

# Hungary 1956-1959 - correspondence, resolutions, General Assembly and Secur...

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Hungary - 1957

18 June

Transcript of press conference held by  
K. C. O. Shaun (Rapporteur, Special Commi-  
- Hee on the Problem of Hungary), at U.N. HQ.

CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT  
Not to be made public  
before 7 a.m. (EDT),  
Thursday, 20 June 1957

Note No. 1614  
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TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY KEITH C.O. SHANN  
AT UN HEADQUARTERS ON TUESDAY, 18 JUNE 1957

Mr. DUCKWORTH-BARKER (Information Officer, Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary): Ladies and gentlemen, we have at last got out the two volume document and I have even met one or two people who have read it through from the one end to the other -- a great feat. As you know, this is still an embargoed talk, as the report itself is embargoed until Thursday morning 7 o'clock EDT. I do not think there is anything I can say before introducing Mr. Shann except -- I hope he will not be very angry -- to compare him to a water beetle. We have worked together very closely in the last few months, sometimes at odd hours of the day or night.

I remember a couple of lines written by an English poet which reminded me exactly of the work he has done in producing these two volumes. The poet talks and admires the way in which the water beetle slides across the water with ease, celerity and grace, but if he ever stopped to think of how he did it, he would sink. But Mr. Shann is going to tell us exactly how he did it and I am quite sure he has no intention of sinking.

Mr. SHANN (Rapporteur, Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary): I regard all that as an unfriendly introduction. I may well sink at this point.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not want to bore you by going into the bread and butter details of this report, about the witnesses and our meetings and journeying around the world, but I would like to get into the report itself. It is very difficult to produce a document of this kind. We who were on the Committee had the benefit of over a hundred witnesses and a great deal of documentation, and if we were to try to bring to the report all of the facts which we think they have established, the document would become buried in these facts and would not be readable, or indeed perhaps incomprehensible. Our problem has been to bring enough of the facts to support, for the ordinary reader of the document, the conclusions which the Committee has unanimously arrived at after a great deal of work and the study of a lot of documentation and listening to a great many people.

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We have tried to be completely honest in the preparation of this document. It would have been possible, I am sure, for us to have been more definite in certain parts of the document, to have claimed to have known as facts things which we had not definitely established, although on many occasions we might perhaps have gotten the benefit of the doubt from the categorical statements made to us by many witnesses. Perhaps I should apologize for the size of this document. It is very long. But the nature of the story was such that it could hardly be shorter.

I suspect that most of you will have managed to read from this document the conclusions. These, I think, can themselves be boiled down into three basic propositions. The first is that there was in fact intervention by force by the Soviet Union, in the first instance, to crush a popular uprising, and, in the second instance, to overthrow a legal and popularly supported Government. I would remind you that no one denies that force was in fact used -- no one.

The second general and broad conclusion is that what happened in Hungary in October and November of last year was a spontaneous national uprising, not assisted from the outside. It was not a counter-revolution designed to restore an old form of government. When using terms like "counter-revolution", I would remind you that they do not mean the same things to all people. Counter-revolution in Eastern European and Soviet terms merely means disagreement with Soviet political ideas. When I use the term, I will use it in the strict sense of the term, that is, a revolution against something else. In our terms, that is, in the terms that I have defined, the real counter-revolution in Hungary was the installation of the Kadar Government against the wishes of the Hungarian people by Soviet force.

The third general conclusion, I believe, is that the Kadar Government did not at the time of its installation and does not now have popular support in Hungary. Indeed, it can be said that for some considerable time after 4 November, there was no Hungarian Government. The administration of Hungary, military and civil, was carried out by the Soviet military authorities.

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These conclusions, and indeed the conclusions in chapter XVII of the report, are only the broad picture of what we have tried to describe in this report. There are in the body of the report dozens and dozens of findings and conclusions as to smaller or sometimes larger facts. Each chapter, you may have noticed, has its own conclusions, and there are some of these conclusions and some things in the body of the report which are, I think, of some importance and which do not appear in the general conclusions at the end of the report.

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Perhaps it might be of some assistance to you if I were to run through a few of these conclusions which lie in the body of the report and which may be of interest to you.

