

Peking story (American prisoners in China) - correspondence, letters and ca...

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Dag Hammarskjöld's saul.

Peking story

11 Jan. 1955

First press reactions to 10 Jan. communique on

a series of talks between the Sec. Gen. and

Chou En-Lai (China)

11 January 1955

Display

USA

Both THE N.Y. TIMES and THE N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE 11/1 frontpage stories under UN dateline on yesterday's communique. THE TIMES leads with a Hamilton despatch headlined: "Peiping Talks End; Two Sides Silent on Prisoner Issue." THE TRIBUNE'S headline reads: "Peking Talks End, No Word on Flyers." Both stories underline that the communique termed the talks "useful", and THE TIMES subheadlines "Tone encourages UN." The latter also includes Mr. Cordier's comment.

A despatch in THE TIMES under Washington dateline states that the State Department being without word refuses comment. Asked whether the Secretary-General was likely to visit Washington on his return for a personal meeting with Dulles, Henry Suydam, S.D. press officer, is reported as saying that "the Secretary-General would be welcome if he wanted to come here."

THE TRIBUNE announces that there was no comment from US delegation. It learns that Dulles will be in N.Y. tomorrow for a speaking engagement and will talk to Lodge about Peking developments.

An Indian Foreign Ministry official is quoted (AP, New Delhi, N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE) as saying:

"From what the communique says, the release of the eleven imprisoned United States airmen does not appear to be imminent, but at the same time it seems such a release is only a question of time -- perhaps after some further clarification and talks."

THE TIMES reports from London that "official British sources were reasonably encouraged by the terms of the communique." No official comment, however, was made "since that would be to prejudice the reactions of the UN as a whole on the Hammarskjold mission."

An AP dispatch in THE TRIBUNE similarly reports that British officials find "a hopeful note in the communique." They take the view, the report adds, that the way is still open for further negotiations.

As to morning tabloids, THE DAILY NEWS 11/1 carries a Reuters despatch under Hong Kong dateline: "Dag, Chou Wind Up in Cryptic Chinese Way." The paper adds a note that "UN diplomats in N.Y. said frankly they did not know whether the communique meant success or failure of the Secretary-General's mission."

THE DAILY MIRROR 11/1 includes a brief story based on yesterday's communique. It also adds that Dulles is coming Tuesday to N.Y. and will confer with Lodge on the case of the fliers.

THE DAILY WORKER has a story from Peking and also quotes from Mr. Cordier's comment.

Another despatch in the paper under Tokyo dateline says that Japanese papers published photographs, distributed by the Asia News Service, of "espionage" by US fliers convicted in China.

In the afternoon, Joseph Lash, N.Y. POST, 11/1, reports "cautious optimism" at the UN that the Secretary-General has paved the way for the release of the airmen. This optimism is based, says Lash, on the belief that the Secretary-General, "a discreet and experienced diplomat," would not have signed his name to yesterday's "friendly" communique if the Chinese "had taken a completely unreasonable position in the four-day talks." According to the writer, "some diplomats believe the key phrase in yesterday's communique was 'we hope to be able to continue the contact'." Lash adds that it is not excluded that, if the

US were willing, Peiping might send a technical mission to the UN to negotiate on exchange of persons between US and China.

An AP despatch from S. Francisco in the same paper reports that Peking radio for the first time today informed about the reasons of Secretary-General's visit. The mention of airmen was indirect and came in a story quoting Indian newspapers. The story datelined New Delhi reportedly says: "It was for peace that Premier Chou En-lai agreed to receive Hammarskjold, declares the weekly INDIA in its Jan. 1 issue. China would not be to blame if it refused to receive Hammarskjold, who went to that country with a unilateral UN resolution on the US spy case", the weekly says."

The N.Y. WORLD TELEGRAM 11/1 banner headlines "UN Chief Fails to Free Imprisoned Yank Fliers." A UP story under London dateline, marked as "Extra," informs about reaction in "highly placed diplomatic sources." British Foreign Office is said to have received "detailed diplomatic reports" from Secretary-General, forwarded here by British charge d'affaires in Peking. Although the contents of the report were not disclosed, "informed sources" allegedly said that the communique indicated that "conclusive results had not been achieved. But the communique also showed that the discussions had not bogged down entirely." These sources are said to be optimistic that future talks might win freedom for the fliers and that "considerable more diplomatic maneuvering was anticipated."

