

Middle East - Advisory Committee on UNEF - verbatim records of meetings: Mi...

HS L 179:126



National Library
of Sweden

Dag Hammarskjölds samt.

Middle East

Meeting of Advisory Committee on UNEF

21 Sept. 57

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNEF
(Meeting held in the Secretary-General's Conference
Room on Saturday, 21 September 1957, at 10.30 a.m.)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As to the background of the report, I think I have very little to say that would be news to you, because we have after all discussed this before, and I think that the report is self-explanatory. It is an effort to give the General Assembly as complete a record as possible of all the various aspects of the UNEF operation -- however, obviously, as you see, playing down the political problem, as we did not feel there was any reason to provoke a discussion of that through the report. If anyone wants to discuss it, of course, the field is open. On the other hand, the present impression is that neither side -- neither Israel nor Egypt -- is very keen on it and, if anything, would be a little embarrassed if we put emphasis on that side. That is to say, this is an administrative, routine report, intended to give the fullest possible factual information to the General Assembly.

As to the timing, as things worked out, it was finally felt that there was no need for that little preview which we discussed at the last meeting of the Advisory Committee. There was no pressure for the general transfer of the Palestinian item at all. It was felt that under such circumstances it was better to give the proper time for the proper kind of preparation. Things worked out properly, as you know: We have these two limited items, UNEF and the Canal, on the agenda as approved by the General Committee and as undoubtedly it will be approved by the General Assembly.

As to the time for presentation, I have no very strong views on that. There is one point I might raise: that on the question of deployment the last word, in my view, has not been said. That being so, it might be wise not to rush this report, which might precipitate a discussion if it were published.

There is also another viewpoint, and that is that there may be points raised in the general debate which could most simply be clarified by an addition to the text here.

For those two reasons, without my having any strong feelings about it at all, my "playing it by ear" reaction would be that we should have it ready, but it may be a good idea to wait until, let us say, the first days of October, when we shall have the main part of the general debate behind us and we shall also have seen to what extent further developments may be possible on the deployment issue.

I think that is all I need to say by way of general introduction. I think that the most practical procedure now would be for Mr. Bunche to give his explanatory comments on the first two sections, which are his responsibility, and then for Mr. Turner to give us his explanations of the budget part to the extent that there is a need for further comments.

Mr. BUNCHE: I think that on the first two sections there is little need for any explanatory comment or elaboration. It is more or less a factual account. I should say that it turned out to be rather longer than originally intended. This was because as we got into it we discovered that, though the Secretary-General had made a number of reports to the General Assembly on UNEF, there had been reports on compliance with Assembly resolutions on withdrawal and so on, but the Assembly had not in fact been given factual information about the report. This Committee was well informed, but the other members of the Assembly did not have a factual basis, and so that meant that rather more factual information was included than we originally considered necessary. But still this is not, of course, a definitive report.

For the rest, I might mention only that, with regard to incidents -- though we shall make no mention of this in the report itself -- it is interesting that the incidents that have been reported for just about the last three months have been almost exclusively reported by UNEF itself. In other words, there have been practically no complaints or reports of incidents coming from Egypt or Israel. There was one fairly recently reported by Egypt on 6 September in connexion with an incident on 5 September. The last complaint received from Israel against Egypt was on 16 July,

concerning an incident occurring on 14 July. All the other incidents have been reported by UNEF itself on the basis of UNEF observation. I think that is about all that it is necessary to say.

Mr. TURNER: I do not know whether I can be quite as brief as Mr. Bunche but I shall try to indicate in a general way what this third section of the report is intended to cover.

I think that we can pass over the first two subsections; they are purely historical and factual and they are more for information and convenience than anything else.

