

Middle East - U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) - outgoing code cables: Middle Ea...

HS L 179:124



Dag Hammarskjölds saml.

L 173:129

Middle East

Nov. 56-58

Burns, E. L. M. (Commander, UNEF)

- 7 cables to D.M. (on interviews with Nasser and Fawzi etc.)
- 1 letter to D.M.

The Legal Council

12 February

9

The Secretary-General

In a letter explaining among other things the Israel attitude on the incident of 4 February, the following view is expressed regarding the status of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the participation of the United Nations in the Commission.

"As you know, the Armistice Agreement between ourselves and Egypt is no longer valid, in view of Egypt's continued violation of the decisions of the Security Council and the Constantinople Convention in regard to our freedom and navigation in the Suez Canal and in view of Egypt's claim of a state of belligerency against us in violation of the Armistice Agreement and of an express decision of the Security Council. The participation of United Nations representatives in an Egyptian "Armistice Commission" which does not exist is therefore tantamount to condoning the state of belligerency against us which is proclaimed by Egypt in violation of the Security Council decision."

I would wish you to give a legal opinion on the interpretation thus given to the obligations of the United Nations in this context.

UNITED NATIONS  NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM


TO: The Secretary-General

Date: 12 February 1959

THROUGH:

FILE NO.: _____

"CONFIDENTIAL"

FROM: The Legal Counsel 

SUBJECT: Letter from Israel relating to the status of, and United Nations participation in, the Mixed Armistice Commission established under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel

1. This memorandum is in answer to your request for a legal opinion on the obligations of the United Nations in the context of the argument put forward by Israel in a letter concerning the incident of 4 February 1959.

2. As I understand it, Israel has advanced the following contentions:

- I. The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt is no longer valid, because (a) Egypt has violated the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the Convention of Constantinople regarding freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and (b) Egypt has continued to claim that a state of belligerency exists with Israel contrary to the Armistice Agreement and a decision of the Security Council;
- II. As a consequence of the above, United Nations participation in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission is "tantamount to condoning the state of belligerency" claimed to exist by Egypt.

From the outset, I would like to state that I am unable to see any cogency whatsoever in the final contention advanced by Israel. As far as the obligations of the United Nations are concerned in the context of the above arguments, I understand them to relate to the question of the validity of the Armistice Agreement, and United Nations participation in the MAC.

A. Validity of the Armistice Agreement

2. The arguments advanced by Israel to support the view that

the Armistice Agreement is no longer valid have frequently been invoked before. However, it is relevant to note that, as regards the Agreement:

- a) it has never been formally denounced by Israel;^{1/}
- b) it makes no provision for unilateral denunciation, but provides instead for revision by mutual consent (Article XII, paragraph 3), or, failing this, recourse to the Security Council (Article XII, paragraph 4);
- c) it explicitly states that, subject to revision by mutual consent, it "shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved" (Article XII, paragraph 2);
- d) it has never been deemed by the Security Council to be abrogated; on the contrary, the Council has always upheld its validity when Israel has previously advanced the same arguments;
- e) its validity has been re-affirmed by the General Assembly in the face of similar arguments by Israel [General Assembly resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1125 (XI)];
- f) its validity, furthermore, has been consistently upheld by the Secretary-General pursuant to the policies of the Council and of the Assembly (see, for example, A/3512).

Finally, it may be noted that the Security Council has denied that either Party may exercise belligerent rights, and has called for the lifting of restrictions in the Suez Canal, largely because of the existence and nature of the Armistice Agreement and its continued validity. The Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, for example, states that "since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent ...".

^{1/} Israel's attitude towards the MAC appears to have been defined in political terms of non-cooperation rather than in legal terms of formal repudiation of the Agreement.

