

Peking story (American prisoners in China) - correspondence, letters and ca...

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Peking story - 1955

12 Feb.

Stone, I. F. (I. F. Stone's Weekly, Washington)

- 1 letter to A. Cordier (Exec. Assist. to D.H.)
- 2 encl.

I. F. STONE'S WEEKLY

301 E. Capitol Street
Washington 3, D. C.

I. F. STONE, *Editor and Publisher*


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Feb. 12

Dear Mr. Cordier:

Since there is here presented a quite different view of Mr. Hammarskjeld's mission and (in the issue of Feb. 14) a reference to you, I am taking the pleasure of sending copies to you.

Most respectfully yours,



I.F. Stone

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. III, NUMBERS 2 and 3

FEBRUARY 7, 1955



WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

The Hidden History of the Formosa Crisis

There is an Eisenhower anecdote, probably apocryphal though told me as true by a person with some access to high-level political circles, which may help to throw light on the bewildering twists and turns of Administration policy during the past few weeks. The story concerns an intra-Administration controversy over policy which was so badly deadlocked that it was decided to refer it to the General himself. Each side prepared the executive order it wanted the President to sign, and the two contrary orders were handed him for decision. Mr. Eisenhower was on his way for a few hours' relaxation at a local golf course but agreeably took them along with him to read on the way. The story goes that the President, after carefully reading the proposed executive orders, was delighted with them—and signed both!

The anecdote undoubtedly is unfair to Mr. Eisenhower, whose press conferences reflect a great deal of homework in a bewildering assortment of unfamiliar and complex issues. But in the context of Far Eastern policy it has a kind of symbolic truth. For the President in the past few weeks has in effect sought at one and the same time to implement two contradictory policies. The first was to begin to stabilize relations with Peiping and get the country off the hook on which Chiang Kai-shek and the China Lobby have so long impaled it. The other was to appease the advocates of a tough and unyielding policy toward the New China. In the process, it now appears, he has failed utterly to dislodge Senator Knowland from the offshore islands. America's China policy is back in the old stalemate.

"Massive Retaliation" Against Hammarskjöld

In the excitement it seems to have escaped public attention that the principal casualty of the renewed deadlock is the Hammarskjöld mission to Peiping. The war party may still be too weak to drag the U.S. into war, but has proven strong enough again to torpedo new possibilities for peace. This may prove to be the real meaning of recent events: a glance back will show how dangerously close we must have seemed last month (from the China Lobby's point of view) to better relations with Communist China.

When Hammarskjöld arrived in Peiping on January 5, it was felt at the United Nations in New York that the public trials of the American aviators meant that the Communists wanted to bargain and that they would hardly have agreed to the visit unless they were prepared ultimately to free their prisoners. To make a friend of the Secretary General, to accord him a success, to soften U.S. public opinion were obvious steps toward their main objective—admission to the UN. In neutral Sweden, Hammarskjöld's home and the avenue for the preliminary negotiations, this was well understood. A diplo-

matic official in Stockholm (see dispatch, *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 9) said the trip had been so carefully prepared diplomatically "that the chance of failure was virtually eliminated before he [Hammarskjöld] proposed to see Mr. Chou."

Saving "Face" for China

Whether by design or not, both Washington and Moscow had behaved in such a way as to pave the way for the release of the airmen without loss of "face." Eisenhower had been most pacific and rejected the idea of a blockade, requesting UN mediation instead. Moscow had set Peiping an example by releasing two long-time American prisoners of its own, and soon after a third. If Big Brother could so meekly hand over three American prisoners, there was no loss of prestige within the Soviet family or without if Peiping followed suit. India, too, made a plea for the release of the American fliers.

The Peiping radio kept calling for the liberation of Formosa, but there were indications on Hammarskjöld's return that the Chinese Communists were not unaware of the realities of American politics. The *New York Times* reported January 13 from United Nations headquarters, "according to reliable sources, Mr. Chou did not demand the withdrawal of the U.S. naval cordon that has protected Formosa since the start of the Korean war" but "seems to have given the impression that Communist China would be satisfied with an assurance by the U.S. that there would be no attack on the mainland from Formosa."

This was confirmed when Hammarskjöld first spoke to the press on his return to New York January 13. A story by the *New York Times* chief UN correspondent, Thomas J. Hamilton, reported next morning: "Mr. Chou, it was disclosed, asked for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both North and South Korea, but indicated that he would be satisfied with an assurance from the United States that it would not permit an invasion attempt from Formosa." This was printed on page 5, column 3 of the City Edition, Jan. 14. It was omitted in the Late City Edition when the lead was rewritten to make room for a statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., saying—after a conference with Hammarskjöld—that Lodge felt confident the American aviators would be released.

