

# Middle East - Suez story No 35b-36: Middle East - Suez story No 35b-36 - 51

*HS L 179:115b*



National Library  
of Sweden

Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

L 779: 115

Middle East / Suez story - Nr. 36

(as put together by Dag Hammarskjöld  
and kept in his safe in his office, U.N. HQ)

24 July 57 - Jan. 58

Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Middle East / Suez story - 36

25-26 Dec. 57

Notes on main results of the talks  
between D.H., Dr. Fawzi and President  
Nasser in Cairo, Egypt.

## MEMORANDUM

Notes on the talks in Cairo with President  
Nasser and Dr. Fawzi 25 and 26 December 57.

The following notes do not cover the development of the discussions but only their main results.

1. The Doron Affair. The matter was thoroughly discussed between me and the President in the presence of Fawzi and Sabry. After a very vigorous attack on the Egyptian stand I got the impression that the President personally was giving in but felt that he had to manoeuvre the matter with the Army and the Security before being able to say yes. Fawzi's comments afterwards were: "I think it is all right".

2. UNEF's use of Cairo Airport. The matter was discussed between Burns and Gohar and later between Burns, me and Fawzi. The conclusion was understood by me as being that we were promised, in case of need, to use Cairo Airport for rotation on agreement concerning the specific operation.

3. As to the so-called land-claim the matter was discussed both with Fawzi and later with Nasser. In the talk with the President the end-point reached was that there would be no charge in case we used Egyptian Government property but that in other cases the decisive factor would be whether the Egyptian Government itself would have had to pay compensation. The UNEF would not pay unless the Egyptian Government had been under such an obligation and the extent to which the UNEF and the Egyptian Government should take part in the payment of the compensation, would have to be discussed in its own right.

4. The question of locally recruited personnel was discussed only with Dr. Fawzi. It was agreed that in controversial cases General Hilmy would bring the situation to Burns' attention personally and give him such information as would render possible for Burns to judge for himself about an Egyptian move to exclude somebody from Gaza. I emphasized strongly that we could under no circumstances sacrifice our right to an independent judgment but that, given the particular situation, there needed not be formal submission to the UN of evidence against the local recruit, information about the charge and its basis in direct contact on the top level normally being sufficient for this type of employee.

5. The President agreed to the formula proposed for representation of the Canal Company in negotiations concerning compensation. He did so as a basis for a convocation of the special share-holders meeting. Dr. Fawzi added, with the approval of the President, that before any action were taken, they felt that it would be wise if they could informally get to know the names of the negotiators so that they would not later run into some kind of trouble. The matter was followed up by me in Paris with Jacques Georges-Picot and in a letter to Fawzi sent on my return to New York.

6. Canal surtax. Dr. Fawzi said that the Egyptians wanted neither to police nor to administer the Canal surtax. They did not see any reason for a formal agreement. If, as I said, we informed the Egyptian Government about steps taken, they would accept that with a simple acknowledgment. He felt that such an exchange would be the maximum needed by way of "agreement".

7. It was noted that in a couple of recent cases before the local courts of justice in Gaza, the courts had recognized - against the stand of the local authorities - the immunity of UNRWA. Dr. Fawzi confirmed that this stand would be accepted by the Cairo authorities and that therefore we had no reason to discuss the question of the status of UNRWA.

8. The Egyptian authorities noted that there was no deployment of UNEF on the Israel side and that for the time being I had no intention of pushing the matter any further. They did so without any objections or demands. I pointed out that the principle was upheld even if one of the parties did not act accordingly.

9. It was noted by the Egyptians that the Mixed Armistice Commission did not function and that here again I did not press for a change. I pointed out that I considered it very difficult to do so as long as the Egyptian ban on Israel shipping in the Canal was upheld. Under the circumstances I would advise against pressing the matter unless the Egyptians themselves were willing to change their policy. This point and the previous one were discussed with Dr. Fawzi and later with the President.

10. Economic Development Fund. The matter was thoroughly discussed both with Dr. Fawzi and the President. The end of the discussion with the President, in which I had to do the selling as Dr. Fawzi so far seemed to have kept a non-committal attitude in his reports, was that the President said that he fully approved of my initiative and felt that the plans might prove most helpful.

11. Dr. Fawzi mentioned the appointment of Sir Humphrey Trevelyan with the comments that that was perfectly all right and that, if somebody brought it up - as might happen - I should not take that as any indication of objections.

12. A very strong stand was taken by Fawzi concerning the Afro-Asian Conference. It was pointed out that it was entirely outside government responsibility and that I should discount the reactions at the Conference as the operation had a strong element of "letting off steam".