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Middle East

Meeting of Advisory Committee on UNEF

19 Nov. 56

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNEF

(Held in the Secretary-General's Conference Room
on 19 November 1956 at 12 noon)

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The last time we met, I gave you a summary of the discussions which had taken place prior to the arrival of the Force in Egypt. I felt, when I gave some thought to it, that it was one thing to take the responsibility in a given political situation for getting the first advanced groups in, and another matter to keep the transactions -- the operations -- going. The later operations obviously required much more clarity as to where we were and what really was the understanding.

I can confirm, without going into any details, that my own conclusion, from all I saw, was that we were right in considering that the time factor was vital. The fact that we managed to get going when we did, both with the first decision and, later, with the arrival, has had an impact on the situation on which, I think, the United Nations can congratulate itself.

Looking at it in this way, however, I felt that I should, in preparation for the talks in Cairo, see what could be done in order to lay a firmer basis for the continued co-operation -- a firm basis which itself, to my mind, should have the approval of the General Assembly.

I concluded rather quickly, of course, that there was no possibility in the time available to work out any detailed arrangements, even in principle, concerning stationing and similar matters which had to be discussed in the light of the developments of the talks between the Commander and the Egyptian Government. I also concluded that legal texts of the usual nature were of little importance in a situation of the present nature, because it was, of course, the moral and political forces which decided the issue, and not this or that written word.

On that basis, I put before the Egyptian Government an "Aide-Memoire on the Basis For Presence and Functioning of UNEF in Egypt", which is an aide-memoire which still exists on my responsibility, but also one where agreement exists between President Nasser and myself as to the wording and as to the presentation. This aide-memoire, which I will read to you, is, you will find, in fact a combination of one-sided but interlocking declarations. I intend to propose to you that it be put before the General Assembly. When the General Assembly takes note of it -- as I hope, with approval, or just takes note of it -- with the concurrence of Egypt, and after the Egyptian statement on it, of course, it

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becomes a kind of joint decision which, although it is not formally an agreement, for all political purposes has even more weight than a formal legal agreement.

The text is as follows:

"NOTING that by cablegram of 5 November 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General the Government of Egypt, in exercise of its sovereign rights, accepted General Assembly resolution 394 of the same date establishing 'a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 2 November 1956';

"NOTING that the General Assembly in its Resolution 395 of 7 November 1956 approved the principle that it could not request the Force 'to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country' (paragraph 9 of the Secretary-General's report of 6 November 1956, A/3302);

"HAVING agreed on the arrival in Egypt of units of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF);

"NOTING that advance groups of UNEF have already been received by Egypt;

"The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have stated their understanding on the basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF as follows:

"1. The Government of Egypt declares that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter" --

that is to say, including stationing, or whatever it may be --

"concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the General Assembly Resolution 394 of 5 November 1956.

"2. The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned Resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain the UNEF until its task is completed.

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"3. The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General declare that it is their intention to proceed forthwith, in the light of points 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF, including its stationing and the question of its lines of communication and supply; the Government of Egypt, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of UNEF, and the United Nations are agreed to expedite in co-operation the implementation of guiding principles arrived at as a result of that joint exploration on the basis of the Resolutions of the General Assembly."

As you see, 1 and 2 are interlocking, and 3, so to say, was put on for implementation. Paragraph 1 means that we combine the two -- first, on the one side, noting, of course, that it is a recognized sovereign right; on the other hand, there is the declaration of good faith (implementation) in consonance with its own acceptance of the General Assembly resolution and with the task established in it.

What I would have preferred myself would have been to have here the direct undertaking to maintain the consent as long as the task was not completed, but that runs us at once into the difficulty that the tasks are, as we well know, very unclearly defined, and if it was the direct, the positive declaration of the Government of Egypt to maintain its consent up to a certain time, from the Egyptian point of view the definition of a task took on an abnormal weight, because no one could say when they would be free from their own direct commitment.