Brandishing the Atom Bomb

For the record, Mr. Hammarskjöld spoke very carefully. "The door that has been opened," he told the press that night, "can be kept open, given restraint on all sides." Mr. Lodge echoed this with a call for "patience." But the foreign correspondents here in Washington were appalled in the next 24 hours by two events which hardly fit into the pattern of

(Continued on page two)

patience, though little noticed by the American press. The first was a most inflammatory speech made before the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce on the night of January 13 by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, which was abusive, unrealistic and intemperate in its treatment of China.

The other was the fact that Secretary of State Dulles, despite last-minute efforts at the State Department to dissuade him, flew to Omaha next day for a "briefing" at Strategic Air Command headquarters by Gen. Curtis Le May. Lodge, who was supposed to see Dulles in Washington to report on what Hammarskjold had to say, was instructed to meet the Secretary in Omaha instead. The SAC, of course, is our long-range arm for delivery of the H-bomb; it seemed as if we were "tuning up for" massive retaliation.

There were inquiries from the UN and from abroad. Next day the White House told the press Mr. Eisenhower had talked with Mr. Dulles by phone in Omaha and issued a statement

Morse's Fear of Radford

"MR. MORSE. It simply must be said—even though it is a very blunt statement—that some of us, and I am one of them, believe that for the past two or three years Admiral Radford has been leaning and inclining very strongly toward the preventive war theory. Some of us feel, after we hear him, that he entertains the thought that war with Red China is inevitable—and, for that matter, that war with Red Russia is inevitable, too; and we fear that he may hold the opinion that if such a war is to be fought, now is the time to fight it—if not sooner. That is why we have this additional reason for fearing the language of the joint resolution."

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 27, Congr. Rec. 742.

calling for "calm." Later in the day at Omaha, Lodge—but not Dulles—issued a statement saying that the meeting with the SAC command had "nothing to do with a show of power diplomacy and is not primarily concerned with the captured fliers." But this incident seemed the first foreboding sign that despite the President the advocates of a "tough" policy still threatened the results of Hammarskjold's mission.

Why Wasn't Hammarskjold Told?

There was a second disturbing incident which has yet to be explained. This has to do with the exchange of letters between Secretary of State Dulles and the Nationalist Foreign Minister George C. Yeh on the mutual defense treaty with Chiang. The treaty was made public December 1. The letter was dated December 10 but not made public until January 13. There are several curious things about the timing. The letter

Charges Against Chiang Not Even Knowland Rose to Deny

"MR. LONG. For myself, I fully believe that Chiang Kai-shek and his friends have no more certain purpose than to have the United States fully involved in all-out war with Red China, even if this should mean war with Russia."

—Jan. 26, Congr. Rec. 632.

"MR. MORSE. I happen to share the point of view, which has been expressed by other Senators also, that the Nationalist Chinese believe their only hope of survival in the long run is to get the United States involved in an all-out war on the mainland of China."

—Jan. 26, Congr. Rec. 638.

"MR. KEFAUVER. We shall place our future . . . in the hands of a man who passionately wants to get back on the mainland of China, and who apparently would give anything in the world to get us involved in a war with Communist China, so he could get back on the mainland of China, by using our troops and our military power."

—Jan. 26, Congr. Rec. 658.

"MR. BYRD. If the pending treaty is ratified, we would enter into close partnership, on equal terms, with Chiang

Why Let The People Know?

"MR. MORSE. I was surprised and a little shocked last night, Mr. President, to hear a prominent journalist tell me that he thought the major objection to my approach to this problem was that the people of the country should not be the ones to judge the course of action which is taken in such a matter as this. I could not believe my ears."

"He went on to argue that, of course, the people did not want to go to war, but it may be necessary to go to war. I hope we have not reached the point, Mr. President, where the people, and the sons of the people who will be doing so much of the dying in a war, if it should come, cannot determine the peace and war policies of their government."

"I am perfectly satisfied that if the people of this nation had 1 week in which to consider the implications and inevitable consequences of this resolution it would be overwhelmingly rejected by them in its present form."

"There are various reasons for wanting an early disposition of this resolution which is before the Senate, but I am not blind to the fact that one of these reasons on the part of Administration leaders is that they would like to get the matter settled before the people learn too much about it."

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 27, Congr. Rec., p. 740.

was not made public until it began to look as though there might be trouble getting the Democrats to ratify the treaty. A private memorandum by Benjamin V. Cohen questioning the terms had begun to circulate among the Democrats a few days earlier and had leaked to the press. The Dulles-Yeh letters disarmed criticism because it filled a loophole left open by the treaty. The exchange of letters gave the U.S. a veto over any attack on the mainland by Chiang, albeit a veto which had to be evaluated in the light of Chiang's stubborn and successful fight to keep any such clause out of the treaty itself, and in the light of the exception for measures taken "in self-defense."

