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Minister of U.S.S.R.)
by the American Journalists.

D O C U M E N T S

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W. R. Hearst and J. Kingsbury Smith,

January 29, 1955

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Press Releases

NEW TIMES No. 6

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Interview with V. M. Molotov

by the American Journalists

W. R. Hearst and J. Kingsbury Smith,

January 29, 1955

Hearst said that this was the first time he was in the Soviet Union. He was very glad of the opportunity to make the trip and acquaint himself with the country, and had been pleasantly surprised by the friendliness which Soviet people everywhere had shown him and the persons accompanying him. This led him to hope that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union might improve considerably and continue to improve, which would be to the interest both of the two countries and of the whole world.

Molotov remarked that the present state of Soviet-American relations was such that one could not but wish for their improvement. As to the attitude of the Soviet people to Americans, it had always been friendly.

Hearst said he was now convinced of this.

He then requested V. M. Molotov's permission to put a few questions concerning the present state of international affairs.

Molotov consented.

Hearst said that the situation which had recently developed in the Far East was evidently the most important of present-day world problems. He asked whether Molotov thought that the situation in the Formosa area represented a serious threat to world peace.

Molotov replied that the situation in the area of Taiwan (the Chinese name for Formosa, which was also the name used in the So-

viet Union) was, of course, receiving attention, and should receive attention because it was creating tension in the Far East and adversely affecting the whole international situation, since it constituted a threat to peace, held out the menace of war. He had to add that, in his opinion, the responsibility for this rested with the United States, because it was interfering in China's domestic affairs.

We, Molotov said, consider Taiwan an inalienable part of China.

Kingsbury Smith said that he would like in this connection to remind Molotov of Eden's recent statement that China, as such, had not had control of Formosa for many years.

"About a hundred years, I think," Hearst added.

Molotov replied that there was the Cairo Declaration, which had been signed by the United States and Great Britain, and the Potsdam Declaration, which had also been signed by the United States and Great Britain. Furthermore, there was the Agreement on the Surrender of Japan, of which the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. were signatories. According to all these basic international documents, Taiwan was Chinese territory and must be transferred to China. This was likewise confirmed in a subsequent statement of the President of the United States made in 1950. What one got was this, that formerly the island was seized by Japan, and

now by whom?—by the United States. Thus China had been deprived of her national territory first by one country and now by another.

As to Eden's statement, that would require separate discussion.

Kingsbury Smith said that Molotov was known as one of the greatest realists of our time. He probably realized that, in the present situation, it was hardly likely that the United States would abandon the defence of Formosa until it considered that peace in the Far East was guaranteed. It was therefore possible to find a solution to the threat to peace, so to speak, within the bounds of realism. In that connection, Mr. Hearst would like to put one more question.

Hearst said that at the Geneva Conference the Soviet government had striven with success to prevent extension of the Indo-China conflict. The question was, would the Soviet government be prepared to act similarly with regard to Formosa?

Molotov replied that there was, of course, a big difference between the Indo-China and the China problems. In one respect, the position of the Soviet Union was similar as regards both Indo-China and China, or any other area—in the respect, namely, that the Soviet Union was interested in relaxation of international tension. The Soviet Union was prepared to support everything that conduced to relaxation of international tension, that really facilitated the achievement of this aim. But the proposed measures must be really designed to reduce international tension. The interference of one state in the affairs of another state cannot contribute to the achievement of this end.

In connection with the remark about realism, he would like to add that in his, Molotov's, view, a realistic approach to present-day China should be different from the one certain foreign states were accustomed to adopt in the past. Today China's entire territory was united under the administration of the Central Government, which was not yet the case only a little while ago. The Chinese people felt that they had accomplished this in the face of enormous difficulties and regarded it as a great national victory. The wresting of any part of the territory of China was so repugnant to the national sentiments of the Chinese people that it aroused their vehement protest and indigna-

tion. Regarding the matter realistically, therefore, it must be said that present-day China was a state which demanded as never before that its national rights and interests be respected. Only given such an approach and understanding could relations with China develop to the benefit of both parties. As to the Soviet Union, it based its relations with China on equality, friendship and consideration for mutual interests, and this was yielding good results.