Coming to the third subsection, "Cost Estimates", I think that there are three points that perhaps need to be made. One is that the total estimated expenditure on UNEF for what has been regarded under the provisional financial rules of UNEF as the first financial period, that is to say, from the inception of the Force through 31 December next, comes, you will observe, to roughly \$24 million. The detail of how this figure is arrived at is given, together with explanatory text, in the annex to this document. The first point that should be registered is the fact that these estimates were, of course, necessarily in many important respects still of a highly tentative nature, and it may be possible to refine them further and make them somewhat more precise as certain elements of expenditure and obligation are reviewed in the field. We are hoping to get a further report from the field in the course of the next week or two, on the basis of which we may be able to give a slightly more accurate forecast of where we shall come out by the end of the year. If I may be a little rash, I would regard this figure as perhaps setting more in the nature of a maximum than a minimum in respect to expenditures which are, as it were, the direct responsibility of the Organization itself.

The second point is that this figure does not include any provisions for such additional costs as may have to be borne by the Special Account as a result of policy decisions to be taken by this Assembly-- decisions largely relating to the questions that we have discussed in this Committee

that have been the subject of extensive consultation with participating Governments over the last several months in the matter of the basis on which the costs incurred by Governments furnishing contingents should be shared between the Governments concerned on the one hand and the UNEF Special Account on the other hand. Depending on the decisions that are made, we may have to provide, as indicated, for anything up to \$4.8 to \$5 million over and above the \$24 million that is detailed. With respect to this \$4.8 to \$5 million, I would take a somewhat different point of view and regard that as a minimum rather than a maximum possible additional liability.

The third point I wish to make is that these estimates equally do not include or make provision for certain costs which heretofore have been considered, by ourselves at least, as having represented voluntary contributions by the Governments furnishing certain facilities and assistance, mainly transportation facilities in the early stages. You will possibly have noted that on pages 23 and 24 certain of this voluntary assistance has been listed. This text simply reproduces the text that was included in the report made last session to the committee of nine.

Our attention has been called to the fact that the text is perhaps a little incomplete and it will need to be somewhat revised and amplified. For example, we have, unfortunately, not given full credit to the assistance rendered by the Canadian Government in respect of transportation of their initial contingents, because, in addition to the transport of troops by the Canadian aircraft carrier, Canada also provided very extensive assistance in earlier airlifts.

Mr. BUNCHE: And it continues.

Mr. TURNER: It, of course, continues as an integral part of the total UNEF operation. Also there will need to be some further consultation between certain of these Governments that have reserved their position as to whether certain of these expenses are in fact going to be regarded as voluntary expenses or may be the subject of reimbursable claims against the Account. That may require some adjustment of this section of the report, but I think that is a matter that might more usefully be taken up further in talks between ourselves and the Governments concerned.

In subsection 4 there is an attempt made to set out in a very brief form the current status of receipts and expenditures. It is not the happiest of pictures, I regret to say. The total moneys received towards the \$10 million that was initially assessed come to \$5.7 million. Additionally, towards the \$6.5 million that the Assembly hoped might be forthcoming through voluntary supplementary contributions, we have received to date approximately \$586,000. Amounts have been pledged, by the United States in particular, but the payment of those amounts is subject to matching formulae from other voluntary contributors.

Reference is made to the extent to which we have up to now been obliged to look to the Working Capital Fund for financing current operations, the amounts currently outstanding by way of advances from the Working Capital Fund approximating \$3 million.

We have made as careful a review and examination as we can to ascertain just how we are faring in terms of keeping within what is currently our authorized obligational authority, namely \$16.5 million. It appears that we are within that amount, but we shall obviously not be in a position to stay within that limitation very much longer.