You will have heard a great deal about the fact that this was a counter-revolution which had support from overseas. For the view of the Committee on this, I would draw your attention to paragraph 129 of the report, which says clearly that "the Committee has no doubt that the Hungarian uprising was not only nation-wide, but also spontaneous in character".

You have also heard a great deal about the fact that the Hungarian revolution was fomented and supported by Radio Free Europe. The Committee was at pains to look carefully into this subject, and it does not feel that the revolution was fomented by Radio Free Europe. We do feel, however, that some of the broadcasts from Radio Free Europe were perhaps a little encouraging at times to people who were indeed looking for encouragement, and the Committee has said in paragraph 131 that it feels that "in such circumstances the greatest restraint and circumspection are called for in international broadcasting."

There have been allegations that the Hungarian revolution opened the way to all the old political influences. Paragraphs 141 and 142 deal with that question. We have felt that it was of some importance to record in the report the views of a man who was and is an avowed Communist, Mr. Peter Fryer, who was a correspondent for the Daily Worker and who has written a book on what took place. What Mr. Fryer has had to say on this subject is recorded in paragraph 148; and he, a Communist, says: "It was the upsurge of a whole people, in which rank and file Communists took part, against a police dictatorship". We have, later in the report, in discussing the apparent conflict between Russian military preparations and Russian negotiations, reached a conclusion which may be of some interest to you and which you may have missed as it is just in the body of the report. In paragraph 185 we say: "It may well be that, immediately before the second intervention, the political and military authorities of the USSR differed regarding the best way of meeting the unusual circumstances which had arisen...".

The position of the Prime Minister, Mr. Nagy, in this is also of interest. He had denied that he ever invited Soviet troops to enter the country. He has

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also denied that he instituted the system of summary jurisdiction. The Committee spent a lot of time investigating the position of Mr. Nagy, and I would refer you particularly to paragraph 258, which will indicate that the Committee has some doubts as to whether Mr. Nagy was entirely in control of the situation throughout. In fact, I think it would be fair to say that the members of the Committee feel that Mr. Nagy was more or less carried along by events rather than leading them himself.

There is the question of the invitations said to have been made by the Hungarian Government to the Government of the Soviet Union, in particular the invitation which Mr. Shepilov, in the General Assembly, claimed had been made in a note dated 24 October to the Soviet Union from the Hungarian Government. The Committee finds it very difficult, as you will see from paragraph 265, to understand how Soviet tanks could arrive in Budapest at 2 a.m. on 24 October in response to a request received by the Government of the USSR on the same day.

There is also the problem of Mr. Kádár -- his identification for some days with the ideals of the revolution, his public statements on the radio that he agreed with what was going on, his relations with Mr. Nagy, and the fact that he left the Government and has now formed a Government of his own. The question of why he left, exactly how he left, and so on, is a matter which the Committee investigated most carefully but on which it has not been able to reach definite conclusions, and we have admitted that fact.

The conclusions to Chapter VII, which begin in paragraph 301, are something to which I would draw the attention of the correspondents, as they are, I think, of some importance.

Chapter VIII covers the question of the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. It shows, in paragraph 311, the manner in which Hungarian armed forces had been built up far in excess of the forces permitted by the Peace Treaty between Hungary and the Associated Powers, and it goes carefully into the question of the desire of the Hungarian people for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. There is no doubt in the mind of the Committee as to the desire of the Hungarian people on this subject. That is covered in paragraph 327. But, despite this almost unanimous wish on the part of the Hungarian people,

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the Annex to the end of Chapter VIII will show you that the present Government of Hungary has entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union to permit the continued presence within the country of Soviet troops.

The second volume starts with the demands of the Hungarian people -- the students, the writers, the workers and the people generally -- and it contains the texts of some of the manifestos which were issued at this particular time. In this Chapter also there is a section on the attitude of the people towards the secret police -- the AVH -- and I would stress again that there is no doubt in the mind of any member of the Committee on the question of the behaviour of the secret police. This is covered in paragraph 434. But reference should also be made to Chapter XVI, which is the Chapter on human rights, in which some of the precise methods of the secret police are described in the words of some of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee. Chapter XVI contains some quotations from Hungarian witnesses as to the methods used by the secret police.