In that situation I swung around, after very long discussions, to the opposite line. That is to say that the United Nations says, on the basis of the Egyptian declaration, of which we take note, that it understands it to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt that it should stay until the task is completed, and they are willing to maintain it until the task is completed. That now makes it, as I see it, a question of good faith -- agreement between the two sides as to when we should wind up the matter.

I do not want to complicate the story by bringing in here the time factor and related questions, because that, I think, would just lead us on to ground which is not ripe for discussion, but I must say myself that I do feel that on both sides it may well be that we will, at a certain stage, feel this willingness to maintain as a heavier burden than Egypt has found it. I mean, we both would tie our hands to a certain understanding of what is the task. I am not sure that Egypt will be the one which arrives first at the conclusion that the task is completed. However, we have embarked together on an undertaking where it must be, on the one side, good faith declarations to create the necessary moral basis; on the other hand, somehow there must be some kind of connotation as to what we understand, step by step, by the tasks.

I would like to add one thing, and that is that the key to this whole problem is the question of whether or not, openly or hiddenly, the Force can be, so to say, functioning as a means of enforcement. If it is a means of enforcement, then 1 and 2 will be brought quickly to a kind of crisis, undoubtedly. If it is not that, but really a means in order to provide a basis for some kind of real progress and maintenance of quiet during that period, I do not think that this is likely to lead to that kind of crisis.

However, any lawyer would prefer texts of greater clarity, but I would like to throw the ball one step back to the General Assembly Resolutions themselves. But this has to do very much with the other documents which go together with it, and where I, so to say, again by way of explanation, submit the points which I read to you last time and which, on the two sides, provided background for the arrival as an emergency measure.

This text corresponds, as I said, to what I quoted to you last time, but it is here cleaned up. It is also an agreed text between the Egyptian Government and myself, though I put it out in my own name. It reads:

"It is noted that the agreement of the Egyptian Government to the arrival of units of the UNEF had been based on the following interpretations of the Resolutions of the General Assembly.

"1. The area that the Force would occupy at the Armistice Demarcation Line, after withdrawal of the Israeli Forces behind that Line, would be subject to agreement.

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"2. The Force would have no function in Port Said and the Canal area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian Forces."

I will read you later a memorandum concerning that point, which is mine.

"3. The question of appropriate staging areas for the Force would be subject to agreement." --

obviously, including the possibility of staging areas in the Canal Zone: there is no limitation. We have avoided the whole question of principle in this way --

"4. The Secretary-General declared that it was his intention to negotiate with the Government of Egypt concerning any additions of new nations to the list agreed upon as representing a 'balanced composition' on which it would be possible to begin the transfer of troops.

"5. "--(and those two agreements have to be read together in 5)" Concerning the duration of the presence of the Force in Egypt, it was noted that "(that is what I said)" "as the UNEF would come with Egypt's consent, it cannot stay nor operate unless Egypt continues to consent". The Secretary-General stated that his approach to the question of the UNEF had been based on his understanding of Egypt's acceptance of the General Assembly Resolution of 5 November 1956."

The final point is no longer of interest because it is covered by the other one, which gives a fuller and more balanced exposition of the same thing. It is exactly the same plan. I say that they cannot say, but then I say they cannot say I say it on the basis of the fact that they had accepted the tasks by their acceptance of the Resolution.

This is, as you see, on the whole a one-sided paper -- from my side, not from their side.

Mr. LALL (India): This is not an agreed paper, is it?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is an agreed paper. It is over my name, but it is an agreed and complete paper. There is nothing more. So, after about twenty cables, this is what remains -- these five points.

Mr. LALL (India): Yes.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The fact that we have here a point 2 will, of course, bring one of the lacks of clarity in previous Resolutions to the light, and for that reason I felt -- as I did last time, but now in a new form -- that it is useful to explain what is the reason why I think this is correct. I can add one thing. If this had not been correct, there would be no UNEF in Egypt. That much is clear.

