangements must not appear to be taken in the interest of any of the Big Powers and for that reason the authority acting in the new field should be free from any suggestion of having been put into his position at the inspiration or in the interest of any single party or group.

c) The new activity should be so organized as to lift it entirely outside the Cold War orbit. It therefore must be accepted by the Soviet Union. An attempt to push it through against Soviet resistance would annihilate the possibilities of success for the new arrangement and is likely to accentuate the cold war in the area. Again, therefore, considerable advantages are to be drawn from an organic

growth of the scope of the present machinery, and by avoiding the impression of a new departure from previous lines of action.

(d) The arrangement should be possible to implement without any delay. Especially it should be avoided that any delays should be caused by the possible complications referred to in the two previous paragraphs.

(e) However, the arrangements may well be staged in such a way as to have a direct psychological impact on all the parties concerned as an indication of the active interest of the world community and an efficient measure for the preservation of peace.

4. The simplest way, perhaps even the only one now available to meet these conditions, would be to extend the functions of the Secretary-General according to 2, so as to cover in the first instance an exploration together with the governments concerned about the possibilities of an intensified attack on the major problems within the framework of the United Nations. Such a development would enable the Secretary-General to go out to the region at once in a manner which will create confidence and yet with a mandate which would not bring up the issue in any provocative form. In the course of this exploration he may either build up an acceptance of a continued wider role for the Secretary-General, or else an acceptance of a continued operation through a special agent who, constitutionally would carry the delegated authority of the Secretary-General as defined and sanctioned by the Security Council. Of course, it would be theoretically possible to eschew the exploratory stage and to go

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straight for the wider functions for the Secretary-General. But that would mean that he would be forced on the parties in a way which might limit his possibilities for useful action. In fact, even with the limited mandate here indicated, he would be forced to cover the whole political ground and thus could initiate discussions of the type which is now considered necessary. This, despite its limits, could open the door either to a continued shouldering of the full responsibilities by the Secretary-General, or for such other arrangements as the Security Council on the basis of his report on the first phase of the operation may find necessary and appropriate. Therefore irrespective of the way in which the formal basis for such a negotiation through the Secretary-General is built up, his mission within the limits of his role, would be understood as major action and could not avoid having a direct and salutary effect on the situation in the area. (The extent to which this would be the case, would necessarily depend upon how the formal decision on the proposed mission is taken.)

5. From the point of view of the operation itself I would consider it sufficient if the governments in the region were informed informally by the four major Powers of their approval of the effort of the Secretary-General. However, that may be insufficient from the point of view of public opinion which has to be taken seriously into account. For that reason I would not exclude a formal decision of the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to ... etc. etc. ..., but I must insist on such a decision being taken not as one which must be understood as emanating from an initiative of the Western Powers or even on the initiative of the Big Four. This can be avoided by the initiative formally being the Secretary-General's own, although admittedly as a result of discussions with the major Powers.

6. I need not add that the observations presented here reflect an attempt at an objective analysis. There is no wish on the part of the Secretariat or the Secretary-General to reserve to themselves any special position in the efforts in the Middle East. That is excluded not only because of the great seriousness of the problem, but also because the effort itself is hazardous and not without great personal risks. But the risk might be taken because of the urgency of the problem and because it is probably impossible to make any further progress without building on an organic development of existing organs and machinery. It is in the light of this fact, combined with the extreme limitation of the possibilities if a cold war accent is to be avoided, that I find that neither my work at the UN Headquarters nor the risk to the Secretary-General's personal prestige should stop him from assuming the wider responsibilities if it is agreed that they are in the best interests of all concerned. I would thus be willing to go out for a couple of weeks or the somewhat longer time that may be necessary, at very short notice, provided that the preparation for it is such as to provide reasonable scope for making a useful contribution.

7. If any immediate action is considered necessary in line with the suggestions about which I was informed yesterday, I would, in the light of the previous observations, make the following formal proposal.

The Security Council be convened some day next week at the request of the Secretary-General. This step should be preceded by

a contact with various delegations, including the Soviet Delegation and key delegations from the Middle East.

