

Small files: Israel - Doron case, Boy incident, Jerusalem parade, Flint inc...

HS L 179:183



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Israel

Jerusalem Parade - 1958

20-24 April

Gen. von Horn, Jerusalem - 2 clear cables
- 2 code cables

- to D. H. / Cordier, U.N. HQ.

- 1 clear cable from D. H. - to von Horn

- 2 code cables - " -

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: VON HOEN JERUSALEM
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL
DATE: 20 April 1958
NUMBER: 249

After further consideration and informal discussions with UK and US delegations, I authorise you to transmit the following message to the two Governments ".(attached)..."

Please observe that this is an authorisation and not a request as further developments and your own judgment of the situation should be taken into account before a demarche is made.

If you find that you should transmit the message but would suggest amendments, please submit your suggestions urgently.

If and when you transmit the message to Rifai you should give him the following comments from me. I have had to choose between this demarche, in equal terms to the two parties, or a formal request to both parties for an immediate withdrawal. In deciding on the present line of action instead of a formal request for withdrawal, I have had to consider the following facts. The Israel action of bringing heavy equipment etc. to Jerusalem is formally, of course, a breach of the GAA, as I have stated in my message. However, their commitments, which so far are informal, that the equipment will be withdrawn immediately after the parade and that it will be unarmed, means that it may be held that the arrangements — which are of a kind completely unforeseen in the GAA — in substance are not in conflict with the purpose of the Agreement. Further, the step taken today by the Government of Jordan, when it has brought troops and heavy equipment up to the region, presumably with arms and munition, has fundamentally changed the situation. For the Secretary-General to request immediate withdrawal, as matters now stand, would be widely interpreted as an action under threat in a direction for which a clear legal basis does not exist. Such a step now most certainly would not lead to any effect but start a conflict which might go far beyond the present issue and/^{would be}likely to prove harmful to the relations between the two countries and the UN authorities. With the assurances given and the steps already taken it does, therefore, seem much more in the interest of peace to intervene as I have done, that is (a) to put the principle clearly on record, (b) to request all the necessary assurances and (c) to reserve the possibility to act on the principle if such assurances are not forthcoming.

Of course, the line taken does in no way bar the Jordan Government from pursuing the matter in whatever ~~form~~ form it considers appropriate, but I wish to point out as a personal opinion that were the requested assurances to be given and the security measures to be taken by Israel, the countries represented on the Security Council would probably not consider the case, if raised by Jordan, to be one where the Council could order withdrawal because of the formal breach of the GAA which the presence of the heavy equipment in Jerusalem represents.

The only comments needed to the Israel side seem to be that this formalisation of your and my previous reactions has become necessary in view of the steps taken on the Jordan side, which have brought out the implicit risks in the situation created by the Israel move.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: VON HORN JERUSALEM

FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL

IMMEDIATE

DATE: 21 April 1958

NUMBER:

Re UNTSO 614, 615, 616. If message were to be used you should make the amendments you suggest yourself. The reference to "display" etc. final sentence point three in draft message was intended to cover your own proposal in Amman and what other similar proposals you may have to Add.

It seems now obvious that already for physical reasons message could not be delivered before MAC meeting. It would at all event be highly dubious if such delivery at that stage would not lead to confusion. Whether it should be used after MAC meeting, or perhaps some other message should be delivered then, will depend on development in meeting.

Probably chairman of MAC, whatever his voting on whatever resolution Jordan may table, would have to go on record with his stand. I presume that will be done in a way corresponding to your position, as taken in Jerusalem and Amman. This means that text of suggested message may serve as his brief both as regards the history and as regards the conflict between the formal and the substantive aspects of the Israel move. (Ofcourse, if text is used as brief, the chairman speaks in first person singular and the Secgen is not part of the picture).

Were the chairman, following previous practice, thus to go on record with his views, and does so following the draft message as his brief, the UN line would have been defined in keeping with your previous stands and my own interpretation of the situation so that I would consider it possible to endorse his position formally. I might have to do so in support of "minimum measures" considered necessary. We might in this way maintain balance apparent from para. three and four of draft message, as followed by final para. of said message.