An AP story from Washington in the TELEGRAM reports that Senator Alexander

Smith (R.N.J.) proposed today that the US ask its Allies to join in a blockade of Red China if UN efforts to free the airmen fails. However, the story recalls that since the communique describes the talks as "useful," ^{there is} ~~this prompted~~ speculation that the Secretary-General may have met with some success.

The JOURNAL AMERICAN, 11/1, carries a brief INS report from UN headquarters, stating that the Secretary-General departed from Peiping "with no positive indications given about the outcome of his mission."

Comment

The N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE 11/1 headlines its leading editorial "The Door is not Closed." It says: "The most that can be deduced from the terse communique on the conversations between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Premier Chou En-lai is that the door to negotiation over the fate of the eleven American airmen held prisoner in Red China is not closed." The paper notes that "the vagueness and brevity of the communique may be disappointing to the many who have hoped that there would be a speedy decision on the flyers" but it cautions that "it was hardly to be expected, however, that such a decision would be forthcoming immediately; Red China has so insistently maintained the Americans to be guilty of espionage and the Communist regime justified in jailing them that a change in position will be difficult." The TRIBUNE hopes to learn from the Secretary-General "something of the atmosphere in which the talks were conducted, such as the reactions of Chou and his advisors to the information which the Secretary-General brought on the purely military status of the prisoners and their rights under international law." The paper observes that if Chou has made counter-demands upon US, or

offered conditions for the release of the airmen, these would probably be passed on to the State Department in confidence. Nevertheless, the paper expects to learn "some clue to the intentions of the Peking government," maintaining that, as stated by Lester Pearson, the only crime of the flyers was that they carried out faithfully their duty to the UN. The paper concludes by recalling that the powerful pressure in the US for stronger action than diplomacy "can be resisted so long as diplomacy offers a hope that the men will be freed."

THE N.Y. TIMES, 11/1, says that "the joint communique is so cryptic that it could signify anything or nothing." However, the TIMES hopes that the mission has led at least to a partial success because the Secretary-General would not have consented to the use of word 'useful' in the communique if the mission had been a total failure. Another reason for the hope is seen by the paper in the "comparatively cordial atmosphere surrounding the meetings," in the pressure of Indian opinion, and in the release of two Americans by the Soviets "in what may be a nudge to Peiping to follow suit." The TIMES believes that if the Chinese release the fliers, under whatever formula they choose, they will gain favor and prestige in the eyes of a good part of the world; conversely, they will consolidate opinion against themselves if they don't. The paper claims that the communique contains passages which could be read as either outright refusal or an attempt to make the prisoners pawns in a bargain for what the Communists want. The paper adds that if the bargain should be limited to the matter of exit visas for the thirty-five Chinese students, it could be quickly closed. If, however, Peking should raise such questions as Formosa and admittance to the UN, "no prospect of agreement would be in sight," concludes

the paper.

Syndicated columnist David Lawrence (N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, 11/1), while reading "between the lines" of the latest dispatches from India and especially a UP dispatch from New Delhi claiming that India suggested to Peking that it would be wise to release the fliers in order to ease tension between US and Peking and pave the way for a future appeal by Red China for a seat in the UN, comes to the conclusion that "the first step in Red China's effort to blackmail her way into the UN has been taken." Lawrence interprets yesterday's communique as hinting that "negotiations for a deal are on." US is committed to Formosa, he says, but it can be outvoted by other members. Peking "may release the eleven airmen and take it for granted that, without any specific commitment to that effect, the Secretary-General of the UN will 'pave the way', as the New Delhi dispatch phrases it, for the admission of Red China in the UN."

INDIA

On 11 January the press stressed from the joint communique "Questions pertinent to relaxation of world tension."

Mankekar, the TIMES of India, 11/1, describes the Secretary-General as "a buyer in a seller's market" while UPI, Delhi, reports that political observers regard the communique as raising "high hopes" and expect "far reaching consequences spelling good for East-West relations."

USSR

On 11 January, Moscow papers published TASS dispatches about meetings

between Chou En-lai and the Secretary-General and their joint communique. TASS also reported that on 10 January Chou had given a farewell party in honor of the Secretary-General.

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TJÄNSTE

TAXE PERÇUE

SVERIGE

1. Copy of Sec. Gen. And the au-
thority is bound by resolution
rather than charter - obligation to
come here under the Ch.

Ch. also expressed hope that
vestiment (of course includes you)

As it corrects, no intention
to put Eb and Ch. you as to
order. Not only but all vesti-
ment question - How you
should be solved with the of
us committed, because on
one hand you Sec. Gen. Ch. and
and in U. N. - likewise
you. we ought to ask me
to agree to ^{special cases to} such relaxation
of functions. It certain in-
distinguishable on the few
question. Approval of
future aspects.