Kingsbury Smith said that he, and Hearst, understood the Soviet position in this matter. However, he thought that the most urgent problem was to find some solution, even if provisional, which would prevent the danger from spreading and becoming a conflagration which might threaten world peace.

Molotov replied that China was not threatening anybody, and it would be a good thing if nobody were to threaten her. This was what was most needed for the promotion of peace and the establishment of normal relations in the Taiwan area.

Hearst asked whether, if the American government were to use its good offices and recommend its Chinese friends, that is, Chiang Kai-shek, to seek for a peaceful settlement, the Soviet government would be inclined to act similarly in relation to its Chinese allies, so as to prevent the spread of the conflagration.

Molotov replied that Hearst should realize that the government of the C.P.R. and the so-called government of Chiang Kai-shek were not equal parties. The government of the C.P.R. had every warrant for demanding the restoration of its lawful rights with respect to Taiwan. As to the "government" of Chiang Kai-shek, which has been repudiated by the Chinese people, it was time it cleared out to some other place and stopped spoiling relations between states, as it was now doing by remaining, with the help of the United States, where it had no business to be. Everything that might contribute to a solution of this problem would have the support of the Soviet government.

We consider, Molotov added, that it would be in the interest of the United States itself to assist the re-establishment of a normal state of affairs in the Taiwan area and throughout the Far East, with due regard to the real state

of affairs and to the historic changes which had taken place in the development of China and the Far East generally.

Kingsbury Smith asked what would be the attitude of the Soviet government to the possibility of a temporary cease-fire—for a month, say—so as to permit the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's forces from some of the islands off the Chinese coast (Tachen), and to avert the heavy sacrifices both sides would probably have to bear if an attempt were made to capture these islands by force. That might also help to avert the danger of the conflict spreading, which was possible in the present situation. This would have to be regarded, **Kingsbury Smith** added, as a temporary measure and, perhaps, the first step to an eventual settlement of the whole problem if it should be impossible at present to secure a permanent cease-fire by the armed forces of both sides.

Molotov replied that he could answer that question briefly: if Chiang Kai-shek desired to withdraw his forces from any of the islands, it was hardly likely that anyone would prevent him.

Kingsbury Smith asked whether this meant that, if Chiang Kai-shek should decide to withdraw his forces, the Chinese forces on the mainland would not attack him during the withdrawal, nor attack the ships that might be used to assist the withdrawal.

Molotov replied that he was not authorized to speak for the government of the Chinese People's Republic and that the question should be put to the Chinese government.

Kingsbury Smith asked whether the Soviet government would be prepared to put this question to the government of the C.P.R. on behalf of the United States.

Molotov rejoined: "Is the United States government requesting us to do this?"

Hearst said that he wanted to point out, in connection with **Molotov's** remark that he was not authorized to speak for the Chinese government on the mainland, that neither he, **Hearst**, nor **Kingsbury Smith** was acting or making proposals in the name of Chiang Kai-shek or the United States government.

He added that **Kingsbury Smith** and he had now asked all the questions concerning the Far East which interested them, and they thanked

Molotov for his replies. He requested **Molotov's** permission to ask a few questions concerning European affairs.

Molotov consented.

Hearst said that Prime Minister Malenkov, in his New Year's message to the American people, transmitted through an American television agency, had stated that the chief reason for the tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. was the establishment of a network of American military bases around the Soviet Union and states associated with it. With a view to making a start towards disarmament through gradual reduction of armed forces, and also to creating favourable conditions for co-existence, would the Soviet government be prepared, even before a peace treaty was concluded with Austria, to liquidate its military and air bases in its Austrian zone of occupation; provided the Western Powers should act similarly in their zones.

He wanted it to be understood that he was asking this question, too, as a journalist.

Molotov replied that there were two questions here. The first concerned Austria, and the other the American military bases located around the Soviet Union.

As to the Austrian question, he supposed that **Hearst** was well acquainted with the Soviet Union's viewpoint.

As to the American military bases around the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, that really was a question which was complicating the whole international situation, for the bases were evidence that one of the parties, the United States, maintained an unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and, in establishing these bases in close proximity to the Soviet borders, was threatening the Soviet Union. This could neither conduce to relaxation of international tension, nor facilitate reduction of armaments, in which the public at large in all countries were interested. It stood to reason that the existence of American military bases in close proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union was one of the things which were preventing the settlement of many other questions besides the Austrian question, since the establishment of these bases testified that, whereas the Soviet Union was desirous of improving relations with the United States, the very opposite desire was to be observed on the part of the United States.

