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D.H.'s aide memoire

5 September 1957

A i d e M é m o i r e

Mr. Kidron saw me this morning at my request. I told him that Bunche had informed me about his talk with Kidron yesterday and that I also had heard about the US demarche and the Israel reaction. In view of this information I wanted to express my own views.

Talking, not ex officio, but as somebody emotionally deeply involved in the issue, I could say that I shared the hope that it would be possible to maintain the status quo in Gaza. However, I was rather concerned because I did not believe it possible to preserve that status quo unless we got some additional cards in favour of the maintenance of the UNEF, making it possible for us to counter the unavoidable criticism because of non-compliance with the request for deployment on the Demarcation Line. It may be that the Egyptians would not like to raise the issue - Fawzi's way of replying in Parliament seemed to support that view - but even if the Egyptians, as I thought, would like to lie low, pressure might develop as others might consider it a good case for embarrassing the Egyptians. If Kidron wanted to transmit to Ben-Gurion this most sincere expression of great concern, he was, of course, free to do so, but he should emphasize that I was speaking in straight human terms.

I had given thought to what might be done in order to check unfavourable developments and I had arrived at the following conclusion. If, for reasons of principle, a stationing of UNEF on the Israel side of the Line was considered impossible as it obviously was, there remained a possibility

that Israel could grant, on the basis of reciprocity, certain rights for the functioning of the UNEF within an area on their side of the Demarcation Line. If they granted such rights enabling the UNEF to cross the Demarcation Line and to function on both sides in the same way, I would be willing to try and sell this as compliance with the 2 February resolution; this obviously meant also that I would be willing to take the same stand publicly. My basis would be that as the UNEF now was firmly established on the Egyptian side with camps, lines of communication, and so on and so forth, it was no longer a practical proposition to have them stationed also on the Israel side. That being so, the best way in which the aims of the resolution could be realized, would be to agree on the functioning of the UNEF on the Israel side as indicated, leaving the question of stationing aside.

Summing up, I said that what I had wanted to present thus were two things: on the one side an expression of grave personal concern regarding the possibilities to save the status quo, on the other hand an offer. Kidron asked me if what I had in mind also was fixed patrolling on their side. I replied that I had not yet gone into any details. What seemed essential to me was the right to patrol on the Israel side, this right to be implemented in the way found appropriate.

Kidron then said that he felt that the reaction he would get to what I had said would be a request for further details and clarification. I replied that that would not make me unhappy, as it would mean that I could honestly say that the matter was under consideration with Israel. This would at least serve to postpone reactions. It might influence our time table for the circulation of the report on UNEF.

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