

**Middle East - Suez story No  
35b-36: Middle East - Suez  
story No 35b-36 - 3**

*HS L 179:115b*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Middle East / Suez story - 35

Feb. - March 57

- Diary notes on the Gaza take-over, by D.H.
- Comments on the situation 1-6 March, D.H.
- U.S.A and U.K. memoranda conc. Gaza Strip.

DIARY NOTES ON THE GAZA TAKE-OVER

24 February 1957:

Eban returned from Jerusalem and had a long afternoon talk with Dulles. After the talk Mr. Lodge saw me and transmitted a message to the effect that the Sharm-al-Shaik situation was solved on the basis of the US declaration, and that Israel would withdraw from Gaza "on the face value" of my statement of 22 February. Eban would come up the next day in order to get a couple of clarifications of that statement. President Eisenhower hoped warmly that I would be in a position to give those clarifications.

While Mr. Lodge was with me, Mr. Bunch returned from a talk with Mr. Pearson who had been informed by Mr. Comay the same afternoon (from Eban) that the Israeli stand was that there could not be any return of Egyptians in any way, shape or form to Gaza. Later Mr. Lodge called me over the telephone and said that he had checked with Dulles, that his message had been correct and that the version that Pearson had got of the Israeli statement was unfounded as far as Mr. Dulles knew.

25 February 1957:

I saw Mr. Eban before lunch and again later in the afternoon. After the morning meeting I informed Mr. Lodge of the stand taken by the Israelis as later published in the report of 26 February. I also had a contact with Mr. Pearson who informed me that Dulles the same morning had given a version of his talk with Eban to Ambassador Heeney which had led Heeney to the conclusion that "there was no basis for optimism". In the afternoon, before the late meeting with Israel, Dulles called me over the telephone, asking me to do my utmost in order to get Israel to accept withdrawal on the basis of the statement of 22 February as I had interpreted it myself. He said that he fully endorsed my legal stand and that, when the Israelis had tried to force his hand on that issue, he had refused.

26 February 1957:

In the morning Mr. Lodge called me and said that he considered it essential for me to publish right away what had happened the previous day as he considered it very important to have the hard facts on paper. He also found it desirable to make such a statement in order to avoid that the Israelis gave a distorted version of what had happened, trying to put me personally to blame. I replied that I did not want to publish it until I knew what came out of the meeting between Eban and Dulles, as I did not want to do anything which might lessen the chances of success in the course of that meeting. Later, at 4 pm. I was informed that nothing new had emerged in the course of the meeting and that, on the US side, one at least had no objection in Washington against publication of the report on the talks of the previous day.

28 February 1957:

When M. Pineau saw me in the afternoon, he showed me his working copy of the text on which, according to him, agreement had been reached the previous day between him, Mrs. Meir and Dulles concerning the assumptions on which withdrawal should take place. The text was identical with the one later used by Mrs. Meir, but had in the first point originally "initial take-over" where, however, later the word "initial" had been deleted in ink. The second part which covered what should be the contents of statements from the US and others, was more pointed than in the final version which I have later been shown by Mr. Eban. I said that I did not want to discuss the substance of this declaration, but pointed out the various aspects which I could foresee would give rise to questions and criticism. Especially I mentioned that whether the word "initial" was mentioned or not, point 1. must be considered as covering the first phase and point 2, where the word "exclusive" did not appear, the second phase. M. Pineau was vague but said that he understood it to mean that at all events no Egyptian troops should return. - In the evening the same day at my dinner for M. Mollet, M. Pineau and M. Alphand made it perfectly clear that

the Israeli statement was intended to exclude all return of Egyptians to the area. When I pointed out the impossibility to maintain such a line for the United Nations, Alphand said that if so, no solution had been reached and that the UN was in a situation where we simply had to see to it that no Egyptians returned. I repeated that if that were so, they had based their proposal on impossible assumptions.

1 March 1957:

Before the Assembly meeting in the afternoon, I took solid discussions with Lodge and Pearson, pointing out the perfectly intolerable situation for the UN which would be created if withdrawal statements were to be made based on an assumption which neither was legally possible nor endorsed by the majority. I was absolutely certain that the Egyptians would insist at least on a token administration and, of course, I had no assurance that they might not go further. The statement on 22 February, which had been approved by Dr. Fawzi, talked in its second sentence only about "helpful arrangements with" the UN and UN auxiliary bodies which obviously in no way excluded an Egyptian civilian administration. On the other hand, I believed that Egypt had for the present no intention to return militarily.

