

# Middle East conflict. General Assembly resolutions collected by Dag Hammars...

*HS L 179:127a*



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Amman, corresp. 1958 <sup>code</sup>  
cables

From D.H. — to Piero P. Spinelli (Europ. office of the U.N., Geneva)  
and Amman, Jordan

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI GENEVA

FROM: SEIGEN

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1958

NO.:

I would like you if possible to come to New York Wednesday for discussion of important temporary assignment which would take you away from Geneva presumably for about a month beginning next week. Sorry to break in on your well deserved peace after Atomic Conference but believe that you yourself will be interested. Anyway assignment is of key importance.

- 1) The supply of oil to Jordan from Iraq through the Syrian Region after the withdrawal of foreign troops.
- 2) We accept that during the withdrawal of British forces from Jordan, the British aircraft use the air space of the Syrian Region, providing they will comply with the specific conditions which will be agreed upon (namely previous notification, number of aircraft in each sector, etc.)

Code cables 1358

For the time being, should in no way be publicized. In general terms, a reference to the assurances will be given in the report. I hope that by that time the air Jordan problem will be definitely solved; point 3) in the Egyptian message seems to imply that Cairo on its part takes positive attitude as promised. I hope that this message will favourably influence Jordan public

OUTGOING CODE DABLE

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SEGEN  
DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1958  
NO.: /

For your information. Regarding the various practical matters which should be straightened out as a step towards normalisation of conditions, the situation is now as follows:

1. Baghdad has assured me that, after withdrawal, they are eager to see a restoration of normal relations, including a resumption of oil deliveries on a commercial basis.
2. From Cairo I have today received the following message:  
"1) We have no objection to the supply of oil to Jordan from Tripoli through the Syrian Region after the withdrawal of foreign troops.  
2) We accept that during the withdrawal of British forces from Jordan, the British aircraft use the air space of the Syrian Region, providing they will comply with the specific conditions which will be agreed upon (namely previous notification, number of aircraft in each squadron,...etc.)  
3) Regarding the resumption of the Air Jordan trips between Beyrouth and Amman, we shall consult with the new Government of Lebanon and contact anew the Secretary-General.

Meanwhile we shall do our best to simplify all difficulties."

Please inform Samir Pasha about these developments pointing out that they, for the time being, should in no way be publicized. In general terms, a reference to the assurances will be given in the report. I hope that by that time the Air Jordan problem will be definitely solved; point 3) in the Egyptian message seems to imply that Cairo on its part takes positive attitude as promised. I hope that this message will favourably influence Jordan public

reaction regarding the withdrawal, and also that it may prove helpful to you as an indication for Samir that the United Nations operation is not without its immediate practical value.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI ALMAN  
FROM: SEGEN  
DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1958  
NO.: 13

Rear SP 27. Plan as outlined is fully acceptable as a basis for your further elaboration in more definite report. However, I feel that you might wish to plan for somewhat greater number of non-secretariat assistance, partly with a view to justify line of communications which obviously requires certain size of your operation in order to make sense.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1958

No.: 15

Reur SP 33. As preparation for possible intervention I would appreciate further information, if available, regarding Free Jordan Radio Station. Where is it located? By whom is it supposed to be operated?

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

FROM: SEGEN  
TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1958  
NO.: 24

Warm thanks letter dated 8 October with valuable and highly appreciated analysis. To the extent views expressed may require reaction, I am agreed with you.

Reur SP 44. Best reply is relaying to you cable from Bayal, the background of which is request by me to him to press for solution of Air Jordan problem in Beirut (This demerche in Beirut was made in agreement with the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic).

Text of cable follows:

" ..... (UNGGIL 1155)....."

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI, AMMAN

FROM: SECCHI

DATE: 17 October 1958

NO:

39

Thanks excellent report transmitted with letter of 14 October. We will now work with this as a basis, taking into account your letter to Bunche of 15. A first step will be the editing of an announcement in accordance with your P.S. Will send you draft shortly.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AGIAN

FROM: SEGHEN

DATE: 24 October 1958

No.:

52

Foreign Minister of UAR is leaving Sunday. I will therefore have my last opportunity to discuss with him liaison office arrangements in Damascus tomorrow morning. I feel that I should use this opportunity to prepare the ground for the more technical talks which will have to follow. You will remember that matter is agreed in principle and that discussion now therefore covers only implementation. As guidance for my talk with Foreign Minister I would appreciate urgently an indication of your present thinking as to the practical arrangements in Damascus which would adequately serve your needs as discussed between us.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