At the meeting of the Security Council the Secretary-General should report that in light of the general concern felt about the situation in the Middle East, he has consulted various delegations concerning the possibility of intensified United Nations action utilizing the existing United Nations machinery. At the suggestion of some delegations he has felt that an exploration of such possibilities in consultation with governments in the region might be helpful. Given the nature of this approach it would seem appropriate that the consultations should be undertaken by the Secretary-General himself. It would require a brief visit to the region and should result in a report on such measures as might be necessary or appropriate in order to move forward in the United Nations approach. He has felt that, in view of the primary responsibility carried by the Security Council, such a step should not be taken without a prior submission of it to the Security Council for consideration. He would not consider a formal decision necessary but would, on the other hand, if such a decision were considered desirable, find that it might take the form of a request to the Secretary-General, after consultation with governments in the region, urgently to report to the Security Council on possible steps aiming at a strengthening of the United Nations assistance towards a peaceful settlement of the conflicts reflected in the present increased tension.

OUTGOING CABLE

TO: BURNS
JERUSALEM

FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL

DATE: 3 APRIL 1956

NUMBER:

WITH LIKELY PROSPECT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL WILL PASS RESOLUTION WEDNESDAY HAVE PLANNED TO LEAVE FRIDAY EVENING FOR ROME. WILL ARRIVE ROME WITH SMALL STAFF ON BEA FLIGHT 257 AT 1720 HOURS. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMING TO ROME FOR PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE OF TWO OR THREE DAYS. SUGGEST YOU BRING VIGIER AND A SECRETARY WITH YOU. AM ALSO ASKING LABOUISSSE TO COME FOR SAME PERIOD. YOU MIGHT CHECK WITH HIM AS TO TRANSPORTATION. WILL BE USING HIS PLANE FOR AREA CONTACTS. AM ATTEMPTING TO GET ROOMS HOTEL EXCELSIOR. WILL VERIFY.

27 March 1956

.....

As I think the enclosed memorandum from Burns
may be of interest to you, I send it for your personal
information.

1 enclosure

His Excellency
Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York City, N.Y.

27 March 1956

....

As I think the enclosed memorandum from Burns
may be of interest to you, I send it for your personal
information.

1 enclosure.

His Excellency
Sir Pierson Dixon, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
to the United Nations
99 Park Avenue, 7th Floor
New York 16, N.Y.

27 March 1956

.....

As I think the enclosed memorandum from Burns may be of interest to you, I send it for your personal information.

1 enclosure

His Excellency
M. Hervé Alphand
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
4 East 79th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

16 March 1956

PERSONAL

.....
With reference to today's report in the New York Times, page 2, on what Colonel Nasser said to the American Press, it may interest you to read the enclosed letter which was cabled over to Fawzi Monday night.

I thank you for your letter of yesterday. I fully share your views on the need for discretion and from that viewpoint read with growing concern the press reports from Washington (which this morning culminated in the U.P. statement that high administration officials favoured UN action despite reported opposition from the Secretary-General). The continuous comments given to the Press in Washington build up an impression which runs us into the risk that whatever is done by the UN will be regarded as a manoeuvre with all ensuing difficulties to give the operation on which agreement may be reached its proper impact and chance of success in the Arab world.

Encl.

H.E. Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
United States Mission to the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, N.Y.

12 March 1956

Dear Dr. Fawzi,

Problems well known to you, added to all the things waiting for me on my return, have delayed the letter I wanted to write to you in order to thank you for the kind reception you and your colleagues gave me in Cairo and for all the courtesies and hospitality extended. My visit was most useful in bringing me to a closer understanding of your viewpoints and difficulties. It also left most pleasant memories of personal contacts which I highly appreciate.

Through Dr. Loutfi, you may have had reports on various statements which I have had to make to the international press here in New York. Trying my best to help those, who like you are aiming at peaceful progress in the Middle East, while at the same time remaining strictly within the limits set by my own conviction, I have again and again appealed for confidence in the sense of responsibility and the wisdom of the leaders. I am perfectly aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East but react sharply against any suggestion that the difficulties are insuperable and that we are drifting towards war. Indeed, from whatever viewpoint we approach the problem, for all parties concerned an initiative to wage war would border on political suicide.

In the case of Egypt, the basis for the line that I take is, as you may guess, in the first place, the impressions I have gathered from you and Colonel Nasser. Apart from my faith in the sincerity of various statements made, I have my conviction that these statements are backed by a realistic appraisal of the situation. I remember your own arguments on several occasions, but I have been increasingly

His Excellency
Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cairo, Egypt

impressed also by the economic and social tasks facing the Egyptian Government - tasks which will require a rallying of all Egyptian resources and potentialities, especially if she wishes to stick to her line of complete independence in all directions.

Excuse my thinking aloud in this way concerning the considerations on which I base the line I have been taking publicly since my return. Wanting, as I do, to help those aiming at a peaceful development, I would appreciate your reaction to and advice on, the line to be taken by me. I am very much aware of the fact, as matters stand, that what I say to the press may have an impact, through public opinion, on the freedom of action of the Governments concerned.