Anything to add?
No, not at this stage

2. Points of doubt: "and accept pertinent questions." - (correcting)

3. Goal of we can discuss all pertinent questions. In the spy cases too "pertinent q.".

4. "Obligation to come here."
US refuse to discuss the spy cases. Acknowledged this within CI. domestic jurisdiction.

Resolution or binding force.
Unacceptable - as stated in cable of reply. This would not bar us from discussion.

Two premises: Unacceptable
Domestic affairs
no interference

(Mandate not rejected
International law applies)

5. This question further clarified. Special mandate - and general obligation. From its form to its content unacceptable. Cable 1 and 2 (includes new). We have this in common: to relax tensions.

He is playing for them
and has no plan.

At any rate not till
tomorrow

6. We cannot say: we accept that part of the resolution?

We thus end by accepting any part etc.

7. In the spy cases - not solely international law. Will come back tomorrow. We should not: two parties. No legal debate. - Prepared to discuss the cases ~~then~~ ^{it} refers to it. - The "two" - U.S. did not raise the other two. Why?

Reason to mention the two - U.S. and others mentioned under U.V. command Sec. gen. represents U.V. command. Suffered and evidence to prove and explain for U. war. 89. and willing to put himself in the position of spokesman of U.V. command. - Only purpose to provide me with the material.

8. Replace one question of law
tombstone. Great number of
differences. And uses the same
language. In the, when "intended"
into and engaged the " - I have
affirmed pr. of use. - The way
of finding a solution or a com-
mon view. - Very many
things done against the in-
validation of death.

General political question
only possible approach.

Disc. of pol. question.

(We have used US material
when it is relevant.)

Not a question of language
(papers etc. exist)
Pol. question.)

9. I: publicity question. Time
substance

At. pol. question substance
connect pr. with pol. problems.

Formal - substantive.

If he makes great
play with the confessions
and seems inclined to
stick on his legal position,
then, perhaps, we ought to
ask at once for copies
of the confessions?

Waldock:

Is it and true as a general principle that a tribunal cannot convict on the basis of a confession if the confession is contradicted by established facts?

One cannot generalise quite to that extent but confessions are regarded in most systems of law as of uncertain value as evidence & most courts would reject a confession inconsistent with proved facts - or at any rate with proved basic facts

①

1. Carefully studied notes. Reply
replies welcome: to discuss all
question points to place, as
see. Gen.

2/1/51

Accordingly both elements: needs
of us committed. Whichever hope
through contact and frank ex-
change of: able to achieve com-
mon point of view to the
benefit of continued con-
tract (in interest of peace).

Make it clear: every step toward
peace not away from peace.

Specify course stand of Ch.:

As stated in cable to me:
Entirely a matter of Chinese
domestic jurisdiction caught
inside Ch. No right for UN
to interfere. - Resolution
from you to contact un-
acceptable (without participa-
tion of party). This does not
imply that we will not
discuss with you, on the
contrary: in order to expose
clear up facts by U.S.
and to correct false information
present true facts. The ex-
change might be helpful
through see. Gen to remedy ①

Impression based on the
papers.

Legal code: I recognize some
right of courts. Lower con-
clusion: GA violates provi-
sion 2:7. - Important ma-
terial? Eight points: failed
to see anything more than
submitted to G.A. Conclusion
of U.S. and UN serves to
cover up basic fact: for-
feiture for espionage.
Therefore point out: Ch.
has not worked on 1 -
correct material.

Basic facts:

1. Number of persons
convicted 13. Distinctive
elements the two cases.
Distinctions were in both cases
espionage charged by CIA.

JIS: and F that down
29 Nov - 52. at Fulton county
attempts to pick up spe-
cial agent. Thus two US
spies + agent all dispatched
by CIA

11 Colonel Arnold com-
mander. 581 unless for

C 317. This depends upon
what time down when
swallows etc.

2. The two aircraft
both intended in U. first -
try, Williams in the area.
The ruins of aircraft still
there. Obviously intended
for experiment, and U IV 6.
We don't they land under
free measure.

3. Material evidence
proves that two aircraft were
for experiment operations
in the F D work-up
unit, already released
when shot down.

See URC/H portable
radar for ground use.
Exactly same as captured
from parachuted spies.

4. Aircraft of Downey
sent by CIA from
Japan to Seoul, taking
off to Chosun.

Arnold's took off
directly etc.