Hammarskjold on January 16 sent a message on this to Peiping and "reliable sources" at the UN disclosed that the Secretary General believed the chances for the release of the U.S. airmen would be improved "when Communist China learned the exact meaning of the treaty." Hammarskjold had not left for Peiping until December 30, which was 20 days after the date of the Dulles-Yeh letters "but did not find out about it [the exchange] until after his return from Peiping." (N. Y. Times, Jan. 17). It seems very odd that this information was not given Hammarskjold by the State Department in advance of his trip, since it might help to allay Chinese suspicion of the mutual aid treaty.

Kai-shek . . . It was Chiang Kai-shek to whom America sent hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of war materials when the civil war began in China. Later, our valuable war materials were found not only in the black markets of China but also in the hands of the Communists.

"We are becoming a partner with the leaders of Chinese who have been driven from their country. Our purpose is to protect the perimeter of our defense. Above all, we do not want land warfare on the mainland of China. But the primary desire of Chiang Kai-shek is war on the mainland to recapture his power in Asia."

"For his purposes, Chiang Kai-shek knows better than anyone else that he can never set foot on China again without American planes, troops and ships."

"As a Senator, it is my considered opinion that Chiang Kai-shek is motivated by self-interest; that when the critical time comes he may place his ambitions above the welfare of his American partner."

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 28, Congr. Rec. 838.

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Knowland Raises the Alarm

It looked that week-end as if this Dulles-Yeh gloss on the pact with Chiang might further smooth the way toward success for Hammarskjold's mission. The day after the Secretary General announced that he was informing Peiping, Knowland made a speech in Chicago declaring that Hammarskjold had failed and warning of "a Far Eastern Munich." Knowland's anxiety seemed justified when Yikiangshan, a tiny island 20 miles north of the Tachens fell to the Chinese Reds and Dulles—after talking with Eisenhower—told his

A Warning That May Prove Prophetic

"MR. MORSE. . . if we go into such a war, we are not going to end it in a day or in a year, or in ten years. That is because all the modern weapons, all the atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs will not subjugate the mainland of China. We can pockmark it with all the weapons of atomic destruction, and even though each pockmark on the topography of China may extend 20 miles across, we could not subjugate China by atomic action. Mr. President, in the last analysis we could not subjugate China by any means except manpower; and that would mean American manpower, with foot soldiers—American foot soldiers. . . .

"Should a conflict come it will go on long after the bombing is over. We then would be confronted with the job of occupying the vast land mass of China, which no nation to date has ever subjugated, and which I am not sure even our trigger-happy military advisers of our own Nation believe even we could conquer. Years of guerrilla warfare would go along with our occupation of China."

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 26, Congr. Rec., p. 637.

press conference that day the island was of no importance. The next day was worse for Knowland. The President after breakfasting with the Senator from California told his own press conference we were not concerned with the Tachen islands and were committed only to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Mr. Eisenhower suggested that the UN negotiate a cease-fire.

Efforts for a cease-fire had been made behind the scenes last September after the Communist attack on Quemoy and failed. Apparently a first condition for such a cease-fire from Peiping's point of view was the abandonment of the offshore islands from which guerrillas and intelligence agents made

The "Sophisticated" View

"MRS. SMITH of Maine . . . But is it [the resolution] actually what it seems to be to the American public? Certainly that does not seem to be the case with many of the sophisticates in international relations, for there is a widespread interpretation and prediction in Washington, in London, and in other capitals of the world that the resolution is a beginning of a partial withdrawal of the United States from this area of Chinese conflict; that it is the first step toward a goal of two-pronged neutralization: First, to insure the security of Formosa and ultimately to make it a UN trusteeship under Chiang Kai-shek; second, to give notice to the Chinese Reds that the United States not only will not help Chiang in any attempt to invade the mainland and regain control of China from the Reds, but that the United States will go further and prevent Chiang from making such an attempt.

This interpretation and prediction, which is being made freely in Washington, London and other capitals of the world, further forecasts an ultimate and accelerated admission of Red China to the United Nations and the recognition of Red China by the United States. Who are right in their interpretation—the American public or the sophisticates in international relations?"

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 26, Congr. Rec., p. 662.

constant forays onto the mainland, and from which the Nationalist navy harrassed ships moving into Chinese ports. It looked on January 19 as if Mr. Eisenhower was prepared to let the offshore islands go, thus creating a situation in which a de facto cease fire might be achieved.

