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Middle East

19-27 June 57

2 memoranda conc. meeting D.H. -
- Ambassador Wadsworth

US

AIDE MEMOIRE

Ambassador Wadsworth came to see me today. One of the matters he brought up was the question of repayment of advances to the Canal clearance.

Washington felt that the only sound solution would be to impose a surcharge. They talked about some 10 % until the amount spent was repaid. They felt that a proposal to that effect should be submitted to the General Assembly and would themselves support it. They could even envisage a solution without a formal approval by the General Assembly. As to the manner of collecting the surcharge, they would suggest payment to a special United Nations account in the International Bank.

I said that I would prefer action by the Assembly simply approving a repayment plan. Such a decision would probably be easier to get than a decision spelling out the way of repayment. I would also prefer BIS as paying agent.

We noted that there was a considerable meeting of minds on this issue between Washington and the UN. Ambassador Wadsworth asked when I might bring it up. I replied that I would not like to tie up the loose ends with Egypt until we had got other matters out of the way. As to the necessary contacts with other governments I would both for that reason and in view of the summer holidays try and get matters settled in good time before the General Assembly, say some time in August.

19 June 1957

27 June 1957

MEMORANDUM

Ambassador Wadsworth, together with Mr. Barco and ^{Mr.} Pedersen, saw me this afternoon, at his own request. Mr. Cordier was present at the meeting.

Among other things, Wadsworth read a report from the U.S. diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv on certain information "volunteered" to the U.S. representative by an Israeli spokesman. The information given was to the following main effect:

The United Nations had not "cared to disclose" the extent of the casualties suffered by the UNEF, and they were intentionally minimising serious incidents in which the Force had run. Due to Egyptian propaganda the position of the Force had considerably deteriorated in the area, and it was now hated by the population. The recent story when two Arabs were killed had not been properly presented, as it had happened when the UNEF unit had been attacked by an Arab band. The occasion when recently a Yugoslav unit had run on a mine was a case of retaliation by the Arab bands against the UNEF; etc., etc.

The information was obviously intended to create the impression that the UNEF was reduced to complete insignificance and at a breaking point, but that we, on the UN side try to hide this fact. The information covered also various points concerning Egyptian policy in Gaza, as e.g. withdrawal of a number of fishing permits and arrest of certain people suspected of collaboration with Israel.

This summary does not give the full impression of the extraordinary character of the information but presents the main points.

My reaction was that this was a case of unusually vicious "political sabotage". The essential facts were lies, and the method of going to a foreign mission with false information they would never dare to try out on us, needed no characterisation. I hoped that the US representative would be instructed to react in very clear terms against this move. It might be added that such a move was made while, at the same time, the Israel representative in New York assured us that the Israel Government did all it could to stop newspaper stories discrediting the UNEF.

I informed Dr. Bunche about what had taken place, and said that I had no objection against his telling Mr. Kidron that we have evidence of vicious and intentional maligning of UNEF to foreign missions.