Obviously it was impossible at this stage and after what had happened on Wednesday in Washington, to stop the process. Mrs. Meir's statement, however, was followed by Mr. Lodge's which, with its verbatim rendering of my statement of 22 February and the following references to the Armistice Agreement, served to straighten out Mrs. Meir's presentation where the direct or indirect quotes from 22 February had dropped the two time-qualifications in that statement ("in the first instance" and "in the transitional period"). Needless to say I had had nothing to do with the drafting of Mr. Lodge's statement.

The same afternoon I sent instructions to Burns to arrange for a meeting with Dayan urgently. Burns' position in the talks should rest exclusively on resolutions of the General Assembly and the documents on which they were based. It was further said that any controversial questions should be referred to Headquarters immediately.

2 March 1957: Israel exploded because of the Lodge statement which, according to them, did not correspond to what had been promised and did not give the necessary basis for further action. Consequently the meeting between Burns and Dayan was postponed. New talks were taken up with Washington. One result of these talks was Eisenhower's letter to Mr. Ben Gurion.

General Burns cabled and asked what stand he should take if the Egyptian authorities requested that as soon as Israel had gone, Egypt's (a) civil administration, (b) police, (c) military governor, (d) other military personnel, should be allowed to return. He also asked what answer he should give if Dayan were to ask what the policy was in those respects. I replied as appears from a cable, the text of which is annexed.

.....

4 March 1957: Mrs. Meir repeated her withdrawal commitment in the General Assembly. Dr. Fawzi repeated the same general reserve as he had put on record on 1 March. In order to balance Mrs. Meir's expression that withdrawal was taking place in accordance with her statement, I mentioned in my report to the Assembly that instructions to Burns were for unconditional withdrawal.

5 March 1957: A cable was received from Burns with a suggested text for a statement from him at the take-over, scheduled for 7 March. In the revised text we used the expression that the Emergency Force "acting in fulfilment of its functions as determined by the General Assembly" for the purpose of maintaining quiet etc. The UNEF in this context was said to have assumed responsibilities for civil affairs in the Gaza Strip. The stronger phrase in Burns' proposal "until arrangements are made for the regular administration" of civil affairs in the Gaza Strip", was in my view far too provocative in relation to Israel to be used in this context, although obviously it would have made the situation clearer with Egypt.

In the course of the day I had a series of talks beginning with Mr. Pearson and ending with Mrs. Meir. I had in all those talks but the last one, brought out the basic contradiction between the Israeli interpretation, as it might be, of their assumptions, and what, on the other hand, was the well-known majority stand as well as the official stand of the United Nations. While everybody recognized the practically impossible situation created by this contradiction at the very basis of the United Nations' action, none had, for the time being, any other suggestion to make than that we would have to try to get on without getting this conflict in sharp focus. We would, so to say, have to try and live for a while with the contradiction, hoping that no move on the Egyptian side would bring it to light and trying for our part to find a formula which avoided the key issue.

In the talk with Mrs. Meir she took formally the stand that Israel could not tolerate the return in any way, shape or form, of Egypt to Gaza and that this stand had been approved by Mr. Dulles. Eban, who was present, used a vaguer phrase: that Dulles knew about the Israeli stand. She likewise stated that the right of self-defense was recognized by all those who in general terms had talked about Israeli assumptions as reasonable; such a general endorsement in Mrs. Meir's view, committed them to every point in the Israeli statement. She also maintained that Israel would be entitled to send war-ships through the Straits of Tiran, as innocent passage referred only to the "conduct" and not to the character of the ship or the cargo.

I informed at once the US Mission of what Mrs. Meir had said, asking them for a cross-checking with Washington. In a later meeting with the Advisory Committee the same afternoon, I avoided any direct reference to the Israeli stand, but brought out the different theories pointing out the impossibility of reconciling their consequences for the United Nations. It was decided to resume discussions of the issue on Thursday morning.