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Chapter X describes how the revolution started and describes the course of events which led up to the first shots being fired and the revolution becoming one involving life and death rather than, as we are convinced was intended, merely peaceful demonstrations. The Committee heard evidence from dozens and dozens of people on this particular subject, and also had the benefit of eye-witness accounts from other reliable sources as to what took place. We are completely confident that what we have described here, the marching, the demonstrations around the Stalin monument, the Bem Statues and in front of Parliament House is entirely accurate. This Chapter, I think, demonstrates more than anything else the spontaneity of the revolution. The accuracy of what took place can perhaps be borne out by an example. That is, we had one witness who described what took place around a certain statue, and sometime later in Geneva we saw a film in which this witness was there large as life in exactly the place he had described himself as being in.

The next Chapter is on the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils which you will probably find rather dull, but this Chapter shows the effort of the people to take into their own hands local and factory-level administration from the Communist machine, and they were in this almost completely successful in the very short time that they had. The manner of setting up these Councils and the manner in which they worked do, I think, reflect the sort of democratic systems which most of us understand a little more than some others. These Councils had a very great influence on the Government and the programmes of the Government of Mr. Nagy reflected almost exactly the demands and desires of the Revolutionary and Workers' Councils.

From then on the report describes the development of political freedom, which was hesitant in the first place but then became quite considerable, the re-emergence of the political parties, the ones that had been approved by the Allied Control Commission, which operated in Hungary after the war and which included the Soviet Union, the abolition of the one-party system -- all things which are not really arguable as they appear in official documents and statements by all the members of the Government, including the present leader of the Hungarian Government, Mr. Kádár.

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In this connexion, perhaps you would like to refer to paragraph 574 which has a statement by Mr. Kádár to this effect. You may also be professionally interested in a footnote on page 102 which describes the return of the free press in Hungary during that very short period.

From then on the report describes what has happened since the revolution was suppressed. It describes the extent of Soviet intervention under the present régime particularly in paragraph 600. It has the texts of military orders which were issued by the Soviet Military Commander which do not just apply to military matters but which apply to the whole of the civil administration of the country, and the extent of Soviet control of the country is indicated in paragraph 607. One example of the powerlessness of the Hungarian Government itself, Mr. Kádár's Government, is described in the paragraphs which follow paragraph 630. After an agreement between the Yugoslav Embassy and the Kádár Government concerning the future of Mr. Nagy, Mr. Nagy was released from the Yugoslav Embassy but was promptly seized by the Soviet military authorities contrary to the agreement with the Hungarian Government.

The report then proceeds to describe the slow whittling away to practically nothing of the political rights which the Hungarian people had gained during the revolution, the abolition of the Budapest Workers' Council, which was the Central Workers' Council for that particular area, and it also has certain words which I think are indicative of the attitude of the present Government towards the position of the workers. Mr. Kádár said in paragraph 651: "A tiger cannot be tamed by baits, it can be tamed and forced to peace only by beating it to death." It describes the suppression again of the political parties and of the press, and I would draw your attention also to the conclusions to this chapter in paragraph 708 and as follows.

Deportations was a subject which aroused considerable interest here, I believe, when the subject was first discussed in the United Nations. I and other members of the Committee approached this subject with a completely open mind. It was not proved that these things had taken place, and for some time the Committee found it extremely difficult to prove that this had happened, but as we went along we were able to see more and more people who had in fact been deported to the Soviet Union. We would not accept hearsay evidence, as we say in paragraph 720, but in the end we were completely convinced

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of the facts of deportations to the Soviet Union. Hungarians who were deported to the Soviet Union were not badly treated, and many of them were returned home. I think the idea was to frighten the people and to break the back of the revolution. Our conclusion on the question of deportations is in paragraph 740.

The General Assembly also felt that there had been interference in the delivery of Red Cross supplies in Hungary, but this is a matter on which the Committee was not able to reach any definite conclusions. It was not proven to the satisfaction of the Committee that interference had in fact taken place. The report then ends, with the exception of the conclusions, with paragraph 767 on trials, on judges, on the reinstatement of camps for political prisoners, and with the quotations to which I referred before, on the manner in which the secret police is again behaving in Hungary.

