Peking story (American prisoners in China) - correspondence, letters and ca...

HS L 179:82a

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Dag Hammarskjölds saml.

Peking story

3-9 Aug. 1955

a.) D.H – to Andrew Cordier (Exec. Assist. to the Sec. Gen)

- 1 letter
- 1 code message
- 1 code message from Cordier to D.H.

b.) 1 pressclipping

EUROPEAN OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE EUROPÉEN
DES NATIONS UNIES

Télégrammes : UNATIONS, GENEVE
Téléphone : 33 10 00 33 20 00 33 40 00

REF. No. : STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
(à rappeler dans la réponse)

Palais des Nations
GENÈVE

3 August 1955

Dear Andy,

Enclosed you find a letter from the President of the United States and a letter from Hagerty with my replies, which I ask you to transmit.

I also send you a copy of my letter to Chou En-lai, which you may show - or even give - to the U.S. Mission with the following observations:

What remains for me to be done is to raise the questions concerning military personnel of other nationalities than American. Possibly, I shall also have to raise the question concerning American personnel missing after the Korean war. I should not do anything on either of these lines until we know where Ambassador Johnson's talks concerning, among others, the last mentioned group have led. In the meanwhile, I must keep the ball in the air and for that reason I must emphasise my wish for continued contacts. At the same time, I feel that I must rub in that Chou En-lai cannot make a distinction between Mr. Hammarskjöld and the Secretary-General. Finally, it must all be dressed in such terms as to maintain the friendly atmosphere on which Chou En-lai himself now puts such heavy stress.

With these explanations I feel that the purpose of the letter would be fully understood and its phrasing properly appreciated: In fact, I have this time had to indulge in some "double talk" as the letter has an appearance which is much more positive than its rather restrained substance when analysed.

Warm regards.

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General

Mr. A.W. Cordier,
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

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Secretary-General

Mr. A.W. Cordier,
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary-General,
United Nations,
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

9 August 1955

CODE MESSAGE

FOR CORDIER FROM SECGEN REUR 1153 OFCOURSE EYE HAVE NO INTENTION TO SAY ANYTHING FOR THE TIME BEING OR EVEN LATER UNLESS PROVOKED Z BARCO MUST REFER TO WHAT EYE SAID TO BILL HALL VIZ THAT IN VIEW NEW SITUATION CHINESE WERE ENTITLED TO EXPECT ME AND EYE ALSO FOR OTHER REASONS WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS MY VIEWS ON SOME ASPECTS OF CHINA PROBLEM WITH LESS RESERVE THAN UNTIL NOW Z HALL'S REPORTING THUS NOT VERY EXACT AS TO NUANCES Z THEREFORE YOU CAN REASSURE CABOT WHOM EYE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE THURSDAY ALSO IN VIEW OF PRESS CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR FRIDAY END

9 August 1955

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

No. 1153

Secretary-General from Cordier.

Barco informs me you had hinted to Americans Geneva possible early extension of views regarding Red China problem. Cabot hopes you say nothing until you and he have chance for discussion on your return.

EDITORIAL NEW YORK
Herald Tribune
14 Tuesday, August 9, 1955

Red China's Black Record

"They use 'persuasion' that civilized people simply do not know about," said Col. John Knox Arnold jr., summing up his tortures at the hands of the Chinese Reds. And as he and his fellow prisoners described that "persuasion," applied to men held in defiance of international law and the express provisions of an agreement signed by the Chinese Communist government, the world outside the Bamboo Curtain recognized that there was still another indelible stain on the Red record.

There are those who argue that Red China should long ago have been admitted to the United Nations. They apparently see no irony in allowing the Peiping regime to subscribe to a profession of faith which reads: "We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. . . ."

That is part of the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. How has Red China shown its respect for those principles and ideals?

1.—Red China was born of a broken treaty. In February, 1952, the General Assembly of the U. N. formally condemned the Soviet Union because it had "failed to carry out" the terms of its treaty with Nationalist China, a treaty which should have prevented the rise of the Reds to dominance.

2.—Red China showed its respect for "the equal rights . . . of nations large and small" by invading Tibet in 1950, and subjugating it.

3.—Red China demonstrated its intent to avert the "scourge of war" by intervening in (if indeed it did not provoke) the criminal assault of the North Korean regime upon the Republic of Korea. It also defied the U. N. itself, in the process, and continues to break the terms of the truce agreement concerning Korea which it signed with the U. N. command. In Indochina a rebellion against a legally constituted government was fomented and aided by the Peiping government and a division of Viet Nam imposed by force.

4.—Red China proved its devotion to "fundamental human rights" by establishing a dictatorship, by suppressing freedom of speech and thought, by imprisoning and expelling missionaries and seizing church properties, by expropriating business men and land owners, Chinese and foreign, by setting up courts that were a travesty on justice.

5.—Finally, the Chinese Communists displayed their belief "in the dignity and worth of the human person" by massacres and brutality on an unparalleled scale. How many Chinese died at the hands of their Red fellow-countrymen may never be known. But in 1952 the Free Trade Union Committee of the American Federation of Labor set the figure at some 18,000,000 persons. Five million "landlords" are said to have been killed; 900,000 "treacherous merchants." And the purges still go on—one is under way now. The United States Army reported in 1953 that 29,815 persons, including 6,113 Americans, had been killed after capture by North Koreans and Chinese. A full account was rendered to the U. N. of the "beatings, deliberately planned starvation, cold-blooded murder, mutilation and torture" by which this appalling total was achieved.

The case of the eleven flyers, returning haggard, worn, with minds full of the "things you don't want to talk about," has now been added to the long and barbaric list. The nations and statesmen who have argued that Red China should be admitted to the U. N. may have put their consciences to rest by the old theory that relations between nations are not governed by moral codes but by recognition of existing authority. But even if that were a satisfactory guide to world policies—and the United States does not accept it as such—the U. N. Charter expressly refutes it.

To qualify for membership, Red China would have to do far more than release the tortured bodies of a few of its victims. To be accepted in the society of nations at all—to ask for confidence in its word, diplomatic association on an equal basis with other states, and the normal intercourse of international life and trade—there would have to be drastic changes in its code of conduct. And if the United States should be alone in demanding the acceptance of minimum standards of international decency, it would still be important to hold this example before the world. The dead demand it.