According to incomplete
statistics: Interns 32,599
sailors. Number of green
squad parachutes 230.
Wireless receivers 96,
Aircraft, these aircraft: C47
and B29.

5. All in uniform & —
both cases. (?) Not only
because of uniform and
U.N. - command. In-
terns under cover of
Korean war.

U.S. - China not in a
state of war. Therefore
not p. of w. The inter-
national law.

True basic facts point
to one conclusion: un-
der two examples of many of
active espionage.

I should be able to
realize extent of U.S.
impairment and collabora-
tion against Gov.

Calls for facts, presents
opinion that these activities
are 21 Jan - 53 on the
Prudal case

Ch. courts are executing
their duty to safeguard
etc. and to pass judgment
D and A.

In conformity with
Ch. to safeguard sov.
rights. Justice has been
done when etc."

A. to aviation (U.S.)
that A. were carrying
out leaflet droppings. Thus
only coming up.

=====
Construction ^{long and}
of what the beyond
development / some Green.
Exp. contacts Ch. UFA after
G.

Barry G. rep. of two
whos made contacts even
concerning U.S. nationals who
committed offences. Such
contacts must be rep. of dele-
gation and later handling (5)

by courts martial. At that
time: list, a, b, c (Army
military personnel)

All gone replies on basis
of list: some ~~in~~ in the
others out etc. Later U.S.
revision to facts: 66. Army
those also 11 + 4 + yet
one under for Chosen, and
check, Not Downey and
Fecteau (never included)
Harden, we have the list
never raised question of
P. of W.

Reply in G.: Friendly
to U.S. nationals in the
some protection to those
who abide by our laws.
Those who wish to return
we try to let them return
as soon as possible after
~~separation~~ investigation.

As to conviction of
others: general practice
to be lenient. Ad-
mit guilt. Good beha-
vior: consider release (6)

We told U.S. that this
was our policy to be followed
also in future.

At that time many of
66 had not been commu-
nicated. We told U.S. commu-
nications would be connected

U.S. expressed cati fac-
tion with reply. When
mentioned prof w - and
there is no connection
there although they
mentioned that some
were U.S. military per-
sonnel.

After G. started dealing
with cases in some with
results in G. - Those who
have applied for exit
permits have got it
as soon as possible.

There are others (un-
U.S.) who made no
other appearances than
interview. Were de-
ported.

14 U.S. have asked
for and got exit after

(17) G.

The 4 still under investi-
gation. The question of further
work. We have yet to find
if they also committed
other offences. Shows that
we are serious about.

It was in this process
we converted 11 + 2.
Shows that after G.
dealing with all G.G.
H. and D and isolated
cases.

Why at this juncture?
We have been dealing
with etc. continuously
(Correction from H.A.)

From all this clear
that Ch. G. has no in-
tention to create trouble.
Work to catch them for
love with G.

Downy and F and in-
cluded. Yet we must put
on their case. Have
parachuted to groups.
Remove these units (8)

If we speak of human in-
herent innocent people
have been mistreated.

Burns is out after im-
prisoned 27 has received
permission but only
10 have returned.

Chou agrees human
concern should be
shown these US in-
China. If so - the
world even greater
attention "second
Hundred"

As regards proposal
of the National C.
to call atten-
tion. Students have
addressed letters to H.A.

Only intention to
give a comparison -
for fair conclusion.
In no way implies
that an exchange is
possible.

(10)

U.S. aggressive policies.

Even after aggression in
Korea and T. China asked
for peaceful settlement in
K. but U.S. continued.
This gave Ch. no other
choice than to take volun-
tary action to help K.
For self-defence. Now
U.N. broke its solemn
and conditional. While
U.N. an instrument
for U.S. No other re-
call; great indignity
of Chinese people.

Malto's proposals. Ne-
gotiations for more than
two years. U.S. abstrac-
ted by all means. Ch.
still insisted. When
agreement practically
there by agreement there
27000.

After armistice U.S. agents
violated by sending more
than 14,000 to Taiwan.
Violation of armistice
agreement.

Now on 11 ~~th~~ UN
passed a resolution
and was heard. Nations
that peoples loving
justice have expressed
disatisfaction.

I said, how you
were to react in
China. Indignant against
subversive action.

How come so: no
U.N. reaction 14,000
and infringement of
arm. agreement - but
the U.N. Right and
wrong reversed.

U.S. have to give
an account for
14,000.

