

# Middle East conflict - correspondence with participating countries: Middle ...

*HS L 179:107*



Dag Hammarskjöld's saml.

Middle East

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1956 - 58

Lloyd, Selwyn (Secy of State for Foreign  
Affairs, U.K.)

- 12 letters from D.H.
- 3 letters to D.H.
- 2 statement by S. Lloyd.

4 Nov. 56

MR. SELWYN LLOYD  
FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN  
LONDON (ENGLAND)

SINCE THE DISPATCH TO YOU OF MY EARLIER CABLE TODAY COMMA MY ATTENTION  
HAS BEEN DRAWN TO CERTAIN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN CONNEXION WITH THE TIME  
LIMIT OF 2000 HOURS GMT COMMA SUNDAY FOUR NOVEMBER STATED IN THAT MESSAGE STOP  
ACCORDINGLY COMMA I AM EXTENDING THE TIME LIMIT HOUR FROM 2000 HOURS ON SUNDAY  
COMMA FOUR NOVEMBER TO 0500 HOURS GMT ON MONDAY COMMA FIVE NOVEMBER STOP

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD  
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS

HAMMARSTEDT 3800

CONFIRMATION COPY  
OF MESSAGE DISPATCHED

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- PRIORITE NATIONS -

- PC -

MR SELWYN LLOYD

FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

LONDON (ENGLAND)

41 ONE SIR COMMA I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE  
RESOLUTION WHOSE TEXT IS SET FORTH BELOW WAS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST  
EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS MEETING ON 4  
DASH 5 NOVEMBER BY A VOTE OF FIFTY SEVEN IN FAVOUR COMMA NONE AGAINST  
AND NINETEEN ABSTENTIONS STOP TWO THE RESOLUTION READS COLON QUOTE THE  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMA PARA HAVING REQUESTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL  
IN ITS RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON 4 NOVEMBER 1956 PAREN A SLASH 3276 UNPAREN  
TO SUBMIT TO IT A PLAN FOR AN EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL UNITED NATIONS  
FORCE COMMA FOR THE PURPOSES STATED COMMA PARA NOTING WITH SATISFACTION  
THE FIRST REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE PLAN PERN A SLASH  
3289 UNPAREN COMMA AND HAVING IN MIND PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH 4  
OF THAT REPORT COMMA PARA ONE ESTABLISHES A UNITED NATIONS  
COMMAND FOR AN EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO SECURE AND SUPERVISE THE  
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE TERMS OF THE RESOLU-  
TION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 2 NOVEMBER 1956 PAREN A SLASH  
3256 UNPAREN COMMA PARA TWO APPOINTS COMMA ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS COMMA  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION  
ORGANIZATION COMMA MAJOR GENERAL E L M BURNS COMMA AS CHIEF OF THE  
COMMAND SEMICOLON PARA THREE AUTHORIZES THE CHIEF OF THE COMMAND  
IMMEDIATELY TO RECRUIT FROM THE OBSERVER CORPS OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION  
ORGANISATION A LIMITED NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO SHALL BE NATIONALS OF  
COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THOSE HAVING PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL SEMICOLON AND FURTHER AUTHORIZES HIM COMMA IN  
CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL COMMA TO UNDERTAKE THE

COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THOSE HAVING PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL SEMICOLON AND FURTHER AUTHORIZES HIM COMMA IN  
CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL COMMA TO UNDERTAKE THE  
RECRUITMENT DIRECTLY FROM VARIOUS MEMBER STATES COMMA OTHER THAN THE  
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMA THE ADDITIONAL  
NUMBER OF OFFICERS NEEDED SEMICOLON AND PARA FOUR INVITES THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO TAKE SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AS MAY BE  
NECESSARY FOR THE PROMPT EXECUTION OF THE ACTIONS ENVISAGED IN THIS  
RESOLUTION STOP UNQUOTE THREE ACCEPT COMMA SIR COMMA THE ASSURANCES  
OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION STOP

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS

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LINE 18 FIRST: ORGANIZATION

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UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



Distr.  
GENERAL

A/3314  
7 November 1956

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First emergency special session

QUESTION CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS  
749TH AND 750TH MEETINGS HELD ON 30 OCTOBER 1956

Letter dated 7 November 1956 from the Secretary-General, addressed  
to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United  
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

New York, 7 November 1956

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt, in reply to my communication, 5 November, of your message, 6 November, transmitted to me by letter from the Permanent Delegate of the United Kingdom the same day.

I note the wish of Her Majesty's Government to have my confirmation on three points, referred to in the letter.

Messages, stating acceptance of an unconditional cease-fire, have been received from the Governments of Egypt and Israel. These messages have been circulated as General Assembly documents. I confirmed immediately, orally, these acceptances. The Governments of Egypt and Israel were informed about the confirmation thus given. I now wish to repeat it to you in writing.

The General Assembly this afternoon approved a resolution fully implementing the recommendations in my Second and Final Report on an Emergency United Nations Force. It is my conviction, in the light of the promises of participation received from various Member Governments that the Force, when established in accordance with the General Assembly resolution now adopted, will be capable of the tasks assigned to it and flowing from the resolution of 2 November.

I have, in this context, to draw attention to a statement of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben Gurion, in his address to Knesset, 7 November. According to a report received from the Chief of the United Nations Command, the Prime Minister in this statement declared: "the Armistice lines between Israel and Egypt have no

validity", and "on no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory or in any of the areas occupied by her".

This position, if maintained in violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on these matters, while not affecting the cease-fire arrangement, would seriously complicate the task of carrying out the resolution of 2 November 1956.

I will, as soon as possible, revert to your offer to assist in the technical work to be undertaken in order to reopen the Suez Canal. At present, I am exploring the possibility of undertaking this task under United Nations auspices through agents from nations not engaged in the present conflict.

