

Middle East conflict - Jordan. Amman files: Middle East conflict - Jordan. ...

HS L 179:106a



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Amman, code cables (1960)

From Piero P. Spinelli — to Dag Hammarskjöld (Sec. Gen.)
(Amman, Jordan)

L 179: 1069

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, Amman
DATE: 10 March 1960 1513
NUMBER: SP-23

On my arrival in Amman last Sunday I found that, for a few days already, there had prevailed in Jordan a new tension in its relations with the U.A.R.

In some quarters locally it is thought ~~is~~ that this tension stems from a speech made by the King on 1 March which contained certain remarks interpreted by President Nasser as being aimed at him and his policy. The Jordanian Government denies the correctness of such an interpretation and maintains that the King's speech was couched only in general terms and dealt solely with general problems. In any case, say the Jordanian authorities, in the ~~many~~ many speeches which Nasser made in Syria during this last month he kept referring pointedly to the "lackey of imperialism" although never actually naming Hussein or the ~~King~~ Jordan Government.

The radio and press in Cairo and Damascus, taking their cue from Nasser's more or less open attacks on Hussein a few days ago, have adopted a tone which reminds me of the one used in 1958.

Yesterday Majali held a press conference at which he replied to U.A.R.'s attacks and advanced counter-arguments to justify Jordan's position. Although the tone of his statement was ~~is~~ quite correct, nevertheless its substance is not likely to improve the situation.

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In the talk which I had with the King yesterday I gained, for the first time since the beginning of this Mission, the impression that he was upset and nervous. He told me that, as long as the U.A.R. insisted upon trying to impose its policies on Jordan and other Arab States (he referred to the problem of the Palestine entity), there would be no hope of any improvement in the general situation in the Arab world. He felt pessimistic and discouraged and believed that the only way to react was to take a very firm stand against U.A.R. policies. Majali also told me more or less the same thing and the only assurance I have been able to obtain so far is that, if they have to continue their polemics with the U.A.R., they will maintain a correct tone and not resort to personal attacks.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 18 MARCH 1960 1412
NUMBER: SP 28

With some exceptions the Jordanians have kept their word not to make personal attacks in their polemics with the UAR although these have been continued in quite a strong tone.

In the last few days the King visited several army camps on the West bank where he made a number of speeches that contained remarks that would have been not said. He made quite clear the Jordanian position with reference to the question of Palestine. For the time being at least, he is opposed to creating a Palestinian entity, but at the same time he declares himself ready to accept the result of a plebiscite, to be held under the supervision of the Arab League, through which all Palestinians living in Jordan could indicate their political wishes .

For its part, the UAR continues to attack Jordan and its King quite sharply in press and radio. President Nasser, however, has himself made no statement since the one of last week.

Majali and Foreign Minister Mussa Nasser hold a somewhat different opinion from the King regarding the sharp tone of Jordan's polemics and they feel the time has now come to use the soft pedal. However, I am not sure they will have their way.

I think it best to delay my departure somewhat since I count on seeing the King again, perhaps more than once, in the next few days. I shall try to make clear to him my ideas concerning the difficult situation in which he is putting both himself and his country.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 24 MARCH 1960, 1402
NUMBER: SP 29

Judging from recent broadcasts made by Cairo and Amman, the mutual hate campaign is now abating. It may well be that the 2 main actors are beginning to think of other things - the one of his coming trip to India and Pakistan, the other of his visits to Teheran, Rabat, Tunis and Tripoli.

During the last week I have seen the King and Najali several times. To them I have repeated my cautionings about a more restrained attitude in their press and radio in order to bring the polemics with the UAR to a quick end. Both of them assured me that instructions are being given to slacken off the intensity of their utterances so that, if Cairo continues to adopt a more impersonal approach, as it has done these last few days, the whole thing will gradually fade away.

I leave for Geneva tomorrow Friday.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATED: 26 MAY 1960 1408
NUMBER: SP 40

Please pass the following to Mr. Spinelli:

A. Jordans activities and interest this week centered around Army Day 25 May. Eight celebrations were jammed into 4 days. At Army Day King gave a speech in which he really went after President Nasser without actually naming him however. For example he said "One sees in some cases only ignorant, adventurous and opportunist leaderships who are always active but only for ^{the} needs of the day and who are continually offering sacrifices in which they only sacrifice the public interests and Arab capabilities." We are now awaiting Cairo's counterblast. Ceder says he doubts that in this very strained atmosphere Radwan will return here at all. UAR he believes will continue on a Charge D Affairs basis.

B. In strictest confidence OMF told me he will be replaced here by the Honourable John Hennecke-Major, now chief of Bureau of Personnel at Foreign Office. OMF goes on home leave on 20 June, returns here again for visit of Duke of Gloucester and then proceeds direct to his new post, Aden.

C. OOF hopes to go on Home leave in September.

D. OOF took Waldstrom to see Jass Jamali, Mousa Nasser and briefly the King. Waldstrom who had just come from Baghdad filled them all in on the Iraqi picture. Waldstrom said anti-communists now much stronger and if anything happens to Kassem they will probably be able to take over. Americans apparently think Kassem may get knocked off anyday. OOF told Jordanians he very gratified at increasing anti communist strength as ^{it} justified Americans non-interventionist policy. Iraq must work out her own destiny. King remarked Jordan likewise had been non-interventionist and proposed to continue like that. This pleased OOF greatly..

CONTINUES IN SP 41

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE
FROM: SEGRE, AMMAN
DATED: 26 MAY 1960 1415
NUMBER: SP 41.

CONTINUATION SP 40

E. When OOF and Waldstrom talked to Mussa Nasser, the latter harked back to a letter he wrote to President Eisenhower 5 years ago. In it he said he had great confidence in the fair mindedness and ingenuity of the USA. But USA had never come to know the real facts of the Palestine question since Zionists had always seen to it that Arab case was never truly given. Therefore he wanted Eisenhower to appoint a group of outstanding personalities of the greatest integrity who would come to Palestine solely as a fact finding body, making no recommendations. Mussa Nasser still pushes this idea and from something Senator Fulbright said publicly it may be that Mussa Nasser found there a receptive ear. OOF remarked such would rather be for the UN to do, to which Mussa replied that at the time ~~of~~ of the letter Mr. Hammarskjold had just taken over and that the Arabs ^{HAD} had no confidence in Trygve Lie whom they believed to be pro Jewish.