That is what I want to say about the report. If there are any questions, I will be glad to try to answer them.

Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): Mr. Shann, one thing puzzles me about your conclusions, and that is the emphasis that you place on the fuzzy situation regarding the invitation which might have been given to the Red Army to come in by Nagy. Is the Committee implying that if it were able to establish that Nagy did invite the Soviet troops, that then the presence of the Soviet troops or their intervention would have had the blessings and the approval of the Committee?

Mr. SHANN: Not at all. The question of the intervention of Soviet troops is quite another thing, I think. We did establish that Mr. Nagy did not invite the Soviet troops to come into Hungary either for the first intervention or for the second intervention. So far as the first intervention is concerned, we have established by the mere fact of the time at which Mr. Nagy was appointed as Prime Minister that he could not have invited the Soviet troops to come in. So far as the second intervention is concerned, Mr. Nagy, at the time when the Soviet troops were deploying around Budapest, was engaged in negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the entire country.

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Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): I know that that appears in your report; I read it. My question was mainly to establish the legality aspect of the situation. If it were ever established or if it should be established in future history -- your report is not 100 per cent firm on that -- that he did give that report, would that have been politically moral in the eyes of the Committee? I am asking a hypothetical question, but it has a bearing because your conclusions on that are not 100 per cent firm.

Mr. SHANN: Are you referring to the first intervention or to the second intervention?

Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): I would refer to almost any intervention from the first day of 23 October on. I know that you did not have the advantage of talking to Nagy. That was your greatest disadvantage of course. But I am trying to find out just what the thinking of the Committee is on this point. If Nagy were to have invited the Red Army, would that have been morally acceptable to your Committee in so far as the mentality of your Committee and the general attitude is concerned towards the whole thing?

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Mr. SHANN: You mean that if it were established that the legal Government of Hungary invited the Soviet Union to intervene, to assist it in suppressing a revolution, would the legality of the Government which made such an invitation have led the Committee to think that the intervention was correct? Is that what you are saying?

Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): That formulation of my question would be correct if you agree that the Nagy Government was a legal Government. In the whole course of the revolution there are times when it is difficult, through these two excellent volumes, to determine where legality resided in the flow of Governments, the reconstituting of Cabinets; but if you want to put it your way -- because my question is so hypothetical -- I would be satisfied.

Mr. SHANN: I must answer the question in two parts. There is a difference of opinion as to whether any Government has the right to invite another Government to intervene to suppress a popular revolution. The International Commission of Jurists believes that international law says that no Government has such a right. The Committee has not expressed a view on that legal point.

So far as the legality of the Nagy Government is concerned, it was properly sworn in under the Hungarian Constitution, it was recognized I think by the whole world, including the Soviet Union, as being the legal Government of Hungary from 24 October until 4 November.

Mr. GOLDSTEIN (St. Louis Post-Dispatch): As a matter of information, is the AVH composed in part of Hungarian nationals?

Mr. SHANN: It is mainly composed of Hungarian nationals but there are quite a number of Soviet advisers.

Miss FREDERICK (National Broadcasting Company): Have you had any protests of any kind from the Soviet Union or the Kadar regime in connexion with your work? Has your Committee been able to establish anything about the exact whereabouts of Nagy at this particular time?

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Mr. SHANN: We have been informed, in reply to notes addressed to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Hungary and Romania, that the Committee by its functions violates the United Nations Charter and therefore is not recognized as legally existing.

So far as Mr. Nagy is concerned, the Committee has quite good reason to believe that he is still in Romania and is held in some form of captivity.

Mr. CARPENTER (Associated Press): Since the Soviet Union does not recognize this Committee, I take it, nevertheless, that you dropped a copy of this report off at the delegation. Also, have all delegations received copies of this report now?

Mr. SHANN: Yes, I understand so.

Mr. FREUDENHEIM (Chicago Daily News): What do you expect will be the next step; will the Assembly meet to approve this report?

Mr. SHANN: That, fortunately, is not a subject on which I am called upon to give an answer. We were asked by the General Assembly to ascertain the facts of what took place in Hungary in October and November of last year and in certain respects subsequent to that time and we were not asked to make any recommendations as to what the General Assembly should do with the report.