(Signed) Dag HAMMARSKJOLD  
Secretary-General

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8 November 56

S/G

x

H.E. DR MAHMOUD FAWZI  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
CAIRO (EGYPT)

(Same Cable to:

H E THE RIGHT HON SELWYN LLOYD  
C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFF  
LONDON (ENGLAND)

&

H.E. M CHRISTIAN PINEAU  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
PARIS (FRANCE)

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT THE TEXT OF A LETTER RECEIVED TODAY  
FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL. IN REPLY I HAVE INFORMED THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER THAT I AM ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THOSE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH  
WOULD PUT THE WITHDRAWAL INTO EFFECT. QUOTE.....(see enclosure...  
UNQUOTE

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD  
SECRETARY GENERAL  
UNITED NATIONS

14 November 1956

Dear Selwyn,

I must confess that I listened only with half an ear to what you said yesterday concerning your intended reporting, because I was so deep down in my concern with the urgent replies to Egypt. Afterwards my memory, however, brought back to me a few of the points you mentioned, and that causes me to try and define, independently, how I look at certain aspects of the present situation.

1. The demand of the General Assembly to France, United Kingdom and Israel for withdrawal is, of course, the basic fact. It is unqualified and does not leave any margin for conditions, such as reference to specific terms under which the United Nations Force is set up.

2. However, it is recognized that France and United Kingdom entered upon a cease-fire and promised to withdraw with reference to a United Nations force, capable of its tasks. This should mean that the two countries, if staying until they themselves were satisfied with the United Nations Force arrangements, would act in line with their own official stand, although in violation of the request of the General Assembly. It is obvious that in this indirect way, they can - as an expression of their unilateral stand, and notwithstanding the General Assembly request - argue about the terms established for the United Nations Force.

The Right Honourable Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E.,  
T.D., Q.C., M.P.  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations  
99 Park Avenue  
New York City, N.Y.

3. I guess it is fairly generally appreciated that the Anglo/French forces may not withdraw from Port Said until they see how the United Nations Force comes into function. However, if they were to stay provided that the United Nations Force did not "take over" in Port Said and the Canal Area, I think this must be considered as in violation of, not only the General Assembly resolution requesting withdrawal, but also of the Anglo/French stand in accepting the resolution on the United Nations Force, which does not foresee any "functions" in that area once it is out of the war zone.

4. Maybe it will prove impossible to achieve a withdrawal in that immediate future within which we must try and get going the clearing of the Canal and some kind of approach to a Suez Canal settlement. I feel that I could and would get on in spite of that. However, I consider it impossible to envisage that either the clearing, or some kind of negotiation concerning a Canal agreement, be started before the Anglo/French forces have withdrawn. And I feel sure that, in order to reach a settlement on starting these two activities, it will be necessary to give the most clear assurances as to the Anglo/French withdrawal.

As you see, I have had to link together here the points to which you referred yesterday with two other points: (a) the terms of the United Nations Force (as they have to be established on the basis of the United Nations resolution, irrespective of the conditions you may wish to put forward for withdrawal) and (b) the phasing of the various steps in the withdrawal in relation to various steps in preparation of a clearing of the Canal and an agreement on the Canal. I think it is necessary to think in those terms.

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URGENT

Confidential Message from Mr. Dag Hammarskjold to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,  
New York.

Dear Selwyn,

I have received your message through the Swedish channel and noted its content. Simultaneously and independently, I have received from the Egyptian Government various complaints concerning the situation in Port Said, the most significant of which are that attempts allegedly have been made to get Egyptians to work with British units under British orders, and that force has been used in such attempts; and, further, that house-searches by military groups have been made in forms, which have been humiliating to the civilian population.

Of course, I have, as a matter of urgency, brought your complaint to the notice of the Egyptian Government on the highest level and pointed out all the reasons against the alleged actions, both on a legal basis and on the level of Egypt's own political interest.

It must be an assumption in my work that information received from men like your opposite number here is to be trusted. Just as I requested Dr. Fawzi to do, I therefore would ask you to look into what is going on in Port Said so to avoid any steps that may justify an Egyptian move of the type you mentioned in your complaint. The developments are, of course, interlocking and in trying to get rid of one element in the picture we must try to get rid of all. It all demonstrates the dangers involved in a situation like the one established in Port Said, and it all shows how essential it is, in order to avoid a deterioration of the situation, to get to work on the problems we discussed together.

I received this morning a British complaint about a break in the Sweetwater Canal to Port Said. According to reports from our own observer, that break is now already mended.

I need not tell you how essential I find it that nothing be undertaken which might complicate further what I am trying to do. Concerning my own task, after the talks here, I am reasonably optimistic, provided no new elements are introduced.

4 December 1956

My dear Mr. Secretary,

In the communication from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, 3 December 1956, concerning the withdrawal of Anglo/French forces from Port Said and the Canal Area, it is stated in point (d): "The Secretary-General will promote as quickly as possible negotiations with regard to the future regime of the Canal on the basis of the six requirements set out in the Security Council resolution 13 October."

I note that in your statement in Parliament you elaborated this point and said that I would "promote as rapidly as possible negotiations on the basis of the following matters:

(a) The six requirements set out in the Security Council resolution of 13 October.

(b) The conversations between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Ministers of France, Egypt and yourself in New York.

(c) The Secretary-General's letter to the Egyptian Foreign Minister of 24 October setting out a basis for the negotiation of the system to conform to the six principles and the Egyptian acceptance thereof of 2 November."

This elaboration of yours corresponds to my understanding of the undertaking to promote negotiations which I have given, and I will pursue my efforts on that basis.