F. OOF raised again with Mussa Nasser the latter's plan to resolve the Palestine question which was supposed to have been presented at the Arab League Foreign Ministers Conference. It never was presented due to the hassle over the Palestinian entity. Mussa said he still stood behind his plan which consisted of 6 points. OOF tried to get Mussa Nasser to detail these but Mussa Nasser ducked. The only thing he mentioned was the plan to make Israel a religious state- A Jewish Vatican-with no expansionist ideas. This strikes me as the acme of unrealism. Can one ever imagine Israel agreeing to disarm when surrounded by armed Arab neighbors ?

MORE FOLLOWS

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: FIELD SERVICE FOR SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATED: 26 MAY 1960 1501
NUMBER: SP 42

CONTINUATION OF SP 41

G. With Samir Fasha they talked mostly about Jordan's September elections. The rumour has spread that the UK AND the USA are forcing these elections. Not so says OOF. Samir says that if they must be held at all they should not be held under Majali and a government that has allegedly lost the peoples confidence. Some unpolitical body like the Judiciary should do it. Samir's main objection to their being held in September is that he fears UAR will put pressure on the West Bankers by forcing them to come out with their stand on the Palestine entity. Naturally they will support it and that will not be good for Jordan. There is some force to this argument. West Bankers feel UAR more capable pull their chestnuts out of fire than Jordan.

H. I can see there is little love lost between OOF and Samir, especially on latter's part. OOF feels Samir does not tell the truth and more or less told him so politely. The time when OOF/^{took}~~was~~ over here coincided with the end of the tension period when USA ceased its overly-generous crash programme. Samir can't help blame OOF and still feels if he were PM he could get out of USA more money than Majali. OOF does not agree E.G. Samir failed get extra funds during his visit to USA. OOF told me he thought Ken Wright had been too naive and inexperienced for a critical period.

I. Monim Rifai returning here soon. Says he won't go back either unless his government gives him enough money to handle the job properly.

J. The over-all water development programme has bogged down because Americans cannot find the properly qualified man to head it up despite a salary of \$24000. Majali is annoyed that Burns won't sign a point four contract until this man is found. So over \$1 Million lies inactive. The water situation is becoming very serious, also locally. My Jabal has not had one drop for several days and it is not known how long it will be so. I shall never take water just for granted again.

K. Any idea when you will come here?

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, GENEVA
DATED: 9 JUNE 1960 1055
NUMBER: UNGVA 1204

Leaving today for Amman/

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, GENEVA
DATED: 25 JULY 1960 0854
NUMBER: UNGVA 1573

From latest news received from Amman I gather that my presence there for the moment would serve little purpose. Am therefore postponing my trip to Jordan until sometime in August.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: PALTHEY, GENEVA
DATE: 29 AUGUST 1960 1532
NUMBER: UNGVA 1917

Spinelli en route for Lome. Having learned news from Jordan informs me he has changed his plans and will be in Amman tomorrow evening with Taylor Shore.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SPINELLI, GENEVA and SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK
FROM: LANATA, AMMAN
DATE: 29 AUGUST 1960 1000
NUMBER: SP 68

A violent explosion took place in Amman about noon today local time in the Prime Ministry. Unconfirmed reports state that many persons were killed and wounded.

Amman Radio at 1420 announced the death of Premier Majali in consequence of the explosion. Curfew has been imposed in Amman area until further notice. Communications remain normal.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, Amman
DATE: 17 June 1960 1409
NUMBER: SP-47, 48

CONFIDENTIAL.

As usual when returning here after some time away, I found an atmosphere somewhat out of touch with what is going on in the rest of the world and even in this region. This may be partly due to the fact that Jordan's main preoccupation is to secure its annual financial aid from various sources. Once they are sure of such aid, as they are for this year, their attitude towards other problems, including that of the rather severe prevailing drought, becomes hopeful. Even the possibility of a rapprochement between the U.A.R. and Iraq, so much talked about elsewhere, arouses here surprisingly little interest.

Concerning the general situation, it is quite evident that the King and Majali are not as they were previously, in complete agreement about many internal and inter Arab problems. Majali's approach is more realistic, whereas the King, advised by his inner circle, is inclined to insist too often on the ancient prestige of his family and on his duty to intervene -- so far fortunately only in words -- in the affairs of neighbouring Arab states. His last trip to Africa, and in particular the understanding he seems to have reached with the King of Morocco, have given him more confidence and have made him more decided to follow his own personal policies. I see this also in his reaction to the advice I always give him to be more realistic and reserved.

Re The two problems that have agitated this part of the Arab world lately, viz., the Palestine entity and the Jordan River waters, the picture remains the same in the sense that the Jordanian leaders are interested only in the first one. I have noticed that Majali's approach to it has become ever more realistic. Up to a few months ago only the Foreign Minister, Mussa Nasser, was ready to accept the idea of taking a first step towards creating a Palestine entity by establishing a committee

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to be composed of two Palestinians from Jordan and one Palestinian from non-Jordanian groups of refugees. Majali now more or less accepts this idea even if he is not clear in his mind about the committee's terms of reference. The Arab League which proposed such a committee believes that the main purpose of the committee should be to represent Palestine in international bodies. The question will be discussed again at the next meeting of the foreign ministers in Beirut set for after 15 August. However, my feeling is that no easy solution will be reached there, the more so since this time Iraq will send a representative.

While in the press Jordan and the U.A.R. have almost ceased attacking each other, one Cairo radio station, the Voice of the Arabs, carries on a series of violent broadcasts against the Hashemites and Majali. These attacks are countered as usual by Radio Amman in a more correct tone. Both countries say they are ready to stop all this but so far one misunderstanding or another has led to their continuance. However, the endless repetition has greatly decreased the propaganda value.