Mr. FREUDENHEIM (Chicago Daily News): Can you tell us the feeling in the Committee as to what the General Assembly should do?

Mr. SHANN: The subject has never been discussed in the Committee.

Mr. LESUEUR (Colombia Broadcasting System): Does the Committee feel that its existence has come to an end, or will you stay in formation until there is a General Assembly session to consider this subject?

Mr. SHANN: The Committee has discussed that subject and it will remain in being until the General Assembly makes up its mind on the subject.

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Mr. KAMATH (Press Trust of India): I refer to page 164, paragraph 369 of your report which says:

"The Committee has not found that these feelings and aspirations were antagonistic to the Soviet Union as a State or to the Soviet people as individuals or that they excluded sympathy of a great many Hungarians for a number of features of the Soviet economic and social system. Although the idea of neutrality has been put forward, the precise implications of such an international status were not defined;" (A/3592, paragraph 369)

It then says:

"Hungarian leaders who appeared before the Committee or whose statements have been examined have asserted the necessity for their country to maintain with the Soviet Union correct, and even friendly, political, military and economic relations and have indicated their readiness to give, in that connexion, all the necessary guarantees." (Ibid.)

My question is this: Do you, as a Committee, feel that if Hungary or the Nagy regime was given adequate time without the Assembly having brought the question before the public and if it had been given time to define the international status of neutrality, would you have expected the entire tragedy which followed?

Mr. SHANN: The question is very hard to answer because I do not think it is based in the context of what actually happened. The Nagy Government was indeed not given time to work out precisely what it meant by neutrality, and so on, but it was not the General Assembly of the United Nations which prevented it from having the time, it was the second intervention of the Soviet Union in the early morning of 4 November, when the Nagy Government was overthrown and any ideas of neutrality, leaving the Warsaw Pact, and so on, very rapidly disappeared. I am afraid it is impossible to answer a hypothetical question as to what might have happened if the Nagy Government had been able to consolidate its authority and work out precisely what it meant by the aspirations expressed during the short time it was in authority.

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Mr. CARPENTER (Associated Press): This report is framed with such directness and clarity that I hope many other sections of the United Nations will follow it. It really is a model which I think stands out about as high as the thirty-eighth floor here. But what I am trying to get at now is: You speak of it as a unanimous report. Was this unanimity pretty well throughout the time, or was it hard to arrive at, or do you want to comment on that?

Mr. SHANN: I am quite prepared to comment on that. I do not suppose there was any particular unanimity amongst the members of the Committee for some time. It took us some time to get into the work; it took some of us quite a long time to make up our minds what had happened; but after a certain period, general unanimity in the Committee as to the broad outlines of what took place in Hungary existed and continued to exist right through until the end.

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Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): Mr. Shann, I was hoping that even with the excellence of clarity of the report, which I think is refreshing, it would shed light on what a lot of other reports, such as Radio Free Europe's excellent report and others, have left rather in a haze -- that is, what really transpired in Budapest in the Government building from the time that Nagy began to lose control of his Government to the time that he lost control of it completely. I think it was a matter of hours or perhaps only a few days. I did not read all of the report from beginning to end, but I find that its conclusions are not too firm on that.

Mr. SHANN: If you will read Chapter XII, I think -- you will find that all of your questions are answered on this particular subject. We go almost hour by hour into what happened.

In relation to your question I would like to say that it is not the view of the Committee that Mr. Nagy was losing control of his Government or of his country. That control was taken from him by intervention from outside.

Mr. OATIS (The Associated Press): Did the Hungarian delegation get to any of this material before any other delegation? Since getting the material, has it reacted in any way?

Mr. SHANN: I have heard of no reaction, and I am quite certain it did not have this material before any other delegation.

Mr. OATIS (The Associated Press): Was there a protest from the Hungarian delegation last week, for example?

Mr. SHANN: Not to my knowledge.

Mr. FINE (International News Service): Following through on Miss Frederick's earlier question, did the Committee receive any testimony that Nagy was taken to Moscow from Romania and then brought back to Romania? Also, did the Committee have any evidence that the Kadar Government is planning to try Nagy as an alleged traitor?