I note that in your statement in Parliament you also said that the British Government, "of course, adhere to their view as expressed in the resolution voted on by the Security Council on 13 October with re-

H.E. the Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Foreign Office  
London

gard to the 18 power proposals". I understand this statement to indicate only the views held by the British Government regarding the extent to which the implementation of the six principles should be safeguarded in a forthcoming solution without prejudice to the basis for my efforts to which I have agreed and which you presented in your statement in Parliament. The note verbal on the same subject, 3 December, is understood by me in the same sense. As a document within the framework of the planned negotiation, it is for the present not my intention to have it circulated as a United Nations document.

15 December 1956

Dear Selwyn,

The continued attacks on General Wheeler, to which now also Lord Hailsham has made his contribution, has made it necessary for me to say a word in public defense of him. I am sorry if this declaration embarrasses you, and I would regret it if the effect were that the attacks now instead would be directed against me so as to reduce my bargaining value. However, I owe my top collaborators some protection. I could not expect present attacks to go on unchecked without a dangerous effect on the morale. It is frankly with disillusionment that I now, and over the last fortnight, have seen how implementation has been given to your words in the general debate that the United Kingdom would do everything in its power to help. I can understand the need to safeguard certain domestic political interests, but I do react deeply when that is to such a large extent done at the cost of the United Nations, its prestige and my possibilities to get something done.

I am sure you understand this very personal and outspoken reaction in the right way.

*Given to Sir Pearson  
on 15 Dec '56*

His Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

21. december 1956

Dear Selwyn,

I am worried about the current development of clearing discussions which I can explain only by a crossing of wires due to the necessity to have part of the talks in Port Said and by the fact that everything has been discussed from divergent viewpoints. In these circumstances I consider it necessary to go straight to you and give you my view of the situation in order to clarify to you my way of thinking. I have to go back a little bit in history. I shall discuss the Port Said operation and the question of the six ships separately.

In my reply of 7 November to the French and British letters promising cessation of hostilities under certain conditions, I stated, concerning the clearing operation, that it was my intention to go to private firms in neutral countries. That statement was given before any contact was taken with the Egyptians and based only on the situation in the General Assembly. The very next day I contacted the Danish and Dutch firms.

The same stand was repeated in my report to the General Assembly 20 November when I said that I intended to address myself to firms in countries outside the present conflict. In the debate in the General Assembly you did not raise any objection against this stand, but made an offer on behalf of the United Kingdom "to work in any way wanted in this task", and you voted in favour of the resolution approving the re-

His Excellency  
the Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Foreign Office  
London

port. Two days later, 26 November, the Dutch-Danish consortium was requested to dispatch to the scene all the salvage ships and other equipment that they had put in readiness in various ports during the previous two weeks.

The day you left, 27 November, you appealed to me informally to use British resources but did not go any further. On 29 November you asked me if I would be "free to use" British resources, to which my reply was that I would be free to use British equipment, for my part leaving aside the question of crews on which I had not got anywhere with the Egyptians for the time being. This was the situation concerning the clearing, when you made your statement on withdrawal in Parliament.

On 7 December it was stated on your Government's behalf that the Anglo/French salvage fleet, with its administrative support, was a single unit which must either stay as a whole or go as a whole. With the position outlined above the only conclusion I could draw from that statement would have been that I could not use any assistance from you, contrary to what your statement in the General Assembly had led me to expect. Somewhat later it was made clear from your side that no British ship could be expected to serve without its crew.

In the light of your stand, 7 December, I found it necessary to formulate a clear-cut United Nations stand, based on the line taken in the report to the General Assembly, but with two exceptions caused by the immediate needs: a) that no "specific and limited salvage project under way on individual vessels should be dropped by Anglo/French salvage crews", and b) that six selected vessels should serve down the Canal with three British officers each for one week. This stand was reflected in an immediate instruction to General Wheeler. Orally, I informed your Delegation about the instruction on Monday, and, more in detail, on Tuesday, 10 December. Verbally,

the text of the instructions was transmitted to the British Delegation on Friday the 14th, i.e., a week ago. I felt, and I still maintain, that my stand was in complete conformity with the position of the General Assembly, that it did not go against anything which had been said between us and that it was a line that could be maintained in both directions as a reasonable compromise between the principle and the acute needs.

On Wednesday, 19 December, I was approached by the British Delegation because of your concern about a signal from Port Said according to which General Wheeler's "conditions" as stated to Slater, were that only Seasalvor and Salvada would be employed by him. This message seemed based on a misunderstanding, as our principle a) above should be maintained whatever the E-Day seen in relation to the salvage situation. I therefore informed Sir Pierson Dixon and General Wheeler in identical terms that we wanted Seasalvor and Salvada but that we, on the basis of the original instruction which was maintained, also wanted to see a completion of all work in hand. Obviously, this term was to be understood in the light of the whole preceding history and the text of the instruction all of it well known to you.

Yesterday I got the first indication that things might have gone wrong. Slater's list of ships, to which General Wheeler was said to have agreed but which I had never seen, went so far beyond all General Wheeler's previous indications that it could scarcely be explained only by mistaken information; there seemed to have been a change bent on a different interpretation of my well established position. This became even more apparent when General Wheeler's own report reached us this morning indicating the need for practically the whole British salvage fleet and the total crew of more than one thousand without any specified time limit. It seems to me incredible in the light of all information previously received that such a situation should be found suddenly to be the consequence of instructions maintained for so long on the basis of which Wheeler previously had taken a very different position.

Of course, the new picture may be correct and it may be that technical conditions have developed so that all these ships with this very great number of crews, really are necessary on the basis of the principle first stated practically a fortnight ago, but the switch seems so surprising that, in our own interest but also in order to maintain confidence in our good faith as a basis for the necessary Egyptian cooperation, I simply must know concretely that this set-up does correspond to the technicians' conclusions from a strict interpretation of the principle stated. I have therefore told General Wheeler that, of course, for the time being his agreement must stand, but that I do need at once specific justification for each one of the twelve salvage ships, indicating on what wreckage they are working, for how long they have been engaged in that operation and when they will be through with it. Such information will make it possible for me to steer the Egyptian reaction if this information warrants the practical conclusions drawn from it according to the latest reports. If the conclusions go beyond what follows from the principle, I do not myself endorse them, and correction must be sought by a proper phasing out.