I plan to leave for Geneva Sunday, 19 June, to proceed thence to Rome around the middle of next week.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 18 JUNE 1960, 0815
NUMBER: SP-49

Early this morning a serious incident occurred in Amman in which Crown Prince Mohammed was involved. According to the first version given me unofficially by the Foreign Minister, it seems that Prince Mohammed in one of his tantrums fired his machine gun into a group of people who were obstructing the passage of his car, killing one or two. A later version, still unofficial, alleges that one person was shot by Mohammed's Aide de Camp when a small crowd surrounded the car in a threatening manner. So far the public at large has little knowledge of the incident. I am convinced that, notwithstanding the version when given officially, the position of the King and Majali will suffer.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATED: 20 JUNE 1960 0820
NUMBER: SP 51

In my last conversations with Jordanian authorities and with the UAR Ambassador, who returned here 18 June from Cairo, I received formal assurances from both sides that the 2 governments are ready to stop the radio campaign against each other and that they will see to it this in the very near future. However, as I have heard such assurances before, although not in so specific terms, let us hope that this time they really mean them.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL (PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL)
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 1 SEPTEMBER 1960 1404
NUMBER: SP 71

I found the general situation here among the people at large to be already calm and normal and this confirmed my feeling that the plot was made by persons outside the country so that the reaction of the populace was one of astonishment rather than one of commitment. I gained the impression however that considerable anxiety was still felt by the leaders.

Yesterday I saw first the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister together and then later, with them, the King. The conversation with the P M and the F M was on a quiet and realistic basis but when we were with the King afterwards his tone was more formal and stiff, reminding me of the conversation you had with him when you were here in early January 1959.

The Jordanian Government's contention is as follows. The UAR, having seen that all its efforts to overthrow the legal Government of Jordan were ineffective, had recently concentrated on organizing, through its undercover agent in Damascus, plots against the lives of Jordanian leaders, at the same time using the Cairo V O A Radio station to incite dissident elements to violence against them. The various attempts at assassination discovered in the last few months, as well as this last and successful one, all originated in Syria. While it is realized that absolute proof will be hard to obtain, the King especially is firmly convinced that these plots could not have been hatched without the UAR's consent and involvement. In particular, the last plot, which according to the earliest investigation, was executed by three hirelings, two of which were Foreign Ministry messengers (to whom sums of money in Syrian currency had been paid) demonstrates the vanity of any hope for Jordans having peaceful relationship with the U.A.R.

(More follows)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL (PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL)
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 1 SEPTEMBER 1960 1436
NUMBER: SP 72

(Continuation of SP 71)

A further proof of this, the Jordanian Government point especially to three aspects: (1) the assassination took place the very next day after the end of the Arab League Conference at which Jordan had agreed to many proposals, e.g. the Palestine entity (2) two of the plotters took refuge in Syria (3) the Cairo V O A, on the night of the assassination and before any comment from Amman, made clear reference to Majali's death, adding that all traitors would meet their doom sooner or later.

The King has said that, notwithstanding all this and in order to avoid further complications, he will for the time being be satisfied if the UAR will grant Jordan's request, soon to be made, to extradite the two who flew to Syria. The Jordanian Government is also thinking of asking for the help of the Arab League and of our Organization to secure this extradition. At the same time they also plan to ask us and the Arab League to use influence so that in the future there will be no repetition of such plots originating in Syria and so that a stop will be put to the UAR's press-radio incitement to assassination.

Since during our conversation the King stated that, if the UAR persisted in its present behaviour, he could not guarantee that Jordan would not take retaliatory action, I pointed out quite forcefully to him that I was in Jordan under your instructions to be of assistance at this difficult moment and that such language did not help me in my task. Although the King seemed to understand this, it did not prevent him from repeating his same idea later in a milder form.

I was told at the end of the meeting that, as soon as the investigation is completed, its results will be made known to me in detail.

The local press and radio gave prominence to the message which you sent to the King and to the latter's reply to it. The message was greatly appreciated since it made the people feel that Jordan did not stand alone in her time of trouble.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: SECGEN
FROM: SPINELLI, Amman
DATE: 4 September 1960 (Sent 1400 GMT; received 1519 GMT)
NUMBER: SP 73

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hassoona's visit to Amman, made at request of Jordanian Government, took place in rather formal atmosphere. For their part Jordanian Authorities confined themselves to factual account Majali's assassination without asking intervention Arab League, while Hassoona in turn took no repeat no initiative that might have encouraged Jordanians discuss Cairo-Amman relations. During Hassoona's very short stay Jordanians found way to mention their appreciation of fact that you had sent message and had instructed your Special Representative to return to Amman at once. Hassoona replied that he too would have come immediately Amman had he thought his presence would have served useful purpose. His answer made Jordanians feel Cairo did not repeat not wish Hassoona take initiative on part of Arab League.

In further conversation with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both expressed serious concern about situation that might develop. Since they feel quite sure there will be no move on Cairo's part that would ease situation, they fear that those elements among Jordanians that desire retaliation will become more vocal. Even moderate elements, among whom Prime and Foreign Ministers number themselves, believe that if some remedial action is not repeat not soon taken, situation is certain deteriorate to point where control could be lost.

Although Jordanian leaders have not yet got as far as formulating precise request for help, it seems to me they begin feel more and more that only intervention our Organization can save the day.

Radio-press campaign again full blast. Cairo and Damascus radio stations have resumed and even reinforced their incitement to eliminate Jordanian leaders and Amman radio has started again more forcefully than before its appeal to Syyrians to revolt against Egyptians.

TOP SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL

FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1960

Sent 9 ~~1500Z~~¹⁵⁰⁸ Received 9 1556Z

NUMBER: SP 78

Personal and confidential.

Situation to which I referred in second part my yesterday cable 76 has suddenly deteriorated. According information received from British Embassy alleged new plot against life of King decided latter began yesterday troop movements toward Syria which do not (repeat not) at all look of defensive nature. Am trying see King and Prime Minister this morning and shall advise you further.