6 March 1957:

I received, both through Lodge and directly over the telephone from Dulles, a flat denial of Mrs. Meir's statement concerning the US attitude. Dulles had never committed himself contrary to the legal status of Egypt according to the Armistice Agreement as recognized by the US, nor was there any in blanco acceptance of an Israeli right to resort to military measures of self-defense at its own choice of interpretation of the Israeli statement.

Later in the day I had a talk with Dr. Fawzi (together with Mr. Cordier, as usual) where I brought out the whole underlying conflict as a matter of very serious concern. I said that common ground seemed to exist only as to the initial take-over with a completely indeterminate interpretation of the word "initial". It seemed that the word would have to be interpreted so that the initial phase lasted until the Egyptians "raised their eyebrows". Dr. Fawzi replied that the only possible thing now was to go ahead and that, as I had pointed out, that could be done on the basis of the agreement as to an "initial take-over exclusively by the UNEF", hoping that this initial period might bring us closer to a solution. I indicated that in my view such an initial period had to be fairly long as it should provide opportunities for an orderly settlement of the questions mentioned in the statement of 22 February. Dr. Fawzi nodded approval, but did not say anything.

In a cable to Burns the same day I said that "On administration (by UNEF) neither Egyptian nor Israeli nationals should be employed by UNEF, although indigenous population may be employed and Egyptian nationals already employed should not be terminated". The phrase obviously covered only employment by UN of Egyptian nationals and not members of an independent Egyptian administration, a question to which no reference was made.

7 March 1957:

In a meeting with the Advisory Committee I said, referring to our discussion on 5 March, that I felt that as matters had now developed, we had to "gamble" by going ahead on a pragmatic basis, hoping for a slow development in a low key. As the record of the meeting shows, this stand was accepted by the whole Committee.

- 9 March 1957: In a cable Burns said that Brig. Helmy had said that he was going to Gaza on 10 or 11 March and would open the post-office. Burns further said he would like to be informed by us whether Egypt had agreed to stay clear of the Strip for any specified period, so that he would know how to deal with Helmy.
- 10 March 1957: Burns reported that Helmy had requested that he should agree to an Egyptian liaison Headquarters being set up in Gaza, consisting of himself, six or seven officers and a number of other ranks. He also indicated that the Palestine Office section of the Foreign Office would like to set up an office there. Helmy said the functions of the liaison office would be to act as go-between UNEF Headquarters and civilian authorities in the Strip. Burns reported that he had told Helmy that it was his understanding that initial take-over would be exclusively by the UNEF, and that he understood that Egypt would not press to send any personnel into the Strip during negotiations leading up to definite arrangements. Helmy said he had been ordered to set up the liaison office. Burns said that he would like to refer the matter to the Secretary-General for instructions, and Helmy agreed to wait until this was done.
- In the reply I sent at once, I stated that I agreed with Burns' reaction. I added, however, that this was mainly a question of timing as such a small liaison office in itself was nothing remarkable. As I had already had a long talk with Dr. Fawzi the same morning, I preferred to bring the matter up with him in the morning of the 11th, when I had an appointment with him. Burns could tell Helmy that the matter would be discussed by me with Dr. Fawzi and that instructions to him would be received immediately afterwards.
- 11 March 1957: In the morning meeting of the 11th, I discussed with Dr. Fawzi this very matter, in the same spirit as all other administrative arrangements of significance had been mentioned to him from day to day. I stressed the importance on the Egyptian side of going slow on these matters, even when they were of fairly natural character,

as we were still in a rather delicate period. In this context I referred to my previous statements concerning the desirability of extending the initial phase so as to avoid to bring out the underlying conflict. Dr. Fawzi did not show any concern, nor any wish to press the matter. However, in the course of our discussion, news arrived about the appointment of Latif as Administrative Governor, which, of course, was a fact which entirely changed the perspective. There was no indication of any conflict of views between Dr. Fawzi and me as to what had happened so far. He stressed, however, that it was desirable that we contacted appropriate people directly in Cairo. I got the impression that he had been informed about the discussion between Helmy and Burns directly.

The same day I had a meeting with the Advisory Committee which was wholly agreed on a wait-and-see policy. Further information on Egypt's intentions seemed to be necessary before a policy decision could be taken by the UN.