Kingsbury Smith said that, naturally, neither Hearst nor he could agree that the actions of the United States in the matter of the bases were an unfriendly act. These actions were explained by considerations of security and by a desire to safeguard peace. However, he believed that if one were to begin with the liquidation of the bases in Austria, which lies close to the Soviet Union, this in time might be extended to other areas.

Hearst remarked that one must begin somewhere.

Molotov asked Hearst what he thought were the chances of beginning the liquidation of the military bases in one area and extending it to others. How did he conceive the possibility that, if begun in Austria, the liquidation of the bases would continue in other areas?

Kingsbury Smith remarked that it might prove infectious.

Molotov rejoined that such a hope was hardly enough to go upon.

Hearst said that matters would be helped if the American and Soviet people were to come to know each other better. At any rate, the United States had never in its history embarked on offensive wars. He repeated that one must begin somewhere.

Molotov replied that there were neither military nor any other Soviet bases in the vicinity of the United States. But it appeared that the security of the United States required it to maintain bases, for instance, in Norway, a country bordering on the Soviet Union, in Turkey, which likewise bordered on the U.S.S.R., and even, it seemed, in Pakistan, to say nothing of other areas of Europe and Asia. It likewise appeared that for the safeguarding of its security, the United States also needed Taiwan. If U.S. security were construed so broadly, one might go to the length of declaring that its security necessitated the maintenance of bases in all countries. It was scarcely likely that such plans would meet with the sympathy and understanding of other nations, who knew the meaning of sovereignty, independence and national rights and interests.

Molotov added that it was the confirmed opinion in the Soviet Union that the United States could achieve nothing good with all these bases, neither from the standpoint of its own interests, nor from the standpoint of the interests of peace. No unbiased person could agree that the United States was establishing military bases in many countries, and moreover in close proximity to the borders of another state, from considerations of its own security. He, **Molotov**, thought that nobody was naive enough to believe that. All this could not be explained by considerations of the security of the United States, because nobody was threatening its security, and as to the Soviet Union, it was not threatening anybody, any country. The Soviet Union was absorbed with its internal affairs, of which there were plenty, and it was naturally interested in safeguarding peace, as other nations were. As to the statement that the establishment of American military bases did not testify to an unfriendly attitude towards the U.S.S.R., one might say the following: improvement of relations between the two countries would be greatly assisted by the liquidation of these bases and a transition to the situation customary among states which maintain normal relations with each other.

Kingsbury Smith said that Hearst and he could give a detailed explanation of why the government and people of the United States considered that the establishment of American military bases was in the interest of their security and of universal peace. However, they feared that if they did that they would be drawn into a dialectical dispute with **Molotov**, and they were certain they could not stand up against him. Moreover, since they had already taken up more than enough of his time, they begged him to excuse them and accept their thanks for the time and attention he had accorded them.

Hearst, in conclusion, thanked **Molotov** for receiving him and spending so much of his time on answering his questions.

Prauda, January 31, 1955

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Press Release

On January 28, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., received the British Ambassador, Sir William Hayter, at the latter's request.

Sir William Hayter communicated the substance of a statement which the British chargé d'affaires in Peking was to make that day to the government of the Chinese People's Republic concerning the situation in the area of Taiwan and other Chinese coastal islands. The Ambassador stated that the government of New Zealand intended to place the question of the fighting in the area of the islands "off the coast of the mainland of China" before the U.N. Security Council, and declared that the British government "are concerned at the very dangerous situation which is developing in the area. They have been in constant touch with the Americans on the importance of lowering tension, and firmly believe that they wish a pacification in the area. But as Sir Anthony Eden said in his recent message to Chou En-lai, progress towards a lowering of tension will be possible only if all are prepared to work for it on the basis of the actual situation. Her Majesty's Government see no reason why reference to the Security Council of the matter of the fighting around the coastal islands need prejudice the claims of either side."

