

Middle East conflict - Jordan. Amman files: Middle East conflict - Jordan. ...

HS L 179:106a



Dag Hammarskjölds saml.

Amman, code cables 1961

From Piero P. Spinelli - to H.D. (Secretary-General)
(Amman)

L 179: 1069

48

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 4 JANUARY 1961 Sent 4 1105Z Recvd 4 1452Z
NUMBER: SP-2

(A) I very much appreciate your message No 1 of 1 January 1961. As I am postponing my departure from Amman beyond 15 January could you confirm to me a few days in advance your schedule for this area so that I may arrange to meet with you?

(B) Although the execution of 4 persons convicted in connexion with Majali's assassination created no noticeable stir, the King, evidently in order further to maintain tranquillity, has commuted General Sadek's sentence from death to life imprisonment. 14 others got similar treatment. Still others who were serving time were released.

14

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL

FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN

DATE: 7 JANUARY 1961

Sent 07 1054Z Rec'd 07 1318Z

NUMBER: SP 6

In conversations I had these last few days with local leaders, they all emphasized the fact that lately the tone of their press-radio campaign had become milder and that statements made at year's end by King and FM were confined mainly to internal matters and avoided provocative words. They added that they intended to continue in this vein in the hope that the UAR would do likewise. They naturally are hopeful that in your visit to Cairo you will find an atmosphere favourable for improving the situation.

Speaking with Talhouni this morning, he pointed out that the King, although he realized your present itinerary is a crowded one, would appreciate it greatly if on your way to Beirut you could stop for an hour or two in Amman. I told Talhouni that it was my impression that this would be difficult since such an unexpected diversion might seriously interfere with your already tight schedule.

#7

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 19 JANUARY 1961 Sent 19 1040Z Recvd 19 1459Z
NUMBER: SP-11

The elements who favour a rapprochement with UAR, who, while they are numerous, are not the most powerful in the Govt, are hoping that at the on-coming meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Baghdad, progress may be made in this direction. For my part I am trying to persuade the highest circles to allow a reasonably free hand to their delegation there so that they will not be obliged to refuse any overture which could come from a third party. There is the feeling here that such overture might conceivably come from the host Govt and this possibility was hinted to me also ~~was~~ during my recent short unofficial trip to Baghdad by Foreign Minister Jawad.

I plan to remain here for one more week and then return to Geneva.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 25 JANUARY 1961 Sent 25 1045Z Recvd 25 1337Z
NUMBER: SP 12

In my frequent conversations these last few days with King, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister I was asked to delay my departure from here as they feel my continued presence could be useful in case a decision had to be taken here on some proposal for a détente that might possibly be made at the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Baghdad. The King and Prime Minister assured me that the Foreign Minister, who will head the Jordanian delegation to Baghdad, has been given instructions to entertain any overture that might be made in that direction. Their one condition for this détente is that the propaganda warfare should cease simultaneously on both sides.

In the last audience given to me by the King the day before yesterday I gained the impression for the first time that his once deep resentment for what happened last August had diminished. He talked at length about his plans for the economic and social development of the country and added that, even if the Baghdad meeting lead to no amelioration of relations with the UAR, he intended gradually to tone down his press radio campaign to the point where any attack from Cairo would be eventually ignored.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 29 JAN 1961 (Sent 291045z, Rcvd 291125z)
NUMBER: SP 13

Reur 14.

Am glad you agree that my present stay here should be extended somewhat and I now will remain until such time as we can see what develops from the Baghdad meeting .

SEA F O A M B O N D

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 4 FEBRUARY 1961 (Sent 04 1100Z Received 04 1925Z)
NUMBER: SP 14

According to the first reports from Baghdad by the Jordanian delegation, the meetings so far between Fawzi and Nasser have been cordial but inconclusive. The possible third party from whom it was hoped concrete proposals would come that would lead to an amelioration of Jordan-UAR relations has not yet shown itself although there have been some general appeals to that end. The feeling here therefore is that meetings will be unproductive as far as any rapprochement is concerned. Not only that, but it is generally felt locally that this Arab foreign ministers conference is not tackling the roots of any problem that becloud inter-Arab relations.

The presence of the Tunisians at the conference, so the Jordanian delegation reported, has created a certain difference in atmosphere there which it seems to me that Cairo does not appreciate if we are to judge by the violent attacks launched these last few days in which Bourrbaiba received even worse treatment than Hussein.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY -GENERAL

FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN

DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1961

Sent 6 1603Z

Recvd 6 1825Z

NUMBER: SP-15

Since at the last session of the Baghdad foreign Ministers Conference the wish to cease the press-radio warfare among Arab States was again generally reaffirmed, King Hussein has decided for his part to get on with it, ignoring what other parties choose to do.

Fawzi was unable in Baghdad to commit himself specifically to similar action but gave assurances, both at the Conference and to the Jordanian foreign Minister privately, that he would do everything he could to see to it that his Govt adopted a like policy.