I think that the main body of the report, in terms of consideration and possible action by the Assembly, is really covered in subsections 5 and 6. Subsection 5 deals with the allocation of costs of UNEF contingents between the United Nations and the Member States concerned. This is intended simply to recapitulate the so-called new formulae which have been informally discussed with

the Governments concerned and which, I believe I am correct in saying, have in general and in principle been given broad endorsement. The formulae really are two-fold: first, the idea that for the first six months, assuming that the first six months can be considered to have been the emergency period, the United Nations obligation is limited to reimbursement of so-called extra allowances which certain of the Governments have been obliged to incur; and, second, that, for any period subsequent to the first six months of UNEF service, reimbursement by the United Nations is broadened to cover any costs which can reasonably and properly be regarded as extra or extraordinary costs incurred by a Government furnishing a contingent, as a direct result of having furnished that contingent for UNEF service. Thirdly -- and this is really a special facet of the extra costs principle -- there is the particular problem of the eventual replacement or compensation for depreciation and deterioration of equipment which was initially furnished by these Governments to their contingents. There the Secretary-General is on record as recognizing that a reasonable case exists for the United Nations assuming some responsibility in this matter.

Subsection 6 deals with the rather particular question of compensation in respect of deaths or injuries sustained by personnel of the Force. It had been suggested earlier that it might be possible to work out a special comprehensive scheme for such compensation, but on further reflection it is our conclusion in the Secretariat that much the most satisfactory procedure would be to continue to hold to existing arrangements whereby the Governments concerned make the claims and then transmit those claims to the United Nations for reimbursement on the basis of existing national laws and regulations.

Lastly, I think we really hit the major problem that confronts the Assembly under the heading of "Financial Requirements". I would first just mention that, under "Obligational Authority", the first action or one of the earlier actions called for is to increase the existing obligational authority from \$16.5 million to the estimated total needs of approximately \$24 million plus whatever further requirements arise as a result of decisions taken on

these other reimbursement principles. Then later it will be necessary also to authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments in respect of any expenditure that will occur during the 1958 period, always assuming, of course, that UNEF continues for the time being on roughly the same basis of operations as at present.

I think that particular attention should be called to the statement that is included on page 36 under the heading, "Basis for Financing UNEF Costs". This is a fairly forthright statement, and, although it does perhaps not make any specific or concrete proposals, I believe that from this statement, and in the light of all the facts and figures contained in this report, it is difficult to draw other than one rather obvious conclusion: that that is perhaps the crucial issue before this Assembly, because on the settlement of this issue, I think, the future of UNEF is vitally dependent. Members of the Committee may want to pay some rather particular attention to the text of this particular subsection of the report.

There is, finally, a third financial problem, which is simply one of ensuring that, whatever arrangements are made for providing the funds that will be needed, certain supplementary arrangements are assured for seeing that we have the cash necessary with which to meet current obligations. We shall unquestionably have to resort to borrowing by the end of this year or early in 1958. We can, under the authority that the Secretary-General already has, make some short-term arrangements through the use of advances from other funds under his control, such as the TAB Working Capital and Reserve Fund, but we do not believe that that will necessarily meet the full problem or that it may be regarded as other than a somewhat palliative and temporary measure of relief, and we have to look to the possibility of obtaining advances from Member Governments with which to finance operations pending the receipt of assessments or other contributions.

The situation in summary, from the financial point of view, is as we state at the top of page 36:

"... the shortfall in contributions received and assured (in excess of the \$10 million assessed) as against estimated costs through 31 December 1957, is of the order of \$12.8 million, without taking account of the estimated cost of reimbursing 'special allowances' during the first six months ... or, should the General Assembly so decide, of reimbursing all 'extra and extraordinary' pay and allowance expenses ..." -- equipment expenses -- "during the balance of 1957."

That would add at least another \$5 million to the total needs. So, quite apart from the 1958 problem, we are in need, in order to meet obligations in 1957, of not less than \$13 million and conceivably nearer \$18 or \$19 million.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I guess that the best way of organizing this discussion is to devote attention first to sections I and II, with regard to which the questions are more or less on textual drafting points, and then to look at the financial section, which is, of course, the one where the real problems arise.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I think that I should mention -- and this is a matter of course with the whole of the arrangements that we have -- that, of course, the Advisory Committee as such does not take any responsibility for the final text. You cannot do so and you should not tie the hands of the delegations or of the General Assembly or of the Fifth Committee, whichever may handle it. So, if we have troubled you with this, it is first of all because of the good advice you can give and also in order to bring you, so to say, up to date and help you in your own thinking on these matters at this early stage. May I, then, suggest that we first of all look at the first two sections -- so to say, the historical and descriptive sections?