However, as you know, without going into any details, it is closely linked to two other questions. It is linked to the question of the clearing of the Canal, and it is linked to the problem of the settlement of the Canal question. As to the clearing of the Canal -- leaving aside, for the time being, the question of point 2 here -- there is an agreed outline, an agreed outline of a report. I had to fill out certain details, but what is, so to say, of interest to the other party is in this agreed outline, and I should like to read it:

"1. In view of the urgency for clearing the obstructions in the Suez Canal, and the scope of the task, the Government of Egypt has addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a request for assistance from the United Nations in arrangements for this purpose, as a matter of high priority. The work should be started immediately on the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces."

In brackets, of course, I can say that that is not a condition. It is simply a necessary statement of fact. How could the United Nations possibly get in before we had a situation demanded by the United Nations itself?

"2. Under the authority given to the Secretary-General in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning the present situation in the Middle East, the Secretary-General has given assurances, in principle, that the United Nations would seek to provide such assistance. It is the intention of the Secretary-General, on his return to New York, to take the necessary steps with the General Assembly to get the operation started.

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"3. The Secretary-General intends to request authority from the General Assembly to negotiate and conclude agreements with such firms as might speedily and effectively undertake the clearing. He has, for that purpose, already explored possibilities of obtaining the assistance to the United Nations from Danish and Dutch firms. In his negotiations with these firms he will also try to clarify to what extent they in turn may need assistance by enterprises not directly approached by the United Nations."

That is to say, that opens possibilities of assistance or hiring of equipment, even from countries with which, in this affair, we should not, for the present at least, consider any direct agreements.

"4. The Secretary-General will likewise request the General Assembly to give authority, in consultation with the Advisory Committee," --

As you will note, gentlemen, you now suddenly find yourselves engaged in clearing canals --

"to enter into the financial commitments that are unavoidable in this context. He is not prepared to indicate how the costs involved should be shared. As soon as possible he will report to the General Assembly on the outcome of the negotiations and on the estimated cost.

"5. The arrangements to be made with the Government of Egypt in order to establish the basis for the assistance, requested from the United Nations by the Government of Egypt, as well as to facilitate the carrying out of the operation, will be discussed with the Government of Egypt as soon as the matter has been considered by the General Assembly and the necessary exploration, as set out in the preceding paragraphs, has been completed.

"6. In the course of his direct contacts with the Government of Egypt concerning this matter, the Government of Egypt expressed to the Secretary-General its wish to see the operation completed with the utmost speed. In view of the interests of the Government of Egypt, as well as of the interests of all the users of the Canal, the Secretary-General has felt that the most expeditious procedure to achieve the desired results should be followed in connexion with this matter."

The last is, of course, an excuse for the inversion of a natural order -- first explore, study and, then, propose to the General Assembly. That is not here a possibility: the possibility must be the opposite one, and I feel that it is correct to have an excuse for it.

There is one more fact I will have to bring into the picture. In reply to the question whether their acceptance of the idea put forward tentatively on the

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question of settlement of the Suez question in a letter of 24 October (a letter which, with one small and not significant exception, was accepted by the Government of Egypt on 2 November) -- in reply to the question whether their acceptance of 2 November of my proposal still stood, they said "Yes". Obviously, the commitment, or rather the acceptance, was given after the military action began, and for that reason it is only consistent to proceed that way.

However, that does mean that the two points which were raised in operative paragraph 4 of the first resolution concerning the Suez Canal are both fairly clear as far as Egypt is concerned. There is a formal request to us, which would not mean that it is under the Egyptian flag. It is under the United Nations flag. But by their request there is the proposal to safeguard the sovereignty aspect of it on the one hand, and on the other hand there is a definite Egyptian stand as to the framework within which a settlement of the question of co-operation with users and safeguarding the users' interests could be sought. That has obviously a bearing on the question of the functions of the Force. This is a first draft only, and I may have to look it over in detail, but I hope to give you copies of this explanatory memorandum as a basis for your consideration of the situation. Perhaps I may read it to you without being able to give you copies immediately:

"1. In the aide-memoire concerning interpretations given to the General Assembly resolutions as a basis for the arrival of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, it is stated that the Force would have no functions in Port Said and the Canal Area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces. This statement is based on the following considerations.