13 March 1957: We were informed by Burns that it was possible or probable that Latif with five civilian administrators would move to Gaza on 14 March. Although I took for granted that the US knew directly about it, I took it up immediately together with related matters with Mr. Lodge. In the course of general conversations I also informed the British and the French about the information we had. In view of the general instructions to Bunche, he was going to have a talk with President Nasser the same afternoon. I did not consider it possible to make any direct demarche concerning this question as it would have been a stroke absolutely in the dark pending information of the outcome of the Nasser/Bunche talk. I was also informed about the fact that Hare was going to see Nasser the same evening.

No report from Bunche or from Hare was received in the course of the 13th.

14 March 1957: A report from Bunche was received at 8 a.m. It was by then obvious that no message - even if it had been of any avail - could reach our people before the arrival of Latif in Gaza was already a fait accompli. We were informed later about the failure of Ambassador Hare the previous night to get anywhere on the issue. He seemed to have been even less successful than Bunche, although Bunche did not succeed in moving Nasser concerning this point.

16 March 1957: The first new information of any significance on the Egyptian take-over, was received while the Advisory Committee was in session. The message noted that the UN organs still functioned as before the 14th. A question was raised concerning the use of local police. The question was thoroughly discussed by the Advisory Committee and instructions in conformity with the conclusions of the Committee were issued. All other developments of Egyptian administration in the course of the 14th and 15th had been on the basis of independent decisions by Bunche and Burns.

COPY

Cable to Burns from Secretary-General 2 March 1957

Reur 474, 475 point 2. We refer you to following sentence my statement General Assembly 22 February, repeated Ambassador Lodge's reply yesterday to Israeli declaration: "It is the desire of the Government of Egypt that the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel - which, as has been the case, in the first instance will be exclusively by the United Nations Emergency Force - will be orderly and safe as it has been elsewhere." Your instruction to discuss with Dayan and provide for entry of UNEF in Gaza (and Sharm el Shaik) covers this phase of initial take-over which will be "exclusively" by the UNEF. You can say that what will follow after this initial take-over is outside your present functions to discuss. The matter having been negotiated with the US, you may, however, find it useful to refer to statement by Lodge following the quotation given above. In this statement he declared that "it is the view of the United States that, from a juridical standpoint, the future of the Gaza strip must ..... be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement". You can further refer to Secretary Dulles' statement yesterday that Israel withdrawal "would be predicated wholly upon the prior decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the reports of the Secretary-General and the public position of the United States".

It would involve serious risk for crossing of wires for you to engage even in non-committal discussion of arrangements following initial take-over. Regarding possible statements on Israel side concerning "assumptions" for their withdrawal, you should avoid impression of tacit acceptance by reserving position concerning all such matters as having been negotiated elsewhere and, therefore, having to be settled with same parties. In doing so you should avoid giving impression of stand which by Israel representative may be presented as "negative" concerning implementation of their assumptions. We believe that can be achieved by following the lines indicated above.

We repeat that your instruction is to arrange for "full and unconditional" withdrawal of Israel military and civilian units with "initial take-over exclusively by UNEF". Of course, you are authorized to move UNEF into Gaza at any time and in any way indicated by your talks without, however, in doing so, permitting any Israel assumptions to be accepted as conditions by the very fact of such moves being made after statement of such assumptions from Israeli to you.

For your personal information. We assume UNEF will run full administration for couple of weeks necessary in order to negotiate more definite arrangements with the Egyptians. Our authority in Gaza, according to stand of General Assembly on Israel occupation and Armistice Agreement, must be considered as derived from Egypt as power "in control" under the agreement and not, repeat not, from Israel as occupying power handing the territory over to the United Nations.

COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION 6 MARCH 1957

The data of 6 March in the morning were as follows:

On the one side the UN situation on the Gaza question was circumscribed by

- a) my statement 22 February as further elucidated in the report of 26 February;
- b) Mrs. Meir's statement 1 March with a reference to full exclusion of Egypt only in its first point;
- c) Mr. Lodge's statement in reply, 1 March, with its reference to the Armistice Agreement and its verbatim rendering of the statement of 22 February, and
- d) Mrs. Meir's statement, 4 March, after the clarifications of the American stand as reflected in Mr. Lodge's statement 1 March.