URGENT

FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL

DATE: 28 October 1958

NUMBER: 62

Re SP 87.

anticipated

King's and Rifai's reactions ~~noted~~ anticipated. Rifai's brother will be able to fill you in on developments here regarding UAR. I would expect things to loosen up fairly quickly after completion of withdrawals. This, in my view, would be worst possible moment for initiative in Security Council. You can inform Rifai that I sent direct personal message to President Nasser last Saturday with the full cooperation of Fawzi. In that message I repeated emphatically the demand for immediate relaxations, suggesting that Bunche would visit Cairo if Nasser would not find it possible to respond to my appeal within the nearest future or if he wanted a further elucidation of my views of the situation. Abdul Monem Rifai can give necessary information on background also this demarche.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SEGGEN

DATE: 30 OCTOBER L)E(

NO:.

URGENT

Please inform Prime Minister at once of the following:

I have just received oral message in reply to my letter to President Nasser of Saturday last. According to this reply the suspension of permission for Air Jordan to traffic between Beirut and Amman across the Syrian region has been revoked with immediate effect. Further, over-land traffic of goods ("approvisionnement") will be restored 1 November.

I have today received message of thanks from British Foreign Minister regarding successful completion of air-lift.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 30 OCTOBER 1958

NO: 65

URGENT

Please inform Prime Minister at once of the following:  
I have just received oral message in reply to my letter to  
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and Amman across the Syrian region has been revoked with immediate  
effect. Further, over-land traffic of goods ("approvisionnement")  
will be restored 1 November.

I have today received message of thanks from British Foreign  
Minister regarding successful completion of air-lift.

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: SPINELLI, AMAN  
FROM: SECRETARY GENERAL  
DATE: 7 November 1958  
NUMBER: 76

On matter of Damascus liaison office, would seem timely to take a next step. UAR has given agreement in principle and Dr. Fawzi was informed of our views concerning size and composition of staff while he was here. We suggest that now next step could be taken by you, possibly by sending Reedman to Cairo to clinch final arrangements with Fawzi, and subsequently, in agreement with Cairo, to Damascus. Arrangements for Reedman's visit to Fawzi can appropriately be made through us. We will await word from you before approaching Delegation here.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI, ANMAN

FROM: SECDEF

URGENT

DATE: 10 November 1958

NUMBER: 79

Reur SP 105.

Whatever action may be possible for us will have to wait for your full report which I hope will cover more fully also question of clearance. You will have noted that, if Syrian action was to intervene after refusal by plane to land, when requested to do so because of incomplete clearance, and if, further, Syrians were not even informally notified of the King's presence, the whole incident would boil down to a question regarding which the UN has only limited range of possible reaction.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SEGEN

DATE: 11 November 1958

*N<sup>o</sup> 81*

Because of repeated stories out of Amman in British press but also from a French Agency, we would like to issue statement here through UN spokesman to the effect that (a) the UN had in no way been approached regarding transit for King's plane over Syria, (b) that to our knowledge no repeat no / request for such transit had been made through other channels. Before issuing such a statement we would wish to have urgently your comments. It is unpleasant to torpedo propaganda stories so that it may reflect on Jordan authorities but it may be in the best interest of peace in the area and it is needed for your protection.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: BEGREN

DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1958

URGENT

NUMBER:

I have received Rifai's message and submit urgently for your comments the following draft reply. It should not be transmitted to Rifai before you have got green lights, which I shall give after receiving your reaction. Message follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of 10 November 1958, transmitted through Ambassador Spinelli, regarding the incident that took place on that date against the royal plane transporting King Hussein during his flight over Syrian territory.

I note the information contained in the message. Likewise, I note the additional information received from Ambassador Spinelli to the effect that clearance had not been requested for the flight from the UAR.

In your note you ask me, primarily, that I take urgent steps to submit the case to the Security Council in accordance with my jurisdiction and competence. The Jordan Government presumably has in mind Article 99 of the Charter according to which the SG may bring to the attention of the Security Council a matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. I referred to this Article in my report of 29 September 1958 on 'Questions considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958, (A/3934/Rev.1)', where in paragraph 38 I stated:

'The reports to the Secretary-General from the representative stationed in Amman would not be public documents unless the situation were found to call for their circulation as official documents of the United Nations. Such circulation, which might serve as a basis for action by the General Assembly or the Security Council, represents obviously an alternative line of action open to the Secretary-General in such cases as would seem to him to call for stronger measures than diplomatic démarches. Were the findings to be of a serious nature, they may, under present circumstances, be regarded as

indicating a threat to peace and security in the sense of Article 99 of the Charter. This fact, and the possibilities for action which it opens for the Secretary-General, lends added weight to the planned arrangements as a means to help in upholding the purposes of the Charter in relation to Jordan.'