Incoming code cable

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1960 (Sent; 091015z; Rcvd: 091050z)
NUMBER: Sp 79

Personal and confidential.

A. Jordanian Authorities remitted 6 September to local UAR Embassy formal request for extradition three persons accused complicity in plot which led to Najali's death. I had been notified such remittance was to be made and that copy of request, fully documented, would be sent our office, for information, as soon as translation had been prepared. The UAR however has in meantime notified Jordan that the 1953 extradition agreement between Jordan and Syria is considered abrogated by Cairo Government. Balance of message to follow separately.

TOP SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 9 1250Z Received 9 1553Z
NUMBER: SP 80

Personal and confidential.

Para B of our 76 repeated. Local situation appears reverting to normalcy and that may well be one reason why King, in attempt keep issue burning makes so many statements and gives so many press conferences.

I have clear impression that idea is growing in minds of King and of some Jordanian leaders that if all attempts - such as request for extradition, appeal to Arab League, appeal to UN - result in failure secure redress, their only remaining recourse is, in their turn, to organize similar plots in Syria. Such acts of violence - which might take even form border raids - should be made so provocative that even more violent counter-action could be expected from UAR. In preparation for this possibility, quite a few military movements mainly of defensive nature until now have taken place here these last few days.

Naturally I am doing my best convince Jordanian leaders that such retaliation is not at all in their interests but it is difficult for me know at present just how successful I am. However, while I do not exclude possibility of obtaining results by stronger intervention at right moment I am worried about two things:

1. that Cairo will reply to request for extradition in insolent tone,
2. that more plots against Jordanian leaders will be laid. If either these possibilities occurs and the second is much more dangerous, then I fear it will be very difficult to restrain King and Jordanian leaders from embarking on hazardous and absurd ventures.

TOP SECRET

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL

FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1960

Sent 9 1900Z Received 9 1959Z

NUMBER: SP 82

Personal and confidential. In view alarming news about troop movements I saw King and P M this morning to ascertain factual situation and reasons therefore. King told me it true certain units moved from West bank towards Syria border as part larger plan take precautionary measures. He emphasized and repeated word "precautionary" saying he not thinking of any aggressive action. However he could not guarantee in view persistent UAR plotting, that day would not come when he would be forced think of different approach. King added that if and when that time came he would inform me. He accepted all my arguments against rash action but explained that in climate created by UAR - and he said more plots had been uncovered - he and his followers might soon have to choose between enduring continued killings and taking such rash action.

This conversation confirmed my impression of danger some irrational action by Jordan, the unknown factor being the extent to which King under pressure to confront Syria aggressively. It could be King no longer free agent since he feels he must do something placate incensed and now unopposed military who are trying to force his hand.

British and Americans use every effort dissuade King from taking any action which might render already complicated situation even more difficult.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TOP SECRET

TO: SECGEN
FROM: SPINELLI Amman
DATE: 11 September 1960 (Sent 1405Z; received 1735Z)
NUMBER: SP 783.

I very glad get your 64. Situation shows no new development but it seems now quite clear King and Military think there will shortly be serious internal trouble in Syria which could result possibly in Jordan's being asked for aid by a new separatist Syrian Govt. I do not see how they came believe this but it appears, and I have heard this in many quarters, that recent troop movements towards Syrian border were made mainly in view this possibility.

I feel King has listened seriously to various interventions made not only by myself but also by UK and USA as well as by some Jordanian notables like Samir Rifai with whom I am in close contact. Nevertheless the situation still fraught with danger since best fighting units whose commanders are all Bédouins, several belonging to Majali clan, are now fully mobilized, deployed towards the border and eager for action. Thus the tinder is all prepared and any match could touch off a conflagration.

In last few conversations with King and PM they asked me if I had received any message from you replying to my communications. I think time may now be opportune for you to send me word which I could both pass on to them and also use as a basis for further action. We shall probably be confronted shortly -- unless Jordan makes some rash move -- by a request for UN assistance since it remains their declared plan to appeal for redress to the Arab League and to our Organization in case extradition is not granted. Thus for my further action it would be helpful if I knew how far I may go in assuring them that upon their request, we shall do our best to alleviate the tense situation between Jordan and the UAR.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 13 1054Z Received 13 1641Z
NUMBER: SP 85

I feel your briefing for my oral communication to King and Prime Minister, which I shall make later today or tomorrow morning, will be of great assistance to me unless Jordan becomes the man whom God wishes to destroy by rendering him mad.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 13 1825Z Received 13 2002Z
NUMBER: SF 86

As intimated in my 85, I communicated your message this afternoon to the King with P M and Foreign Minister also present.

While the King expressed his thanks for the interest you are taking and for your offer of assistance, he reacted in his usual formal way to the first part of your message in which you expressed the hope that no action would be taken which could be considered as provocative in view of the fact that he seemed not to appreciate this, I then explained to the King that we believed it to be our duty to bring to his attention the inadvisability of taking action that would only render it more difficult for the UN to help Jordan. My explanation, however, did not appear to change his attitude and he went on repeating his usual complaints against the UAR which he ~~said~~ said was responsible for the whole trouble. He added, however, that he was not contemplating any aggressive action as long as there was hope of solving the situation peacefully. According to him, such a solution could be reached (1) if the UAR showed itself ready to extradite the three Jordanians implicated in Majali's death and (2) if a formula could be found whereby the UAR could be convinced to put Jordan on the good - neighbour basis envisaged in the August 1958 G.A. Resolution, which means for him mainly the cessation of incitement by press and radio to murder Jordanian leaders and the preventing of Jordanian political refugees from plotting in the Syrian province.

At the end of the meeting and the Foreign Minister expressed to me formally their sincere wish to have you use your good offices to that end as they feel that otherwise the situation will deteriorate since the Arab League apparently is not prepared to do anything.