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Mr. SHANN: The answer to the first question is no. The answer to the second question is that we did hear witnesses mention this possibility. They did not establish in any sense that it was likely. I am afraid your knowledge of this is as great as mine because it is something which has been in the press recently since the Committee ceased its work.

Mr. LESUEUR (Columbia Broadcasting System): Did you meet with any reluctance on the part of witnesses to testify? Or was there any thought that some of the witnesses may have been agents of the Communist regime or of the Soviet Union?

Mr. SHANN: In the first case, yes, there were witnesses who were worried about their own position and the position of friends and relations in Hungary. I think there were witnesses who did not appear before the Committee because of this fear. And about 80 per cent of the witnesses, although they gave us their names, asked us to suppress these names in case something might befall their friends in Budapest.

What was the second question?

Mr. LESUEUR (Columbia Broadcasting System): The second question was: Did you have to reject any witnesses because you perhaps suspected that they were agents of the secret police or the Soviet Union?

Mr. SHANN: No. I must confess that the thought crossed my mind occasionally, but I do not think that we were subjected to that.

Mr. BEER (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Zurich): With reference to certain evidence in your report about the grievances in Hungary, may I ask you whether you feel that this is strictly a Hungarian phenomenon? Or have you some evidence that these grievances which were at the root of the uprising also exist in other Communist countries?

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Mr. SHANN: That is not within the province of the Committee. I can only say that the events in Poland, which certainly preceded the events in Hungary, have certainly had some effect on the expression of grievances in Hungary.

Mr. SANDERS (Het Parool, Amsterdam): From what the Committee has said in paragraph 369, does it imply that the opinion of the Committee is such that it thinks that the feelings and aspirations which were not antagonistic to the Soviet Union were not expressed clearly enough by the Government and by the Councils?

Mr. SHANN: What the Committee is seeking to say here is that the Hungarian people feel that they have derived considerable benefit, particularly in the economic field, from the system that they have had over the last ten years. There was no desire to return to the old system of Government. The relations between Soviet troops in Hungary and the Hungarian people were usually quite good. Before the revolution, the Hungarian people did not appear to have hostile feelings towards the Soviet Government. But they did want to be able to run their own affairs. That was the basis of their desire to get the Soviet troops out of Hungary. The revolution was not an anti-Soviet revolution as such.

Miss WEILL (Agence France-Presse): Were you able to ascertain when you finished your investigation whether all the resistance had stopped or whether there was still in existence some passive or active resistance to the present Government and to the Russian occupation?

Mr. SHANN: Resistance to the present Government did continue for quite a long time, actively and militarily, until about 17 November. There were strikes through December and in January, and things took a long time to settle down. By the time we finished the investigation some time in April, things were fairly quiet. The sort of precautions that had been taken against the possibility of a recurrence of these troubles were such that I would not think there would be too much active resistance at the moment.

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Mr. LASH (New York Post): The report indicates that two members of the Soviet Presidium, Suslov and Mikoyan, were in Budapest during the crucial days or during some of them anyway. You also indicate that there was some hesitancy on the political end on the part of the Russians as to what ought to be done, how the situation should be handled. Was that reflected in the expressions or the testimony you had about the attitudes of Mikoyan and Suslov?

Mr. SHANN: To a certain degree, yes. Some of the Hungarians who spoke to the Soviet officials expressed confidence that the negotiations which were taking place would come out well. At the same time, as the report describes, the Soviet military authorities were taking such steps as would lead one to believe that they intended to operate again forcefully against the Hungarian people.

Mr. LASH (New York Post): Perhaps my question is not completely clear. There had been some reports that Mikoyan represented a soft wing and Suslov a hard wing in the Soviet leadership. I wonder whether this was reflected in any of the testimony.

Mr. SHANN: No.

Mr. CARPENTER (Associated Press): Do you believe that the Kadar Government could remain in power if the Soviet troops were withdrawn?