As we will probably not have opportunity for further exchange of views before MAC meeting, you should, however, act according to your own judgment. We have to be in touch again before any formal message from me is delivered to any of the parties.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER
FROM: VON HORN, Jerusalem
DATE: 22 April 1958 1726
NUMBER: UNTSO 620

During recess of meeting EJKIMAC attended by Israelis now in progress I was called at 1955Z on phone by Gen. Laskov who told me - and I quote his very words: "GEN LASKOV: There is a point which was instructed to clear up on which I think there is a misunderstanding. There will be no ammunition on any vehicle or any weapons in the parade. I believe I mentioned that when we met and our people feel that this has not been made clear and I hope it is clear." GEN VON HORN: "It is clear." - GEN LASKOV: "Now there is a personal point. I am measuring every word I say. I feel that the fuss created around this parade will be the cause of anything that might happen. This is the thing that creates the ~~ix~~ tension, nothing else, because nothing of the kind has happened before. Anything that is wrong on this parade is caused by the artificial tension created around it which did not exist in the area. This is all. I tried to get this to you. I hear the tension is accumulating. I feel that this thing is creating the tension."

Will keep you advised.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: VON HORN, Jerusalem
DATE: 23 April 1958 1500
NUMBER: UNTSO 632

Your letter delivered by Nelson to Rifai at 1215Z today. Rifai stated that he would reply to letter later but wished to convey thanks for kind advice of Secretary-General in meantime.

A. He commented again that reinforcement of existing troop strength previously in Jerusalem should be considered natural and precautionary and that they could not do otherwise confronted with this show of Israel military strength "within metres of the Armistice Lines."

B. He asked message be given to C.O.S. that provocative acts such as lighting Star of David on Hadassah and Hebrew University "right within our territory" and searchlights shining on these buildings from Israel might be provocative. He also referred to Israel flag which might be placed alongside UN Flag on Scopus building as provocative.

C. With regard to parade he was not as emphatic as with Scopus activity although hoped that in Israel excitement or celebration of their holiday nothing untoward would happen. He referred to some irresponsible stone throwing or a single shot on the other side.

D. He reiterated previous conversations with Secretary-General and Dr. Urrutia on cooperation and strengthening UN and specifically TSO contrary to "Jewish attitude and action."

E. New subject. Letter from Mrs. Meir just received indicating that Israel Ambassador in Washington learned from State Dept. of Jordanian warning that "they would open fire if Israel sector Scopus illuminated on Independence Day." Have immediately talked to Senior Jordan Delegate about this and said Israel had advised

there would be no searchlights whatsoever on Scopus or reflected on Scopus from New City. I had taken up matter with Israelis following conversation with Rifai who had taken strong exception to searchlights (see end of UNESO 601.) I referred to your message to Rifai today and ~~xxx~~ impressed once more necessity for Jordan to take all possible measures to avoid incidents. Am confirming my conversation with Senior Jordan Delegate by letter tonight.

67 SSS JERUSALEM 19 24 1520

UNATIONS NY

UNTSO 638 STOP SEC GEN FROM VON HORN STOP PARADE COMPLETED

AT 1500Z WITHOUT ANY INCIDENTS REPORTED

CFM 638 1500Z

TELEGRAM UNIT

1950 APR 24 1010 53

UNITED NATIONS

S/G

CONFIRMATION COPY
TELETYPE UNIT

108 SSS NY 76 24 2344Z =

UNATIONS

JERUSALEM =

260 VON HORN FROM SECGEN STOP IT IS NOW PAST MIDNIGHT 24TH
AND I HOPE SILENCE AFTER YOUR 638 MEANS THAT OUR HOPES WERE
CONFIRMED STOP THIS IS THE OCCASION FOR US HERE TO CONGRATULATE
YOU ALL ON AN EFFICIENT AND MOST JUDICIOUS HANDLING OF A VERY
THORNY =

P2/26 =

SITUATION STOP I AM SURE THAT ALL THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE SHARE THIS
APPRECIATION OF A MOST VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IN THE TRUE
INTEREST OF THE TWO COUNTRIES CONCERNED +