Although this morning there were still some attacks from certain UAR radio stations, their afternoon programmes, which heretofore had been devoted to such attacks, were missing. While we cannot yet be sure that things will continue like this from the UAR side, nevertheless it is a good omen.

The King, in informing me of his decision, said also that, in arriving at it, he had borne in mind the advice which he had received from you in New York and asked me to convey to you his grateful thoughts.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 9 FEBRUARY 1961 Sent 9 1605Z Recvd 9 1837Z
NUMBER: SP-16

The UAR press-radio campaign against Jordan stopped the afternoon of the 6th of this month and we are hopeful that this situation will continue for some time. There are still some radio programmes on both sides which in very general fashion could be interpreted as unfriendly if one wants to read into them specific attitudes. In any case, King and FM assured me that they will resist any temptation to hit back, ever if really and directly provoked. If this kind of détente goes on there will be, I think, some chance during the next period of the G A - where the Arab foreign Ministers expect to go - for a concrete attempt to succeed in effecting a rapprochement between the position of Jordan and that of the UAR.

I plan to leave for Geneva via Rome at the beginning of next week.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 17 JUNE 1961 (Sent 17 1500Z Received 17 1533Z)
NUMBER: SP-39

After such a long absence from the territory I needed more time to orientate myself the more so because inter Arab relations appear to have entered a new phase. It is now felt here that the period of violent press-radio campaigns has come to an end and the leaders seem now to be jockeying for ~~mutual~~ position in a more subtle approach to each other in which nevertheless suspicion still exists.

In my first contact with the King on my arrival, he struck the dominant note when he talked at length about this new phase as it affected Arab -- Jordan relationship. He told me that, while he shared the general impression that violent policies would not return, nevertheless he was convinced that Cairo would continue through the Arab League inter alia to put him and his country in a difficult position.

Recent developments at the meeting of the foreign and defense ministers of the Arab League in Cairo seem to confirm Hussein's fears. The proposals to re-establish a Palestinian govt and to create a supreme command of the Arab forces are looked upon here as attempt to place Jordan in disadvantageous position. The instructions given by King to the Jordanian delegation are very ~~not~~ clear and firm since he knows the other interested govts (Saudi Arabia, Iran and Lebanon) are not ~~not~~ ready to oppose openly any proposals put forward by Pres Nasser to the Arab League. Jordan is not ~~not~~ prepared to accept the idea of reviving the Palestinian govt of 1948 as the King thinks that the situation has completely changed since the great majority of Palestinians--meaning the ones in Jordan - are already by their own decision Jordanian citizens. The Amman govt on this delicate issue is still of the opinion that, for the time being, the only useful step would be to implement fully one of the Shtura conferences decisions about the functioning of an inter-Arab Palestine committee.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 17 JUNE 1961 (Sent 17 1540Z Received 17 1641Z)
NUMBER: SP-40 (Continuation of SP-39)

As for the creation of a supreme command, the King is decided, even if he stands completely alone, to accept this only if the power of the commander in chief is restricted by the authority of a standing committee which would share the executive power and if the moving of troops into an Arab country other than their own would be permitted only in case of war.

B. The recent reports about a possible meeting of Pres. Nasser and King Hussein and of the heads of states of the Arab countries of the Middle East have no rpt no basis in fact for the time being.

C. I found the general internal situation quite calm. The over-all reaction to Hussein's marriage, although unanimously unfavourable, has now become less overtly so.

The King talks often about holding new elections which will be the prelude to a complete re organization not only of the govt but also of the whole structure of the state. I do not rpt not doubt at all these intentions of the King but I think some time yet will be required before this step is taken considering also the fact that certain groups, headed by the P M, are less than enthusiastic.

I still feel that there are few chances for Samir to return to power. The Monim Rifai problem, which was quite acute last week since he refused to visit the foreign minister, has been settled for the time being in a way that I think could happen only in Jordan. A few days after Musa Nasser's leaving for the Cairo conference, the P M summoned Monim and after a lengthy and cordial conversation asked him to head informally the foreign office during Mussa's absence.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM : SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE : 27 JUNE 1961. (sent 271722Z received 27 1937Z)
NUMBER: SP-46

(a) Things were flowing along quite nicely here and the general situation was relatively undisturbed by the decisions, political and military, taken in the Cairo conference when Kassem's statement regarding the status of Kuwait suddenly muddied the waters again. The first reaction of the Jordanians to the statement was not to take it too seriously but then they ~~realized~~ realized, in view of open commitment made by Kassem, it would be prudent to delay any official expression of their opinion and attitude. It seems clear, however, that Jordan is not in sympathy with Kassem's pretensions for two main reasons:

First, an opposition in principle to a smaller country's being absorbed by a larger and stronger one that bases its claim on alleged historical rights and second, because steps had already been taken to establish close political and economic ties with newly independent Kuwait. While I had planned to leave here the beginning of this week, I have now decided to wait a few days more to see how things develop.