Mr. LALL (India): May I first say that, as far as the Indian delegation is concerned, naturally it reserves its position fully on this document. As you have pointed out, Mr. Secretary-General, this is your report, and we shall take up our position at the appropriate time in the General Assembly. As to my comments, they are as follows.

It would be extremely helpful if there were a sort of outline map attached to this document, showing where the forces are actually deployed, because there are now statements such as, "South of the Gaza Strip the force is doing so and so", and all that kind of thing, which look all right on paper but do not add up to precision in one's mind. I think that a quite ordinary map would be helpful.

Mr. BUNCHE: I might make just one comment on that. We had thought of a map and we would have attached it if it could be, as Mr. Lall described it, an ordinary map. The trouble has always been -- and that is why there was never any map attached to the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement -- the designation of the lines south of the Gaza Strip. It creates very great difficulties once it appears on a map. With the other agreements there were maps attached, but in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement there could never be a map attached, because there was never agreement, and quite clearly this would create a real difficulty for us.

Mr. LALL (India): I see; quite right. This is an amazing situation. I thought that you did once produce a map.

Mr. BUNCHE: For the Committee.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Internally.

Mr. BUNCHE: It never went beyond here.

Mr. LALL: I see.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We know what the facts are but we do not know how to describe them; that is the trouble.

Mr. LALL (India): In other words, you cannot put them on a map.

Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil): I think it is a very good idea to familiarize people with this because many representatives in the Assembly do not know what that means, but it appears to be impossible to have a map.

Mr. BUNCHE: I might say one further word. The problem actually involves and has always involved the definition of what is the armistice line. You may notice that in this report we make reference to "the international frontier and the armistice line", because there are those who contend that the armistice line involves only the line along the perimeter of the Gaza Strip and does not involve the line below.

Mr. LALL (India): There are two small points which I should like to mention -- but, again, I would emphasize that the responsibility is yours, Mr. Secretary-General, and not ours.

I should like to refer to the statement at the end of the first paragraph on page 11 that "the Force could not be stationed or operate on a country's territory without that country's consent, while the length of its assignment would be determined by the needs arising out of the conflict which brought it into being". Now, we all recollect that we had a lot of discussion about this aspect of the matter, and -- although I know that this is a matter entirely for the Secretary-General to decide -- I wonder whether the word "agreed" could not be inserted before the word "needs"; making the phrase read "determined by the agreed needs arising out of the conflict".

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The situation in this case is somewhat like that of the map. Both sides talk about the needs, but we have never used the word "agreed". Everyone knows that when we come to the question of continued need there may be different views, and if there are different views we must somehow get out of the difficulties. "Agreed needs" is in a certain sense more controversial for both sides than the mere word "needs".

Mr. LALL (India): I see, then, that my suggestion was not a very good one.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is a little bit dangerous. There is no question but that I consider it to be agreed needs. If we were to use the term "agreed needs", however, in this report, it would be the first time that the term had been introduced.

Mr. LALL (India): The point really is this -- and I am speaking entirely from recollection, since I am not now able to verify the wording of document A/3302. The impression left in my mind is that the wording used in that document did extend the consent of the country concerned not only to the mere entry of the Force and the Force's operations, but also to the continuing presence of the Force in the area.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: No, we never said that. We said "entry, stationing and functioning", leaving open in that report (A/3302) the question of extent. My problem in relation to the Egyptians, as regards the question of consent, was to find a formula which would, so to speak, limit their freedom without creating a problem for them on other fronts. As you may remember, the formula found was that the Egyptian Government undertook to implement all its constitutional and sovereign rights under a good-faith interpretation of the tasks of the Force. We did switch from talking of time to talking of the task. We were agreed that the task -- or the need, as it is called in the report we are discussing today -- would determine the extent of time.