The Chinese Foreign Minister Yeh called immediately after the press conference on Secretary Dulles and stormed out angrily, saying he was returning to Formosa "where I belong." On Taipeh a responsible source was quoted as saying, "The Communists are going to take our islands one by one, and the U.S. 7th Fleet is not going to do a damn thing about it," adding "and there is not much we can do without American naval and air support." United Press, N. Y. Times, Jan. 20).

That day was the high-water mark of the Eisenhower China peace policy. We must leave until next week the story of how and why it was transformed first into a war policy and then degenerated again into the old familiar stalemate.

A Vivid Glimpse of Preparations for Preventive War

"MR. CASE of South Dakota. Because I do not expect to vote for the [Langer] amendment [limiting the President to defense of Formosa], I wish to make a few brief statements about it, and to make clear that if the amendment should be rejected, as I think it will be, that rejection should not be construed by indirection to say that the intent of the pending resolution is to give the President a directive to use forces on the mainland of China. It does not do that . . .

"Mr. President, I wish to give point to this situation by reading a part of Ned Calmer's broadcast as reported on the CBS World News Roundup this morning. It was Bob Schackne's report from Tokyo. I was startled by it when I heard it on the radio this morning. I had my staff call the CBS office in New York to get a transcript of the broadcast, and I have in my hand what they furnished me. I read now from Bob Schackne's report from Tokyo at 8 o'clock this morning:

"The Air Force has rushed war planes to Korea to meet the crisis in the Formosa Straits. Fifty planes, half sabre-jets and half propeller-driven bombers, were sent to Korea at the same time they were ordered to Formosa. A glance at the map explains why.

"South Korea is closer than any other territory in Allied hands to Shanghai, only 365 miles. It is in the Shanghai

—U. S. Senate, Jan. 28, Congr. Rec. 795-6.

area that the Communists have concentrated twelve to fourteen hundred planes, including some 250 MIGs, and possibly some hundreds of IL-28 twin jet bombers. These are the planes that threaten the United States 8th Fleet and Formosa.

"In standard Air Force tactics, the best way to counter this threat is to strike directly and destroy the Red airbase. The best weapon to use is a tactical atomic bomb. The Air Force has the plane to do the job—the F-84 Thunder Jet, which can fly great distances and refuel in midair.

"Whether this will be done is a decision President Eisenhower has not yet made. What the Air Force is doing in positioning itself in case the order is issued."

"Mr. President, I do not believe that the President of the United States is going to decide on any move such as this commentator suggests. If I did, I would support the pending amendment, because I do not believe in starting war under the guise of preventive war . . .

"Mr. President, when a broadcast from Tokyo tells of a buildup in Korea of our planes, and a concentration of Red planes in Shanghai, and says that the best way to counter this threat is to strike directly and destroy the Red airbase and that the best weapon to use is a tactical atom bomb, I do not wonder that fears are being generated."

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How Long Will Attorney General Brownell Go On Using False Witness?

One of The Government's Most Notorious Informers "Comes Clean"

Washington—As we go to press on Thursday morning, one of the government's most notorious informers, Harvey M. Matusow, was about to appear at a press conference in New York to unveil his new book, "False Witness." The revelations are expected to upset a whole series of prosecutions in which Matusow was a star witness, notably the Lattimore case.

In the meantime, affidavits by Matusow were filed last week in the Federal courts in Texas and New York, asking

"Fine, Intelligent Witness"

"Mr. Harvey M. Matusow,
"1491 Macombs Road,
"Bronx 52, New York.

"Dear Harvey:

"As I told you before you left El Paso, I am sincerely grateful to you for your fine cooperation in the case of U.S. v. Clinton E. Jencks.

"As you know, your testimony was absolutely essential to a successful prosecution and you presented it in a fine, intelligent manner.

"If you are ever in my part of the country, be sure and look me up.

"Sincerely yours,

"(S) Charles F. Herring

"United States Attorney

"Western District of Texas."

new trials in two cases in which he admits he lied. One is the Taft-Hartley oath prosecution of Clinton E. Jencks, an official of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers. The other is the conviction of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and a group of so-called "second echelon" Communist leaders under the Smith Act. On this page we give samples from both affidavits which indicate their flavor.

The affidavit in the Flynn case accuses Roy Cohn of suborning perjury, a grave charge inviting a legal contest in which

Lied About Copper Strikes and Korea

"At this time, and with further reference only to Clinton E. Jencks and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, I would like to add that I testified falsely, or did not tell the entire truth, when I appeared in Salt Lake City on October 8, 1952, before Senators McCarran and Watkins during hearings conducted by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security concerning Mine, Mill. Specifically, and without now referring to other matters I then testified about, I also told the same untruth about the conversation with Jencks relating to a plot to interfere with the Korean war by calling copper strikes which I later told when I testified at the trial of Jencks."