Geneva conference, impossible
to agree on Korea. 9 sessions
desire for further efforts not
approved by 16. Result
Andros proposal withdrawn
Will of U.S. always do-
minates.

Termination of Andros
decision against U.S.
Thence U.S. ~~staged~~ ^{worked out}
"Manila treaty" to create
allts in Asia. U.S.
should have led countries
concerned to take part
in joint guarantee
of collective. Edens
locarno pact dropped
because of U.S. What
U.S. does in ^{South} Vietnam
"No military withdrawals
etc."

Since the two Asia
was U.S. has concentra-
ted efforts to support
China in her war
of harassment of (IX)

China mainland, Freedom
of the seas. Even British.
Since June 54 neg. agree-
ment to legalise occupa-
tion of Taiwan. Con-
tinue aggression against
China.

Activities of U. S. (Far
East) stepped up after Geneva.

China's aggression and
serious case after second
war of occupation of
territory of other nation
Violation of Charter:

In order to cover
up its "serious acts"
of aggression spy-
cases used to create
uproar. Purpose to
draw attention from
aggression. U. N. timid-
ly followed. Payed no
heed to China protests

With this compromise
we can say that UN
majority against
of U.S. aggression.

Some people interpreted
this treaty as restraint
on China. That means:
allowed some robbers to
occupy part of the houses
of the a family on picture
that it ^{prevent} ~~restraints~~ caretaker
Agreement asks the pr-
ivity to accept. Next
step: to restore cautious
regime

Others say: purpose to
prevent extension of
war. Without U.S. ass-
tance Taiwan long
ago liberated. War
continues every day
and war will be
extended. Withdrawal
would relax tension
Agreement increases
tension. (16)

US withdraws and
H/Tarawa lubricated that
would ~~not~~ lead to relaxa-
tion in Far East, and
lubrication would lead
to increased tension,

U.S. policy test case:
in direction of preparation
of war ? If so U.S. is
"increases tension". This
prevents peaceful coexis-
tence in spite of differ-
ences of "social systems".
All countries in Area
can have w. coex.
China prevents it.

We hope S G after
hearing this would
take into account
whether possible to per-
mise U.S. concerns
relaxation of tension
to give up aggression
to withdraw -

(17)

Some people harbor ideas
of neutralism or creating an
independent state in Taiwan.
Chinese people would never
agree. Fight about this
idea. People firmly against

We hope that S.S.
will understand atti-
tude of C.M. For the
clearer etc.

Plan steps gradually for
the purpose of relaxing
tensions. He wishes to
take similar steps

On the basis of 5
principles (Independence and
Peace) wishes to estab-
lish friendly relations
with every state. Ex-
cludes no one.

China firmly desires
peace but under no
circumstances beg for
it at cost of territory
or sovereignty.

Against war but (18)
never intimidated by
war threats. She the pe

testified by other facts.

Our previous work will be further
pulled. The values we have
followed will be maintained

Parallel Downey,
581 character.
Equipment (rodow)
leaflet

Membership

Students

Indochina.

"Come up" - U IV
kindly followed.

"Who promotes?"
(intention and effect)

1. Agree purpose is to explore,
to seek certain common ~~view~~
views, of possible understandings
between of us committed.

We only regret that there
are so few ~~of~~ where we
see eye to eye and so
many. Despite that, we
hope we shall be able
to look at things objec-
tively and reach a
wider understanding.

Not to put ourselves
in opposite position.
Neither try to prove
something. Only so
this contact helpful
It would then be the
beginning and not the
end of our contacts.

(I agree.)

2. You mentioned our cri-
ticism of U.S. ^{as} part
of cold war. Don't agree
even less that U.S. could
use same words. Chou
criticism is based on
facts. Honolulu, the Pan-
Pacific
Holloman

3. I also mentioned fear on both sides the same. The "fears under the respective ideologies" are not the same. We do not object merely because U.S. acts. We welcomed U.S. participation in Korean armistice and Geneva.

4. As to the action Ch. has taken U.S. regards it all and interprets as for purposes of expansion. This means interpretation contrary to intentions. Korean armistice for peace, Ching agreement for aggression.

5. We don't deduce motives from their acts. But acts themselves show the policy behind.

Ching treaty not only peacefully occupies but also provides for area of protection (see mainland). Want to intimidate Ching

Touman at its pleasure
Tarva may attack. We
must not do anything to
T. because it causes U.S.
displeasure. We ~~are~~ full-
ramp of such aggression.
What would you feel if
you put yourself in
the position of a Chinaman.
We don't guess other
peoples' motives in
this air.