3. In view of the foregoing, it can only be concluded that the Armistice Agreement is still valid and that it is the obligation of the United Nations to uphold it in its entirety pending the final settlement or any contrary decisions by the Council or the Assembly. As you have yourself pointed out "the Secretary-General, in carrying out the policies of the United Nations, must act with scrupulous regard for the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other principal organs" (A/3512, para. 5). This would appear to apply also to all other organs of the United Nations (including UNTSO) and would seem to be relevant both as regards the validity of the Armistice Agreement, and the questions of belligerency and freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal.

B. Functioning of, and United Nations participation in,
the Egyptian-Israeli MAC

4. Israel has suggested that "the participation of United Nations representatives in an Egyptian 'Armistice Commission' which does not exist is ... tantamount to condoning the state of belligerency against us which is proclaimed by Egypt in violation of the Security Council decision." As already indicated, I am unable to see any logic or consistency in this argument. The Armistice Agreement remains valid, and it is, therefore, in my opinion, the duty of the United Nations to co-operate with and participate in the MAC established by that Agreement. Participation in the peace machinery has exactly the contrary effect to condoning any claim to the exercise of rights of belligerency. As previously pointed out, it is because of the armistice regime and its peace machinery that belligerent rights may not be exercised. The failure of Israel to participate in the MAC in no way changes its character or status under the Armistice Agreement, and does not turn it into an "Egyptian 'Armistice Commission'." To adopt this latter contention by Israel, would be to permit Israel to take advantage of its own default.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: DE SEYNES, GENEVA
DATE: 28 JULY 1959 1615
NUMBER: UNGVA 1568

Your 1435. Israeli Permanent Representative here approached Nyun and Hill. Nyun consulted Pakistan Principal Representative to ECOSOC, whose reaction was not favourable, and proposes discuss matter further with Foreign Minister when he visits Karachi shortly. Subject study by legal counsel believe Pakistan has no valid case for refusing visas to representatives any UN member wishing attend ECAFE session. Matter may need top level intervention during General Assembly.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: DE SEYNES GENEVA
FROM: SEGEN
DATE: 23 July 1959
NUMBER: 1435

I received following memo from Bunche which is transmitted for your information:

"Shahi, of the Pakistan Delegation informs me that his Government, having invited ECAFE to meet in Karachi in 1960, would not wish to issue a visa to an Observer from Israel should Israel seek to be represented. This is in order to ~~function~~ 'protect' Pakistan's relations with the Arab States. It appears that some approach along these lines has already been made to the ECAFE Secretariat.

"When I advised him of the UN position on such matters and the obligations under the Privileges and Immunities Convention, he asked whether a Member State has the 'right' to send Observers, I told him that I would seek advice from the Legal Counsel on that point."

Maybe that governments strictly speaking have not the "right" to send Observers, but I do not believe that Pakistan, with any hope of political success, could take up the defense of their stand on that line. You may wish to look into this matter.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary-General

23 July 1959

FROM: Ralph J. Bunche

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RJB

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Message to Ambassador Svenningsen from Mr. Hammarskjöld

Saturday I had thorough talk with Israel representative regarding Inge Toft. It seems obvious that they can not now be moved to any flexibility. They seem to feel that presence of Inge Toft in Port Said is less embarrassing to other parties than to Egypt. However, he showed keen interest in getting Inge Toft out of the way and explored all possible lines of action. He was fully aware of limitations of Danish possibilities and of fact that moves must be initiated by Israel. He asked for my reaction to thought that Danish ambassador might have "second talk" with Fawzi. I replied that rambling exploratory talk could probably not do any harm and might add some further clarification, but that I did not believe that it could lead anywhere unless Danish ambassador knew within what limits further action to soften up situation might be possible in view of Israel intentions.

Israel representative seemed strongly in favour of second talk while recognising limited value. However, he felt it premature for Israel to make any move short of fuller knowledge of Egyptian reactions. I have impression that this stand has political background at home and aims at gaining time by delaying action. On balance I believe that it might be wise to permit ambassador to try his hand once again, however without raising general issue of policy and carefully avoiding leading questions.