—Affidavit of Matusow in U.S. v. Jencks.

either Matusow or Cohn might go to jail. Cohn was also one of the five prosecutors whose name is signed to the first indictment of Owen Lattimore. Matusow says in his book that he lied when he testified that "Owen Lattimore's books were used as the official Communist Party guide on Asia."

Anyone who has followed the prosecution and inquisition of radicals, and knows something of life on the hounded Left, is aware of the pressures exerted by the government on the ex-Communist. There is no market for the drab dull truth. Prosecutors and inquisitors want "hot stuff" which will make headlines and wow juries.

Unscrupulous prosecutors and Congressional investigators have ample leverage with which to create liars. People who admit they have been Communists are open to prosecution, deportation and/or denaturalization on political grounds. Add the fact, as shown by testimony in several trials, that some of these professional witnesses are men with pasts marred by crimes more tangible than the harboring of Marxist thoughts, and you can see how easy it is for the "coaching" process.

Matusow's Own Story of How He Was "Coached" in Perjury by Roy Cohn

"In all other respects, my testimony concerning this conversation with Defendant Trachtenberg is false. At no time in the course of the conversation did Defendant Trachtenberg make the statements that I attributed to him in the foregoing quoted portions of the testimony. At no time did Defendant Trachtenberg refer to the book in relation to the concept of revolution or overthrow of the Government. At no time during the many occasions that I met with and talked with Defendant Trachtenberg did he indicate that he advocated the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or any other means.

"The question of my testimony concerning the book 'The Law of the Soviet State' by Andrei Vishinsky, was first raised by Roy Cohn, Assistant United States Attorney, who worked with me in preparing my testimony. The conversation in which the subject was first discussed with Cohn took place in a car driven by a special agent of the FBI. U. S. Attorneys David Marks, Roy Cohn and J. C. McCarthy, a special agent of the FBI, and two other individuals were seated in the car at the time. Mr. Cohn mentioned the book by Vishinsky. Cohn said that because of a section of the book it would be important to connect the book with the defendants. He said that the U. S. Attorney had attempted to introduce this book in the Dennis case, but was unable to lay the necessary foundation. He then asked me if I had ever discussed the book with any of the defendants.

—Affidavit of Harvey M. Matusow, in U.S. v. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn et al.

I told him that I had discussed it with Trachtenberg. Cohn asked me for the substance of that conversation, and I informed him that Trachtenberg had inquired about the sales of the book in a conversation in which he made similar inquiry concerning the sales of other books carried in the bookshop.

"A subsequent conversation concerning the book occurred in Roy Cohn's office. He showed me the book entitled, 'The Law of the Soviet State,' and asked me whether this was the book which Trachtenberg had discussed with me. He then asked me for further details concerning this conversation with Trachtenberg, and I informed him that Trachtenberg had discussed the price of the book. Cohn stated that this would not be sufficient to lay the necessary foundation for its introduction in evidence. Cohn pointed to a passage in the book and told me that that passage was important in proving the Government's case. He then asked me if I had discussed anything with Trachtenberg which would tie him with this passage, and I said 'No', I had not. Nevertheless, thereafter, in several sessions with Cohn, we developed the answer which I gave in my testimony, tying Trachtenberg to that passage. WE BOTH KNEW THAT TRACHTENBERG HAD NEVER MADE THE STATEMENTS WHICH I ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN MY TESTIMONY."

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An Appeal Recently Made by the Great British Philosopher Over BBC

Man's Peril from The Hydrogen Bomb

By Bertrand Russell

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The Formosa crisis has given such urgency to this recent appeal by Bertrand Russell over BBC that we are reprinting the full transcript as published in the British Broadcasting Corporation's organ, THE LISTENER. It is a pity that no American commercial broadcasting company has had the enterprise or courage to rebroadcast this moving warning from England's foremost living philosopher, the octogenarian, Lord Russell.*

I am speaking on this occasion not as a Briton, not as a European, not as a member of a western democracy, but as a human being, a member of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts: Jews and Arabs; Indians and Pakistanis; white men and Negroes in Africa; and, overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between communism and anti-communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong feelings about one or more of these issues; but I want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings for the moment and consider yourself only as a member of a biological species which has had a remarkable history and whose disappearance none of us can desire. I shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than to another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it. We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, for there no longer are such steps. The question we have to ask ourselves is: What steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all sides?