In the circumstances, as known to me, I find it difficult to consider the incident as indicating a threat to peace and security in the sense of the Charter. The ways then open to me would be circulation of your note as a Security Council document which I would arrange at your request, or, alternatively, diplomatic demarches in order to solve the conflict between Jordan and the UAR to which the incident, whatever its explanation, has given rise. As you know, the matter has been considered by me in my current contacts under the August 21 resolution. I am willing to pursue my efforts along this line and would, if it were to prove necessary, consider resorting to the machinery set up under that resolution (See the report paragraphs 35-37).

I have not considered the possibility of reporting on the matter to the General Assembly. The reason is that such a report could not lead to any action unless an item were to be inscribed on the agenda. I have assumed that it was not the intention of the Jordan Government that, on the basis of this incident, I should propose the inclusion of an item which presumably would have to cover the whole field of the emergency special session in August.

Permit me, finally, to express my deep regret at this unfortunate incident and let me, at the same time, assure you that I would be happy, at your request, to take such good-offices steps as would eliminate any possible risks for a similar situation, were His Majesty to wish to follow through his plan for a vacation in Europe." End of draft message.

You may wish to inform Rifai orally and informally about the substance of the official reply I would have to give. If so, you are free to follow the above draft as a brief. Such an informal approach to Rifai might be useful in order to check that I have not misunderstood the intentions in his note the text of which is anything but clear.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1958

NO.: 82

I mentioned already yesterday to UAR delegate desirability of some kind of apology from UAR irrespective of fact that technically they may not be at fault. I have today followed this line through by a personal message to President Nasser, suggesting that he express his regrets as a simple matter of courtesy. You may mention this demarche to Hifai emphasizing that its effectiveness depends on the discretion with which the demarche can be handled as it is well known that Nasser never yields to what he considers to be public pressure. In the light of your analysis I am not sure that the success of my demarche would be entirely welcome but ~~so~~ I am guided by what seems to be most in the general interest. Needless to say an expression of regrets from Nasser would necessarily be so worded as to avoid any implication of their being responsible. Anything else would be unreasonable to expect in view of the hard facts of the matter.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECGEN

URGENT

DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1958

NUMBER: 86,87

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OUTLING CODE CABLE

URGENT

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECGEN  
DATE: 12 November 1958  
NUMBER: 88

Reur 117.

Most happy to register this new development in which I trace the influence of your wise handling of the matter. I have at once approached Cairo again in order to put added weight back of my suggestion according to our 82.

Would you please transmit to Rifai and the King my sincere appreciation of their trust and consideration which I am anxious to merit. I am convinced that in the spirit which has directed our collaboration of the past months we shall find a way out of the present difficulties which fully safeguards interest of security as well as dignity of all concerned.

Your action in withholding discussion of my suggested reply was most judicious. I thank you for the whole way in which you are handling this matter.

OUTLING CODE CABLE

URGENT

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECDEF  
DATE: 12 November 1958  
NUMBER:

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECGEN  
DATE: 17 November 1958  
NUMBER: 95

I received ~~the~~ clear cable, signed by Said Mufti, ~~President~~ in his quality of President National Assembly, saying that "Members of Jordan National Assembly .....repudiate the flagrant premeditated aggression .... and strongly protest against it ". They further ask me to let the "free civilised world ~~hear~~ hear how far those (UAR) authorities adhere to their pledges".

In view our information and total picture, I find it difficult to judge about character this ~~déclaration~~ dated 16th. I therefore hesitate how to reply and would appreciate your comments.