B. In our next Pouch I am sending you a translation of the official legal request made by the Jordanian Government to the Minister of Justice of the Syrian province for the extradition of the three Jordanians. To this request are attached statements made by various witnesses against these three accused men.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1960 (Sent 171102Z) (Received 171443Z)
NUMBER: SP 87

The news of the Syrian decision to close the border nightly from 7 P.M. to 6 A.M. the following day coincided yesterday with the news of recent concentration of UAR troops along the Jordanian north border. While this troop concentration increases evidently the potential danger of the situation, it may well deter the Jordanian hot heads who had been thinking in terms of a surprise attack. So far there has been no reaction on the part of the Jordanians to the Syrian decision to close the border nightly.

If you have a spare moment I would appreciate an answer, even if a preliminary one, to my last cable number 86.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 17 SEPT 1960 (Sent: 171955z; Rcvd: 172133z)
NUMBER: SP 88

Personal and confidential. Most urgent.

This afternoon I was summoned to the Royal Palace where the King informed me that, in view of the tense situation prevailing here, and of the difficult position in which his country has found itself lately and having considered your recent suggestion, he is now of the opinion that all efforts to find a solution should be made through the UN. He sincerely hopes that through your good offices the problem can be solved and he intends to go to New York in the early part of next month as the head of the Jordanian Delegation, also in order to be available for any consultation you may wish to have with him in the execution of your good offices. He added that only in case it was patently impossible to find a peaceful solution - and he is confident that that will not happen - he would then have to consider, after consultation with you, the advisability of presenting Jordan's case to the GA.

After the meeting with the King, the PM asked me to see him together with Samir Rifai. The two of them explained to me briefly that they had been able to convince the King to stop thinking about the inevitability of irrational action and to turn his thoughts instead to something more constructive. Their idea is that only through a real understanding with the UAR can this impossible situation be changed. They believe that a meeting in New York at the highest level - evidently they mean Nasser and Hussein - under your auspices could go a long way towards achieving that ens. They assured me that if such a meeting takes place, they will attend it with open minds, forgetting the past and naturally without putting any preliminary conditions.

As Talhouni and Samir Rifai expressed a desire to see me tomorrow in order to elaborate their ideas I would be grateful to you if you could let me have for my guidance your first reaction to this new development.

Underlined word received as per copy.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 19 1111Z Received 19 1221Z
NUMBER: SP 89

I have your messages 71 and 73 for which I am most grateful.

A) Rifai explained to me yesterday how he succeeded in the last few days, first through Talhouni and then directly, in persuading the King to listen to the voice of reason. The young monarch is now convinced that only a general reconciliation with the UAR will spell peace for Jordan and he is ready, anyhow for the time being, to go a long way to attain that objective. According to Rifai, who has been lately the catalyst in the matter, it would be enough, in order to stop the present grave impasse, if Nasser and Hussein could just meet. Afterwards the Jordanians would have no objection to pursuing the matter further even if on a different level either in New York or Cairo. I realized even before receiving your last cable that their too rapid change of heart does not give you enough time to create the proper atmosphere for something that should happen only in the very near future. Nevertheless I feel - as you rightly said in your last message and as Rifai said in almost the same words the day before yesterday, - this is a unique opportunity which may not occur again for a long time.

I shall not have to suggest here that the stay should be a short one since in the meeting I had the other day with Talhouni and Rifai it was clear that the visit in New York would last not more than 4 or 5 days. The tentative schedule is to leave on 2 October to be in New York on the 3rd or 4th. The date of leaving here could be easily postponed but setting an earlier date, is possible even if there might be some little difficulty.

Rifai, who along with Talhouni, is supposed to accompany the King, would appreciate hearing your opinion about the best timing for the possible intervention of the King in the G.A. and for the possible high-level meeting.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 19 1645Z Received 19 1628Z
NUMBER: SP 90

Continuation of 89.

B) I will see Galhouni today and tomorrow the Foreign Minister but I do not expect to hear anything new from them.

C) The press and radio campaign continues unabated and announcements followed by denials about alleged or real small border incidents have become a daily practice. The concentration of troops by both sides has reached a stationary state but with no sign of any intention of partial withdrawal. I do not exclude the possibility, if in the near future there is hope of some détente seen in New York, of persuading the Jordanians to step down the tone of their propaganda and to pull back some of their troops who, so I am assured, are some distance from the border.

D) You may be interested in knowing what the Lebanese Ambassador to Jordan told me last week. According to him, Hassouna said in his presence to the Lebanese Foreign Minister that the UAR Govt was opposed to any mediation by the Arab League because the Jordanian Govt came out immediately after the bombing with open accusations that UAR authorities were involved in the plot.

I have a small comment to add to that. It is a fact that on the same night of the assassination at 915 the commentator of radio Amman charged the Syrian authorities with the murder of Majali and that afterwards the same radio and the King himself in their attacks of complicity did not spare even Nasser himself. However, it is a fact to that the voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo, which up to the middle of August had incited to violent action against Majali, on the same night of the assassination at 815 (one hour before the first comment on Majali's death by the Amman radio) after referring, without mentioning Majali's name, to what had happened in Jordan on that day, ended its broadcast saying "that this was a clear demonstration that all traitors would find their doom sooner or later."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL Personal and Confidential
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 22 1540Z Received 22 1652Z
NUMBER: SP 83

I transmitted to Samir Rifai yesterday the contents of your cables 76 and 77 and this morning in the presence of Talhouni I gave the King your message of welcome. The King told me that he is doing his best to arrange his schedule so as to be in New York on 29 September. He asked me to express to you his sincere appreciation and to assure you that he intends to go as far as possible to help in the attempt to reach an amicable settlement.

Please let me know if you think it advisable that I too should be in New York during the King's visit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL Personal and Confidential
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1960 Sent 22 1006Z Rec'd 22 1058Z
FROM
NUMBER: SP-92

Urgent.

If your 82 refers to para (d) of my message number 90 I evidently did not express myself clearly. My comment on what the Lebanese Ambassador had told me was aimed at the fact that it was the Cairo radio which had been in the first instance provocative.