"2. The basic fact is the adoption by the General Assembly, in its resolution of 7 November concerning the UNEF, of the statement on the functions of the Force which is to be found in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report.

"3. Paragraph 12 in the Secretary-General's report quotes from the resolution of 2 November, operative paragraphs 1 and 2, concerning the cease-fire and withdrawal. After this quotation follows the statement: 'These two provisions combined indicate that the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when the cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956.'"

(The Secretary-General)

Mind you, as I pointed out last time, in fact this definition of functions is based on the two first operative paragraphs, not on 4, but there is a sweeping reference to the whole resolution.

"4. It is clear that the functions, as determined by this explicit reference in the report, paragraph 12, to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 in the resolution of 2 November, link the activities to the areas where the dividing line would go between Egyptian and non-Egyptian forces. After the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops from Port Said and the Canal Area, this dividing line, and therefore the functions, obviously would be outside Port Said and the Canal Area. This was reflected in the explanation given by the Secretary-General in the debate in the General Assembly, where he said: 'The United Nations Force will have to come in at what is at present the dividing line between Egyptian and Israeli forces. It is at whatever may come to be the dividing line that they will have to function'. This statement did not give rise to any comments or reservations before the vote was taken.

"5. However, paragraph 12, as seen from the quote above, also says that the Force, in general, should have the duty 'to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November'. In that resolution it is said, in operative paragraph 4: '... urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation'. Because of this operative paragraph seen in conjunction with the general reference in the Secretary-General's report, paragraph 12, to the terms of the resolution 2 November the question arises, whether the Force might have functions in the Area also after the withdrawal of the non-Egyptian forces from Port Said and the Canal Area, irrespective of the opposite conclusion reached, on the basis of operative paragraphs 1 and 2.

"6. When the resolution of 2 November was adopted, no proposal was on the table concerning the establishment of an international force. It is, thus, clear that the General Assembly had in mind other steps when it adopted the wording of operative paragraph 4. As a means to the ends

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established in operative paragraph 4, the Force may yet come into the picture. It may do so as a new element which, by achieving the cease-fire and the withdrawal, helps to maintain a situation in which the other steps, envisaged by the General Assembly, can be taken. Such an indirect responsibility in relation to operative paragraph 4, however, obviously does not give the Force any other functions in the Area than those which follow from operative paragraphs 1 and 2. It follows that the indirect link that may exist with operative paragraph 4 does not lead to any functions in the Area as soon as the withdrawal is achieved.

"7. The steps envisaged in operative paragraph 4 may, in principle, be of two kinds: - either they may be steps taken in co-operation with and in full agreement with the Government of Egypt or they may be steps taken without such co-operation and against the wishes of the Government of Egypt. In the first case it is obviously not excluded that agreements made with Egypt might provide also for certain functions for elements of the Force in the Area. However, if that were to be the case, the functions would derive from a free agreement with the Government of Egypt and not from the General Assembly resolution. On the basis of the second alternative" -- (that is to say, in agreement with Egypt) -- "it is obvious that the Force cannot have any functions in the Area; the General Assembly has established that the Force should function with the consent of the Government of Egypt, and the General Assembly then cannot at the same time have reserved for the Force functions in implementation of steps which would not have the approval of the Government of Egypt.

"8. It thus follows that, on the basis of the General Assembly resolution of 2 November, the Force has no functions in Port Said or the Canal Area after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces, and that operative paragraph 4 does not contradict this conclusion, as the Force can have significance in that context only through fulfilling the functions which it will have at the dividing line, or through undertaking additional functions based on a freely negotiated agreement with the Government of Egypt."

That is, in condensed form, what I think is the legal argument, and I personally have not the slightest doubt that this corresponds to the situation as it was when the vote was taken by the General Assembly.