Then, of course, the question did arise as to what would happen if a good-faith interpretation on their side led to a demand for withdrawal. What would happen, of course, would be that the matter would be brought to the General Assembly. If the Assembly happened to agree, well and good. If it did not agree, there would be a problem to be settled because of the lack of agreement as to the extent of the task. As I have said, the time element was subordinated to the idea of the task.

Thus, the wording in the present report is strictly correct. It is drafted in this way to correspond to the terminology of that time, without, so to speak, either embarrassing Egypt or weakening our position. That is really the intent behind the phrase. One could, of course, use a direct quote, but it is so awkward to drag along these texts, which are rather subtle.

Mr. LALL (India): I raised the point exactly because it is so subtle. You do not think, do you, that you could say "determined by a good-faith interpretation of the tasks arising out of the conflict"?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Let us have a look at that.

Mr. LALL (India): Of course, it is your responsibility.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The presentation in this report is a fair one, but we shall have a look at that suggestion.

Mr. LALL (India): I felt I should raise the matter, because in my mind this wording did not quite correspond to the other.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: You see, I am always in a rather advantageous position because, beyond the texts, I know what was said. I repeat that I think this presentation is correct, but I shall have another look at it.

Mr. LALL (India): My second point refers to the top of page 12, where there is a quotation from resolution 1125 (XI) which specifies the purpose of the activities of UNEF. But the wording used in the resolution is: to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area, with due regard to all the considerations set out in your report of 24 January 1957. Now, the latter phrase is, in my own view, very important, and, since it is in the resolution and does in a sense qualify the quotation on page 12 of the present report, I felt I should mention the point.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We can, of course, quote it more completely.

Mr. LALL (India): I have in mind the phrase from the resolution which says that due regard should be paid to all the considerations set out in your report.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think we can agree that the first resolutions and the first reports need to be tidied up a little bit, because some rather sweeping formulas were used which are very nearly impossible to interpret. You know that the basic resolution also talks about all the conditions set out in the said resolution, which leads to complete absurdities if one takes it textually.

I think that you, like we on the Secretariat side, may consider, when you analyse them to the bitter end, that some words which have been used do not make logical sense. That is the reason why once you start quoting you have to quote all along the line. After all, in the interpretation of the

resolutions and the reports, there has emerged a kind of common-sense line which is tacitly agreed. That is why it seems advisable to cut it down to what really appears to be alive. But, obviously, we should have a look at this, too.

Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): I think that this report is so painfully perfect that it is impossible to comment on it.

I do have one point to raise that may not be strictly relevant to the report itself. Could there be any indication given of the possible period for the continuation of this activity?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Well, that leads us back to the previous discussion, and I am afraid that my honest reply must be "no". I would rather skip this question because I am sure that very different views are still held on it. My present impression is that both sides are still very keen on maintaining the Force; there is no question about that. There is a development in their thinking. That is fine and good from our point of view. On the other hand, it could not be indefinite. What, then, would be the reason for a break-up? Perhaps the need as originally envisaged had not been fulfilled; we might go past that stage and come into a new one; it might be a very useful device to keep the field open while other issues and other aspects of the problem were discussed. I should not like to anticipate such possibilities in writing, although I might wish to do so privately.

Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): I agree, except, of course, consideration of the other part of the report would be affected by the possible length of the stay.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: In fact, this is written in such a way as to bring us all through 1958 without any trouble. On the other hand, if we were to break up the whole arrangement prior to the Assembly's thirteenth session, we can always manoeuvre within these margins since the main figure is an annual and not a monthly figure. That is to say, we are trying to make the arrangement in such a way that it can run over the whole year but, on the other hand, we would not be stuck if we had to liquidate, let us say, in the course of the summer. We have taken an annual amount as the established

limit. That would certainly take care of the situation if we had to liquidate before the General Assembly met again. Of course, it would be an entirely different problem if it happened while the Assembly were in session.