The general public, and even many men in positions of authority have not realised what would be involved in a war with hydrogen bombs. The general public still thinks in terms of the obliteration of cities. It is understood that the new bombs are more powerful than the old and that, while one atomic bomb could obliterate Hiroshima, one hydrogen bomb could obliterate the largest cities such as London, New York, and Moscow. No doubt in a hydrogen-bomb war great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters that would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York, and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in the course of a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we now know, especially since the Bikini test, that hydrogen bombs can gradually spread destruction over a much wider area than had been supposed. It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 25,000 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radio-active particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish although they were outside what experts believed to be the danger zone. No one knows how widely such lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with hydrogen bombs is quite likely to put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many hydrogen bombs are used there will be universal death—sudden only for a fortunate minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

War Itself Must Be Abolished

I will give a few instances out of many. Sir John Slessor, who can speak with unrivalled authority from his experiences of air warfare, has said: 'A world war in this day and age

would be general suicide'; and has gone on to state: 'It never has and never will make any sense trying to abolish any particular weapon of war. What we have got to abolish is war.' Professor Adrian, who is the leading English authority on nerve physiology, recently emphasised the same point in his address as President of the British Association. He said: 'We must face the possibility that repeated atomic explosions will lead to a degree of general radio-activity which no one can tolerate or escape'; and he added: 'Unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race.' Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert says: 'With the advent of the hydrogen bomb, it would appear that the human race has arrived at a point where it must abandon war as a continuation of policy or accept the possibility of total destruction.' I could prolong such quotations indefinitely.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible and no one can be sure that they will not be realised. I have not found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as my researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. I have found that the men who know most are most gloomy.

Stark, Inescapable Problem

Here, then, is the problem which I present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war. The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term 'mankind' feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realise in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited. I am afraid this hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use hydrogen bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture hydrogen bombs as soon as war broke out, for if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.

On both sides of the Iron Curtain there are political obstacles to emphasis on the destructive character of future war. If either side were to announce that it would on no account resort to war, it would be diplomatically at the mercy of the other side. Each side, for the sake of self-preservation, must continue to say that there are provocations that it will not endure. Each side may long for an accommodation, but neither side dare express this longing convincingly. The position is analogous to that of duellists in former times. No doubt it frequently happened that each of the duellists feared death and desired an accommodation, but neither could say so, since, if he did, he would be thought a coward. The only hope in such cases was intervention by friends of both parties suggesting an accommodation to which both could agree at the same moment. This is an exact analogy to the present position of the protagonists on either side of the Iron Curtain. If an agreement making war improbable is to be reached, it will have to be by the friendly offices of neutrals, who can speak of the disastrousness of war without being accused of advocating a policy of 'appeasement.' The neutrals have every right, even

from the narrowest consideration of self-interest, to do whatever lies in their power to prevent the outbreak of a world war, for, if such a war does break out, it is highly probable that all the inhabitants of neutral countries, along with the rest of mankind, will perish. If I were in control of a neutral government, I should certainly consider it my paramount duty to see to it that my country would continue to have inhabitants, and the only way by which I could make this probable would be to promote some kind of accommodation between the powers on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain.

I, personally, am of course not neutral in my feeling and I should not wish to see the danger of war averted by an abject submission of the west. But, as a human being, I have to remember that, if the issues between east and west are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether communist or anti-communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether white or black, then these issues must not be decided by war. I should wish this to be understood on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is emphatically not enough to have it understood on one side only. I think the neutrals, since they are not caught in our tragic dilemma, can, if they will, bring about this realisation on both sides. I should like to see one or more neutral powers appoint a commission of experts, who should all be neutrals, to draw up a report on the destructive effects to be expected in a war with hydrogen bombs, not only among the belligerents but also among neutrals. I should wish this report presented to the governments of all the Great Powers with an invitation to express their agreement or disagreement with its findings. I think it possible that in this way all the Great Powers could be led to agree that a world war can no longer serve the purposes of any of them since it is likely to

exterminate friend and foe equally and neutrals likewise.

As geological time is reckoned, Man has so far existed only for a very short period—1,000,000 years at the most. What he has achieved, especially during the last 6,000 years, is something utterly new in the history of the Cosmos, so far at least as we are acquainted with it. For countless ages the sun rose and set, the moon waxed and waned, the stars shone in the night, but it was only with the coming of Man that these things were understood. In the great world of astronomy and in the little world of the atom, Man has unveiled secrets which might have been thought undiscoverable. In art and literature and religion, some men have shown a sublimity of feeling which makes the species worth preserving. Is all this to end in trivial horror because so few are able to think of Man rather than of this or that group of men? Is our race so destitute of wisdom, so incapable of impartial love, so blind even to the simplest dictates of self-preservation, that the last proof of its silly cleverness is to be the extermination of all life on our planet?—for it will be not only men who will perish, but also the animals and plants, whom no one can accuse of communism or anti-communism.