(The Secretary-General)

In order to give a full picture, I should perhaps add something on the facts of the situation in the area. Yesterday, at Abu Suweir, we had 544: 54 Colombians, 258 Danes, 188 Norwegians and 44 Yugoslavs. At Naples in the staging area, we had at the same time only 157. Planned movement of troops in the immediate future involved an additional 2,600 men.

We had a transport problem, to which I shall refer very briefly. It was that the contract with Swissair was to expire on the 25th. However, thanks to assistance from the Government of Canada, we will be self-sustaining at that time. In the meanwhile, if we run into any trouble, we have the possibility, with the agreement of the Egyptians, of putting in Italian transport planes on a stop-gap basis. So it can be a smooth run in those respects.

To come, finally, to what I consider to be the necessary General Assembly action, in the next few days I will have to put three reports on the table: one report setting out the basis in principle for presence and functioning, together, of course, with the report on what was the basis on which the arrival was arranged; one report on the Egyptian request as to clearing the Canal, and the decisions which should follow from that; and one report, which I think is unavoidable in the course of this week, on compliance.

The second decision on withdrawal was taken on 7 November. On Wednesday, a fortnight will have elapsed since that decision was taken. There is this and that to be said about the cease-fire, but, as we all know, there is more to be said about the withdrawal. For that reason, I simply must address the question to the three Governments directly concerned with the withdrawal about the state of affairs as a basis for a report, which I cannot possibly delay beyond a fortnight, as the General Assembly asked for it promptly.

There are also other things. There is an aide-mémoire from the Egyptian Government, which we want to be circulated and which will be circulated, which draws attention to the fact of complete non-compliance with all the withdrawal requests.

I am sorry that I have put before you a very great number of things at what may be a somewhat high speed. But I think that, with the great acquaintance you have with these problems, it will be possible all the same to look at the situation as it is today. This was really a report on what has happened over the last three days.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): May I ask one or two questions arising out of your report?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Please do.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): Before doing so, I want to tell you how glad we are to see you back well and rested --

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: In good humour.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): -- in good humour, imperturbable as ever in the face of trials that would have destroyed by now any ordinary mortal. The arrangements that you have been working out and which are embodied in these papers -- one of which has not yet been circulated, but which you were good enough to read to us -- are becoming almost metaphysical in their subtlety. I have no complaint about that because if, from the beginning of this operation, we had attempted to be specific, we would not have had an operation at all. I think that we just have to pursue that procedure without, of course, giving way on the questions of principle -- and that applies to both sides.

This is my first question: What is the exact status of the papers we have received? They are not in any sense formal agreements between yourself, as Secretary-General, and the Egyptian Government? They are summaries of discussions and arrangements that you have made with the Egyptian Government, but do not constitute in any sense an agreement with that Government?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The situation is as follows: The papers are, so to say, drafted by me. They have been negotiated in detail with the Egyptian Government, practically every word, and they do represent papers which will meet with their approval if and when put on the table of the General Assembly.

I had no authority to conclude any agreements for the United Nations, nor were they in a position to anticipate whether the General Assembly might take another line. Therefore I felt -- and they accepted the view -- that the proper procedure would be that I sum up my sense of the exchange of views in words which had their prior approval and put it before the General Assembly.

(The Secretary-General)

The General Assembly, if they would do so, could note it with the concurrence of Egypt, thus constituting in the Assembly a kind of agreement by noting these interlocking declarations.