Thus, we have really left open in the budgetary presentation the question of duration; we can manoeuvre both ways. At least, that is our intention.

Mr. TURNER: I have just one point on that last question. I think that it might be wiser not to regard the figure of \$20 million as necessarily representing a full annual charge. It should be sufficient to take us into the period of the thirteenth session of the Assembly, but not necessarily through a full twelve months.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Let us say that we gamble a little bit on the possibility of making economies and, if they do not work out or if we have to incur new costs, then of course we shall safely be within the time of the thirteenth session.

The whole idea, of course, is that, if we can, we should stick within this frame for 1958. It is a kind of target, at least.

Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): You also have this figure of \$2 million a month, which is probably a better guide on the whole.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is a better guide -- it works out, of course, to \$24 million annually -- but, on the other hand, the longer such an operation continues, the more possibilities there are to, so to speak, avoid certain costs which are unavoidable at an early stage. Although this monthly figure is the more important one calculation-wise, we have subordinated it merely for the reason that we may need a fairly broad margin in the course of the summer or in the course of the spring, when the Assembly is not in session, if, so to speak, there were to be an obvious case for cutting down in this or that way; of course, full liquidation would require, in my view, a decision of the General Assembly.

Mr. AHMED (Pakistan): Could that be done as between you and the Commander? I am referring here to a reduction.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: To the extent that it is a question of scope and organizational details, and to the extent that the Commander takes the stand that the change -- for example, a reduction -- is in keeping with the fulfilment of the aims of the Force as laid down, I would say that that would be within the administrative competence of the Secretary-General. He cannot liquidate the whole operation; of course not. But he can certainly, for example, cut it down by 2,000 if the Commander says, "Now I can operate on a 4,000 basis". That would already involve certain extra costs; we would have to send the persons home, and so forth.

Mr. MURRAY (Canada): First, I should like to seek some clarification. Did I understand you to say, Mr. Secretary-General, that you expected to release this report about 1 October?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I said that I have a feeling that the right time may be immediately after the general debate, so that we shall know whether anything has emerged from that debate which may most usefully be taken care of in this report.

Mr. MURRAY (Canada): I ask that question because the report is so commendably complete but is also so formidable a document that I think that some of my people may want to have a look at it and may then have some comments which may be of use to you. Perhaps this could be done in the period before the report is released.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Certainly, that would be most welcome. We shall, so to speak, trim the report after this discussion and have a draft ready, but so long as it has not been published we shall, of course, be very happy to have any additional advice that may be given.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): I wish only to express my appreciation of a very good report. I should like to know whether you have in mind any particular Committee of the Assembly which should consider the report.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Of course, as you know, the whole question of consideration of the report was shelved in the General Committee at the request of the United Kingdom delegation, which wished to see the report before making up its mind.

Our feeling, which I think I mentioned at the last meeting of this Committee, is that the real decision in this connexion is a political decision.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Yes, I agree.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is a political decision in two ways: what kind of assessment, and, in view of the costs, do we want this to go on? On the last point I think the reply will be an unhesitating "yes". On the first point, of course, I cannot guess. Those questions are not Fifth Committee questions.

Mr. GUNewardENE (Ceylon): Certainly not.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There is one problem which falls within the sphere of competence of the Fifth Committee, and that is of course the estimates and details, and so forth. Our idea was that the General Assembly could get the necessary guidance on those technical aspects -- which are not at all key issues -- by requesting the Advisory Committee to report. There the mandate can be qualified and limited. It is rather difficult to do that in relation to the Fifth Committee. If this question is submitted to the Fifth Committee, I think that Committee will have to take it up in the usual way.

