

**Congo. Dag Hammarskjöld's  
strictly personal  
correspondence: Congo. Dag  
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R. Dayal Story 1960/61

(Papers collected and marked by  
D.H., - from the safe in his office)

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

16 November 1960

Chester Bowles (Long distance telephone conversation)

He said he was anxious to talk about Congo affairs as he and his colleagues had been very disturbed at the attitude of the State Department to my report. During this period of interregnum there is no proper direction from Washington. When the new Administration takes over, it will give great attention to the Congo problem as it is very sensitive to developments in Africa. He had himself visited the Congo some five years ago and had predicted that the Belgians would pull out suddenly in panic, but no one had listened to his views and it was thought that the Belgians would hold out for another 25 years.

Now that the UN had been saddled with the responsibility, it was entitled to full support and he was confident that the new Administration would show great understanding of this difficult problem. He saw in the UN action the beginnings of a form of "world government"; the pattern which was emerging would equally apply to territories like Angola, Mozambique, etc., which were also on the point of eruption. The UN would be compelled to assume wide responsibilities and to play a more direct role in guiding these emerging nations; otherwise there were dangers of serious conflict threatening international peace.

Mr. Bowles thought it was time to build up an international civil administration service, a start having already been made with the OPEX scheme. He would be in Washington on 20 November and would be contacting his colleagues in regard to the Congo problem. He and Mr. Stevenson expected to be in the new Administration but he would know in a week in what posts. He wished us the best of luck in our "difficult task".

R. Dayal

CONFIDENTIAL

24 May 1961  
ENGLISH

COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED UNDER THE TERMS OF  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1601 (XV)

Meeting at Headquarters, New York,  
on Wednesday, 24 May 1961, at 3 p.m.

Hearing of Mr. DAYAL

61-14470

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Dayal, thank you very much for making yourself available to us this afternoon. We feel that you will be able to give us some information regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Lumumba -- both before and after his death. Whatever you say will be treated as strictly confidential, and therefore you can speak as frankly as possible regarding the names and points of fact.

Mr. DAYAL: Mr. Chairman, I should be very happy to assist your Commission to the best of my ability and knowledge in your difficult task. I presume that you have already met with the officers who were immediately concerned with the problem on the spot and that they have given you full testimony. Therefore, I think it might be better if whatever I am to say should be of a somewhat more general nature, since -- I having over-all responsibility for the operation and being away from the scene of this tragedy -- my information of course was based upon the reports received from our officers. But I presume also, Mr. Chairman, that you and your colleagues have seen the various reports that I sent to the Secretary-General on this matter and that you also have copies of the telegrams exchanged with Headquarters on the subject which were issued immediately that information came to our knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN: We are in possession of these documents.

Mr. DAYAL: So whatever I say should be by way of supplement to that information.

Well, I can only say this: I myself was extremely worried and puzzled in regard to the circumstances which led to this tragedy, because up to that time, although the politicians there in the different factions were carrying out arbitrary arrests of their opponents one way or the other and keeping them locked up for some time or maltreating them, no actual killings had taken place until these killings and some others set some kind of pattern. Therefore, while the effort of the United Nations there was throughout to do whatever it could to prevent any type of political violence from breaking out -- and arbitrary arrests could be classified also as political violence -- somehow or other, by means of good offices and what not, the people were released, and nobody was actually

(Mr. Dayal)

done to death. **These** events were, therefore, particularly shocking.

I need not go into the circumstances of Mr. Lumumba's arrest or his incarceration with his colleagues at the Thysville camp, but from early in February we began to hear rumours that there was some dissatisfaction in Thysville among the soldiers and that they were conspiring to release Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues, who of course had a considerable personal following also among the soldiers. Various rumours came to be heard from time to time, until on 13 January there was this mutiny in Thysville. We heard that it was caused by the desire of the soldiers to release the prisoners -- there was some opposition, I believe, among the soldiers and the officers -- so that the President, Colonel Mobutu and Mr. Bomboko proceeded to Thysville to deal with the situation. The statement that they put out on their return was that the mutiny, if such it could be called, was due to dissatisfaction with the emoluments, and those emoluments were raised practically overnight by 300 per cent.

(Mr. Dayal)

That story obviously did not represent the full facts, because then we suddenly heard that on the seventeenth of that month -- a few days after -- Mr. Lumumba had arrived, in conditions of great secrecy, at Elisabethville. We do not know exactly how he was taken out from Thysville, but there was a story at the time that he was taken quietly by car to a small airfield, and from one plane to another, and finally transferred by, I believe, a DC-3 plane to Elisabethville. What we heard from Elisabethville has already been reported to you.

It was in the beginning of February that these rumours began to persist that these men had been put to death. Well, our people at Elisabethville were alert, and whatever information they had which was worth reporting they reported to us. At the same time the Press correspondents in Elisabethville began making inquiries there, and they asked questions at Press conferences and whatnot, and these rumours were denied by the Katangese authorities until 10 February, when the story was put out about the alleged escape of the prisoners. We are all aware of the subsequent events.

We immediately took action in Leopoldville as soon as this story on the 10th of the alleged escape was received, because it seemed highly suspicious, particularly coming at a time when these rumours had been circulating around. We sent General Iyassu, the Chief of Staff, with Mr. Knecht, who is a very experienced police officer, and a photographer to Elisabethville to make inquiries and to report to us. What happened to their mission has also, I believe, been reported to you.

Therefore, so far as the United Nations operation in the Congo is concerned, these are the only facts at our disposal, and anything beyond that, of course, is conjecture so far as we are concerned; and I believe it is for the Commission to try and take us further from this realm of conjecture to establish the facts.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: The information that Mr. Dayal has given us is, of course, what he had already communicated to the United Nations. We are not really disappointed because we expected just exactly that. However, we would like to see if Mr. Dayal would venture to go a bit beyond the conjecture point and tell us his own personal impressions on the basis of what he saw and what he heard, and then what were the thoughts in his own mind.

I wish, of course, to repeat what our Chairman has said, that anything he may care to tell us is absolutely confidential and, naturally, does not bind him because we are still in the field of conjecture and hypothesis.

Mr. DAYAL: Well, Mr. Chairman, there is very little that I really have to go by in answer to the question put by your colleague, and I can only go by facts. You, as well as I, have heard the rumours, and so on. It is very difficult for me to say to what extent the rumours are based upon anything.

Just to mention one example, after the event it was said that the prisoners had actually been killed very much earlier. But we do not know anybody -- at least I have not encountered anybody myself -- who could give that information. It may be that in the course of your inquiries -- and if there is some co-operation from the local authorities -- you may be able to track down these rumours.