CFM 260 24TH 638 +

UNATIONS
APR 24 PM 6:56
TELEGRAPH UNIT

3 JERUSALEM PN PN PN 931 23 0158Z

P1/51

UNATIONS NY

PRIORITENATIONS

UNISO 624

CORDIER INFO FOOTE FROM VON HORN STOP FOLLOWING IS TEXT PRESS
RELEASE ISSUED TODAY 23RD APRIL JERUSALEM STOP QUOTE AT THE
308TH EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
DASH ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION HELD ON 22 DASH
23 APRIL CMA IN THE ABSENCE OF

P2

THE ISRAELI DELEGATION CMA THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION TABLED BY
THE JORDAN DELEGATION WAS ADOPTED BY TWO VOTES OF JORDAN
DELEGATION CMA THE CHAIRMAN ABSTAINED STOP PARA SUBQUOTE THE
MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION HAVING DISCUSSED THE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
REPORT DATED 21 APRIL 1958 WRITTEN FOR INVESTIGATION
ON JORDAN COMPLAINT NO 609 FINDS

P3

CLN THAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES CONCENTRATED TROOPS WITH
HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT CMA 80 TANKS 24 GUNS 155 MM
12 GUNS 105 MM CALIBER CMA AND 900 SOLDIERS STOP PARA STOP
DECIDES THAT THIS CONCENTRATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED TROOPS
AND TANKS WITH THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN ISRAELI SECTOR OF
JERUSALEM

P4

BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES IS AVE SERIOUS AND INTENDED BREACH
OF ARTICLE SEVEN PARA ONE OF THE GGGAAA CMA AND PARA ONE AAA
PARA TWO AAA OF ANNEX TWO TO THE GGGAAA STOP PARA STOP CALLS
UPON ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY ALL THE
ABOVE MENTIONED FORCES CMA TANKS AND

P5

HEAVY EQUIPMENTS OUT OF JERUSALEM AND ANY OTHER FORCES BEYOND
THE DEFENSIVE FORCES ALLOWED IN THE GGGAAAAAAA STOP PARA
STOP REQUESTS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVE THE EXECUTION OF
THIS RESOLUTION BY ISRAEL AND INFORM JORDAN WITHIN 12 HOURS
FROM THE TIME OF ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION UNSUBQUOTE STOP
PARA

P6

P6

STOP THE CHAIRMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT CLN
SUBQUOTE EYE HAVE ABSTAINED ON THIS RESOLUTION BECAUSE
EYE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE MMMAAACCC WAS EMPOWERED TO TAKE
AYE DECISION ON THE JORDANIAN COMPLAINT STOP ACCORDING TO
THE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE OF THE MMMAAACCC CMA AGREEMENT
HAS TO BE REACHED BETWEEN THE

P7

PARTIES ON THE INVESTIGATION OF AYE COMPLAINT CMA OR ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN LIEU THEREOF CMA BEFORE SUCH
COMPLAINT CAN BE BROUGHT FOR CONSIDERATION STOP THE ISRAELI
DELEGATION HAS REFUSED TO AGREE TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
JORDANIAN COMPLAINT STOP IT HAS ALSO REFUSED TO AGREE THAT THE

P8

DATA ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE JERUSALEM AREA GIVEN TO THE
JORDAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 21 APRIL
1958 BE ACCEPTED BY THE MMMAAACCC IN LIEU OF AN INVESTIGATION
STOP DURING THE DEBATE CMA EYE REGRETFULLY NOTED THAT THIS
POSITION OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE
FOR THE

P9

MMMAAACCC TO PROCEED WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE JORDAN
COMPLAINT STOP PARA STOP AS THERE HAS BEEN AYE DECISION OF THE
MMMAAACCC ON THE MATTER CMA TAKEN BY THE AFFIRMATIVE VOTE
OF ONE PARTY CMA IN THE ABSENCE OF THE OTHER CMA MYSELF ABSTAINING
CMA EYE WISH TO MAKE THE

P10

FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS STOP PARA AS REGARDS THE WAY IN WHICH
THE PRESENT SITUATION HAS DEVELOPED CMA IT SHOULD BE NOTED
THAT BOTH THE TTTSSSOOO AND JORDAN HAVE BEEN FACED WITH A FAIT
ACCOMPLI STOP THE ISRAEL DELEGATION INFORMED ME ON 24TH
JANUARY AND FORMED THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION ON 27 FEB