The United Nations' attitude in view of these facts must be to follow as closely as possible what Mrs. Meir actually stated on 1 March, within the limits set by Mr. Lodge's statement and my own previous statement.

However - and that was another set of circumstances - the French and Mrs. Meir had, outside the UN, indicated an interpretation of the Israeli stand much more extreme than the one stated in the General Assembly and impossible to reconcile with the conclusion drawn concerning the UN attitude in the previous paragraph. In view both of the official position as publicly given, and of my reaction to the French and the Americans before the Israeli statement on 1 March, the Israeli Mission must have been aware of the fact that I considered it excluded for the UN, both legally and practically, to give effect to the extreme Israeli interpretation. They likewise knew that I had no commitments from Egypt going beyond what was on the table; this emerged both from the discussion on Monday in explanation of the 22 February statement and from my later contacts in particular with the French. The Israelis, themselves, made no attempt to check whether we in the UN had any commitment from Egypt later than, and going beyond that of 22 February.

Although the UN stand must be considered as clear, and although the more far-reaching Israeli statements were made outside the General Assembly under the conditions indicated, I could, of course, in no way disregard those statements. The question, therefore, arose whether, with knowledge of the Israeli line taken outside the General Assembly, I could permit the UNEF to go into Gaza.

Not to permit them to do so, would, of course, have meant to break up the result of the Washington talks on the basis only of unofficial Israeli statements and in contradiction to what was the official record. To permit UNEF to go in, required, on the other hand, certainty that there was no US Commitment to the unofficial Israeli stand which undermined the whole official record of the matter. It required further that Egypt would play along, and that they on their side acted in full knowledge of the complications.

The decisive developments in the course of the 6th were, in consequence:

- a) the stand taken by Dulles, who went to the extreme of saying that I should not "care about what Mrs. Meir had said but just go ahead" (this was said both in the message transmitted by Lodge and directly over the telephone), and
- b) the stand taken by Fawzi.

With these two stands - seen against the background of the official record as spelled out in the beginning of this memorandum under points a) - d) / it became impossible not to try the chance which might exist to manoeuvre things around the dangerous corner. Not to take that chance would have meant to throw the whole matter back into a state of acute crisis in spite of the official record and in spite of the stands taken by Dulles and Fawzi.

## COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION 1 MARCH

- - - - -

Mrs. Meir, in the discussion 18 March, said that she considered that everybody who had not stood up and criticized the "assumptions" in her statement 1 March, had taken responsibility for their accuracy. In particular this was true of the Secretary-General, who, if he looked at it that way, should have said in the debate that he had not sufficient powers under the Charter to ensure the implementation of the assumptions, or that the Armistice Agreement did not give him sufficient scope for implementation. This statement calls for the following comments.

When the Israeli Delegation presented their assumptions, they were, like everybody else, fully aware of the following circumstances:

- a) Under the Charter, the UNEF functions with the consent of Egypt, (which is restricted only by a good-faith interpretation of the functions of the Force, <sup>as</sup> ~~This is~~ <sup>a special</sup> ~~stated~~ in the ~~Second and Pini~~ Report);
- b) Egypt's rights under the Armistice Agreement are recognized by the United Nations;
- c) According to the decision of the General Assembly the UNEF is not a combat force that could be put in military control of a territory;
- d) The decisions of the General Assembly were that the withdrawal should be unconditional;
- e) The extent to which cooperation by Egypt to the establishment of a UN administration in Gaza might be possible, was ~~it~~ spelled out in the statement 22 February as elucidated 26 February.

As the Israeli statement 1 March obviously was to be considered as a statement in good faith, all these points had to be assumed as taken into account by Israel and forming an implicit background of its declaration. At all events, they were not in need of any repetition in the debate as a qualification of the stand of the Secretary-General, which could not have been considered as changed or withdrawn simply by his silence.

It was known that the Israeli statement was part of a carefully planned and even rehearsed procedure with the American reply as the clinching factor. As the American reply gave my verbatim text of 22 February with reference to the Armistice Agreement as setting the legal frame for a solution, it provided the Israeli statement with an explanation and qualification to which I had nothing to add.