What I want you to see is the absolute consistency of the line I have maintained from the moment you brought in your all-or-nothing formula. You may disapprove of my line, but to the best of my understanding it is the one which would receive today solid majority support in the General Assembly as reflecting the basic stand of the Assembly. In the complicated operation which I have had to run under the pressure which has developed, my only salvation has been to say the same thing to both sides, and so I have done, but then we cannot have a divergence of interpretation which puts in question the very good faith of the United Nations. The Egyptians having to provide security and the operation being on Egyptian territory and in no way imposed on them by the United Nations, they must know in broad terms what we are doing and why we are doing it, and this must correspond to the principle we have stated.

I can see your point, if you or your people wish to get as much out of the ships remaining in Port Said as possible, but that is a stand different from the one which I have understood as being that of the United Nations, which permits me to draw on your resources to the extent it is necessary in order not to lose what

has been gained and so as to make the United Nations operation as efficient as it can be if obvious gaps in our equipment are filled. If you disapprove of my policy, I will be happy to have your criticism brought up in such a form as to give me the possibility to explain my stand. As you know, I cannot enter upon a debate either with statements in the press or in Parliament, and a report to the General Assembly, which I am perfectly willing to make any day, must have a reason in an interest of the General Assembly itself if it is not to be interpreted in the wrong way.

Concerning "the six", I regret the detour over Wednesday and Thursday, which is explained by a misunderstanding, perhaps too likely to occur under the enormous pressure which we all have upon us. At all events, as usual, there were no tricks from Fawzi's side. I had, last week, as you know, an Egyptian acceptance to my basic proposals for the use of British crews as indicated in my instructions to General Wheeler. The acceptance was withdrawn as a reaction to the unfortunate publicity aftermath to your Paris talks. Fawzi put up a fight to re-establish the approval and got that result Wednesday morning. The publicity formula he proposed, covered both Port Said and the six, the margin of vagueness referring to the Port Said situation where he left matters to be worked out by me on the basis of our principles. Unfortunately, my interest was wholly concentrated on the six, and his presentation led me to believe that he was talking only about the six, with the interpretation which then obviously followed and which I gave to your Delegation. When, at a cross-checking yesterday, it was discovered that his free margin did not refer to the six but covered only Port Said, he volunteered to try and find some transitional arrangements concerning the six which might take us some bit on the way, although in no way as far as your reply would assume. I have really no reason to blame Fawzi, while I find myself reasonably well excused by the circumstances.

I feel that the substance of the matter is now one which should be a question London-New York or for that sake New-York-Cairo. In the time of grace, which circumstances still seem to offer, I hope we will get somewhere; if we don't I cannot personally change the view I expressed in the letter to your Delegation last Monday, 17 December.

Frankly, I sometimes get angry when I think of how these matters could have been handled if the main parties had been in the same house instead of being separated both by awkward time differences and by their settings and political concerns. For me it remains the most time and nerve consuming operation I have ever tried. I can only say that while I shrag personally if these efforts lead to nothing, I would feel that we are, none of us, worth much professionally if we cannot get around this corner. But in doing so I must stand for the United Nations Position.

Cow with B.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER NEWYORK

FROM: SECGEN GENEVA

DATE: 6 May 1957

NUMBER:

UNDER SAME CONDITIONS AS PREVIOUS CABLE ON THE SAME ISSUE I TRANSMIT FINAL PARAGRAPHS OF MESSAGE RECEIVED TODAY FROM SELWYN LLOYD QUOTE

In your message to me of May 3 you agree that it may be that the Egyptians will clarify the point referred to above, and you state your willingness to make an early approach to Nasser on this matter. You raise, however, the question about further meetings of the Security Council. Para.

I think that we should have to reserve the right to summon a further meeting of the Security Council if any new complications were to arise. If the Egyptians were to make difficulties about payment of tolls, or the servicing of British ships, we might have to bring the matter to the Security Council again. There is also the Israeli complication which might arise at any moment if the Israelis were to seek to send a ship through. However, I think that I can promise you that, in the absence of some factor such as that, we would not seek to use the Security Council as a means of bringing pressure to bear upon the Egyptians during a reasonable period of, say, a week while you are dealing with the matter, in other words, until some time during the week commencing May 12. We have no desire to have a meeting of the Security Council just for the sake of having one. We should want it to fulfil some constructive role. Para.

I agree that it would be very desirable that you should be back in New York for any meeting of the Security Council. Para.

If you decide to proceed on this basis, I suggest that you should act on your responsibility as the Secretary-General of the United Nations and not at the request of one particular Government. Anxiety about a unilateral revocation or amendment was generally expressed at the SCUA meetings, and I believe that one or two Governments may have made independent representations on this point to the Egyptian Government. UNQUOTE

I HAVE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS QUOTE.....UNQUOTE

6 May 1957

Message to the Foreign Secretary

"I received your message of May 6 and would like to make the following observations:

Ad your message, paragraph 11

I confirm my willingness to try to clarify the point mentioned.

Ad your paragraph 12

Of course, I never intended that you should sacrifice the possibility of using the Security Council for such purposes as those now mentioned by you. What I had in mind was that my position obviously would be false if, even in case a satisfactory clarification from the Egyptian side were to be forthcoming, the same issue might be run again through the Security Council machine. This is clearly a different matter from the situations you have in mind. There is, in my view, no reason to consider now whether Security Council action would be the most appropriate approach in those other cases.