As to the paper on arrival, it is an entirely different thing, because I, myself, go on record with the interpretations I gave, prior to giving an order to the people to go out. If those interpretations do not meet with the approval of the participating countries and/or the General Assembly, the Assembly is of course completely free to say, "Well, this was not our idea". Then the Government of Egypt can say, "If that was not your idea and is not what you now say, we must say that we have worked on the wrong assumption". I do not believe that that was an alternative, but I felt that I had to clean up the situation for the office of the Secretary-General in two respects: First of all, to put on record those interpretations which, from the point of view of Egypt, had been essential when it accepted for approval or disapproval by the General Assembly the idea of the troops coming, so that the General Assembly and Egypt did not fool themselves. Obviously they must have known on what basis they acted. Secondly, the fact that we were operating in a combination of respect, first, for undertakings of the type Egypt had in its acceptance of the whole thing, and, secondly, for sovereignty under the general cover of the necessary mutual good faith. That is something which I felt should be on the table, and lifted out of the Secretary-General's executive context, because it is not for me to say whether arrangements are satisfactory or not.

If the General Assembly would like greater clarity, it is then, again, the question of the drafting of resolutions which balance the Egyptian and the General Assembly viewpoint. I feel myself that this is an operation where the exact legal text is much less important than the moral and political factors. The text which goes straight for the moral and political factors -- that is, the good faith point -- is more valuable. Because if Egypt -- which I do not believe -- would do something here, which certainly goes against what was the intention of the General Assembly, with this kind of registration on the stands, the attack would be less one for saying, "Well, this is against the letter of the law", than, "This is bad faith" and, for that reason, to be outlawed and condemned. Therefore, this is a stronger stand.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): That seems to meet the position completely. I have only one worry arising out of what you have said, that is, in paragraph 4 of the aide-mémoire on the basis for arrival. That paragraph talks about the addition of new nations to the list agreed upon as representing a balanced composition. There are two questions in my mind. One is purely a question of fact: what is the list agreed upon? Secondly, what is the agreement which is referred to in that paragraph?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The agreement is only that we could start the movement of troops within such and such a framework. That is the whole agreement. Such a point, if it is unclear, can be easily corrected by me. Basically, my drafting was this one. We are bringing out the difficulty. They have said, "We consider it a condition for the presence of any national unit that we are agreed to it." I said, "I do not accept that as a condition." And then, when we went to get the troops in, I said, "Let us push that aside. We have two entirely different stands upon the question of principle. But let us see if we cannot agree on the basis on which we can start moving troops, which is an entirely different matter." That was possible at that stage, with the reservation on my side concerning the wish to have additions. Additions may also be necessary in the light of needs, naturally. In this context, they did not want to bring it out as I had already drafted it. They said that it was not necessary. What was necessary were two simple things: that the movement started on the basis of a certain framework; and that, if you made a change in the framework, the matter should be brought up. So it really is with a view to a reservation as to the legal issue: what are their rights and what are my rights?

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): Would the acceptance of an agreement with them as to the immediate movement of the foreign forces prejudice the position in regard to their agreement for subsequent introduction of forces?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: No, no.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): Because that is something that I, for one, could not accept in principle, because it does run counter to the principle which you, yourself, have --

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I thought I had solved that from the legal point of view by simply noting, without giving the reasons why: "The Secretary-General declared it was his intention to negotiate with..." If you will come down to the hard facts, I must say that it is impossible to avoid that kind of negotiation because -- I would not call it a subtlety in this case -- the very brutal facts in some respects are what they are. And just as I have to take into account this and that political aspect with all sorts of countries from my angle, I must take into account their political considerations. There are countries which politically I would consider extremely unwise to bring into the picture. There are countries which they, for political reasons, consider unwise to bring into the picture. We have to thrash that out somehow. In principle, the system must be that the units determine the composition of the Force, that it is an international Force and that there should not be any snags about from where they come. We know that in political practice, it simply cannot be done, and that is it.

What I said in explanation of this was: I do not say take conditions from them. I do not take any right from you to say this and that. But what is obviously a fact is that I want and I should have your full arguments for this and that kind of conclusion. Then it is my right to weigh the value of these arguments. If I think that they are wrong, we will then have an open conflict -- it is unavoidable -- because that is my right. On the other hand, if I think that your reasons are something which I should take into account, we will reach an agreement. So you see there is no underlying snag here that we are giving up any right.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I would feel much happier if that understanding of the position, which you have just mentioned -- which seems to me to be the right one -- could be embodied in that paragraph by some slight change of wording. Would it be accurate to say that this reflects your understanding of it: "The Secretary-General declared that it was his intention to consult with the Government of Egypt concerning any additions of new nations to the list submitted", instead of "agreed upon"; and "to consult" instead of "negotiate".