I cannot believe that this is to be the end. I would have men forget their quarrels for a moment and reflect that, if they will allow themselves to survive, there is every reason to expect the triumphs of the future to exceed immeasurably the triumphs of the past. There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? I appeal, as a human being to human beings; remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death.—*Home Service.*

A Witty Attack on the Reece Committee—and a Sad Confession

How Foundations (Like The Rest of Us) Are Intimidated

By Robert M. Hutchins

EDITOR'S NOTE—*Because of its militancy, its intellectual gayety and its realism, we are reprinting the major portion of the speech made January 26 before the National Press Club in Washington by Robert M. Hutchins, president of the Fund for the Republic. We believe it deserves the widest possible circulation.*

The conduct of the majority, if it was the majority, of the Reece Committee was so scandalous that it outraged almost all the press and apparently even one of its own members. At any rate, Angier L. Goodwin of Massachusetts wrote a new kind of concurring opinion, one that disagreed with all the conclusions of the opinion with which it purported to concur. In the conduct of the hearings Mr. Reece added some new wrinkles to the distortions that we have become accustomed to in congressional investigations.

The foundations were elaborately attacked by the staff and by some witnesses of dubious standing. Then, pleading that Mr. Hays of Ohio would not let him conduct the hearings as they should be conducted, Mr. Reece adjourned them and informed the foundations that they could file written statements. Perhaps the most depressing fact about the report of the so-called majority of the Reece Committee is that Mr. Reece takes credit for relieving the foundations of what he calls the "embarrassment" of cross-examination. You might as well execute an innocent man without the embarrassment of a hearing—but if you did nobody would claim that you had conformed to the principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence.

Like Those Who Live "In Furnished Souls"

The most entertaining of the new wrinkles was that the majority took a philosophical position. The Cambridge ladies,

e. e. cummings said, lived in furnished souls; so Mr. Reece and Mr. Wolcott came bustling out in second-hand suits of anti-empiricism, supplied them by the sages of the staff. Mr. Reece and Mr. Wolcott were much against empiricism, which they associated with moral relativism, irreligion, the cultural lag and ultimately with subversion.

The Congressmen could not be bothered with history. They overlooked the fact that some of the most empirical empiricists in history, like Hume and Montaigne, were thorough-going Tories. The Congressmen could not be bothered with consistency: for example, they went after the teachers' colleges for sponsoring empiricism and then after the Fund for the Advancement of Education for not sponsoring the teachers' colleges.

If a committee may charge a foundation with empiricism, why not charge a college with it, and if with empiricism why not with Presbyterianism or Catholicism or any other philosophy, religion, or dogma that the committee does not care for? The grant of tax exemption may carry with it certain obligations, and those who accept it may by implication agree that they must perform certain services. But it has never been supposed that by taking tax exemption a college, university, church, or foundation, otherwise within the law, was liable to condemnation because of the philosophy that it held. If there is such liability, the way is open to the most flagrant violation of religious freedom and of freedom of speech and teaching.

The lesson the majority, if it is a majority, of the Reece Committee wants to teach the foundation is stated in words of crystalline clarity: "They should be very chary of promoting ideas, concepts and opinion-forming material which run counter to what the public currently wishes, approves and likes."

The One Way to Be Safe

Here the Committee throws overboard the principle accepted by the Cox Committee that the justification of the foundations is that they supply risk or venture capital in the field of philanthropy. That is what they are for, to take chances, the Cox Committee said. The Reece Committee would confine them to what a public relations man, presumably by a series of careful polls, found that the public currently wished, approved, and liked. The way to be safe would be to attract no attention, arouse no discussion, create no controversy.

Even this would not be enough. All the things of which the Committee now complains were currently wished, approved, and liked at the time the foundations did them. To meet the test laid down by the Committee, therefore, a foundation would have to be able to foresee what would become unpopular by the time of an investigation.

But even this is not enough. The issue is not what the public will wish, approve, and like. There is no evidence, for example, that the American public dislikes empiricism. Quite the contrary. The public does not dislike empiricism: the Reece Committee does, or rather two members of it do, or perhaps just the staff of the Reece Committee does. Running a foundation on these terms becomes an extra-hazardous occupation fraught with dangers that test pilots and submarine explorers and others who are up against nothing worse than the laws of Nature do not encounter.