So, we were not in any position at the time to track down these rumours. Our relations with the Katangese authorities were rather bad at the time, and the Leopoldville authorities also were not very co-operative, even in response to our attempts to ascertain facts in Leopoldville. Mr. Bomboko told me repeatedly that these people were prisoners. They were described also as common criminals. We were told that it was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, that the United Nations could not interfere in a matter of this kind.

(Mr. Dayal)

Of course, our anxiety was to see that human rights were observed and that due process of law was observed. Despite this rather negative approach on the part of the authorities both in Leopoldville and Elisabethville, we persisted in asking for due process of law to be observed.

You may have noticed in one of my reports that Mr. Bomboko made some kind of statement that they had the intention of trying the prisoners and that the United Nations had not provided them with magistrates for the purpose. Well, our function was not to provide them with magistrates in order to try their political opponents. Of course, we had a general responsibility to assist them in establishing some kind of a judiciary where none existed, but certainly not for the specific purpose of trying their political opponents.

The Leopoldville authorities' line throughout was that the United Nations must keep out of this, that it was their affair and that these people were no more, in their eyes, than common criminals; and very often I was charged and accused by them of in some way showing an undue interest in the fate of the prisoners. Well, I had to show interest in their fate because they were very eminent people. They were among the principal leaders of the Congo, and we were naturally afraid that they were being maltreated because there is, unfortunately, little respect for human rights. It was my duty at least to make them conscious of their responsibility. So this was the role that we performed throughout until the tragic news broke.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: Does Mr. Dayal hope or expect that the atmosphere among the authorities will be a bit more favourable to the Commission now than it was before?

Mr. DAYAL: Yes, in my opinion you will get -- or you should get: one cannot be very certain about these things in the Congo -- a certain degree of co-operation from the Leopoldville authorities. As you know, Mr. Tshombe has been detained by them, and it is said that one of the charges against him is the murder, as they call it, of Mr. Lumumba. From that point of view, it would perhaps be in their interests to assist the Commission.

As regards Elisabethville, it is more difficult to say. Some kind of evolution of the situation is taking place as a result of Mr. Tshombe's enforced absence. But what the shape of things will be by the time the Commission arrives there is, again, one of those imponderable factors in the Congo situation on which it is a little difficult to speculate. But I think that, on the whole, the prospects of finding out at least more than we know about this tragedy are not bad. I would not put it much higher than that; I think the prospects are fair.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: What is the general attitude in connexion with the possible responsibility of Mr. Kasa-Vubu?

Mr. DAYAL: Well, I should say this: It is said that these personages were arrested on the orders of the Leopoldville authorities. I believe Mr. Kasa-Vubu himself was the authority ordering the arrest. Therefore, that authority must be responsible for the safety of the prisoners, whatever the charges against them. That is, I think, an elementary principle of law: that the detaining authority must be responsible for the safety of the detained persons. If they sent these people to Elisabethville, the responsibility must be theirs. They sent them to an area which claimed not to be under the authority of Leopoldville. Therefore, the moment these people arrived in Elisabethville, the Leopoldville authorities must have known that they were no longer in any position to enforce their responsibility -- assuming that Mr. Tshombe would not have listened to them.

Mr. Tshombe, for his part, told our representative -- I do not know how far it is correct -- that they had been anxious, ever since November, and I should say that the real date should be since early December, since their apprehension of these people, to get them transferred to Katanga, but that he had resisted.

(Mr. Dayal)

Nevertheless, when those people actually arrived there, the information that we had from the United Nations Guard present seemed to indicate that the authorities were prepared for their receipt. They had 130 to 150 soldiers waiting for them; they had jeeps, and so on. Apparently, they also made a special exit from the airport. It does show prior knowledge and preparation.

Mr. HAILEMARIAM: When Mr. Lumumba was under United Nations protection, was he free to move or was he confined to his house?

Mr. DAYAL: You see, Mr. Lumumba was under United Nations protection --

Mr. HAILEMARIAM: How did he escape without the knowledge of the guards there?

Mr. DAYAL: He was not a prisoner of the United Nations. We were there to prevent people from getting in to him in order to do him harm. So a mixed guard was placed around his house, consisting of representatives from various units under the United Nations. There was another guard put around the United Nations guard by the Congolese Army, whose function apparently was to prevent him from getting out. Mr. Lumumba was perfectly free to leave if he wanted to -- but the Congolese guard was there to prevent him from doing so. Our guard was to prevent unauthorized persons from coming in.

As to how he left, we now know that at night -- the date, I think, was 27 November, and there was a heavy rainstorm -- a car came in, which I think was recognized as his car, so that the United Nations guards let it in. And then it went out with -- it was a dark night -- it went out. No particular suspicions were aroused at that time. I think the guards took the precaution to inform their Commander. I heard the news the next morning that this movement had taken place, and there were certain suspicions attached to it. But it was really the function of the Congolese Army guards to find out who went out, if anybody did.

(Mr. Dayal)

It was only later in the day, when they went in to find out -- they were accompanied by a member of the United Nations Guard -- that they found the house was empty and Mr. Lumumba had left. Whether it was an act of collusion on the part of the Congolese guard, or whether they were failing in their duty or had gone to sleep or something like that, we do not know. But, as regards his leaving the premises, the responsibility was certainly not ours.

Mr. FAILEMARIAM: When Mr. Lumumba was arrested, did he ask for United Nations protection?

Mr. DAYAL: No. You see, the movements of Mr. Lumumba, unlike those of some of his colleagues who were able to reach the haven of Oriental Province, where they were safe, were rather public. He was a courageous man, and he made speeches in the villages that he passed through. I think he made a speech at Kilwit, a town en route, and he did not proceed with the speed with which he could have proceeded. I think he gave time for his captors to catch up with him.

M. D'ALMEIDA : Je voudrais un complément aux rapports que nous avons déjà reçus du Secrétaire général. Tout d'abord, dans un rapport du 11 février 1961, Excellence, vous déclariez que vous avez eu des entretiens avec le Ministre de l'intérieur de Léopoldville, M. Adoula. Est-il possible de savoir ce qui a été dit au cours de cette entrevue?

Mr. DAYAL: Well, as far as I can reconstruct what Mr. Adoula said to me, he expressed very great concern about the fate of Mr. Lumumba. I may add that Mr. Adoula himself is a rather moderate person, who had kept out of these factional rivalries to a considerable extent, I think. To my knowledge, he was busy trying to work for national reconciliation, and he was opposed to this drift toward civil war and political violence. He was also very greatly concerned in regard to the responsibility of the Leopoldville authorities in the matter. As far as I can recollect, he also told me that his consistent attempts had been to try to bring about reconciliation between the principal leaders representing the main political trends in the Congo -- and Mr. Lumumba very definitely was a leader of a very important trend of political opinion.