RCA POSN 3  
2537NY UNATIONS/RC19/AO/UWS3411 MTA516  
F AMMAN 101 16 1623 JORDAN GOVT

SG

*Cartier*

HIS EXCELLENCY MR DAG HAMMARSKJOLD SECRETARY GENERAL  
UNITED NATIONS NEWYORK

MEMBERS OF JORDAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHO BELIEVED THAT THE  
SAFETY OF HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN IS THE BEST SECURITY FOR JORDAN  
REPUDIATE THE FLAGRANT PREMEDITATED AGRSSION BY THE  
AUTHORITIS IN THE SYRIAN PROVINCE OF THE UAR AGAINST  
HIS MAJESTYS AIRPLANE

P/2/51

AND STRONGLY PROTEST AGAINST IT STOP THE JORDAN PARLIAMENT IN  
CONVEYING TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THIS DECISION REQUEST THAT THE  
FREE CIVILIZED WORLD HEAR HOW FAR THOSE AUTHORITIES ADHERE TO  
THEIR PLEGES AND TO THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND  
OBLIGATIONS STOP PLEASE ACCEPT HIGHEST CONSIDERATIONS  
PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SAID MUFTI +

TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
12 10 29

R U CLEAR ??  
SENT AT 1129AM EST AO  
2537NYOUNATIONS

OUTGOING COME CABLE

TO: SPIRELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECCEN  
DATE: 17 November 1958  
NUMBER: 96

Reur 127.

Formal demarche made Saturday requesting suggested assurances. Demarche last Tuesday, which took the form of personal letter to Nasser (about which you have been informed) follows exactly the line you indicate in last sentence of your cable. However, I have not wished to combine the two things, as that might reduce chances of getting speedy results on either one of them. You will observe that they are both simultaneously on the table, and I have no doubt that they will be combined in Cairo's considerations.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN REPEAT UNOGIL BEIRUT

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 17 NOVEMBER 1958

NO.: 97

One of these days we will announce withdrawal of UNOGIL. This, of course, does in no way influence the liaison office arrangement to be made with Lebanon for your operation. It may be wise in order to avoid any misunderstanding that matter be raised in a preliminary way with Lebanese authorities, independently of the fact that formal discussion has not yet been started with Cairo. You may wish Reedman to go to Beirut for the purpose. Alternatively you might ask Observation Group to serve as intermediary. If you do, you will be sure to give them the necessary data yourself.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SEGGEN  
DATE: 19 November 1958  
NUMBER: 601

*Immediate*

Reur 135.

We are now informed that Cairo issued clear instructions for clearance of the flights already two days ago. This confirms your message. Interested to hear that special clearance was arranged "by Indonesian Embassy". The contact established through Indonesians is likely to have made Cairo feel that there was no hurry in replying to me. In this context I want to point out that it is intolerable to request formal good-offices for a certain purpose, as Jordan has done, without even mentioning parallel approach through other official channel. Apart from striking lack of courtesy, the risk for crossing of wires is considerable and the un-coordinated, double-barrelled approach does not give twice the efficiency, but reduces, of course, the value of each single move through the impression conveyed.

Naturally you are entirely outside these fussy manoeuvres of Jordanians, but they indicate necessity of keeping a sharp check; the bungling of the clearance of the royal plane, the bungling of the sending of the message from Parliament, and now this risky lack of coordination and fussiness sound a warning.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

URGENT

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 19 November 1958

NUMBER:

103

I have now received the following Aide Memoire from UAR Delegation, which you can transmit verbatim to Rifa'i:

"With reference to your memorandum of the 15th of this month, I received today a cable from Cairo, informing me that the competent authorities in the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic were instructed on the 17th instant to take the necessary measures to facilitate the trip of the Queen Mother of Jordan and her party from Beyrouth to Amman by Air Jordan across the Syrian Region."

The Delegate said that the cause of the lateness of this reply was that Cairo had not appreciated that I needed a formal response although I had in my Aide Memoire to the UAR Government explicitly asked for an "insurance".

The explanation of this misunderstanding probably is the Jordan approach through the Indonesian Embassy and the fact that the Egyptians had replied through that channel. It is natural if Cairo thought that my initiative was only in support of the other action or, perhaps, an uncalled for parallel action caused by some crossing of wires.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: BEGREN

DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1958

NO.: 108

Re Rifai note as transmitted by your 136. I intend of course to reply but I am a bit at a loss regarding the proper interpretation of this new appeal.

I gather that air and road traffic are going on without obstacles and that, thus, no further intervention from me is required in order to safeguard air Jordan or over-land supplies. To that extent the problem is resolved and no words added to the picture can be of great value.