I understand that you would hold back an initiative in the Security Council on the issue you have brought up with me during the time that reasonably may be required for the desired clarification. In this context I have to draw your attention to the fact that if, as is likely, I go to Jerusalem on Wednesday, I shall be cut off from the possibility of an exchange of views with Cairo during the latter half of this week. Whatever the action that I may initiate before leaving for Jerusalem it, thus, would have to be followed up in the course of next week.

Ad your paragraph 14

I intend to act on the basis you indicate and in the light of the fact that I made efforts in a similar direction a week before the last Security Council meeting. I dropped my previous initiative partly because of what seemed to me to be a lack of interest on the user side.

Dag Hammarskjöld  
Secretary-General."

44.

6 May 1957

Message to the Foreign Secretary

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Dag Hammarskjöld  
Secretary-General."

6 January 1958

PERSONAL

Dear Selwyn,

With all the reservations I set out in my letter to you the other day I send you enclosed a first internal working document, explaining in bare outlines my thinking on the matter covered by my previous letter. I give copies also to Dulles and Pineau, although the paper, of course, must not in any way be considered an official document.

Dag Hammarskjöld

His Excellency,  
the Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.,  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Office,  
London, England.

see file:  
Econ. Dev.  
for Africa (D.E)

29 September 1958

Last night Dixon and Bealey came to see me with the final text of your memorandum. They informed me about the view held by your Cabinet as to the necessity of substantive progress before the troops could be withdrawn. I understood this to refer specifically to the lifting of the oil embargo before the UK takes any action.

While I understand your way of thinking, I note that it seems to have moved in the direction of a stiffening attitude. You will remember that Samir Rifa'i never even mentioned the oil question. The first time you mentioned it, you stressed that it was a most important point and that any results, in this respect, would help you a lot. When we met just before you left, I understood you to mean that what you needed were "assurances", before a withdrawal, on the lifting of the oil embargo which I, therefore presumed might take place after withdrawal. Thus, I did not understand you at that stage to request action before withdrawal; you even hinted that my word about "assurances" would be good enough, if I felt that I could give it. Now, I take it that you consider it necessary to get the oil deliveries running in advance of withdrawal.

As I said to Dixon and Bealey, this presents us with a couple of statements which, if taken to be firm, would indicate a formal deadlock, as the Egyptians talk about oil deliveries after withdrawal, and you about withdrawal after oil deliveries.

This does not worry me too much, taken as a simple registration of the situation of today, as we have scope for day-to-day negotiations which might provide for adjustments in relation to what, so far, has been put on record. I certainly will try to work out such adjustments as regards the UAR with Fawzi when he arrives, but I will also pursue the matter with you. From

H.E. the Rt.Hon.Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.  
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
London

my point of view an excellent springboard is the fact that the two of you must negotiate regarding transit arrangements for the troops over the Syrian region and, therefore, are likely to get down to rather concrete considerations of the final staging of withdrawal and of the resumption of oil deliveries - not too unlike the staging of interlocking moves which was necessary at the final phase of the Port Said evacuation.

What would worry me would be if either side took an unrealistic attitude and felt that it could stiffly insist on conditions. I cannot think that the Egyptians can do that in view of the fact that the oil embargo cannot be reconciled with part I of the resolution. Nor, however, do I think that you can do it, and that is so less because of an undoubted majority view in the GA, which was but weakly reflected in the resolution, than because of the fact that I don't see how you would be able to stay on for any length of time after the US withdrawal (or could force the US to stay as an alibi, against the will of the Lebanese Government); another consideration is, of course, that, were a deadlock to become a matter of public debate, the Jordanians may well find it is enough, from their point of view, to have an assurance of oil deliveries after withdrawal and, therefore, might try to take the advantage they can get out of a formal request for withdrawal.

This impossibility for both parties to impose conditions makes me fear any statements or moves leading to undue rigidity, but makes me, on the other hand, hope that by mutual adjustment in a spirit of realism and flexibility, we can cut through the formal deadlock which seems to be facing us today.

I am, of course, inspired in this matter not only by a strong wish to see the whole story settled, but also by my very earnest desire to avoid a situation in which a resumption of a debate in the General Assembly might be staged with a view to a resolution requesting withdrawal.

NY337/RC26/RO/UN33606 SK1 LONDON 46 4 1623 SSS ETATBG

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY GENERAL UNITED NATIONS

NEWYORK

YOUR TELEGRAM AND TEXTS OF CANADIAN AND INDIAN RESOLUTIONS  
HAVE ONLY JUST REACHED US STOP MINISTERS ARE CONSIDERING THEM  
URGENTLY STOP CONSULTATION WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL BE  
NECESSARY STOP YOU MAY EXPECT REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

SELWYN LLOYD

UNITED NATIONS  
1955 JUL-4 PM 1:32  
TELEGRAPH UNIT

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UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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28 November 1956

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Eleventh session  
Agenda item 66

QUESTION CONSIDERED BY THE FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION  
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FROM 1 TO 10 NOVEMBER 1956

Letter dated 27 November 1956 from the Principal Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland, addressed to the Secretary-General

New York, 27 November 1956

I have the honour to draw your attention to the enclosed  
... statement by Her Majesty's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in  
the House of Commons on 26 November regarding the treatment of British  
subjects in Egypt.

Thousands of British subjects have received orders from the  
Security Police, under instructions from the Egyptian Ministry of the  
Interior, to leave Egypt within a few days. In many cases, British  
subjects have been obliged to sign a declaration in Arabic (without even  
knowing its contents) confirming that they are leaving of their own free  
will, undertaking not to return to Egypt and renouncing any claim for  
damages. The Swiss Minister in Cairo, who is looking after the British  
interests in Egypt, has vigorously protested to the Egyptian Government  
against what he has described as "a barbarous measure".