(b) It has been announced semi-officially that the former prime minister, Fawzi Al-Mulki, will be appointed as permanent delegate to the UN to replace Munim Rifai. Mulki also had served as ambassador to London and to Cairo and is regarded as a man who always favoured friendship with president Nasser. His name is often mentioned as a possible future prime minister in any reshuffle of the government. He is a man in his early fifties and is considered generally as a person with sufficient prestige to try to implement perhaps a progressive and realistic policy. Lately, unfortunately, he has been quite unwell and it seems that his health may affect adversely his political future.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 30 JUNE 1961 (Sent 301725Z -- Received 302101Z)
NUMBER: SP 47

A. From my recent conversation with the King and the Prime Minister I was able to get a quite clear picture of their attitude toward the Iraq-Kuwait affair. While in principle they do not like the idea of Iraq's annexing Kuwait, they feel that, if Kassem manoeuvres cleverly, he stands a fair chance of obtaining in the long run a good part of his objective. The position taken by the Jordan government, so far rather non-committal, reflects this idea. The King told me that among other factors influencing his decision not to side openly with Kuwait was that if he did so, it might only serve to encourage Kassem, out of spite, to have recourse to some rash action. The King is also of the opinion that any military intervention by England in favour of Kuwait would at this moment strengthen Kassem's position in the Arab world. According to Hussein the best solution for this crisis would be found in the Arab world rather than bringing it now before the Security Council. He does not seem to feel that there is much likelihood of Kassem's using force in the immediate future. I have noticed that in this, as in all other crises, the King keeps his eyes always focussed upon President Nasser's attitude and upon what action the latter might take.

B. Yesterday's reshuffle of the Jordanian Cabinet represents a compromise between the King's intention to hold new elections and to modernize the structure of the state and the somewhat different idea of Talhouni and his supporters. The new Cabinet, in which Talhouni also becomes Foreign Minister replacing Mussa Nasser, is better than the old one since reactionary and corrupt elements - the sheikh type - have been almost eliminated. This reshuffle has caused little public comment since it is clear that the general policy of the government will remain the same.

C. I plan to leave for Geneva via Rome Sunday if in the meantime the situation does not deteriorate.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 1 JULY 1961 Sent: 011053Z Received: 0;1117Z
NUMBER: SP/48

As the situation seen from here could become critical next few days, I am postponing my departure.

SECRETARY-GENERAL

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM : SPINELLI, AMMAN.
DATE : 4 JULY 1961 (sent 04 1410Z received 04 1631Z)
NUMBER: EP/50.

The longer the Iraqi - Kuwait crisis continues, the more it is noticeable that public opinion in Jordan crystalizes or more precisely, develops, in favour of Kassem although his threat to use force is deplored. The British military intervention has, as foreseen, produced a unanimously unfavourable reaction even in the leading circles who seem to have completely forgotten 1958. I understand from Arab friends who have visited neighbouring Arab countries in the last few days that general public opinion there is very similar to Jordan's. This feeling does not follow the official line taken by the leaders who tend to give varying degrees of support to the cause of Kuwait even in spite of the United Kingdom's intervention. As far as Jordan is concerned, I feel that a UN intervention in the solution of the problem would not be resented although an inter-Arab prior attempt would be preferred. There is nothing new to report about internal matters in Jordan since the cabinet reshuffle except the offer made by Talhouni to Munim Rifai of the post of under-secretary of Foreign Affairs. Munim seems ready to accept but is trying to get the rank of deputy minister. I count on leaving here in 2 or 3 days in order to be in Geneva just before your arrival.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM : SPINELLI, GENEVA
DATE : 18 JULY 1961 (sent 18 1847Z rcvd 18 1901Z)
NUMBR : UNNUMBERED

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Having considered my trip to Togo in more detail, from the TA point of view, I feel that it would not be advisable for me to go there before sometime next week. I shall await decisions which will be taken by committee here next Saturday to see if it is preferable that I leave for Lome before the end of the month or later in August.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELDSERVICE
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 4 SEPTEMBER 1961 (Sent 040707Z Recvd 040811Z)
NUMBER: SP/64

Three year lease office premises expires 22 October. Have checked with Mr. Spinelli who advises me he would like renewal same and we suggest I try negotiate with landlord a one year least on same basis as before ie rent of JD 1500 per annum, two months advance notice of desire to vacate during that period plus ten percent of rent for the remaining unused period being required as indemnity. May I have authority to proceed?.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 3 OCTOBER 1961 Sent 3 0830Z Recvd 3 1151Z
NUMBER: SP-77

Please give following message Spinelli:

"Reur Amman 33, did you receive my cables gen 100, 101 and 102 before leaving Geneva? So far not much new in addition to that except Cairo has now broken relations with Jordan. Will keep you posted on further developments.

"New subject: Lanata for his part does not (repeat not) wish KM return to Mogadiscio."