Remaining is the question of some kind of expression of regret of incident from UAR. I have got nowhere on that point, in spite of strong and repeated demarches, as Cairo feels that Amman abuses the situation by resorting to "undecorous and irresponsible polemics and attacks". Cairo considers that "official Amman" is still continuing along that line. In spite of this negative result so far I have maintained my line and continue to plead for some kind of statement which might give satisfaction. (I fear that Cairo may consider that their response to the question of the Queen's flight should be taken as a sufficient indication of their attitude.)

In these circumstances, you will appreciate that I feel a bit uncertain about what I can reasonably do specifically in support of Jordan, on the basis of their appeal, and about what they themselves have in mind. I note that they want me to inform them about my actions.

It may be difficult for you to give me any guidance but your close contact with Rifai and the Palace may give you a chance to enlighten me or to advise me. I would therefore appreciate your comments before sending any reply to Rifai.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECGEN

DATE: 24 NOVEMBER 1958

NO.: 110

Re your 142. I am afraid that Jordan lacks perspective on the situation if, as it seems, they regard themselves as, in all respects, the wronged party who has something to get and nothing to give. Although I myself regard Jordan as being "more sinned against than sinning", there must be a two-way traffic and to ask for an effort from our side without giving us the cards to play, is to react in a rather spoiled and unrealistic way. I shall revert to the question of reply to Rifai. For the moment I have little guidance to give you for continued contacts.

However, I may point out that Jordan publicly created a picture according to which the plane incident was instigated and maneuvered as a major plot by Cairo. This may well have been done in good faith but was never set straight when Jordan came to know better. The first accusation, thus, has been permitted to stand and remains a key note in the international press in spite of the fact that Amman knows it is wrong. The phrasing of the withdrawal of the complaint was not such as to counteract impression they had themselves created. It may well be held that Jordan should come out clean on what they now know to have been the facts. If they did, that would help us very much in effort to get expression of regret from Cairo which otherwise is practically bound to fail as apology without Jordan having said even that they had no clearance would look like Cairo pleading guilty.

Further, you will have received my letter to Rifai on their intended manoeuvres on UNEF in the UN and you will have seen from that letter that this inadmissible propaganda line dates back to last year. It is well remembered by Cairo and regarded as solidly below the belt. This matter should be put straight.

Finally, you may know that Cairo sent message with Abdul Monem Rifai that they would welcome reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations. This "message officieux" should in my view be taken up by Jordan. A reestablishment of diplomatic representation could easily be maneuvered in such a way as to avoid a loss of face on either side, although it should be remembered that it was Jordan which broke the relations while Egypt has taken a first step toward their reestablishment.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: BEGREN

DATE: 24 NOVEMBER 1958

NO.: 112

Jordan delegate just informs me that he has been instructed, in the light of my letter to Rifai, to withhold his criticism of U.N.R.F.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECOEN

DATE: 25 November 1958

NUMBER: 115

Reur 147.

Warm thanks useful and clarifying cable the philosophy of which I fully appreciate. Any time you wish to use to Rifai statements from me regarding continued efforts to keep things on the rails in relation to UAR, you can do so as such efforts indeed are practically daily.

It is in the ~~light~~ light of such continued efforts that I felt need in our 110 and in our 101 to present in cold light how certain Jordanian attitudes ~~xxx~~ look from this end. You should regard such comments as those found in the two cables as background information to you not regarding any emotional reactions here, or regarding any wish from our side for you to intervene and censor Jordanians, but as statements in your assistance based on the daily comparison of attitudes and actions we are in a position to make. As a matter of course such comments in no way have involved any criticism of your handling of matters.

You will appreciate that our contacts in relation to other Arab countries are very frank but must also be very consistent and absolutely fair. This is in best interest of Jordan and therefore I felt it useful for you, in your very important and highly sensitive job, to have as clear a picture as possible of why and where we run into trouble.

I can tell you that at Security Council luncheon yesterday I had great pleasure of paying you a warm tribute for excellent and very judicious diplomatic job.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECGEN  
DATE: 26 NOVEMBER 1958  
No.:

If you are in agreement with the following text, please transmit this message to Rifai:

"My dear Samir *Parha,*

By cable from Mr. Spinelli yesterday, I received your letter of 25 November, for which I thank you sincerely.

I highly appreciate your reaction to my letter regarding a debate on the question of UNEF. Your instructions to Mr. Khalidy are most welcome. It is my conviction that they are in everybody's best interest.

I am happy to note your renewed expression of confidence and friendship. I fully appreciate that there are points in my argument with which you do not agree, but we will certainly find time to discuss them together before there is any need to formulate a final stand.