Mr. SHANN: I seem to have had that question asked before recently. Certainly they would not have been able to attain power without Soviet intervention. They would not have been able to remain in power for some time after 4 November without Soviet support. Whether they would be able to remain in power now is not a question on which I think I can give a sensible answer. They have reinstated police and other military measures to support themselves in Hungary. Whether these would be sufficiently effective I do not know. But I would be prepared to say that the Hungarian people would rather like to get rid of them.

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Miss FREDERICK (NBC): Have you any idea how large the Soviet military force is in Hungary at the present time, and has any substantial part of this force been withdrawn?

Mr. SHANN: I have no idea. The report will tell you exactly how big the Soviet force was at the time of the intervention.

Mr. LESUEUR (CBS): Mr. Shann, would you consider this to be a complete breach of the peace treaty arrived at with the Hungarians in 1946 at the Paris conferences?

Mr. SHANN: Do you mean the intervention of the Soviet forces? That is rather a difficult question to answer. The Soviet forces were in Hungary by virtue of the peace treaties until the peace treaty with Austria was signed. On the day before the peace treaty with Austria was signed, the Warsaw Pact was signed, which gave to the Soviet Union the right to station troops in Hungary under a subsequent agreement under the treaty. Whether the Warsaw Treaty -- not the peace treaty, which by that time, I think, had ceased to operate so far as this particular aspect of the thing is concerned -- whether the Warsaw Treaty gives the Soviet Union the right to intervene in the internal political affairs of Hungary is quite another point. I would say that the evidence is that it does not.

(N.Y. Herald Tribune):

Mr. MOLLESON / Mr. Ambassador, you said that the Hungarian people did not know exactly what to expect from the United Nations at the time of the revolt. Is there a feeling now that you have found in interviewing witnesses as to what the United Nations could have done at that time to have been a little more successful?

Mr. SHANN: Yes, the witnesses generally made it quite clear that they did not expect troops to come marching over the border. Some of them said, "We understood perfectly well that our revolution was not worth a third world war". But they did expect some kind of support from the United Nations and they did not really think it out very clearly. Some of them heard subsequently of the sending of United Nations forces to the Middle East and then wondered whether a United Nations force of some kind could not have come to Hungary to act as a kind of police force. Some of them wanted the Secretary-General to come, some of them wanted United Nations officials

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to come, and so on, but they were never particularly clear. They did feel that the United Nations could have done something, but it was a moral force that they were expecting and not a military force really.

(NBC):

Miss Frederick/ Have you any evidence that any witnesses who appeared before your Committee, or their relatives or friends, have suffered as a result of testifying?

Mr. SHANN: No, but we have had witnesses who have said that they expected that this would happen if it were known that they had appeared before the Committee.

Mr. GABRIEL (Transradio News Agency): Mr. Shann, the question of the intervention of outside forces on behalf of the Hungarians raises a question as to whether the Committee has studied this problem in the light not perhaps of legality but perhaps of fear in Moscow. In a recent speech before a college graduate group, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Lodge, said that it is possible that the Soviet Union might have taken a different attitude towards the question of intervention if it were not for the unfortunate coincidence of the attack in Egypt taking place simultaneously. This remark happened to arouse great indignation in certain segments of the British Press but it does raise a question which I think you know, that Mr. Shepilov here, and a great many times outside, he and Mr. Khrushchev, have always bracketed this Hungarian and Egyptian thing. Has the Committee any evidence that this may have been the thinking behind this intervention, or has the Committee devoted its thoughts at all to this aspect of this very obvious intervention?

Mr. SHANN: The matter was not discussed in the Committee. I think that my colleagues on the Committee will agree with me if I express what is my own personal view: that the Soviet Union would have intervened on 4 November in Hungary no matter what was going on in other parts of the world.

(more)

Note No. 1614  
18 June 1957

28

Mr. LYNCH (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation): Is the Committee suggesting to the General Assembly in this report that it should question the credentials of any delegation from the Kadar Government here at the United Nations?

Mr. SHANN: No, sir.

(President, UN Correspondents Association:

Mr. MUNN / Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your time and co-operation. I should also like to express our professional appreciation of a most lucid report.

The Conference rose at 3.55 p.m.

(CAUTION: ADVANCE TEXT: Not to be made public before 7 a.m. (EDT) Thursday, 20 June 1957.)