I am just thinking aloud now. That is the way we have envisaged the best handling of the matter, but, of course, the General Committee will first have to take it up, and then the General Assembly. I am rather hesitant -- and I think those who have had direct experience of the Fifth Committee would

agree -- about putting a matter of this type before the Fifth Committee, a matter where you have this curious kind of mixture of major political decisions and considerations and financial details.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): I am not in favour of this question's being considered by the Fifth Committee; that is exactly why I brought the point up.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We can, however, leave the matter open until somewhat later, because it will have to be discussed among the various delegations.

Mr. ENGEN (Norway): I have read this report, especially the parts concerning what is more or less history. I think it is very interesting reading. You yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, have mentioned that you have done some sort of tidying-up work during the drafting of the report. I think the report itself is a very good piece of tidying-up. When published, it will have a tidying-up effect.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: May I make one observation? You may have observed that in this report we give for the first time, in fact, all the substance of the basic agreements with Egypt, which we have kept secret so far. Incidentally, the inclusion of that aspect has been consented to by Egypt.

Mr. ENGEN (Norway): I have no comments at this stage to offer on any details of the report. I would only agree with what Mr. Murray has just said about giving the authorities at home an opportunity to study the report. Perhaps at a later stage before the report is published, we could get together and discuss some details of interpretation, especially with regard to the last part of the report.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Yes, of course.

Since there seem to be no other comments, perhaps we could now embark on the more thorny part of the report, the third part. Reservations have been made here by two countries which are most interested, and I presume that all the countries which are interested as contributing countries would wish to make the same reservation-- namely, that they should be given an opportunity to get advice from home. Of course, such advice should and will be taken into account.

Are there any observations at this stage, in more general terms, on the third part of the report?

Mr. LALL (India): I have no observations on this part. It does correspond to some of the documents which you kindly let us see at an earlier stage, about the formula for meeting this cost and the specific responsibilities of countries contributing contingents. All I would say is that I agree that we should send this to our Governments and let them look at it; they have seen your formula, and I think they would want to know that this part of the report corresponds to it.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think that as regards the tone, this is, as it were, one nuance more in support of the contributing countries than the previous formula. I feel that it is fully justified. It is just a question of how to play it tactically.

Mr. MURRAY (Canada): I have some preliminary comments based on information which I have.

I am grateful to Mr. Turner for mentioning the airlift as regards this listing under the heading "Cost Estimates". For purposes of illustration, I might give our assessment of the value of the two forms of transportation. The Canadian estimate of the costs of the "Magnificent" runs about \$330,000; and of the airlift, about \$430,000. I think that they could be included in this list.

Mr. BUNCHE: When you refer to the airlift, Mr. Murray, do you mean the airlift of the Canadian troops by the "North Star" from Canada to Naples, or do you also include the airlift from Naples to Egypt?

Mr. MURRAY (Canada): That is just the initial transportation.

I have another point, which is just a suggestion, on which I should be interested to hear other comments. In the report, under the heading "Voluntary Contributions", a list is given which is not very large. I know that, when we replied to the letter, we indicated that we really could not say whether or what we would give in the way of a voluntary contribution because we had not worked out what the allocation of these various costs would be. It might strengthen this part of the report if that position, which I am sure was shared by others, could be reflected.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think there is a phrase covering it, but perhaps we could be more explicit.

Mr. TURNER: I am afraid that Canada is the only country that is formally on record in that respect, but we can make it more explicit.

Mr. MURRAY (Canada): The only other comment I have is about the financial requirements, and particularly about the part of the report which Mr. Turner has already emphasized -- namely, the basis for financing UNEF costs. I am quite sure that Canadian authorities would underscore what is said in the report about voluntary contributions. We have always felt that the financing of UNEF must be placed on a sounder basis, on a basis of general responsibility among the membership of the United Nations.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: That is, of course, the part where Mr. Turner pointed out that the text here is -- I would not call it rough -- but, in any case, firm. These major responsibilities must be covered.

Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil): Do I understand that on these questions there will be direct contact between Mr. Turner and every delegation involved?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Certainly, there will be continued contacts.

Mr. de FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil): We have some claims regarding our troops, about which Mr. Turner knows already.