Several thousands of these British subjects are poor people, some  
six thousand are of Maltese origin. They are being forced to leave a  
country where they have lived many years without being permitted to take  
sufficient money with them to start a new life elsewhere. Despite the  
efforts of the Swiss Legation, these people are not being permitted to make

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/...

provision for the deserted homes and personal property they will be leaving behind. No facilities are being given them for the appointment of legal representatives.

The indiscriminate character of these expulsion orders is reminiscent of the barbarous methods of mass deportation at short notice which have been practiced in other countries.

This operation is being carried out with indiscriminate and brutal haste against people who have given service to Egypt and have spent their lives in that country.

I have the honour to request that this communication be brought to the attention of all the Members of the United Nations.

(Signed) Selwyn LLOYD  
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of  
State for Foreign Affairs

/...

Statement by Her Majesty's Minister of State for  
Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on  
26 November

Her Majesty's Government have been deeply shocked by the news received through the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had a report from their Minister in Cairo on 23 November to the effect that all members of the British and French Communities in Egypt were to be expelled within the next week or ten days. Each person was to be allowed to take a maximum of twenty pounds with him.

The task of the Swiss Legation in assisting the British and French subjects concerned was at the same time made almost impossible by the action of the Egyptian Government in removing the local staff formerly attached to the British and French Embassies. We have no information on the means by which the Egyptian Government propose to transport these people from Egypt to the United Kingdom and to other destinations. The British subjects concerned are some 13,000 in all. These include those of United Kingdom origin as well as Maltese and Cypriots.

It is not clear from our existing information whether the expulsion order covers those British subjects who had previously been interned by the Egyptians, including the employees of the Suez Canal base contractors. We have asked the Swiss Government to obtain clarification on this point. Meanwhile the British Red Cross have requested the International Red Cross to supply food and other necessities to the internees. No restriction has been imposed on Egyptian citizens in the United Kingdom, nor have any deportation orders been issued against them.

The Swiss Minister has protested vigorously to the Egyptian Government against what he has described as a barbarous measure. My Hon. and Learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has made the strongest possible representations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs in New York.

A further statement will be made to the House when the outcome of these representations is known.



MEMORANDUM

Her Majesty's Government are grateful for the offer to use U.N.E.F. air transport between Port Said and Naples for moving any men from the British Salvage Fleet that may, for one reason or another, have to be relieved. They presume that this route could also be used for transporting certain stores and provisions into Port Said.

The proposal for the exchange of H.M.S. "Striker" by H.M.S. "Lofoten" to which Her Majesty's Government continue to attach much importance, is based on the fact that H.M.S. "Lofoten" unlike H.M.S. "Striker" has been specially fitted out to act as an administrative centre for the crews of the Salvage Fleet, with:

- (a) good accommodation;
- (b) additional office;
- (c) improved sick quarters, laundry facilities etc.;
- (d) cinema, canteen and recreational spaces for the best available welfare facilities;
- (e) better small boat arrangements for liaison with, and between, salvage craft.

A great many of the men in the Salvage Fleet have been at Port Said for some weeks under trying conditions and unable to get ashore. To maintain the morale and efficiency of the crews it is therefore the wish of Her Majesty's Government that adequate recreational facilities - such as are available in "Lofoten" - should be provided.

In addition to this, H.M.S. "Striker" has been at Port Said for nearly two months and is therefore now low in stores etc.

After this exchange has taken place, it is considered that it may perhaps be necessary, about once in every ten days or so, to send a small merchant type ship to replenish supplies. Her Majesty's Government would be glad to examine this question at a later date should there be difficulty in obtaining the required supplies locally or sending them in through U.N.E.F. air transport.

No. 1841/57

April 24, 1957

Dear Secretary-General,

Would you please refer to the semi-official letter dated April 12th in which I explained that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Declaration of the 31st of October, 1955, accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was intended to be temporary while consideration was being given to the terms of a new acceptance to be deposited shortly.

In that letter I said that I should be grateful if you would transmit copies of it to the parties to the Statute of the Court and to the Registrar of the Court, when transmitting copies of the formal letter, also dated April 12th, giving notice of withdrawal.

I have since deposited with you a new Declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and I understand that copies of this Declaration will be transmitted to the parties to the Statute of the Court together with the notice of withdrawal. If I am correct in this understanding, it hardly seems necessary for the semi-official letter of April 12th to be circulated at the same time and I, therefore, wish to withdraw my request that this should be done.

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency  
Monsieur Dag Hammarskjöld,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations.

MEMORANDUM

U.K.

Her Majesty's Government have recently received reliable indication of disturbing aspects of Egyptian rule in the Gaza Strip. They have been informed:-

- (a) that Rushdi Shawa, a former mayor of Gaza, was arrested on May 12 by the Egyptian authorities;
- (b) that the general atmosphere among the wealthier members of the community has recently become one of fear;
- (c) that a hotel-owner in Gaza had recently been informed by the Egyptian Police that her means of livelihood would be taken away from her unless she agreed to inform upon any United Nations personnel staying at her hotel;
- (d) that the Egyptian authorities are placing difficulties in the way of those who seek to emigrate from the Gaza Strip. A deposit of \$100 is required from any intending emigrant.
- (e) that the Egyptian authorities are again seeking to restrict the movements of the staff of UNRWA and to lay down conditions as to whom the Agency may employ in the Strip.

May 31, 1957.

Text of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's Statement on the Middle East  
situation in the House of Commons on the afternoon of  
29 November 1956

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement with regard to my recent visit to New York and the discussions there with regard to the situation in Egypt.

My statement can only be of an interim character. There are important questions to be decided and they must be discussed with our French allies before decisions can be announced. Monsieur Pineau is coming to London tomorrow afternoon and I propose to make a further statement next Monday.