6. This whole thing about
China's treaty, Chinese
people has full right to
drive out China from
T. People say these are
war like acts. Under
U.S. protection China
can occupy coastal
island. We can detain
ships etc. All these
acts are not regarded
as increasing tension.
They expand any
time. Shipping up
arriving ~~at any time~~
of China

We don't talk of nations
abstractly

7. How could this be
said to be a man walking
in a street led by a truck.
Then look on attacks where
you are not permitted
to defend yourself. ^{Robbie in}
the house

8. If we were to enter
a debate the House
would not consider
you impartial but
as defending U.S.
aggression.

9. You are quite right
when you say that
history can and be
rewritten. As to the
claim - history will
draw its own conclusion.
History is written by
the people & help. While
U.S. or China when
was aggression / peoples
views will be the ones
out. Hope S.G. will
listen to the voice of the
Chinese people.

10. To sum up even when
cynics claim treaty U.S.
has been chipping up and
increases time on the
far East. As long as this
is under restriction of
U.S. war on the coast
will continue. Ch. and
apart of war threats.
If you come here
to have an undertaking
This question is the
great question. To
balance U.S. Force
would be like take
noting Japan in the
North last summer.
Second World war,
like to require are
to consider this as a
important fact.

(My reply.)

11. As to my reply, with
regard to fears claim
have none. What Ch.
regard as correct they
do their utmost to

uphold. Never afraid to
voice opinion - they would
definitely resist it.



12. U.N. in past few
years has obviously been
neglecting its request to the
question of China. Even
I cannot completely
deny that.

13. Two outstanding examples

At the same time as
outbreak of K vs. U.S.
occupation of T. via UN
objection. But U.N.
condemned Chinese
aggression in K. -
14,000 to Taiwan. This
latter fact continues
to be pointed out by
Western press. UN etc.
But U.N. followed
U.S. in the spy
case.

With this sharp
contrast obvious -

party has made themselves
tools of U.S. aggression.

14. It is on this about
that U.N. shows unambigu-
ously. That a just case.
That for relaxation can be
peace. The fact going be-
lieve to U.S. in increas-
ing tensions.

Where an even more ^{was}
question - ~~the point~~
of Chinese right in U.N.
"In an objective way"
China said it was likely
to continue. Makes
world tension continue
itself a major fact
to be called to my
attention.

15. The points out
five basic facts two
purposes. 1. state the
basis. 2. reply to our
eight points.

We have different
ways to look at this

¶: captured documents
Louis: essence of the
question.

1. a) 581 ~~w/~~g. According to
the material a special
operation exclusively under
C 7 17. This was controlled
and used by agencies through
air force channels. This
"since agents etc. Operate
" under cover of psychological
warfare." According to the
material U.S. has estab-
lished air wings of this
type in other parts of
the world. - Some squad-
rons. The aircraft of
Arnold belonged ~~originally~~
Squadron class B 29 a.
Equipped for air dropping
paratroopers. - Precisely
the duty which Arnold
intended.

From all this
material we can see
that the B 29 ~~was~~ normally
belonged to Air Force but

actually worked for C I A.
We can because of the
were from ^{not} depend these
people in view of the
essence of the question

2 b) When Arnolds' ^{craft} was shot
down it did not intend
under force majeure. Two
today obvious. One added
to direct flight. Entrance
by mistake was not possible.
Another was acting as
check pilot. Another
proof of intrusion for
intrude.

(Downey was brought
down in Antioch county)

3 c) On Arnolds' craft
Benjamin in charge
of the parachute. Parachute
was unusual. It had
received special hand-
ling - some place
as Downey - Section

This fact is proven again
some training etc.

4. d) On radar transmitter
and receiver super high
frequency. Range about
Use especially for use be-
tween air and land.
Found on special agents
Command draw con-
clusion this radar ex-
cluded from spy ope-
rations.

5. e) Uniforms. Some in K
land. Others not. Wearing
reconnaissance on the
ground sometimes in
civilian clothes. On
the other hand H. A.
used uniforms, which that
does not mean that
were not spies.

So if Downey who
was a spy was in
uniform —

f (6) You mentioned 4
basic points (number of
sorties etc). This was the
air way the basis for the
conclusion. Merely saying
that the two aircraft were
part of general picture.
In those general cases
we find the same kinds
of aircraft. - Our basis
for conviction previous
points

7. Routine report. And
then told that immediately
published protest stating
espionage intrusion.
After amnistia decree -
Chinese were found that
many prisoners were
of Arnold type.
At Geneva etc. ack-
nowledged the part of
presence of U. S.
and neither raise question
of your or object
agreed alone
voluntary and innocent
actions. Prove that

Councils are entirely right and
that U.S. had no right
to bring it before U.N.