I have also been in touch with Egyptians. I have impression that typical Fawzi technique might have proved misleading and that Cairo stand in all respects remains unchanged in relation to what I heard. If so, it is obviously always possible for Inge Toft to go South after unloading, it being understood that cargo would not be confiscated for several months. Their stand, as I understand it, might also leave open possibility of Inge Toft going North with cargo some time at a later date. I do not know quite how to explain seeming contradiction between the differing interpretations of Cairo stand but I have sound basis to believe that Fawzi had no intention to convey impression of a hardening of their positions. As already indicated,

page 2

it probably all may go back to peculiar technique for discussion typical for Cairo Foreign Office. Of course, this applies to my conclusions as well as to those of the Danish Ambassador.

Letter follows.

28 July 1959

AIDE MEMOIRE

At a meeting, 30 May 1959, with the Acting Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Representative stated that there was no connection between the recent seizure by Israel of an Egyptian fishing vessel and of the UAR seizure of the Danish vessel Inge Toft, and that the vessel would soon be released. The Secretary-General emphasised the importance of such a release. Later the Representative has confirmed the statements quoted here as expressing the stand of the Government of Israel.

The Secretary-General has repeatedly asked for an explanation of the legal basis on which the continued holding of the Egyptian ship is justified by Israel. He has so far received no such explanation. As it seems excluded by the statements referred to above that the vessel is held as some kind of retaliation or hostage, the holding of the ship may perhaps be considered as justified on the basis of the legal relationship between Israel and the UAR, either as established by the Armistice Agreement or as resulting from the position of Israel that they do not consider the Armistice Agreement with Egypt as valid. Thus, the holding of the ship might mean that Israel considers that it has rights in relation to the UAR which under international law would seem to belong to a state of belligerency.

The Secretary-General, who has been engaged in an exchange with the Government of the UAR in order to clarify the situation regarding the Danish vessel Inge Toft and to achieve the release of that ship and its cargo, deems it appropriate, in the same spirit and for the same purpose, to repeat his strong appeal to the Government of Israel for the release of the Egyptian fishing vessel and, pending the release, for an explanation of the legal basis of Israel's action.

16 June 1959

The Legal Council

12 February

9

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I would wish you to give a legal opinion on the interpretation thus given to the obligations of the United Nations in this context.

Personal

9 July 1960

Dear Francis,

Thank you for dropping in the other day for what I consider to have been a most useful talk. I also appreciate our various telephone contacts regarding the Congo. Finally, let me thank you for the kind assistance of the State Department in transmitting and receiving messages for us.

I thought it might interest you to get the summary I have received of the results of the Secretariat studies of the various documents relating to the Jordan waters. That we have a problem on our hands emerges clearly, as also that it is elusive and exceedingly difficult to handle because of its elusiveness just as much as because of its explosive potentialities. As so often, our friends of the Book may well be right according to the letter, while being desperately wrong in terms of the spirit, of the law. However, I reserve my judgment as I simply do not find it possible to get things pinned down with sufficient clarity and completeness. Could you help us it would be highly appreciated, but I guess that you find it difficult.

Dag Hammarskjold

The Honorable Francis O. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary of State
c/o United States Mission to the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1960

Jordan Waters: Background Note

Looking at the background of this problem in the light of the latest document in the "foreground" - Mr. Ben Gurion's letter of 27 May 1960, the striking fact is the complete change in Israel's attitude to the problem of Jordan waters. Originally there was to be an equitable (and "non-political") allocation of the waters among the States directly concerned. As Johnston described his proposals of November 1953* a tentative allocation would give 424 m.c.m. to Israel, 829 m.c.m. to Jordan and 50 m.c.m. to Syria (total 1,303 m.c.m.). The approach was based on the principle of "sharing the water among the States which claim it", requiring an acknowledgment of their part "that Jordan and its tributaries constitute an international river system and that there must be some kind of an understanding as to who is entitled to how much of the water". Mr. Johnston added "Israel has so far been receptive in principle and non-committal in detail".