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not see any difficulty on any point. You can well understand that the editing in this case, although it was extremely careful, was under the pressure of time because of certain subtleties. Although it is an agreed text, I do not foresee any difficulty in your wording. I will offer it to Dr. Fawzi, who will arrive tomorrow. I will submit it to him, obviously, before I take it.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): May we have those words?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is the intention to consult with the Government --

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): -- regarding any additions to the list of innovations submitted as representing a "balanced composition". Because I take it you did submit it to them.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I did submit one, and they made a change and returned it. I said that I could take it. If I had had those words from the very beginning, President Nasser would never have said a word about it. I do not foresee any difficulty. It represents the real situation.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): I apologize for taking up all this time. I have one other question, which may be in the minds of other people too: When you talk about General Assembly action in regard to the matters which you are going to submit to it, do you visualize that before action is taken, or indeed before discussion is initiated in the full Assembly, we will have an opportunity, as a Committee advising you on this matter, to go over these papers with you before they are submitted to the full Assembly, so that you might have the backing of the Advisory Committee?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It was my intention, Mr. Pearson, to get these very short reports drafted this afternoon, to circulate them and to have them discussed in this Committee tomorrow morning, just in the way you mentioned.

(The Secretary-General)

As it is, to a large extent, a report on negotiations with Egypt, I should also like to let Dr. Fawzi read it, when I have the possibility to do so, so that there is no slip in any formulation -- not in substance but in presentation -- which would, in his view, give a false impression of what took place. But these will be before you as reports tomorrow morning.

Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan): We would appreciate it very much if we could have another opportunity to meet tomorrow morning, since Dr. Fawzi is here. As has been suggested, the presentation has been wonderful, but it has been fast, and we would like to digest these reports. I have certain comments to make. I think that the matter is so delicate and subtle that it would be much better if we could have an opportunity to look at these papers later when we have more time, either during the day or tomorrow.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think tomorrow morning would be best.

Mr. GUNewardene (Ceylon): Tomorrow morning.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I took that for granted. But I wanted to inform you right away because we are still in no way out of the situation.

Mr. LALL (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I have two very small points. You do say in the memorandum, which was the third paper you distributed today, in paragraph 4, that the Secretary-General is not prepared to indicate how the costs involved should be shared. I take that to mean that he is not prepared at this stage.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: He is not prepared at this stage.

Mr. LALL (India): There is no finality in the statement.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: This was a memorandum addressed to the Egyptians in order to give me the necessary basis for the writing of a report. Of course, it has to be built up. I did not want to make public the statement

(The Secretary-General)

on the request and my reply without knowing that my way of pursuing the matter was something which met with their understanding.

Mr. LALL (India): Then there was the point raised by Mr. Pearson, which referred to point 4 of the aide-mémoire, on the basis for the arrival of UNEF in Egypt. Two changes have been suggested. My understanding is that those changes will not be made until there has been agreement with Egypt regarding them.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Obviously not.

Mr. LALL (India): Yes, thank you.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There is no question.

Mr. LALL (India): This is an agreement?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: These papers, although they are over my name, are, in their present editing, agreed papers.

I do not know if General Burns has some questions at this stage that he would like to bring up. Perhaps Dr. Bunche has some.

General BURNS: I do not think there is anything I would like to bring before the meeting.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Then this is not my legal basis, my legal consideration, for the conclusion that there will be no function in the Canal area. That paper will be circulated to you, and that is not an agreed paper; that is to say, my explanation to the General Assembly for a certain stand taken. It has nothing to do with the Egyptians.

Can we agree on a time for tomorrow? The same time might be a good idea. I should be able to get this out to you late this evening.

Let us fix the time for 11 o'clock tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.