I found the general atmosphere in the United Nations considerably improved and a wider understanding of our position in certain sections of American opinion. The debate on the Afro-Asian resolution during Friday and Saturday of last week indicated the change in the atmosphere in the United Nations. I pointed out that we could not accept that resolution, because it implied a measure of censure which we could not accept and because it demanded that we should withdraw forthwith. Also the resolution was unrealistic as it made no reference to an international force. I indicated our desire to co-operate with the United Nations in these matters and I hoped for a resolution which we could accept. After I express these views, the representative of Belgium, M. Spaak, put forward an amendment to the Afro-Asian resolution calling upon us to expedite the application of the resolutions of the 2nd and 7th November, (which among other things urged us to withdraw) in the spirit in which they were adopted, particularly in regard to the functions vested in the United Nations Force. I stated that if that amendment was accepted the United Kingdom would be able to vote for the resolution. That also was the position of France. On the Belgian amendment the vote was 23 in favour, 37 against, and 18 abstentions, including the United States of America. In other words, the majority of the Assembly either voted with us or abstained. That constituted a considerable shift of opinion. The original resolution was then put to a vote and carried by a very large majority. I should, however, point out that the vote on this resolution was affected in my view by the fact that Mr. Cabot Lodge, representing the United States, had stated that he interpreted the word "forthwith" to mean "a phased operation".

We have repeatedly indicated our willingness to withdraw our forces from Egypt when an international force was effectively constituted and competent to carry out its functions. The House will recall the suggestion originally made by the Prime Minister on the 1st of November with regard to the United Nations undertaking the physical task of keeping the peace in the area. From that date the conception of an International Force rapidly gained support. The United Nations Force has now been constituted and is growing in numbers and I pay tribute to the speed with which the Secretary-General and his advisers have acted. There are already some 1,400 men in Egypt. By the 1st December there will be about 2,700. Within about 14 days the Force should number 4,100, apart from some air personnel, approximately 300 in number, stationed at Naples. The 4,100 will be in Egypt. Among these 4,400 will be some 700 Canadians. Within a fortnight there should be an organised military force with a Headquarters and staff under the command of General Burns, with two armoured car companies and the necessary supporting units including

medical, engineer, transport, signals, supply, workshop, provost and post units and other army services elements. The provisional target of the Secretary-General is to increase that Force to two combat brigades with appropriate administrative backing, including air transport.

I mention these facts to the House because obviously the build-up of this Force must have an important relationship to a phased withdrawal of our own and the French troops. There are however other important matters to be considered, such as the speedy clearance of the Canal, and the negotiations of a final settlement with regard to the future operation of the Canal. Decisions upon these matters must be discussed with our French allies and I also await certain clarifications with regard to the carrying out of the resolution passed last Saturday by the General Assembly.

This resolution authorised the Secretary-General to proceed with arrangements for clearance as a United Nations operation. I shall be able to deal with those aspects of the matter next Monday.

Grave anxiety has been caused in this country as to the position of British subjects in Egypt. The House will recall the statement made by my Rt. Hon. friend the Minister of State on November 26. As soon as I received the report from the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs I made known to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the very serious view which H.M.G. took of it and of the consequences which would inevitably follow if the expulsions were put into effect. On November 27 I sent a letter to the Secretary-General which I will circulate in the official report, pointing out the hardship that would be caused to thousands of British subjects, many of them poor people, who were to be forced to leave the country where they had lived many years without being permitted to take sufficient money with them to start a new life elsewhere.

The present position is not entirely clear, but it seems that no general expulsion order was made. The Egyptian Government did however issue a very large number of individual expulsion orders against British and French subjects. In addition several hundred British subjects in Egypt (subjects) remain interned. The Swiss Minister in Cairo, to whose work I should like to pay a warm tribute, is doing everything he can both to improve the position of British subjects in Egypt and to clarify the Egyptian Governments intentions. We await his further report.

Bearing in mind, Sir, what I have said earlier, I hope that the House will be willing to await my further statement on Monday.

ITEM THREE STOP SELWYN LLOYD ON THE CHALLENGE TO UNITED NATIONS PARA

PS  
May 31/59

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY MR SELWYN LLOYD SPEAKING AT UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION DINER AT MANSION HOUSE LONDON THIRTYFIRST

MAY

~~PARA~~ UN WAS CONFRONTED AT PRESENT WITH MOST CRITICAL CHALLENGE OF ITS EXISTENCE STOP TEST BY WHICH UN WOULD BE

JUDGED WAS HOW IT DEALT WITH MIDDLE EAST AND HUNGARIAN ISSUES STOP GREATEST DANGER TO UN WAS THAT IT SHOULD APPEAR TO ACCEPT DOUBLE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT PARA

HE SAID QUOTE I HAVE NEVER CHANGED MY VIEWS THAT A WORLD INSTRUMENT ENDOWED WITH NECESSARY AUTHORITY COMMA TO QUOTE WORDS OF SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL COMMA IS NECESSARY FOR PERMANENT PEACE OF WORLD STOP DOTS NEVERTHELESS WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE FACT THAT UN IS CONFRONTED AT PRESENT WITH MOST CRITICAL CHALLENGE OF ITS EXISTENCE UNQUOTE PARA

IN PAST SIX MONTHS OR MORE UN HAD HAD TO DEAL WITH TWO MAJOR CRISES COMMA IN MIDDLE EAST AND HUNGARY STOP IN MIDDLE EAST UK FRANCE AND FINALLY ISRAEL HAD COMPLIED WITH WISHES OF UN ON CERTAIN UNDERSTANDINGS STOP AS RESULT UN UNDERTOOK CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES PARA