(Mr. Dayal)

I think he also told me that he was unsuccessful in his efforts because the President was surrounded by bad counsellors and he did not listen to the good advice. For the rest, all that I can say is that he regarded this whole action as arbitrary and without due process of law. He said he would try and find out from the security chief, a gentleman by the name of Mr. Ndeka -- and he might also be able to give some information to the Commission -- whether there were any files against Mr. Lumumba, any information against him on the basis of which charges could be framed. He, as a responsible man, was conscious of the fact that this kind of arbitrary arrest of prominent personalities would not redound to the good name of the Congo, quite apart from its other consequences. That is about as much as I can remember of this conversation on the basis of my report to the Secretary-General.

M. D'ALMEIDA : Merci beaucoup, Excellence, mais il me semble avoir remarqué, dans un télégramme, que M. Adoula vous avait promis qu'après avoir recueilli les renseignements auprès du chef de la sûreté, il vous téléphonerait pour vous dire exactement ce qui s'était passé, et pour vous donner tous les renseignements concernant le dossier de M. Lumumba. Est-ce que M. Adoula vous a téléphoné ou bien avez-vous eu l'occasion de le rencontrer au sujet de cette affaire?

Mr. DAYAL: I continued to meet Mr. Adoula frequently, but I got no further information from him on the subject. My impression is that there was in fact no information in the files of the Department of Security in relation to Mr. Lumumba.

M. D'ALMEIDA : Merci beaucoup, Excellence. Une dernière question, si vous le permettez. Il s'agit de l'arrivée de M. Lumumba au Katanga. Vous avez envoyé le général Yassou, un nommé M. Knecht et le capitaine Fidès pour essayer d'éclaircir la question concernant Lumumba. Vous avez spécifié que M. Knecht et le capitaine Fidès devaient procéder aux opérations d'enquête par toutes les voies possibles et notamment qu'ils devaient se servir d'hélicoptères. Nous avons que M. Tshombé n'a pas reçu le général Yassou, mais d'un autre côté, est-ce que M. Knecht et le capitaine Fidès vous ont rendu compte de leur mission? Vous ont-ils donné le résultat de leur enquête?

Mr. DAYAL: Yes. These two gentlemen were there to assist General Iyassu in the inquiry, and they were not able to bring back any substantial information. They also heard these various rumours. I would suggest that the Commission should meet with Mr. Knecht, at which time it could ask him directly what sort of rumours he heard on the spot.

I may add another piece of information not connected with this question, if I may. After the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues had been acknowledged by the Katangese authorities, I made persistent efforts and sent two, or three telegrams to Mr. Tshombe asking for the bodies. I had a request also to that effect from the widows, and I based my request not only on this humane consideration but also on the desire to give the deceased a proper burial according to the Bantu rites. I had very negative replies from Mr. Tshombe. In the last reply he expressed his doubt of my knowledge of Bantu customs. Well, I must admit that he knows more about them than I do; nevertheless I had these requests and it was my duty to do my utmost to pass them on to Mr. Tshombe. I regret to say that they were rejected.

Mr. HAILEMARIAM: You said that there were rumours before the escape of Mr. Lumumba from his prison was actually announced by the Katanga authorities, rumours to the effect that the escape was a camouflage of murder, and so on. At that time when the rumours were circulating, what was the attitude and the reaction of the Leopoldville authorities?

Mr. DAYAL: Rumours were circulating, I should say about the beginning of February, that these people had been done to death. Our representatives in Elisabethville were vigilant and they were informing us in a general way of the rumours. They were trying to make what inquiries they could, but they were not able to track anything down. The Congo is a great place for rumours. They keep coming up all the time and very often they are not substantiated -- they are generally not. But I must say that they did fill me with a certain amount of anxiety, although, as I said earlier, until that time actual political assassinations or killings had not taken place and one still could continue to hope that no tragedy would follow.

(Mr. Dayal)

I also mentioned the January rumours of the likelihood of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues being released from Thysville; but of course, there again, they did not particularize.

Mr. HAILEMARIAM: What was the reaction of the authorities in Leopoldville to these rumours? Were they feeling uneasy or happy or what?

Mr. DAYAL: I did not detect any particular reaction to this. I cannot even recall whether I tried to get their reaction to the rumours as such.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Dayal, when these rumours came floating around, was there any denial from the Leopoldville Government? Did they say that Lumumba was still alive?

Mr. DAYAL: No, the Leopoldville Government did not say a word.

The CHAIRMAN: I see from one of the reports that even on the 9th of February Mr. Tshombe said that Mr. Lumumba was alive.

Mr. DAYAL: Yes, that is Mr. Tshombe in Elisabethville. I thought you were asking about the Leopoldville authorities.

The CHAIRMAN: We concern ourselves with the Leopoldville authorities first. Now on the 9th of February Mr. Tshombe said that Mr. Lumumba was still alive. Having regard to the fact that he did not allow the Red Cross authorities to see Mr. Lumumba and the members of the Conciliation Commission to see Mr. Lumumba, don't you think that there was some sort of foundation to this rumour that he had been done away with much earlier than reported?

Mr. DAYAL: If you want my personal opinion, I believe that they were done away with a good deal earlier under conditions of very great secrecy, and that it was only when these rumours began to get persistent -- with the Conciliation Commission pressing to see them and with the Red Cross pressing to see them -- that they had to come out with some kind of a story. This is my personal belief, but naturally I cannot prove it. That is why I think that

(Mr. Dayal)

this entire story of their escape and so on is rather fanciful. Having been associated myself for many years with the execution of the law in the Appellate Court and the Court of first jurisdiction, the story on the face of it does not deserve credence.

(Mr. Dayal)

I may add also that when you see the plan of the site from which Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues were said to have escaped, it will also seem rather unconvincing -- how they could have got out, how they could have started the car which was there; how they could have evaded the sentry and got past the sentry-house crossed a bridge at which we are told a sentry was also posted, and made their escape. The whole thing seemed to be a little too contrived.

So I myself -- I am not talking in a judicial capacity, but it is my duty to place before you my feelings on the subject -- I myself am convinced that this assassination took place a good deal before. When and how, naturally we do not know.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: If I am not mistaken, you said a while ago that in the Congo political assassinations are not habitual or customary. Is that right? Did I understand you rightly?

Mr. DAYAL: No. What I said was that until that time --

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: Yes, that is it -- at that time.