Mr. TURNER: I think it is fair to point out that the remark I made just now concerning Canada also applies specifically to Brazil.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There will, of course, be continued contacts with delegations. Any statement referring directly to a delegation would naturally be finally approved by that delegation.

There seem to be no further comments on this part of the report. I think we now know where we are.

Are there any observations on the tentative time-table? After all, it is not a very wide margin. It is a fortnight, or something like that, at the very most, so that a Committee or the General Assembly will, I think, have sufficient time to consider the question. The background consideration is the most important.

I should like to mention another matter. You may have seen in the introduction to the report to the General Assembly that I speak about, as it were, digesting the UNEF experience as an internal operation. I felt that, in all circumstances, that was a necessary thing. It has been and remains a major operation, and all sorts of lessons can be drawn from it: legally and financially, and also on the logistic, the military, side. We shall publish on Monday the composition of the Secretariat committee which will report on the question. Mr. Bunche will be the Chairman, and the other members will be the Under-Secretary, Mr. Dobrynin, and Mr. Stavropoulos and Mr. Turner. They will have military consultants, of course, but this is just the group that has to handle these matters. I think it is better to formalize this so that we get a formal report. It is my own feeling that such a report could be ready in the course of the spring and, at all events, it would be a necessary historical document and probably a very useful one.

You know from some quarters that there is the idea, or even the pressure, for action which would start out in the General Assembly -- either a committee to make this same kind of study, or even work in conjunction with this Secretariat committee, in order to make certain proposals which might be rather far reaching. My own feeling is that to get started with such a committee would be time lost until the internal operation has taken place. I would also feel that it is premature to press the issue, because I think that a discussion which would take place in the light of careful study of the experience would be likely to be much better. It may well be that at that time we shall find that the opinion among delegations and Governments has crystallized so that the whole issue would be much less controversial.

This is, after all, a new departure. It is certainly not contrary to the Charter, but it is in a certain sense outside the explicit terms of the Charter. For that reason, I think it would be highly preferable if we could indulge in a short period of more organic growth, without making it a political issue now. That is really the philosophy behind the operation concerning the Secretariat committee. The fact that this Secretariat committee is set up and publicity is given to its work does not prejudice in any way the stand of the General Assembly. As I have said, I think that this study will be useful in all circumstances, whatever line the General Assembly may take. On the other hand, I feel that the very fact that this work is going on would provide reason for a little bit of caution as to more far-reaching initiatives at the present stage.

That is really the entire thinking on this question. You will, I hope, pardon me for getting into the question of tactics, but I think that it is perfectly in order to do so in this group.

Mr. BUNCHE: A few things have happened in connexion with UNEF since the last meeting of this Committee which are not covered in the report.

The same quiet prevails. There have been no incidents. General Burns is on a short leave at the moment, which has been due him for a long time. He is taking advantage of the period of quiet to enjoy it. In his absence, the Chief of Staff, Colonel Rosengren, is serving as Deputy Commander.

The Indonesian contingent has actually departed by boat; it is en route. It is a seventeen-day trip from Port Said to Indonesia. The contingent is making the trip on a boat chartered by the United Nations.

Since the Committee last met, UNEF headquarters at Gaza have been visited by General Thimayya of India. He had extensive talks with General Burns and the senior officers, and General Burns reported that the talks were extremely constructive and helpful to him and the Force.

There is a very interesting development which can only be mentioned since no firm decision has as yet been taken. On the basis of representations made to General Burns by Egyptian authorities, the shifting to Cairo for the winter months of the leave centre which we have been operating up in the mountains behind Beirut is under serious consideration. The Egyptians seem very anxious to have the UNEF troops come to Cairo during this period.

We also have under consideration, at the request of General Burns and the senior officers, a possible medal for UNEF. We shall be talking with General Burns about this when we see him next week. Of course, before any final decision is made, we shall bring the matter to your attention; I am only mentioning it now in passing.