I fear that, if any report on the matter to Amman from Abdul Monem Rifai is not accompanied by an assurance that the same action was also taken in connection with UAR radio stations, it will have a very unfavourable reaction here and will give more strength to those who are always ready to maintain that, if any warning is to be given by the UN, it is always to Jordan that it is given and not to the UAR. In this particular instance they would have some real justification because since the 29 August plot all the UAR stations have taken and kept the lead in being more aggressive, rejoicing overtly in Majali's death and inciting to further acts of violence.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 24 SEPT 1960 (Sent: 241718z; Rcvd: 241834z)
NUMBER: SP 97

In my conversation with King, FM and some of the high officers who are going to New York, everybody repeated to me that nothing will be done on the Jordanian sides to make difficult a reconciliation in the UN atmosphere. What they mean by that is hard to know even if M I succeeded in getting the following assurances: 1. That the message of the King to the nation and army before he leaves here will be moderate in tone; 2. That the King will exercise every restraint in dealing with the press on arrival in New York; 3. That the King and the Jordanian delegation will not repeat not attack Nasser and the UAR until they feel there is ~~not~~ no repeat no hope for a satisfactory solution; 4. That the Kings speech on three October in the General debate will deal with general problems and will not repeat not contain any specific references to the UAR.

About this last assurance I have some preoccupation, because, while to me the King hinted he would develop interKalia the well known theme that the UN is the "summit of the small nations", to the British Ambassador he elaborated today a little more and in such a way that I feel that he is thinking about presenting Jordans case in a very general manner and this might risk spoiling chances for arriving at an agreement. However, if the King really meant what he told me so often in the last few days, and repeated again this morning, about his sincere desire of reaching a satisfactory and ~~is~~ peaceful solution then we shall still have a chance in New York to Guide him in the right direction for the presentation of his ideas and the tone of his speech.

The King leaves on Tuesday 27 TH via London and will be in New York afternoon of the 28 TH. The chances for Rifais going to New York are at present almost nil.

I confirm my arrival in New York for ~~at~~ the afternoon of Tuesday, 27 TH.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER FOR SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 1 OCT 1960 (Sent: 30 Sept 1636z; Rcvd 1 Oct 0827z)
NUMBER: SP 107

Met with Eric and Charles this morning.

A. Eric read message from his people in Cairo giving their appreciation Nasser's attitude to Jordan and to what extent he involved in Majali's death. Fearing Israeli seizure West Bank and financial drain Jordan would impose, they say Nasser not wishes seize latter country. However he not against getting rid of certain Jordanian personalities thus bringing Jordan more into line with his own policies. They not believe Nasser Himself instigated plot leading to Majali's murder but agree Serraj may well have been involved. They say Nasser has trod carefully re Jordan since 29 August e.g. for several days Cairo said nothing re Jordanian troop movements not wishing create military tension. Comment: they must confine their sources to relatively restrained Cairo press and not listen to Cairo's V O A.

B: Syria seems now calling up reserves into Army to confront massed Jordanian troops.

C: Syrian military plane force landed in Jordan yesterday. Pilot alleges he got lost and ran out of gas. Jordanians claim he defector. The question is now did he get so far into Jordan query. It looks like reconnaissance flight like the U2 to observe Jordanian troop movement.

D: Eghtiary told Eric and Charles Shah hopes US and UK will go all out and support Hussein. Shah also writing Hussein warm letter of encouragement, urging him take no rash action. Charles said his people at GA were instructed make big fuss over Hussein. Ebio said he asked Washington arrange Eisenhower meet with Hussein as he had done with Nasser. Got no reply. UK speeding up delivery Centurion tanks to Jordan to bolster and please Hussein who wants them very much.

Underlined word received as per copy.

HP.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER for SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1960 (Sent 280810Z - Received 280848Z)
NUMBER: SP-101

Today's Jerusalem Times reports under London 27 September datelin that King Hussein said: he had no "personal wish or desire" to see United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser while in the United States.

Nasser, Hussein said, "has been responsible for many crimes" in the mid-east, including the time bomb assassination last month of Jordan's Prime Minister Hasaa Majali.

SP

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER FOR SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 4 OCT 1960 (Sent: 041820z; Rcvd: 041951z)
NUMBER: SP-113

Met again with Charles and Eric this morning but nothing much developed as we are more or less in the dark here as to what transpires in Newyork. Both asked if I had heard from you.

A: Charles read several messages from his people in Newyork. They dealt chiefly with British efforts get on better footing with UAR. British seem anxious do this and are taking the initiative; want to reopen their Cairo Embassy and establish consulates in Damascus and Alexandria. Nasser complained a) about British earlier refusal let him open consulates in certain British territories b) about hostile British propaganda c) about British giving arms to Israel. British rebutted saying they gave more arms to Arab nations and that Nassers propaganda accused UK of being up to all kinds of tricks in Jordan when exactly the opposite had been the case. They had urged Hussein be moderate and do nothing rash. It does seem UAR and UK will come closer together.

B: Nasser said he had nothing against Hussein personally but would not be meeting him in Newyork. He continued to maintain the press radio campaign as all Jordans fault. Jordan assumes the initiative in attacking and UAR only counter attacks. One hopeful sign appeared when Nasser pointed out the press radio war between Iraq and UAR had been allowed gradually to die out. This could be taken as a willingness for same happen for Jordan.

C: Nothing has been heard here about Kassems honouring the agreement entered into in New York by his Foreign Minister with Hussein to recognize again each others countries. The Jordanians here are greatly pleased to recognize Iraq again - both for political as well as for economic reasons. But so far it seems one sided. More follows.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER FOR SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 1 OCT 1960 (Sent: 30 Sep 1717z; Rcvd: 1 OCT 0833z)
NUMBER: EP 108

To continue.

E: Jordan asked Syria for clearance of (King's) plane but did not say he would be aboard. This clearance was first given, then cancelled. However it did not change King's plans as he had already decided meantime not to overfly Syria but go long way round via Sudan, etc.

F: In London King was met by Jord Privy Seal, Heath, who pointedly compared high level of Eisenhovers speech to GA with Krushchevs baser approach. Charles said Hussein seemed to get the point all right.