S.G. come from U.S.
National that you based
yourself on U.S. unilateral
Does not add to what
U.S. delegate brought out
We have ^{been} involved ^{by}
unilateral ⁱⁿ part from the
eyes themselves. We
hope that this unilateral
and the words of Council
You have been able
to listen to true facts
that listening only to
one side.

Therefore we cannot
agree that it is your
or innocent they as
D. and T. have intended
for espionage.

We are grateful for
concern about Chinese
Students. Councils were

Don 35. Release they
will continue to hang
on their request

Finally, reply to sug-
gestions:

1. The Chms you, will
act as card in Chms.
What card will Chms
- concerning all.

2. Separation -
Yes + photos.

Suggestion: you can tell
founder that they can
not provide, from
Facilities and assistance
from Ch. gov. -

The Chms Red Cross would
be changed with the duty
to arrange.

It is clear if we should
~~could~~ continue to argue
the possibility of agreeing
the intention ^{on any scale} for the present
majority yet you are
influenced because the
material has been pro-
vided by U. S. - We
have material evidence
+ confessions. On
this basis the courts
passed their final judg-
ments. We based our-
selves mainly on charac-
ter of 981 which
actually carried out
espionage. - The other
four admitted in-
trusion in charac-
ter and context of
merely because others
etc.

Our duty to give
you the facts on which
etc. Hope you will

Legals

1 A large number of
such operations were
in fact carried out by
U.N. Command

2 The routine
U.N. Command
announcements of the
loss of the ^{B29} aircraft
mentioned the nature
of the operation in
January 1953 —
long before any
question ~~of~~ was raised
about the status of
the 11 men.

That OK?

Of course

At least clear.

Judgment still valid?

I think you have made
your points today with
~~more~~ more than usual
enthusiasm. This is good,
considering ~~what~~ his
speech yesterday. He
raised the temperature
a little yesterday, and
it was suitable, I think,
to be clear and emphatic
today, which you were.

This part
was very good

Grateful for kind words
and expressions of friend-
ship.

You come this time to
tell us your understand-
ing of the situation -
useful - we have come
this. We now know
more. News of China
have been looked and
other nations. The voice
of China could not
be so easily assessed
by you. The views of
this Ch. views even
were worthy of atten-
tion and considera-
tion.

Chen hopes that I
will be able at times
I consider appropriate
to tell those countries
concerned about
Orient - especially
U.S. Even though

4th day -

They are against us they
should have some
~~unwarranted~~
views about our views
etc.

In our views the op-
por created by U.S
on spy cases are wholly
unwarranted. Even
since 45. we have taken
a series of steps to
bring relations closer.
U.S in bringing this
question and engaging
resolution merely man-
ages question more
difficult and does
not contribute to
a solution. Further-
more it increases
tension. If U.S. should
want to continue
its approach the Chinese
people have no fear
Will never take any
step to give up our
position.

With regard to just mea-
sures taken ^{in response} could be tol-
erated. What UN should
go into and what UN
has done before that
should be rectified
we mentioned several
things last few days.
All of them should
be looked into by
U.N. In every case
U.S. is the wrong ^{one}.

We on our part can
assure you will firmly
adhere to the non-
cooperation announced in
joint statement (Nehru
and UN)

If possible we hope
Sec. Gen. will tell U.S.
people Chinese people
are friendly to them

This can be proved by
our willingness to pro-
vide facilities for partici-
pation to visit.

and your presence you
will contribute to peace.



1/ As regards everyone
I have been treated loyal-
ly. Consideration was in
accordance with facts.

Make a distinction:
Contacts with U.S. are
truly in political field
See. you will certainly
be objectively reflect
this attitude of ours.

2/ Relatives. This applies
to 13 + 4. - Among
66 the 15 listed as
evolutionary personnel +

2.

As to the rest of
66. Some and in part
at all. Some have
power. Not of the
would anyone.

under detention etc.
Consuls General in Genoa
can take it up.

3) Information ready
this evening. Health
reports for all 17. Photos
of 13. - 4 in North
East - will be sent
later.