Mr. DAYAL: Until that time, at the beginning of February, while arbitrary arrests, and so on, had taken place, no political leader had actually been killed.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: Exactly. Then my question is this: Since there was no habit of political assassination, why do you think the rumours started so early that there had been a political assassination?

Mr. DAYAL: Well, I did not say that there was no habit of political assassination.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: Yes, I understand.

Mr. DAYAL: But until that time none had taken place. The Congo is very full of rumours, and you always hear the most extreme type of

(Mr. Dayal)

rumour, that something has happened to so-and-so, and then when you make inquiry you find that he is all right. I do not know whether the rumours were based on anything more than this, or, since there is no such thing as a perfect crime, whether something had leaked out, which was known to some people, on the basis of which these stories started.

The CHAIRMAN: When the Conciliation Commission was at Elisabethville, Mr. Dayal, Mr. Delvaux and Mr. Ndeka happened to be in Elisabethville too. I know that they even said that they would try to intervene with Mr. Tshombe so that the Commission might see Mr. Lumumba. What was your impression of their presence there? Would they be in a position to know whether Mr. Lumumba was already dead then?

Mr. DAYAL: It is difficult for me to answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I would like, however, to say just this, that Mr. Delvaux was a fanatical enemy of Mr. Lumumba, and so was Mr. Ndeka. And Mr. Ndeka, the Security Chief, was rather a ruthless young man. Their going up and down to Elisabethville on this occasion is something which I myself regard as highly suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN: Was any reason assigned by Mr. Tshombe for his refusing to see General Iyassu and his companions?

Mr. DAYAL: I was still given the usual reply, that this was an internal matter, that he had nothing to discuss with General Iyassu.

The CHAIRMAN: Did Mr. Tshombe tell you anything regarding the body of Mr. Lumumba when you made that request?

Mr. DAYAL: Yes. He said that it had been buried, but that he could not disclose the place of burial because that would imperil the villagers in whose area they were supposed to have been apprehended and killed. And then he quoted something from Bantu custom to refute my arguments for the body.

I would suggest that when you go to Leopoldville, Mr. Chairman, you ask for a copy of that correspondence. It is there in our files. I do not know whether they have it here, but it is certainly there.

The CHAIRMAN: The place of burial would certainly be in Katanga?

Mr. DAYAL: Well, I imagine so.

The CHAIRMAN: To your knowledge, was there any autopsy performed on the body of Mr. Lurumba to indicate what sort of death he met with?

Mr. DAYAL: The Belgian doctor who went with the so-called investigation commission sent out by the Katanga authorities is supposed to have made an autopsy, but it has not been disclosed to us.

Mr. MARTINEZ de ALVA: Is a copy of the death certificate available?

Mr. DAYAL: I would suggest that you ask this question when you get to Leopoldville or Elisabethville. We have not got a copy ourselves.

M. D'ALMEIDA : Si je puis me permettre une inférence de votre précédente déclaration, j'ai cru comprendre qu'on vous aurait montré le lieu prétendu de la détention de M. Lumumba, ou le lieu d'où M. Lumumba se serait échappé. D'autre part, on vous aurait montré un pont et on vous aurait décrit les circonstances de l'évasion.

Puis-je me permettre de vous demander comment vous avez été mis au courant de cette nouvelle et par qui?

Mr. DAYAL: No, I have never been to the scene. I have never stepped into Katanga Province. But after our people -- General Iyassu, Mr. Knecht and others -- went there, some press correspondents were taken there, to the alleged scene, the spot from where these people were said to have escaped, and some of the correspondent made a rough chart of the house and the surrounding area, where the sentries were said to have been posted, where the car was, and so on. We managed to get a copy of this rough chart which had been prepared there on the spot by some correspondents. I think Mr. Knecht will be able to give you some more information about it because, mind you, although he could not get much in Elisabethville itself, after his return to Leopoldville he continued making inquiries, and so on. I would suggest also that you see this chart when you get there, that you ask Mr. Knecht to give you a copy.

(Mr. Dayal)

In any case, whether or not we have the chart, I would repeat what I said earlier -- namely, that I have had some experience in the administration of justice and the whole story seemed rather unconvincing to me.

The CHAIRMAN: It did not ring true?

Mr. DAYAL: No, it did not ring true.

M. d'ALMEIDA : Pourriez-vous nous indiquer quelques correspondants de presse susceptibles d'être interrogés à ce sujet et qui pourraient nous être utiles?

Mr. DAYAL: I am sorry, but I do not recall the names. However, you may be quite sure that Mr. Knecht will place all his information at your disposal unreservedly.

Mr. HAILEMARIAM: My question relates not to facts, but only to impressions. Mr. Dayal, you have been in Leopoldville for quite a while and you must be quite familiar with the whole situation there. The authorities said that the transfer of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues to Elisabethville was for purposes of safety. But since at that time relations between the Leopoldville authorities and the Katanga Provincial Government were strained, how was it possible for the Leopoldville Government to have confidence in Mr. Tshombe -- if there was not some kind of agreement concerning Mr. Lumumba's liquidation? What is your opinion?

Mr. DAYAL: I share your thoughts in asking that question. Certainly it was not for safety reasons that Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues were sent there. I think that some statement was made to the effect that they were sent to Katanga because there was no prison which was secure enough in the area under the control of the Leopoldville authorities, no prison from which there was not a danger that these people would escape or be taken out by friends of theirs. In view, also, of Mr. Tshombe's attitude towards Mr. Lumumba and of the past history of their relations, the fact that these people were sent into Mr. Tshombe's hands certainly evokes very strong suspicions concerning the motivations of those who sent them there.

The CHAIRMAN: President Kasa-Vubu is supposed to have said that Mr. Lumumba was sent to Elisabethville in order to ensure his safety. Is that correct?

Mr. DAYAL: I think that that is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Kasa-Vubu is also supposed to have said that he did not consider that Mr. Lumumba's life was in danger in Katanga.

Mr. DAYAL: Yes.

The CHAIRMAN: Did Mr. Kasa-Vubu suggest that Mr. Lumumba escaped with the connivance of the United Nations authorities?

Mr. DAYAL: Yes. In fact, we had to do a great deal to convince him that that was absolutely not true.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: And he said that it was on this account that he had decided to transfer these three prisoners to Elisabethville.

Mr. DAYAL: I do not know because the transfer took place very much later than the escape. The escape, I think, was at the end of November, and the transfer took place on 17 January.

The CHAIRMAN: And Mr. Kasa-Vubu also thought that Mr. Lumumba had won over the soldiers in Thysville. Was that his opinion?