G: On return journey King may stop off in Turkey and also spend week in Teheran. Good idea says Charles.

H: Charles reported talk he had with much-discouraged Senator Hashem. Latter said leading Jordanians feel King should retire completely from Govt and rule constitutionally. Hashem added that Halaby and Said Mufti had agreed serve as ministers under Samir Rifai - former as Foreign Minister (that is why Hashem is sad) latter probably as Minister of Interior. It is obvious this idea comes from Rifai inspired by selfish interests but Charles says it is nevertheless good one since Halaby more popular on West Bank than Mussa Nasser. Talbouni would probably be happy go back to Palace and King becoming tired governing all alone. So maybe idea will work.

I: Beirut and Amman press reported UAR's permanent Representative to UN was at airport welcome Hussein. This seems incredible but if true, is sure encouraging sign. Do I see our SG at work here?

J: I met Wric and Charles again Tuesday morning. We are all thirsting for news and they would be most appreciative if you could cable me something of what happens in NewYork.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER for SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 5 OCTOBER 1960 (Sent 050830Z - Received 051015Z)
NUMBER: SP-115

Zaki Qusus has just phoned me with a request from Jordanian authorities, including Acting Prime Minister, that I go and see the body of the Syrian pilot who committed suicide here yesterday. Their idea is to have an impartial witness to support them in case UAR claims Jordanians beat and maltreated this pilot to the point where he killed himself. Qusus made a similar request of Dalaty, local UAR Charge d'Affaires but he refused until he had word from Cairo. As the body is already 20 hours old and as under Moslem custom it should be buried now as quickly as possible may I please have your immediate instructions as to what I am to do?

148

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER FOR SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1960 (Sent 04 1905Z Recv'd 04 2146Z)
EO: SP-114

To continue.

D: The two way circuit set up by RCA to hear from New York the Arabic translation of King's speech did not succeed. Jordans technical apparatus proved inadequate. However, we did get fairly well the WDSI broadcast of King's actual voice in English and this was put over the Amman Radio. I am told it did not rebroadcast too well. I sent to Amman radio station one of our radio boys to assist them as their technical personnel seemed unable to cope. Without him they would have been completely lost. Despite that, they blamed the UN for the failure of the two way circuit, being unable to comprehend their own equipment was what was really at fault.

Reception of King's speech was mixed. Some thought he went too far in attacking UAR, others that he did not go far enough. There was also a lot of criticism that King did not play up more Palestine and refugee problem.

E: Charles leaves here 24 October. His replacement arrives a few days afterwards.

F: Some Jordanian troops have now been brought back to Amman from Syrian border. This does not imply, that a detente is involved. It was done for security reasons in Amman. Prince Mohammed loves his security. Also the Queen Mother may come at any moment.

G: An American ship is on it's way to Jordan with military equipment. Ironically this ship is on Arab black list. Eric was to late to have the ship changed but suggested to Washington this ship not call at Aqaba in order not put Jordanian Govt on the spot. Was ship used inadvertently or is it a deliberate attempt to break up the black listing?

H: Eric said Washington decided against Mills going New York be with Hussein. Parity of treatment was the reason. Other visiting potentates would have expected the same.

I: Both Eric and Charles were summoned to see Prince Mohammed today noon. Reason unknown, ^{and also unknown} if they would be received together. It may be in lieu of a visit to Regency Council for which both had asked.

J: Eric had been with Samir when King's speech was broadcast. Said Samir's mental state was "emotional", kept jumping up and down to see which of his half dozen radios was giving best reception. Eric said Samir was reasonably cheerful but clearly disappointed and frustrated that he was not in New York.

K: Americans are late in getting promised seed corn in hands of farmers who have finished their plowing and are waiting for it. Twelve thousand tons promised Jordan by USA; will try buy in Lebanon, Turkey or Italy.

L: Will meet with Charles and Eric again in our office at 1100 hours Friday 7 October. Any news from your end would be gratefully appreciated.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER for SPINELLI
FROM: SHORE, AMMAN
DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1960 Sent 11 1553Z Received 11 1730Z
NUMBER: SP-119

A: Considerable local dissatisfaction with King's GA speech continues.

B: Prince stated at meeting of Regency Council that Jordan-Iraq border now open and traffic flowing freely; further, that Jordan Govt had received note from Iraq confirming desire resume diplomatic relations. Responsible persons believe neither is the case.

C: Many Jordanians - even those usually supporting Govt - believe UAR, rather than Jordanian, version of Madani affair. But why would Jordanian Govt wish kill this pilot?

D: Morale Jordanian troops near Syrian frontier said low. They are fed up with inactivity. Rains which normally begin that area in couple weeks would fortunately bog down any possible military move either side. Habis Majali however remains cheerful.

E: Reliable sources here feel UAR would not take initiative break diplomatic relations. Each side wants other do that. As always, Rifai strongly opposes such action by Jordan.

F: UAR note, refused by Jordan, complained on three points: 1. Madani death 2. Arrest several employees local UAR Embassy 3. Alleged attempt kill or injure member local UAR Embassy when Jordanian auto swerved in front of him causing him veer off road into tree.

G: Jordanian Govt pressing UNRWA re-engage discharged Jordanian Hebron district office, Duzdar. UNRWA refuses since this man has bad record and also was behind newspaper attacks on Lucas.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER for SPINELLI

FROM: SHORE, AMMAN

DATE: 14 OCTOBER 1960 Sent 14 1035Z Received 14 1534Z

NUMBER: SP-120

A: A visit that was paid to West bank yesterday revealed things quite quiet that area - quieter by way of exception than in Amman. Even in Amman tension seems to have recently slackened off somewhat.

B: King will spend one extra day in London to have further talk UK persons. It is reported he is angrier than ever with Nasser and an attempt will be made calm him down.

C: King received from Shah invitation visit Teheran en route Jordan and has this under consideration.

D: Washington has asked West German officials there contribute to Jordans budgetary support. The figure of from 5 to 7 million dollars was mentioned.