THE NEGOTIATORS LIKE A FAMILY IN "THE HALL OF THE WESTERN FLOWER"

THE FOUR DAY PEKING MEETINGS IN "THE HALL OF THE WESTERN FLOWER" FROM THE PERIOD OF THE EMPERORS - THE LONGEST ONE LASTING FROM 3.00 TO 8.10 P.M. - WERE VERY PLEASANT. THIS INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO THE "DAGENS NYHETER" BY THE INTERPRETER AND MISSIONARY GUSTAV NYSTROM ON HIS ARRIVAL IN STOCKHOLM MONDAY EVENING. HE HAD TAKEN THE PLANE DIRECTLY FROM HONGKONG WHERE HE VISITED FRIENDS FOR THREE DAYS. THE FIFTY-SIX-YEAR-OLD CHOU EN-LAI WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY FINE PERSON AND HE LIKED A GOOD JOKE VERY MUCH. WHEN WE SEPARATED, DAG AND CHOU AND ALL OF US WERE GOOD FRIENDS AND LIKE ONE FAMILY.

"Yes, it was really a trip of sunshine," Mr. Nystrom continues, having been embraced by his wife Ester at Bromma and put down his suitcases marked "United Nations". "The sun was shining, and it was colder than within the memory of living man in Central-China. All the way from South China, however, the snow was shining white everywhere. Dag Hammar-skjold went bare-headed all the time. When he had his picture taken, however, he put on the hat held in readiness by his assistant, Mr. Per Lind, who had got special instructions to that end.

It was fun ever since we left London in the Queen's plane, in which Churchill went to Bermuda and Laniel returned to Europe. There were eight people on board, and when they made the beds at night, they put up a big curtain for the lady aboard, Miss Aase Alm, Mr. Hammar-skjold's Norwegian secretary.

The interpretation went on smoothly. Chou-En-lai had an outstanding interpreter, a Chinese who was Doctor of Philosophy at Harvard, in Political Economy, Hammar-skjold's subject, so the two found each other. He also took shorthand in both languages without any difficulty at all.

After the arrival in Peking and the luncheon at the Swedish Embassy, we received personal invitations to a reception at Chou's. We all had cars at our disposal, so we were all distinguished guests, and Chou shook hands with all the hundred and fifty of us. He often talked to me and asked me to give his regards to the American Bishop Root's daughter, for whom he had a high regard, since she once helped the wounded in China with medicine."

PRAISE FROM CHOU EN-LAI: "A TRUSTWORTHY CHRISTIAN"

"CHOU AND I HAD MORE MUTUAL FRIENDS," MR. NYSTROM CONTINUES. "THUS HE GOT HOLD OF MINISTER MARCUS CHENE, A CHINESE, NOW SEVENTY-ONE, WHO WAS IN SWEDEN IN 1920, LEARNED SWEDISH AND LATER BECAME 'MISSIONSFORBUNDETS' REPRESENTATIVE IN SHANGHAI. 'HE IS A FINE MAN, A TRUSTWORTHY CHRISTIAN'

WAS THE COMMUNIST PREMIER MINISTER'S OPINION OF CHENE. I WAS ALLOWED TO SEE HIM SEVERAL TIMES AND INVITED HIM TO DINNER AT THE HOTEL. OF COURSE, WE ONLY HAD TO WRITE OUR NAMES ON THE BILL WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT PAID.

How are the Christian people in Communist China getting on? Better than in Russia where they also have the right to work against religion. But in Paragraph 88 in a Chinese law it says that a member of the People's Republic has freedom in religious matters. In other words, they have taken away the addendum about "right to work against" existing in Soviet Russia. By the way, Chou's last words to me were: "Welcome back to preach if you like to."

From our first meeting to the concluding banquet in the Purple Hall, a hearty atmosphere existed between the negotiators. Talking of the banquet, by the way, which included swallow's nests and shark fins, Dag went to work with the chopsticks and finally he could handle them quite well. The Secretary-General now even knows a little Chinese."

THE TIBETANS LOOK AT THE ART OF THE FORBIDDEN CITY

"It was wonderful to get a chance to see the art treasures of the Forbidden City. All old paintings, porcelain and vases are done up, and the museums are open to the public. People have come from Tibet and Turkestan to see and be amazed."

No political secrets were unveiled at the short conversation in the hall at Bromma Airport - in case somebody believed this was the case. One thing is certain however - judging from Hammarskjold's nice communicative and "clotted milk" quiet interpreter, the Peking result could as time goes by be quite good. Anyway, the "mandarin" expert Gustav Nystrom does not regret his acceptance when, on Christmas Eve, the United Nations called him asking him if he would like to go to Peking.