My view on the impossibility of an implementation of the Israeli statement as it was interpreted by Mrs. Meir outside the General Assembly, was known beforehand to France, UK and Canada. Israel took no contact with me in order to clarify my views on implementation, what was all the more significant as they had no indication of any change of my stand from 26 February and as they knew that instructions for implementation would depend on me.

It is difficult in retrospect, just as it was at the time, not to interpret the situation as one where Israel, France and the US worked out a formula in order to get over the hump which had become apparent on the 25th and the 26th. In order to do so they had to hide the underlying conflict of views so as not to provoke an open discussion in the General Assembly or to force me to repeat my previous declarations. As the arrangement had been made in Washington and was staged in New York, an interpretation from my side in the debate, restating previous stands - as Mrs. Meir now suggested that I should have done - would, from the point of view of the Governments, parties to the attempt, have been to wreck the slender chance, in a certain atmosphere of vagueness, pragmatically to get around a difficult corner. It would obviously have been highly irresponsible from my side to "protect" myself at the cost of brushing aside this chance of a de facto meeting of minds in spite of the de jure conflict.

for my benefit  
of time

MEMORANDUM

*Confidential*

The United States greatly appreciates being consulted by the Secretary General, prior to his departure for Cairo, regarding negotiations that he will undertake there. We are in agreement regarding difficulties and dangers inherent in this situation. As the Secretary General is aware, the United States has in the last few months taken positions counter to those held by some of its close associates among members of the United Nations out of the conviction that it was necessary to do so in order to restore and preserve peace and to uphold the Charter. The United States position on the issues involved has ~~been~~ been stated in numerous public pronouncements. Our position in response to the Secretary General's inquiry can be summarized as follows:


1. We consider that UNEF is to remain in the areas of Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza "until its task is completed" (A/3375). This means that Egypt is not entitled unilaterally to terminate the mission of UNEF. UNEF should be withdrawn only when the United Nations is satisfied that it should be. There ought to be ample opportunity for consideration by the General Assembly prior to any decision on withdrawal.

2. No Egyptian force should return to the Sharm el-Sheikh area until it is clear that non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice peaceful conditions that must govern navigation in waters having such an international character.

3. We firmly believe that no Egyptian military or paramilitary forces should return to the Gaza Strip, and the UNEF should remain in Gaza until there is a definitive settlement respecting the Gaza Strip or some final general agreement between the parties.

4. Regarding civil administration in the Gaza Strip, it was our understanding from the Secretary General's statement of February 22nd that in the initial period the United Nations take over would be exclusive and there would be no elements of Egyptian administration present. We very much regret the arrival of the Egyptian Administrative Governor and his staff. However the presence of these individuals will be less damaging so long as it is only symbolic. Responsibility for administration in the Gaza Strip must remain in the United Nations agencies until there is a definitive settlement respecting Gaza or some final general agreement between the parties. There is otherwise not only the danger of some Israeli reaction but also the prospect of a renewal of fedayeen raids and the outbreak of serious disorder in the Strip. While the United Nations maintains UNEF in Gaza and continues to care for the Arab refugees, such developments must not be allowed to occur.

5. We believe that any recessions from above positions would seriously undermine confidence in the United Nations since these positions were reasonable to expect from the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Secretary General's statements to the General Assembly.




- 1 -

We consider that UNEF is in the Gaza Strip on the recommendation of the General Assembly and with the agreement of the Egyptian Government.

The Secretary-General's report of February 22 was formulated in such a way as surely to justify the Israelis (and others) in thinking that UNEF would remain in effective control of the Gaza Strip for more than a few days. This was confirmed by General Burns' proclamation of March 7, mentioned in the Secretary-General's report of March 8.

It therefore seems to us that the Israelis (and others) would have genuine cause for complaint if civil administration in the Strip were handed over to the Egyptians at this stage.

/on



- 2 -

On practical grounds it seems to us that the United Nations should, as a minimum, aim at retaining in its hands for the time being exclusive responsibility for security in the Strip, so that there can be a real prospect of its preventing a renewal of Fedayeen raids. The General Assembly's purpose was to ensure that hostilities did not break out again and that effective measures are taken to prevent incursions and raids across the Armistice line. "For the time being" means, we hope, until there has been a permanent settlement.

We hope that on this basis the Secretary-General will be able to work out with the Egyptians arrangements which we shall feel able to recommend Israel to accept.