QUOTE SECOND CRISIS WAS ACTION OF SOVIET UNION IN HUNGARY STOP HUNGARIAN PEOPLE MADE BID FOR FREEDOM LAST NOVEMBER STOP SOVIET UNION SENT IN TROOPS STOP UPRISING WAS SUPPRESSED STOP GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSED RESOLUTIONS CALLING UPON SOVIET GOVT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS AND CEASE THEIR INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY STOP ASSEMBLY MADE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS AIMED AT ALLEVIATING DISTRESS OF HUNGARIAN PEOPLE STOP RUSSIAN ACTION WAS CONDEMNED BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF THE ORGANISATION STOP SOVIET UNION IGNORED ALL THIS STOP HER TROOPS ARE STILL ON HUNGARIAN SOIL AND IT HAS BEEN MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THERES NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING THEM STOP THERE HAVE BEEN NO ELECTIONS TO GIVE HUNGARIANS ANY SAY AS TO HOW THEY WISH TO BE GOVERNED STOP INDEED KADAR HAS POSTPONED SUCH ELECTIONS AS HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT FOR TWO YEARS STOP ALL THAT UN HAS BEEN ABLE TO DO IS TO SET UP A COMMITTEE TO PREPARE A REPORT ON SITUATION IN HUNGARY COMMA REPORT WHICH I HOPE WILL BE ISSUED IN NEGT FEW DAYS PARA

CONTRAST BETWEEN THESE TWO CASES IS ALARMING STOP DOES IT MEAN THAT UN HAS ONE LAW FOR THE REASONABLY FIARMINDED AND ANOTHER FOR THE UNJUST AND THE BULLY QUERY DOES IT MEAN THAT THE ORGANISATION IS POWERLESS WHEN ITS AUTHORITY IS FLOUTED AND CAN ONLY MAKE ITS VIEWS EFFECTIVE WITH THOSE STATES WHICH ARE PREPARED TO BE INFLUENCED BY IT QUERY STOP IF THAT IS TO BE ACCEPTED AS BASIS FOR UN ACTION I THINK FEW OF US HERE COULD MAINTAIN OUR FAITH IN ITS USEFUL CONTINUANCE PARA

TO SUM UP ON THIS POINT COMMA AS RESULT OF WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND OF CERTAIN MEMBER STATES COMMA UN HAS UNDERTAKEN

TO RESPOND OF CERTAIN MEMBER STATES COMMA UN HAS UNDERTAKEN  
A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY IN CERTAIN DIRECTIONS STOP EQUALLY AS  
RESULT OF FAILURE TO RESPOND OF ANOTHER MEMBER OF UN IT HAS  
HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY TO DISCHARGE IN ANOTHER DIRECTION STOP  
AND TEST BY WHICH UN WILL BE JUDGED IS HOW IT DEALS WITH  
THESE TWO ISSUES UNQUOTE PARA

SELWYN LLOYD SUGGESTED THREE CONCLUSIONS SHOULD BE DRAWN  
FROM THIS SITUATION PARA

FIRST QUOTE RELIANCE ON UN CAN ONLY BE PART OF FOREIGN  
POLICY OF A COUNTRY UNQUOTE PARA

SECONDLY QUOTE ROLE OF UN IS NOT JUST TO PRESERVE PEACE  
STOP IT MUST COMMAND RESPECT FOR RULE OF LAW AND SANCTITY OF  
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS UNQUOTE PARA

THIRDLY QUOTE TIS OBVIOUS THAT CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS MAY  
BE POSSIBLE IN WORKING OF THE ORGANISATION UNQUOTE FOR EXAMPLE  
AS REGARDS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL  
COMMA CONSTITUTION OF PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND  
RELAXATION OF VETO IN CERTAIN MATTERS PARA

HE WENT ON QUOTE MOST FORMIDABLE DIFFICULTY HOWEVER IN  
PATH OF SUCCESS OF UN IS FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION IN WORLD BETWEEN  
COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE REST STOP WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN  
TO END THAT DIVISION AND PROMOTE COMMON APPROACH STOP THERE ARE  
SIGNS WE MAY BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THAT COMMON APPROACH AT ALL  
EVENTS TOWARDS A PARTIAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT STOP THAT WOULD  
INDEED BE BIG STEP FORWARD UNQUOTE STOP MOREOVER BOTH SIDES  
SHARED REALISATION OF HORRORS OF GLOBAL WAR AND HAD COMMON  
INTEREST IN PROMOTING HIGHER STANDARDS OF LIVING AND IN  
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IF IT WAS REALLY PEACEFUL AND PERMITTED  
VARIOUS EXISTING SYSTEMS OF SOCIETY TO DEVELOP IN THEIR OWN  
WAYS STOP QUOTE UN CAN OF ITSELF PLAY NOTABLE PART IN PROMOTING  
THAT SENSE OF COMMON INTEREST STOP GREATEST DANGER TO UN IN  
THIS SITUATION IS THAT IT SHOULD APPEAR TO ACCEPT DOUBLE  
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT STOP IT MUST SEEK NOT ONLY TO INFLUENCE  
COUNTRIES WHICH WILL PAY HEED TO ITS VIEW DASH IT MUST ALSO BE  
PREPARED TO BRING AND CONTINUE TO BRING ITS AUTHORITY TO  
BEAR AGAINST ACTIONS BY MEMBER STATES HOWEVER POWERFUL COMMA  
IF THEY ARE REPUGN

NT TO THE CHARTER STOP UNLESS UN IS PREPARED  
TO ACT IN THIS WAY IT WILL BE NOT A DETERRENT BUT POSITIVE  
ENCOURAGEMENT TO LAWBREAKER STOP THAT COULD MEAN THAT ALL  
COUNTRIES WOULD INEVITABLY TEND TO REASSESS THEIR ATTITUDE  
TOWARDS UN AND TO RELY INCREASINGLY UPON ACTION OUTSIDE IT STOP  
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TURNS UPON THEIR INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TO THIS ISSUE OF DOUBLE  
STANDARDS STOP DOTS WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN OUR DETERMINATION TO  
MAKE A SUCCESS OF THIS INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION UNQUOTE PARA

(E)