

**Middle East - Suez story No
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HS L 179:109



Dag Hammarskjöld's samml.

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5 April 56

Burns, Gen. (Chief of staff, UNTSO)

- 1 cable from O.H.

OUTGOING CABLE

DH:dg

TO: BURNS
JERUSALEM

FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL

DATE: 5 APRIL 1956

NUMBER:

REUR 184. OFFICIAL UN ACTION BEYOND YOUR CEASE FIRE ORDER WHICH FOR THE MOMENT COVERS THIRD PARAGRAPH SHARETT'S LETTER REQUIRES ESTABLISHMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS INCIDENT AND ENSUING ACTIONS BY BOTH PARTIES. THIS RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN REGULAR FORM THROUGH NORMAL UN MACHINERY. WHATEVER IMPORTANCE THE LACK OF CATEGORIC CEASE FIRE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE MAY HAVE, WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO SAY IN THE LIGHT OF REPORT FROM ONLY ONE SIDE ON BEGINNING OF INCIDENT, NO REPEAT NO EXCUSE IS TO BE FOUND IN SUCH LACK FOR FAR REACHING ACTIONS OF REPRISAL. IF EGYPTIANS HAVE SHOWN LACK OF CO-OPERATION AS CONCERNS INSTRUCTIONS, UN MUST REGISTER LACK OF CO-OPERATION ALSO FROM ISRAELI SIDE CONCERNING VARIOUS MEASURES WHICH, IF IMPLEMENTED WOULD HAVE RENDERED MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENT LESS LIKELY.

THE LATEST INCIDENTS UNDERSCORE STRONGLY THE NEED FOR STRICT AND MUTUAL COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THUS HAVE LENT ADDED WEIGHT TO LAST SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION WHICH, WITH EQUAL FORCE, DEMANDS COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND WITH PREVIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS COVERING ALSO CONDEMNATION OF ACTIONS OF REPRISAL. THUS THE DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT SWITCH ATTENTION TO WIDER ISSUES BUT CONCENTRATES IT ON THE QUESTIONS WITH WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS RECENTLY BEEN CONSISTENTLY OCCUPIED.

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SHORT OF UNEXPECTED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS, THE RECENT INCIDENTS THUS PROVIDE ADDED REASONS FOR FOLLOWING UP THE COUNCIL REQUEST AND FOR PURSUING MY PLAN.

STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE FIRE IS OBVIOUSLY ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW EFFORT BUT IT WILL REQUIRE CO-OPERATION ALSO FROM THE OTHER PARTY, WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN BY FOLLOWING YOUR ADVICE AS TO PATROLLING POLICIES, BY ACCEPTING FREE INTENSIFIED OBSERVATION AND BY OBSERVANCE OF THE REQUEST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ABSTAIN FROM ACTIONS OF REPRISAL. SHORT OF SUCH CO-OPERATION THE CEASE FIRE POLICY MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT, AND EVEN TO NEGOTIATE. THUS IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE OBVIOUSLY COVERS CEASE FIRE, IT, WITH EQUAL FORCE, COVERS OTHER POINTS ON WHICH DEMANDS MUST BE ADDRESSED TO ISRAEL.