The Reece Committee achieves some of its gaudiest effects by the simple process of giving old words new definitions and then pinning the old words on the foundations. This is the way that empiricism becomes subversive. Subversion now means, the Committee says, a promotion of tendencies that may lead to results that the Committee will not like. Hence support of the New Deal could be subversion. Social engineering, planning, world government, the United Nations, William James, John Dewey, the American Friends Service Committee, Dr. Kinsey and reform are all subversive in the bright new lexicon of the Reece Committee. And of course all these things are socialistic, if not communistic, too.

So a Papal Encyclical Was Termed Red, Too

At times one feels when reading the report that old scurrilous words will be redefined and applied to any expression of decent human feeling. So it was that a staff member found himself identifying the Papal Encyclicals as communistic.

But the Reece report is said to be a majority report, and it will be referred to in the future as a majority report. Its appendix will be quoted as an authoritative collection of dangerous names. The only reason for the appendix is to enable some committee in the future to say of somebody that he was listed by the Reece Committee. This fact will then be greeted with hushed and incredulous awe by those to whom it is communicated.

All you have to do to qualify for the appendix is to favor world government or get mentioned by the *Daily Worker*. The principal charge against one distinguished professor is that he is quoted, apparently with approval, in a dissenting opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals. A low of some sort is reached with the mention in the appendix of the name of George F. Kennan. He is accused of the following—and this is the total record: a book of his was reviewed (we are not told whether favorably or unfavorably) in the *Daily People's World* and the *New World Review*; on May 9, 1950, the *New York Times* reported that he spoke on Communist China (what he said does not appear); and on May 28, 1950, the *New York Times* reported that he "attacked witchhunting of communists." On the basis of such information Mr. Kennan will in the future be referred to as "cited by the Reece Committee."

The appendix of the Reece Committee's so-called majority report is an endless carnival of good clean fun—it is almost 200 pages long; but I must pass on. I cannot regard the Reece Committee as having more than symbolic or sympto-

matic importance. Its wild and squalid presentation affords a picture of the state of our culture that is most depressing. Its aims and methods are another example of the exploitation of public concern about communism and subversion to further political ambition and to work off political grudges.

A Fraud From the Very First

We may as well state it plainly: the Reece investigation in its inception and execution was a fraud. Nobody in his right mind could suppose that the great accumulations of wealth left by our richest men were being intentionally used by their trustees to overthrow the institutions of this country. Hence the Reece Committee had to take another tack: the trustees were said to be so busy that they had to leave the foundations to officers who were often quite disreputable. Though this relieved the men of wealth and standing of the charge of being knaves, it did so only at the expense of charging them with being fools. Only fools could be so careless as to allow enormous sums entrusted to them for charitable purpose to be stolen away and lavished on the subversion of their country.

Congress may properly investigate the foundations and seek to arrive at general legislative policy concerning them. But the most important question to ask about any given foundation is whether it is one. Is it actually using its money for religious, charitable, educational, or scientific purposes? The First Amendment suggests that tax exemption should not be denied or revoked because the particular views of religion, education, or science held or promoted by the foundation are unpopular.

On the other hand, nothing in the Constitution requires that tax exemption must be accorded an organization, which though in outward form a foundation, is actually a tax dodge, or a public relations device, or a scheme to promote the personal interests of the donor. The test is public versus private purposes. The Government may properly inquire into this question, since the exemption is granted with a promise of performance. The appropriate forum for the determination of the question of performance would seem to be a court.

Most Foundations Already "House-Broken"

As Dr. Johnson used to say, we must clear our minds of cant. When we do, we see that in general the foundations have for many years been following the prescription laid down for them by the majority of the Reece Committee. This prescription is to try to avoid doing what is or may become unpopular. The failure of the foundations to be universally popular at all times is seldom caused by a spirit of reckless abandon or eager pioneering on their part. It is caused rather by the difficulties of predicting what will be popular or unpopular.

Who could have imagined that helping prospective teachers in Arkansas to get an education would have ever been regarded by anybody as exhibiting dangerous tendencies of mind? But when a foundation did this, it was criticized by teachers, businessmen, and newspapers in that State and was of course complained of by the Reece Committee. What would the foundation have done in Arkansas if it had been possible to foresee the reactions that in fact occurred? I do not say that the grant would not have been made, but I would not bet on it; for the foundations have in varying degrees suppressed their ambition to provide risk capital in favor of a desire to have what are called good public relations, that is, to avoid unpopularity.

We know that the Attorney General's list is an *ex parte* finding of guilt with no probative standing in law. But how many foundations would give money to an organization or even to an individual in an organization on the Attorney General's list, no matter how meritorious the project? Would we support organizations that allowed groups listed by the Attorney General to meet in halls owned by them? If not, for an irrelevant reason, one that has nothing to do with the quality of the proposal, but that has a great deal to do with our popularity, we have made our peace with Reece.