Mr. DAYAL: Well, the statement which they put out after the visit to Thysville on 14 January, of course, did not refer to this; it merely spoke of the dissatisfaction of the soldiers there with the emoluments. I think it is a generally accepted fact that there was some rumbling among the soldiers in regard to the detention of these people -- there was some dissatisfaction in their minds. Mr. Lumumba had made himself quite popular with the garrison. He used to move around with them, and it is said that on Christmas Day he took part in a Christmas dinner with them; so that they may have felt that there could be a danger, after the crisis of 13 January, of his getting out. That was also the feeling in Leopoldville; he could not have been kept in Thysville indefinitely.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Dayal. Your statement has been very illuminating on certain points and we are sure that it will prove valuable in our work.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.



OUR VISION

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*Verbally answered  
by Mr. W. W. W. W. W.  
20 March '61*

20 March, 1961.

Excellency,

I have read in the newspapers this morning that Your Excellency has decided to renew Mr. Dayal's contract to continue to be your personal representative in the Congo "as long as he is available".

It is further suggested that this is one of the conditions under which the Indian Government agreed to supply the combatant troops which have just arrived in the Congo.

As this piece of news, if true, is of paramount importance to my Government, I shall be most grateful if you will inform me of the true position in order that I might inform my Government accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

Minister of Economic Development,  
Chairman of the Delegation of Nigeria to the United Nations.

His Excellency,  
Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,  
Secretary General of the United Nations,  
United Nations,  
New York.

23 March 1961

In the light of the experience gained in the course of the United Nations operation in the Congo, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Leopoldville, Ambassador Dayal, have taken advantage of the latter's visit to Headquarters to jointly review administrative arrangements affecting the operation both at Headquarters and in Leopoldville. On the recommendation of Ambassador Dayal, the Secretary-General has decided to re-organise the representation in Leopoldville in such manner as to take fuller account of the scope, diversity and character of the tasks of that representation, combining, as it does, <sup>elements of an</sup> important/administrative, supervisory, policy making, consultative and negotiation nature.

Thus, in place of one Special Representative, there will be a Representation by a group of three members, each of whom will be accredited to the Congolese authorities, with equal rank. Internally, however, the group will function under the chairmanship of one of its members who, in case of differing opinions in the group, on questions requiring its decision and not referred to the Secretary-General, will have the deciding voice.

Within the group, the members are to fulfill the various tasks incumbent on the Representation in accordance with the division of responsibilities defined by the chairman or agreed upon among the members.

It is intended that the new arrangement will be set up in the course of the month of April and will begin to function around the first of May. The composition of the group will be announced shortly.

On his return to Leopoldville, following the completion of his consultations, which is likely to be about mid-April, Ambassador Dayal will work together with be assisted by the members of the group and will acquaint them with the work until the group itself

is ready to take over under the new arrangement. Ambassador Dayal will then return to Headquarters for a time in order to assist the Secretary-General with tasks relating to the Headquarters aspects of the Congo operation. The administrative set-up for the operation at Headquarters will be further strengthened by the addition of a limited number of experts. In this regard, Dr. <sup>R.</sup><sub>2</sub> Gardiner and Mr. F. Nwokedi, who are at present on a special mission to the Congo, have been for some time in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in such capacity.

27 March 1961

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Adlai,

I tried to see you today in order to tell you how things developed regarding the Dayal question. However, as you are not back until late I shall have a word instead with Yost and ask him to give you the annexed notes.

.....

Dag Hammarskjöld

H.E. Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson,  
Permanent Representative to the  
United Nations,  
United States Mission to the  
United Nations,  
2 Park Avenue,  
New York, N.Y.

SECRET

1. A couple of weeks ago you raised with me a question concerning Ambassador Dayal's term of office. I stated in brief

a) that he had promised to "stay over the hump" but that, on the other hand, he had also stated that the post was always at my disposal;

b) that he would come to New York, on his own initiative, and that I would have an opportunity to study in detail the problem with him;

c) that I intended at all events to add top officials in the Congo which would make for greater flexibility in all personal questions of this kind;

d) that I was building up an Afro-Asian panel in the Executive Office which would give me also a possibility to test out people for the top operations in Leopoldville and arrange for smooth transitions by rotation;

e) that in view of the general political complications, Dayal's own evaluation of how we could best act would be of decisive importance as, for many reasons, I should not act in a way which would not have his own concurrence and support;

f) that as a matter of course I limited my considerations entirely to the admittedly serious problem which had arisen because of Kasavubu's reactions, refusing even to discuss the artificial and slanderous campaign against Ambassador Dayal, for which I had found no justification whatsoever in substance.

2. Reverting to the matter a week ago, I informed you that I had so far not taken the opportunity to discuss the question with Dayal, but that I intended to take it up for detailed consideration the next few days. I clarified a misunderstanding which had arisen, in pointing out that, while I had given you a picture of the various moves I had in mind, one result of which would be the widest possible mobility, and while my stand must depend on the conclusions of my discussions with Dayal, I had always felt that the return of Dayal to Leopoldville after his visit to New York was necessary. I also made it clear that Tom Hamilton's article had no basis in fact, as no decision had been taken by me in any direction.

3. Irrespective of the stand of Dayal, who as always is cooperative although worried from a general political viewpoint and, not unnaturally, feeling hurt because of the repeated attacks on his integrity from quarters he respects, I find myself at present in the following position. On the one side, the difficulties to maintain satisfactory diplomatic relations with the Leopoldville authorities are as grave as ever and present me with a serious problem which, at some stage, I must somehow manage to cut through. At the same time I know full well that similar difficulties are likely to arise whoever is the representative and whatever setting I give him, because of the fact that basically the UN operation is not understood or accepted in all of its implications by the Leopoldville authorities who once rejected Dr. Bunche and, in substance, continue to show an un-cooperative attitude also in relation to Mr. Abbas. On the other hand, any move just now which would change the representation, presents grave drawbacks seriously aggravated by developments over the last week or so; I shall specify those drawbacks below. Thus, I am facing a situation where I must cruise between the Scylla of bad relations in Leopoldville and the Charybdis made up of all the elements which militate against any move at the present moment.