The Ambassador further stated that, in the opinion of the British government, the status of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores) differed from that of the other coastal islands, and, referring to the significance of the latter, he said that "it would be most dangerous if the Chinese Government were to base their plans on the assumption that United States forces would in no circumstances come to the assistance of their Nationalist allies in the area of these islands. Her Majesty's Government believe, however, that if tension is reduced, the problem is susceptible of peaceful and satisfactory settlement. They therefore urge most strongly on all concerned to exercise the utmost restraint both in their actions and public state-

ments and to take every possible precaution to avoid any incidents which might lead to general hostilities."

The Ambassador further stated that his government and the government of New Zealand were in favour of inviting the government of the Chinese People's Republic to participate in the examination of this question in the Security Council, and he further observed that the British government understood that this was also the intention of the United States government.

The Ambassador said in conclusion that "apart altogether from the rights and wrongs of the case, the present situation represents a serious danger to peace and that it is in the interests of everyone, including the Chinese, to ensure that it does not increase. Her Majesty's Government regard the New Zealand initiative in the Security Council as a genuine and serious attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem without prejudice to the claims of either side. They are therefore most strongly urging the Chinese Government to accept the invitation when it is made."

On behalf of his government, the Ambassador expressed the hope that the Soviet government would consider it possible to advise the government of the Chinese People's Republic to exercise restraint and avoid any incidents that might "lead to general hostilities." The Ambassador also expressed the hope that the Soviet government would recommend the government of the C.P.R. to accept the invitation to participate in the examination of the question in the Security Council.

V. M. Molotov made certain observations in connection with the British Ambassador's statement. It was generally known, he said, that it was the desire of the Soviet government to promote peace and to reduce tension both in the Far East and wherever else it was necessary, and that it was prepared to support such measures as really aimed at achieving this goal.

V. M. Molotov remarked that the British Ambassador's communication, as well as the statement recently made by Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons, avoided all reference to the real reasons for the tension in the area of Taiwan, which was an inalienable part of China's national territory, as had been confirmed in the Cairo and Berlin Declarations to which the British and U.S. governments were signatories. Yet it was quite obvious that these reasons lay in the gross interference of the United States in China's domestic affairs, in its effort to wrest Taiwan from China. These actions of the United States constituted aggression against the Chinese People's Republic, which had every right to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores). The actions of

the United States, and of the Chiang Kai-shek clique which it encouraged, were increasing international tension in the Far East and were fraught with the danger of another war. If the United States were to desist from its aggressive actions in the Taiwan area, this would conduce to relaxation of international tension.

V. M. Molotov drew the Ambassador's attention to the fact that if the aggressive actions of the United States in this area were not supported by Britain, the United States would not have ventured on such actions.

V. M. Molotov concluded by informing the British Ambassador that his communication would be examined by the Soviet government.

Pravda, January 29, 1955

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

Press Release

In connection with the conversation he had with the British Ambassador, Sir William Hayter, on January 28, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., invited the Ambassador to see him on January 31 and made the following statement:

"Immediately after our meeting on January 28, during which you, Mr. Ambassador, set forth the views of the British government and the government of New Zealand on the present situation in the Taiwan area, the Soviet government communicated these views to the government of the Chinese People's Republic.

"Like the British government, the Soviet government is disturbed by the dangerous situation which has arisen in the area of Taiwan and the other islands off the coast of China. The situation that has developed is a threat to the maintenance of peace and increases the danger of another war.

"The government of the U.S.S.R. considers that the reason for this situation is that several years ago the United States, with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, seized Taiwan which belongs to China, the Penghu and other Chinese islands. The United States has lately embarked

on other aggressive actions in this area, which further increases the state of tension.

"The Soviet government shares the opinion of the British government that this entire question should be examined by the U.N. Security Council. It has already given corresponding instructions to its representative in the United Nations, Ambassador A. A. Sobolev.

"The Soviet government has also instructed him to ensure that a delegation from the Chinese People's Republic be invited when the question is examined, this being all the more necessary because the matter concerns aggressive actions against China and interference in her domestic affairs by the United States of America.

"The Soviet government desires to stress that its object in having this question examined by the Security Council is to facilitate relaxation of tension in the Far East and to assist the promotion of peace throughout the world."

The British Ambassador said that he would communicate V. M. Molotov's statement to his government.

Pravda, February 1, 1955