UNITED NATIONS
1958 APR 22 PM 11:12
TELEGRAPH UNIT

P11

THAT AVE PARADE WAS GOING TO BE HELD IN THE NEW CITY OF
JERUSALEM ON 24 APRIL CMA BUT NO INFORMATION WAS THEN GIVEN
ON THE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND THE KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD
BE BROUGHT INTO THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE STOP THE TTTSSSOO
SOUGHT THIS

P12

INFORMATION REPEATEDLY CMA BUT DID NOT RECEIVE DETAILED DATA
UNTIL 17 APRIL CMA WHEN EQUIPMENT PROHIBITED IN THE
JERUSALEM AREA UNDER ARTICLE ROMAN SEVEN PARA ONE OF THE GGCAAA
HAD ALREADY ARRIVED STOP AS INDICATED ABOVE CMA SIMILAR INFORMA-
TION WAS GIVEN BY THE JUNIOR ISRAEL DELEGATE TO THE JUNIOR
JORDAN

P13

DELEGATE IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE YESTERDAY CMA 21 APRIL STOP
PARA STOP THE STATED PURPOSE OF ISRAEL CMA IN BRINGING PRO-
HIBITED EQUIPMENT INTO THE JERUSALEM AREA CMA IS TO HAVE SUCH
EQUIPMENT IN AVE MILITARY PARADE CMA IN WHICH THE TROOPS
CMA TANKS AND GUNS ARE WITHOUT AMMUNITION STOP THERE IS

P14

NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THIS REPRESENTS THE INTENTION OF THE
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES STOP ON THE OTHER HAND CMA THE JORDAN
GOVT HAS CONSIDERED THAT CMA IRRESPECTIVE OF ISRAELS INTENTIONS
CMA THERE WERE RISKS IN THE SITUATION CREATED BY ISRAELS ACTION
STOP IT HAS TAKEN COUNTER MEASURES CMA AS ANNOUNCED

P15

IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN AMMAN ON 20 APRIL CMA ACCORDINGLY
TO WHICH ORDERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO REINFORCE THE JORDAN TROOPS
IN THE JERUSALEM AREA AND IN THE CITY ITSELF AND ALSO TO
REINFORCE THEM WITH HEAVY WEAPONS TO THE EXTENT AND QUANTITIES
NECESSARY TO FACE THE ISRAEL WEAPONS

P16

P16

STOP THUS CMA FOLLOWING THE ISRAEL FORMAL BREACH OF THE
GGGAAAA CMA WE ARE CMA AS AYE CONSEQUENCE WHICH JORDAN HAS
DEEMED NECESSARY FOR HER SECURITY CMA ALSO FACED WITH AYE
FORMAL BREACH BY JORDAN OF THE SAME AGREEMENT STOP PARA STOP
IN THE SITUATION WHICH NOW PREVAILS CMA THE

P17

MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION MUST
BE TWOFOLD CLN TO COOPERATE WITH BOTH PARTIES WITH AYE VIEW
TO PREVENTING INCIDENTS WHILE THE GGGAAA IS BEING VIOLATED
THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF PROHIBITED MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR FORCES
IN THE JERUSALEM AREA SEMICLN AND TO SECURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
THE

P18

REESTABLISHMENT OF COMPLIANCE BY BOTH SIDES WITH ARTICLE ROMAN
SEVEN PARA ONE OF THE GGGAAA STOP CERTAIN MEASURES AIMED AT
MINIMIZING THE RISK OF INCIDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECOMMENDED
BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TTTSSSOOO STOP EYE FIRMLY HOPE
THAT BOTH PARTIES WILL FULLY COOPERATE WITH HIM AND

P19/31

ALSO THAT THEY WILL IMPRESS ON THEIR RESPECTIVE ARMY CMA POLICE
AND CIVILIAN POPULATION THE NECESSITY OF COMPLYING WITH THE
INSTRUCTIONS THEY HAVE ISSUED IN ORDER TO AVOID INCIDENTS
UNSUBQUOTE UNQUOTE .

CFM 62A 23RD 22 23 21 1958 609 80 2A 155 12 105 900 12 2A 17 21 20

UNITED NATIONS
REC 67122 PM11:29
TELETYPE UNIT