As you assume, Mr. Spinelli has kept me fully informed about developments, as well as about his valuable talks with you. He will certainly have told you that I continue to do my best in order to smooth matters out and to keep them on a sound basis. Some successes have been registered, but various problems remain unsolved. We must arm ourselves with the necessary patience and permit some reactions to settle down.

In the meanwhile, please, rest assured that I will not relax in my efforts, for which the views you have expressed to Mr. Spinelli serve as a valuable guidance.

Please transmit my respectful and warm greetings to His Majesty.

With kindest regards to yourself and your brother

Yours Sincerely, Dag Hammarskjöld"

OUTGOING WIRE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN  
FROM: SECGEN  
DATE: 26 NOVEMBER 1958  
No.: 118

If you are in agreement with the following text, please transmit this message to Rifai:

My dear Saad Pasha,

By cable from Mr. Spinelli yesterday, I received your letter of 25 November, for which I thank you sincerely.

I highly appreciate your reaction to my letter regarding a <sup>debate</sup> on the question of UNEF. Your instructions to Mr. Khalil are most welcome. It is my conviction that they are in everybody's best interest.

I am happy to note your <sup>renewed</sup> ~~renewed~~ <sup>expression</sup> of confidence and friendship. I fully appreciate that there are points in my argument with which you <sup>do</sup> not agree, but we will certainly find time to discuss them together before there is any need to <sup>formulate</sup> a final stand.

As you assume, Mr. Spinelli has kept me fully informed about developments, as well about his <sup>valuable</sup> talks with you. He will certainly <sup>have</sup> told you that I <sup>continue</sup> to do my best in order to <sup>smooth matters</sup> smooth matters out and to keep them on a <sup>sound</sup> basis. Some successes have been registered, but various problems <sup>remain unresolved</sup> remain unresolved. We must <sup>arm</sup> ourselves with the necessary patience and permit some reactions to <sup>settle</sup> settle down.

In the meanwhile, please, rest assured that I will not relax in my efforts, for which the views you have expressed to Mr. Spinelli serve as a <sup>valuable</sup> <sup>guidance</sup> guidance.

Please transmit my respectful and warm greetings to His Majesty.

With kindest regards to yourself and your brother

Yours Sincerely, Dag Hammarskjöld

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO : SPINELLI, AMMAN  
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL  
DATE: 4 December 1958  
NO: 135

Reur 164. We have full understanding for Lebanese susceptibilities as indicated para 2 your cable.

I agree with their attitude as mentioned in para 3 your cable. It is also from our point of view for reasons both of practice and policy desirable to synchronize arrangements in Damascus and Beirut to the extent that this can be done. Assume therefore that you will now proceed with matter on the UAR side.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI, AMMAN

FROM: SEGGIN

DATE: 5 December 1958

NUMBER:

140

Reference SP 174. UAR Delegation here was approached regarding visit by Reedman to Cairo and we have been awaiting reply. Will inform you as soon as word is received.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SECCEN

DATE: 10 December 1958

NO.: 147

Reur 185.

Information in final paragraph transmitted via UAR Delegation to Cairo. I pointed out that as matter was handled through Indonesian Embassy, I did this time not request any assurances. However, as I had been informed, I wished to draw the attention of Cairo to the arrangement, at the same time expressing my personal interest in a smooth operation.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI AMMAN

FROM: SEGEN

TOP SECRET

DATE: 12 DECEMBER 1958

No.:

158

You are aware of increasing tension in the Northern Region between Syria and Israel. Any dramatic developments there, which are more likely to have their origin on the Israel than on the Syrian side, obviously would have the most serious significance for Jordan. It is conceivable that minds in Jordan could be split between Arab "brotherly" reaction against Israel and supposed Jordan national interest in a blow against Syrian-Egyptian Union. West bank reaction likely to be along first line. I cannot exclude possibility of "officers'" and bedouin reaction along second line. This latter line may find external encouragement.

In light of these highly tentative thoughts, which obviously have to be handled with utmost delicacy, I would appreciate to receive urgently your comments primarily in following respects. What is your impression of top reactions in Jordan to Israel-Syrian tension and situation in Security Council? What would be your appraisal of popular sentiments on same points? Have you any indications concerning direction of possible influence on top opinion from representatives of chief outside supporter? In the light of this, what would you presume to be action, if any, in case of flareup which in first instance would involve Jordan only indirectly?