Last week I had a report from General Burns on his Cairo talks. I was gratified to note the constructive and helpful way in which the Egyptian representatives reacted to the questions he had to raise. I am sure that in this spirit progress, although slow, is quite possible, and I am convinced that every achievement, by way of agreement on questions of the El Anja type, yields results in the general political field far more important than the immediate improvement in the demarcation line situation.

Once again, I send you and your Government my very best thanks.
Wishing you all success in your arduous task

With kind regards,

OUTGOING CABLE

TO: BURNS JERUSALEM
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: 7 MARCH 1956
NUMBER: 87 AND 88

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

REUR 101 THROUGH 103. UPON YOUR RETURN FROM CAIRO PLEASE SEEK INTERVIEW WITH SHARETT AND PUT TO HIM FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON MY BEHALF.

ONE. AM I TO UNDERSTAND THAT GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL STILL ACCEPTS EL AUJA PROPOSALS OF 3 NOVEMBER UNCONDITIONALLY? FROM YOUR REPORT I UNDERSTAND THAT TO BE THE CASE. CONFIRMATION DESIRED.

TWO. IF SO, IS IMPLEMENTATION REPEAT IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS MADE CONDITIONAL UPON IMPLEMENTATION BY EGYPT OF ARTICLE 8 (3)? FROM EXTRACTS MEMORANDUM QUOTED YOUR TELEGRAM MUST ASSUME THAT ANSWER IS YES. I SHOULD WISH TO HAVE STRAIGHT AFFIRMATION OR DENIAL FROM ISRAELIS OF THIS INTERPRETATION.

THREE. IF ANSWER TO TWO AS ASSUMED IS AFFIRMATIVE, DOES ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REALIZE THAT WITH EQUAL LEGAL RIGHT EGYPT COULD MAKE FULL APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 7 AND 8 A CONDITION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS?

AS ANSWER TO THREE MUST BE YES, I CONCLUDE THAT IN FACT ISRAELI CONDITION FOR IMPLEMENTATION MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS FORCING US INTO

POSITION WHERE WE HAVE TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY FULL IMPLEMENTATION BY BOTH PARTIES OF ARTICLES 7 AND 8. THESE ARTICLES NOT ONLY FULLY COVER BUT GO BEYOND THE TWO POINTS CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES IN SECGEN'S PROPOSALS. THEREFORE CONDITION FOR IMPLEMENTATION ROBS PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSALS OF ALL SUBSTANCE. INDEED, CONDITIONS FORCING US TO APPROACH DIRECTLY SECOND STEP IN FULL IMPLEMENTATION AFOREMENTIONED ARTICLES NULLIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSALS CONCERNING FIRST STEP. DOES ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONCUR IN THESE CONCLUSIONS. IF NOT WHY NOT?

OTHER QUESTION. WHAT IS ISRAELI ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE TO UNTSO IN MARKING DEMARCATION LINE? CAN NEED FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE BE MET IF EGYPTIANS TAKE SAME STAND MUTATIS MUTANDI AS ISRAELIS? IF, AS I ASSUME, THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION MUST BE NEGATIVE, DOES NOT ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE ON THIS POINT LIKEWISE IN PRACTICE NULLIFY PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL? IF SO, THIS OBVIOUSLY IS TRUE IRRESPECTIVE OF REPLIES TO GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOVE.

COMMENTS. IF I NOW PUT TO ISRAELIS THESE VERY PRECISE QUESTIONS IT IS BECAUSE POSITIONS NO LONGER CAN BE LEFT AMBIGUOUS BUT MUST BE CLEARLY AND FULLY ON RECORD. IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION, WHICH I DO NOT WISH TO DISCUSS IN THIS CONTEXT, ISRAELI RETREAT, IF CONFIRMED IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ABOVE, SERIOUSLY LIMITS POSSIBILITY IMPROVEMENT BORDERLINE SITUATION THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. I CONSIDER IT EVEN MORE DANGEROUS FOR FURTHER EFFORTS

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IF WE WERE TO LEAVE SUCH A RETREAT AS SOMETHING TO BE SUSPECTED
AND ALLEGED BY EGYPTIANS WITHOUT POSSIBILITY CLEAR REPLY FROM US.
SUCH A REPLY EVEN IF NEGATIVE IS BETTER THAN IMPRESSION WEAKNESS
ON OUR SIDE AND SILENT ACCEPTANCE OF OR ATTEMPT TO HIDE REBUFF.