4. The difficulties which I now have to face have a triple aspect.

a) The lack of cooperation from the Leopoldville authorities, characterised now especially by their unwillingness to straighten out the Matadi situation - which they created themselves by a planned attack - continues, on the case of Matadi entering the fourth week. At the same time, Kasvubu has continued his attacks on Dayal basing himself on arguments the fallacy of which he must know. (Both from him and from other sources, the last weeks have brought out new allegations which are, to say the least, fanciful). If with this lack of cooperation and facing such arguments and such public statements I would move Dayal, it would have an extremely bad effect in the future on our relations with the Leopoldville authorities. I am afraid that they feel already that they can push us back and around by appropriate noises to foreign representatives add to the press, as well as by taking military

action for which they seem to be excused while it would be considered inadmissible if taken from our side. As you know, nothing is more dangerous than to show weakness in the face of something which, to use a bad word, has in it an element of blackmail.

b) Washington attitudes have now become common knowledge through leaks from Washington and on the basis of various statements the origin of which has lent them credence. This has given rise to a widespread idea among delegations at the UN -- and in e.g. the Indian press -- that the United States exercises pressure on me. I have had to go to the point of flatly denying this in order to counter the bad effects. However, even as late as today you find, for example, an article in the Tribune the tenor of which is determined by Leopoldville spokesmen but in which "Western diplomats" are quoted. You will readily see, I am sure, that for me to move now, under the circumstances, would, however unjustly, be construed in Afro-Asian circles as bowing to United States pressure. This would be as harmful to the United States as it would be to the operation and to myself. In fact, if there is one record of mine which is so far not contested, it is that I have never given in on personnel questions in relation to any government -- and that has been of very great importance.

c) You probably know that the sending of Indian troops to the Congo was not well received in the Indian Parliament mainly on the ground that India might at any time face an emergency against China and may need all her armed forces. Were the Dayal problem to blow up in India, because of any move now, as seems practically unavoidable in the light of a) and b) above, it would in the circumstances definitely be very embarrassing to Nehru in India. Furthermore it would probably affect his relations to the United States, and even endanger the follow-up on the troop decision, with all that this would mean in the Congo as well as for the UN and India in relation to certain other parties and situations.

5. In spite of the difficulties enumerated in the previous paragraph -- difficulties, I have to emphasize, which have taken on a much more serious character in the last few days than they have had before -- I have looked at

the possibility of finding a formula which could lead to a fairly rapid solution avoiding the pitfalls and reflecting solid substantive considerations. The best one would be a switch to a system where instead of one representative (with or without two deputies) we would have a representation consisting of a committee of three. This would, properly staged, be an arrangement very well adjusted for long-term needs, while, on the other hand, Dayal obviously could go back to Pakistan as he would have no reason to step down to a less significant role and matters would be well in hand. He would therefore go back to Leopoldville in order to trim the new arrangement, but not become a member of the committee himself, and thus leave, once the new representation got under way. However, on this point again, a very serious political problem arises. Superficially, the formula would have a certain similarity to the Soviet suggestion for the Secretary-General-ship, although, in fact, it would be very different. The resemblance is great enough for me to anticipate that it would be abused in the propaganda. Now, in the various replies to Krushchev, for example from Nehru, the platform chosen for rejection of the Russian attitude seems generally to have been that any departure in the Executive from the one-man formula to any type of collective responsibility would represent an unacceptable weakening. Thus again, by trying some formula of the kind I indicated here, I would seriously embarrass some UN supporters and, in particular Nehru, on a point of considerable relevance in the present political situation. Naturally, that is a decisive argument.

6. What I have said here leads me to the conclusion that, for the moment and due to recent developments, I am forced into a kind of immobilism: the conditions are simply not there for me to make any immediate move involving Dayal. The stakes are high in both directions, but the counter arguments, as matters stand today, are the more serious ones. What I can do now, therefore, is only to put in before long two deputies in Leopoldville ( one of them would probably be Mr. Gardiner, who is already there ). This would soften the hard edge of the problem and introduce a new channel of communication. On the other hand,

I would feel that Dayal should stay at Headquarters until the end of the Congo debate and thereafter take the promised week in Switzerland. This would probably mean that we would have to function in Leopoldville on an acting or deputy basis until very late April or even early May. In the meanwhile, the constellations which I have had to take into account for a solution of the difficulty may well have changed, and things which seem impossible now may have become manageable. Anyway, the situation is one which strongly indicates that I must play for time, avoiding any hard moves which would aggravate matters, while, on the other hand, continuing a fairly soft front in relation to the Leopoldville authorities.

7. Finally, you will remember that when we met a week ago, I stated to you in very definite terms that, on the moral level and as a matter of principle, I would never permit myself any compromise which in any way, so to say by default, would imply an endorsement of the substantive criticism of Dayal: the decision would have to be based on sound substantive considerations of the proper arrangements for the operation, and it would have to have Dayal's endorsement. In the circumstances, obviously, it is not only fair all round, but essential from my point of view, that the United States assist in giving Dayal the moral redress which is his due, thus also killing the stories about United States pressure.

# Hammaraskjold Under Pressure in Congo Dispute

United Nations, N. Y.

The United Nations Secretary-General is under heavy pressure to dismiss his special representative in the Congo, Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal.

Mr. Hammaraskjold is reported trying to resist this pressure and to reject the motivations behind it.

Diplomats who know Ambassador Dayal intimately feel certain that he is not the kind of man to resign under pressure even though he might have considered at a certain moment the advisability of returning to his post as Indian High Commissioner (Ambassador) to Pakistan.

High UN officials consider this campaign to be deleterious, coming as it does from the Western side as the Soviets are trying every ruse in order to get rid of Mr. Hammaraskjold.

## What Kind of Neutrality?

The attack against Mr. Dayal is said to have originated in London and Paris and to have been lately joined by Washington.

Behind it, as neutral diplomats see it here, there exist more fundamental differences of view concerning the major issue of the future of the Congo.

A diplomat put it this way: "Mr. Hammaraskjold and Mr. Dayal want a strictly neutral Congo while the Western powers want a Congo neutral on the Western side."

Considering that the Congo will not be in a position to take care of its own affairs for at least another 10 years, accord-

ing to the conservative estimate of UN officials, and that they will be for some time utterly unable to exploit the country's immense potential in natural resources, the Congo will inevitably lean on the West.

The UN Secretariat is said to realize this, but at the same time it feels that the personnel chosen to assist the Congolese during the critical years ahead should be free from any commitments to certain powers—free of a "conflict of interest"—and should not work underhandedly to promote their interests.

Ghana, for example, it is pointed out, now relies on more British personnel than at the time when the country was a British colony. The relationship today between British and Ghanaians, however, has changed radically from what it was during the colonial period.

A similar approach now is being sought for the Congo.

Another argument used against Mr. Dayal is that he is unable to get along with the present Congolese Government and especially with President Kasavubu.

This may be so, UN officials point out, but it is part of the system.

All previous special representatives, they point out, beginning with UN Undersecretary Ralph J. Bunche, have had the same experience no matter who was in power.

The reason, they explain, is

By Mario Rossi  
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

that the Congolese want the UN to serve and abet their particular policies while the Secretary-General's special representative must be guided by the directives from the UN organs and act within the spirit of the Charter. Mr. Hammaraskjold is reported

## Wickard Urges Farm Controls

By the Associated Press

Kansas City, Mo.