E: The UAR, having extracted all it could propaganda - wise from Madani affair, the thing seems to be blowing itself out.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1960 (sent 11 1055Z; Received 11 1318Z)
NUMBER: SP/121

Local situation remains relatively unchanged. While the King continues to be relaxed and to hope for some favourable development on the part of the UAR, he still is unwilling to assume all the initiative in decreasing to a significant degree the Amman radio programme directed to the Syrians. With the troop withdrawal away from the Syrian border well under way and with the inauguration of several important completed projects such as the desert road, the atmosphere has again become almost as normal as it was before Najali's death. Only the security measures, which are sometimes a little exaggerated, show the continued existence in the minds of the Jordanian leaders of a plot complex.

As any reaction from Cairo may still take some time to eventuate, I feel that, in the circumstances outlined above, the time has now come when I could absent myself for a short period. I therefore am thinking of leaving here in about one week or ten days time for Rome via Geneva also because I consider it would be unwise to postpone the promised visit to Olympia any further.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1960 Sent 28 1140Z Received 28 1448Z
NUMBER: SP-124

In my first and subsequent contacts with King, Prime Minister and other civilian and military personalities I find everybody for the first time since last spring (when UAR-Jordan relations began to deteriorate), relaxed and patently appreciative of the efforts we have made and are making to assist them in going through this difficult period with the UAR. While the PM has often repeated to me that His Majesty and the Jordanian Government will do all in their power to overcome with your help this crisis, the King himself took pains to confirm to me what he told you before leaving New York i.e. that he depends on our advice to ease the situation and to seek a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi with Nasser. He was to some extent apologetic for including in his G.A. speech direct criticism of the UAR, adding however that he had had to speak like that because the UAR had gone too far in permitting plots against Jordanian leaders to have been hatched in Damascus. He gave me the impression that now that this has been said and his words fully exploited for local consumption, he felt in a position to follow a less antagonistic policy. In discussing the recent heights of violence reached in the radio campaign he promised me that he would give orders for a gradual diminution of this in the hope that Cairo would follow suit.

Notwithstanding this rather optimistic background and these fair promises for the future, present and actual conditions are I must admit none too encouraging. The mutual personal attacks made by Hussein and Nasser in their speeches last week have risen to unprecedented violence and vituperation; the radio-press campaign has flared up again following bomb explosions in Damascus for which the UAR alleges Jordan is responsible; the local UAR Embassy complains continuously of big and small annoyances perpetrated on it by Jordanian authorities. Against this, the only really favorable development is that already one third of the Jordanian troops at the Syrian border have been withdrawn to Amman and the rest are gradually to move back to some extent but all of them will remain in Transjordan proper.

(More follows)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 3 NOVEMBER 1960 Sent 3 1640Z Received 3 1807Z
NUMBER: SP-127

Last few days have produced no significant new developments. Considering the tension still existing between Jordan and the UAR, the King's speech at the opening of Parliament on 1st November was moderate enough in tone even if - against my advice - it did include one critical reference to President Nasser in which latter's name was mentioned.

While the Jordanians are slowly moving their troops back from the Syrian border, the radio campaign in general (the press campaign has been much reduced) shows some signs of slackening off on both sides but more in the frequency of the broadcasts than in their violence. However, one Cairo radio station, the Voice of the Arabs, has intensified its programme directed to the people of the West Bank. This may well cause radio Amman to do likewise in its programme directed to the Syrians.

In my further contacts over the last few days I again received assurances that Jordan, in order to overcome this difficult period, is prepared to follow all our advice but if I am any judge their words so far speak louder than their actions.

My general feeling about their state of mind is that the King, in spite of many dissenting voices around him, is ready and, to a certain extent, is even anxious to start dealing with the UAR authorities in order to reach a détente that will lead to a better modus vivendi with that State. However he is awaiting some encouraging sign from the UAR as to its readiness for discussion so that he may feel strong enough to silence those who oppose the policy of common sense espoused by many people like Samir Rifai and Talhouni.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 19 NOVEMBER 1960 sent 191130Z received 191415Z
NUMBER: SP 132

In my last conversations with King and Prime Minister before my departure, I stressed again my feeling that a real diminution of the radio campaign was a pre-requisite for any attempt to start a rapprochement with the UAR. They both agreed with me, as usual, and both assured me that they were prepared to do this. However, actual implementation is very limited and there are even times when the Jordanians add fuel to the fire; for example, a few days ago Esdio Amman, after giving the names of those^{WHO} are shortly to be tried in connexion with Mijk Majali's assassination, went on to say that the name of the chief criminal, namely Nasser, was not included in the list. Notwithstanding the assurances given me to the contrary, I fear that in the course of this trial, which begins in early December, there will inevitably be virulent attacks on President Nasser.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, GENEVA
DATE: 9 DECEMBER 1960 Sent 9 2008Z Recvd 9 2046Z
NUMBER: URGVA 2857

Just returned from Togoland where I found our work developing in encouraging way. Will report in detail beginning next week. As from news received from Amman in the meantime it appears that no new developments are to be expected during next weeks, I feel I could postpone my return there until last week December, by which time also the Majali murder trial will quite certainly be over.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: SPINELLI, AMMAN
DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1960 (Sent: 311630; Rcvd: 312204z)
NUMBER: SP151

Despite the fact that on the day I arrived here the verdicts were pronounced on those accused in connexion with Majalis death, and the fact that, since then, executions have taken place, the situation remains remarkably calm.

The King, the Prime Minister and the other political leaders whom I have seen these last few days struck me as being relatively unconcerned about the recent violent attacks made by the Cairo and Damascus radio stations and by President Nasser himself. They all repeated again that they are still ready to begin at any level working toward a modus vivendi with the UAR and would welcome any encouraging sign in that direction. As proof of their readiness they pointed out that although Cairo has had here only a Charge d'Affaires for the last few months, they have decided to replace their Ambassador to the UAR (who is old and quite useless) by a Palestinian of a certain standing who, by the way, was one of the most important members in the Nabulsi (very pro Nasser) Cabinet.

I plan to remain here until middle January.