A free market and unrestricted production in agriculture would bankrupt farmers and weaken the nation, says Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture in the last term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

He urged self-control on production and strong price supports. In a speech to the Federation of Federal Land Bank Association, Mr. Wickard said:

"Lower prices have never brought about lower agricultural production, not even during the low farm prices of the depression.

"In the last two years we have abandoned all attempts to hold down corn production and we have reduced corn-support prices. Under this policy we have broken all records for corn production each year."

by diplomats who have talked to him recently to feel that the attack against Mr. Dayal is indirectly putting in question his own integrity.

Ambassador Dayal, it is pointed out, has always followed the Secretary-General's instructions closely while keeping him fully and honestly informed of the situation in the Congo.

This brings back awkward memories since it is known here that prior to the Soviet offensive against him, Mr. Hammaraskjold was definitely persona non grata so far as the United States was concerned.

## Boost for Tunisian

The previous administration in Washington is reported to have resented his insistence in behalf of a policy of strict UN neutrality in such areas as Laos.

While this will be denied categorically today, it can be stated on excellent authority that the United States mission was feeding sentiment against Mr. Hammaraskjold and suggesting that Ambassador Mongo Slim of Tunisia would make a much better Secretary-General.

The Soviet attitude has changed all that, but it is not to be expected that Mr. Hammaraskjold has forgotten a rather recent past.

Thus, in the view of some onlookers here, the Soviets are not the only ones trying to use the UN as an instrument for the

pursuit of their own national policies and interests.

This places a man of Mr. Hammaraskjold's apparent stature and strict adherence to principles in a very difficult position which could become untenable.

Behind the attacks and the pressures observers see, therefore, a problem that goes beyond the person of the Secretary-General to involve the international organization as a whole.

If the UN is to be an instrument for international action, it can consider national interests only to the extent that they are consistent with the principles of the Charter.

This is perhaps too idealistic a view, but if so, then the UN is too idealistic an organization and it is not within the powers of any Secretary-General to change it, a diplomat commented.

The UN might be turned into a meeting place where national representatives go to discuss their problems without reference to a law superior to the national interests. This is the Soviet attitude and it would spell the end of the UN as presently conceived.

The UN, according to some UN officials, is in the throes of a far deeper crisis than is usually realized. Furthermore, they state that it will not be the Soviets' exclusive fault if the crisis deepens to the point of inaction with all that this would imply.

These diplomats—whether right or wrong—hope Washington will change attitude before it is too late.

April 10, 1961

The Christian Science Monitor

PROJET

Lettre du Secrétaire général au Président Kasa-Vubu

Le 17 mai 1961

Personnel et confidentiel

Monsieur le Président,

J'annoncerai bientôt officiellement le retour de l'ambassadeur Rajeshwar Dayal au Congo qui reprendra ses fonctions de Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général. Je connais l'attitude que vous avez adoptée dans le passé à l'égard de M. Dayal, mais je vous ai déjà expliqué qu'il est au Congo comme mon Représentant spécial et qu'il est chargé, à ce titre, de diverses opérations de l'ONUC. En cette qualité, son statut n'est pas analogue à celui d'un diplomate accrédité auprès de votre Gouvernement, mais plutôt celui d'un fonctionnaire international choisi compte dûment tenu d'un certain nombre de circonstances.

Je voudrais également rappeler que mon Sous-Secrétaire, M. Narasimhan, vous a remis copie d'une note concernant les fonctions du Représentant spécial. Il ressort clairement de cette note que, désormais, sous le contrôle d'ensemble du Secrétaire général, le Représentant spécial assumera essentiellement la coordination des diverses opérations de l'ONUC qui seront menées à bien sur la base de contacts bilatéraux directs avec les autorités de la République du Congo. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que M. Gardiner continuera à traiter directement avec les fonctionnaires intéressés en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord du 17 avril.

Etant donné les relations grandement améliorées qui existent actuellement entre les autorités de la République du Congo et l'Organisation des Nations Unies, j'espère très vivement qu'il vous sera possible d'accorder votre coopération au Représentant spécial. Pour sa part, le Représentant spécial est très désireux de coopérer dans

tous les domaines possibles, notamment en ce qui concerne les efforts que vous déployez actuellement pour reconvoquer le Parlement avec l'assistance de l'Organisation des Nations Unies. ~~Je puis vous assurer que vous disposerez de la pleine coopération de M. Dayal dans tous vos efforts visant à mettre en oeuvre les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale.~~ J'espère vivement que nous abordons maintenant une nouvelle phase du progrès de la République du Congo vers la réalisation de son intégrité territoriale, comme d'ailleurs dans tous les domaines, et que les difficultés passées pourront être résolues sous votre conduite en votre qualité de Président de la République et avec l'assistance et la coopération de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Le Secrétaire Général,

Dag Hammarskjold

DRAFT

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ABBAS, LEO  
FROM: SECGEN  
DATE: 18 MAY 1961  
NUMBER:

TOP SECRET

For Abbas only.

Your unnumbered of 18 May.

As you are aware, the formula for distribution of functions has a specific purpose and we may let it be for the present. There will, however, be executive instructions that those in charge of bilateral contacts with the Congolese authorities will act, in fact, as Deputies of the Special Representative.

I have no objection to the deletion of the sentence beginning: "You can rest assured," etc. I do not know if you wish the concluding sentence: "I greatly hope" also deleted. I personally feel that it may remain, but I leave it to your judgment.

I am happy to know that you are going to Coq tomorrow. I would request you to hand the letter, with the changes that you feel necessary, to Kasa-Vubu. I am sure that without my telling you so, you would yourself use all possible arguments and persuasion with Kasa-Vubu, Bomboko, and others to accept Dayal's return with a minimum of fuss. I shall be grateful if on your return to Leo you will cable me their reactions.

2 3 V E O W B O W D

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

FROM: SEGEN

DATE: 20 MAY 1961

NUMBER: 3580

Please instruct Poujoulat to inform Bomboko most urgently that we have received Abbas' report on his conversation with President, Mr. Bomboko and others regarding Mr. Dayal's return. The observations made of which we were informed in the course of the night will be taken up for our most urgent consideration Saturday and we hope to communicate our reaction in course of day. While matter is under discussion we take for granted that nothing will be done or said publicly which could in any way complicate matter or risk the fruitful co-operation which has developed on basis of 17 April agreement.

Transmitted by  
Indian Delegation

20 April May  
1961 Sec. General

3800

His Excellency  
Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi (India)

By their cable Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Dayal will have informed you about the most recent developments on the question of Mr. Dayal's return to the Congo. I wish by this cable to give you a short resumé of the stages which have led up to the present situation.

As Mr. Jha will have told you earlier this week, I had to agree that Mr. Abbas return to his post in the Economic Commission for Africa from which he could no longer be absent without considerable harm being done to the Commission. His departure was set for the 20th of May. After Mr. Abbas departure no Acting Special Representative would be appointed and the operation for some few days would be continued with the senior civilian officer in Leopoldville in charge. Thereafter Mr. Dayal would return and stay for the time needed to organize the work of the various UN operations which are developing on the basis of recent resolutions. This time could be estimated at one or two months.

Recently the new administrative arrangements envisaged were communicated to the Leopoldville authorities. We indicated that once they were made there would no longer be any need for a high-powered diplomatic official in Leopoldville as most of

Page 2

the work would be of an administrative character and the necessary co-ordination would have to be made from UN Headquarters in New York. Thus, without setting any time limit for Mr. Dayal's continued term of office in Leopoldville, it was made clear that the reasons for prolonging his stay in Leopoldville would after a while disappear. Without speaking of Mr. Dayal, his return or the length of his stay, we sought in this way to create the best possible setting for a return, maintaining freedom of movement for Mr. Dayal and avoiding any impression of our giving in to Congolese pressures when, after a fairly short time, he might leave his post.

After consultation with Mr. Dayal as well as with Mr. Abbas, I sent a letter to Mr. Kasavubu, a copy of which is being sent to you by airmail. This letter was given to President Kasavubu by Mr. Abbas on his farewell visit on 19 May.

Late that night I received a report from Mr. Abbas on his discussion at Cocquilhatville with Messrs. Kasavubu, Ileo, Bomboko, Adoula and Mobutu, which followed the delivery of the letter. Their reaction clearly indicated that they would go to considerable length in actions against UN operations in case Mr. Dayal returned. In fact it became clear -- and all of us here, including Mr. Dayal, are agreed on this evaluation -- that we had to count on the perhaps certainty that confirmation of Mr. Dayal's return would set off very serious reactions creating immediate danger for human life and having most far reaching consequences for the

2 E V L O W N B O N D

Page 3

UN position in the Congo as a whole. A complete reversal of recent more favourable trends seemed unavoidable.

These reactions and the weight that must be given them in serious evaluation and with full knowledge of the personalities concerned, naturally obliges us to reconsider the matter. Were Mr. Dayal to return in the face of these stern warnings and were the reactions, which now seem likely, to materialize, it can safely be foreseen that the reaction of a majority of African countries would be in favour of Mr. Kasavubu and against the UN which the Governments would view as having treated the Congo authorities in an impermissibly high-handed way. It can be assumed that the Congo authorities are aware of this, which naturally increases the risks for dangerous steps from their side. In these circumstances, it is Mr. Dayal's view, which is fully shared by myself and my collaborators, that his return to the Congo would now expose the operation and everyone concerned with it to risks which should not be taken. While not doing good to anyone, such a step might well cause irreparable harm.

I have considered it my obvious duty to inform you about this development immediately, fully aware, as I am, of the difficulties which may be created for you by the step that now has become unavoidable. The situation forces from us an immediate  
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

Page 4

reaction in order to forestall a threatening turn of events and avoid unjustifiable risks. We were seriously considering the possibility of an intermediary stage of continued negotiation, but have concluded that it could not possibly yield any result while increasing the risks both in a general political sense and physically for the UN operation and for those engaged in it in the Congo.

I need not tell you that it is with feelings of revulsion that I have to shoulder responsibility in connexion with Mr. Dayal's inability to return due to the unreasonable stand of Leopoldville. This is another one of those occasions in which with a very heavy heart I have had to take the lesser of two risks, when even the one taken, I fully realize, is most serious. I hope that you will fully understand the circumstances which force our hand and I am confident that you will not hesitate to give us your continued invaluable support.

With kindest regard.

Dag Hammarskjöld  
Secretary-General of the United Nations

20 Aprx May  
1961

Sec.General

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Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru  
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SEA FOAM BOND

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SEA FOAM BOND

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With kindest regard.

Dag Hammarskjöld  
Secretary-General of the United Nations

SECRET

22 May 1961

My dear C. S.,

..... As promised by the Secretary-General, I send herewith two copies of a message which went from him to President Kasa-Vubu on 17 May. The Secretary-General promised to send this by airmail to the Prime Minister of India.

Yours sincerely,

C. V. Narasimhan  
Under-Secretary for  
Special Political Affairs

His Excellency  
Mr. C. S. Jha  
Permanent Representative of India  
to the United Nations  
3 East 64th Street  
New York 21, N. Y.

cc Miss H. Platz ✓

17 May 1961

The return of Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal to the Congo to take up again his duties as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in charge of the different ONUC operations will shortly be announced publicly by me. His status will be more that of an international civil servant rather than that of a diplomat accredited to your Government.

The organization of the Office of the Special Representative was set out in a paper presented to you by Mr. Narasimhan. The Special Representative will act, under the supervision of the Secretary-General, as co-ordinator of the different ONUC operations, to be carried out by contacts between various representatives of the United Nations direct with the authorities of the Republic of the Congo. For instance, the negotiations to bring into force the Agreement of 17 April will be continued by Mr. Gardiner direct with the Congolese officials concerned.

As a result of the better understanding between the authorities of the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations, I hope that the Special Representative may look forward to your co-operation. The Special Representative will be glad to assist in your efforts to reconvene Parliament, and in every way possible.

I hope that under your guidance as President and with the help of the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo will progress towards achieving its territorial integrity, and that it will progress in all fields.



No. D/42/TR  
PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
8 EAST 64TH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

May 23, 1961.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjold,

I have the honour to forward the following message  
from Prime Minister Nehru dated May 22 in reply to yours of Saturday,  
May 20:-

"Thank you for your message on the latest developments  
on Dayal's return to the Congo which you sent through Ambassador  
Jha.

I realise how hard it must have been for you to take  
a decision in this complicated and difficult situation. I  
understand that Dayal has, in view of these developments,  
requested you to relieve him from United Nations service.  
We will be happy to have him back with us.

As you know, we agreed to the extension of Dayal's  
deputation for service under the United Nations and to place  
substantial contingent of our forces at the disposal of the  
United Nations, to facilitate the implementation of the Congo  
resolution of the Security Council. We hope that there will  
be no slackening in the United Nations efforts to implement  
this resolution. With kind regards - JAWAHARLAL NEHRU."

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

  
(C.S. Jha)

His Excellency  
Mr. Dag Hammarskjold,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York.