In May 1960 Mr. Ben Gurion writes that under the Plan "we shall have to set aside 35 m.c.m. for Lebanon (from the Hasbani), 42 m.c.m. for Syria (from the Banias and other streams), and for Jordan 70 m.c.m. of sweet and a further 30 m.c.m. of salt water. All the rest of the waters of the Jordan belongs to us.... How we are going to make use of the water thus set aside for us , , , , , is entirely our own domestic affair, and no other country has any standing in the matter."

Between these two contrasting positions of principle lie the involved calculations of needs and capacities and the Johnston negotiations.

Some part of the difference in figures may be accounted for by variations in estimates of the extent and capacity of the Jordan river system, but the essential point of contrast between "before" and "after" is the Israeli assertion of ownership, under the Johnston Plan, of all the waters of the Jordan, less the amounts specifically reserved to the other States.

* In a lecture at Cornell University, May 6, 1954. The text was issued as a State Department Press Release.

The Johnston negotiations

The State Department memorandum of 30 September 1955 describes Ambassador Johnston's activities as those of a "negotiator" seeking to work out a programme for the Valley "which could be accepted by all of the States having an interest in the waters", "a programme to which all could subscribe without impairing their individual national interests". A major principle of the programme was to "distribute irrigation water throughout the Valley" - (by implication not outside the Valley); the Plan must be "equitable", and "accepted by all the countries having an interest in or now using the waters of the River System"... "From the outset of his negotiations, Ambassador Johnston has made it clear that United States support for the Plan was premised on the assumption that it would be accepted by all of the four States directly concerned." Assurances of acceptance might, however, be given separately, and need not involve any negotiations or agreements among the States themselves.

On 21 March 1955 at a meeting between Ambassador Johnston and the Secretary-General, Mr. Johnston outlined the stage his negotiations had reached at that time: The Main-Clapp Report had proposed that 35% (455 m.c.m.)* of the waters go to Israel. Johnston believed that Israel would accept 40% (520 m.c.m.), but Israel claimed 50% of the water (650 m.c.m.). He tried to get the Arab States to take 65 m.c.m. less water than they claimed in June 1954. Although he failed, his visits to individual Arab States were "more successful". However, he preferred, instead of a formal signed agreement with the Arab States, to "maintain a fluid position". Under these arrangements all points seemed resolved except three: the amount of electrical power for Syria; the 31 m.c.m. of water claimed by Jordan; and the Israel conditions attaching to the 50 m.c.m. to be conceded to Jordan. In this meeting with Mr. Eshkol, the Israel Finance Minister, Mr. Johnston was led to believe that Israel would drop certain conditions attached to the additional 50 m.c.m. He expected this would happen by May 1955 at the latest. Then the position of the parties would be only 31 m.c.m. apart.

* The actual figures are approximate. They are based on the estimate in the Main-Clapp Report of the Jordan River system.

There were, however, certain other difficulties. Israel wanted Tiberias used as storage without any authority exercising judgment as to the level of the lake; Israel wanted another 50 m.c.m. from the Yarmouk; there existed a "strong minority" in Israel which believed in going ahead without an agreement and in taking all the water they wanted.

The Secretary-General found it disturbing that the Israel Government had come so close to agreement, yet was stalling on the last step. On the one hand they could maintain that their stand was not too unreasonable, and on the other hand they might feel that they were not committed to an agreement at all. Such a situation offered dangerous possibilities.

In April 1955 in connexion with the position to be taken by the Chief of Staff in the Banat Yacoub project, the U.S. Mission stated that "the United States continues to be hopeful on the Jordan water development plan. In the unhappy event that negotiations to this end should break down or even fail completely, we would have to reassess our attitude toward further area planning and to the Banat Yacoub project in particular."

It would seem that Israel's decision to proceed unilaterally to develop the Jordan waters for its own use was made sometime around September 1953 when the construction of Banat Yacoub canal in the Demilitarized Zone was started. At about the same time the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that Israel's decision to proceed was related to the agreement signed 4 June 1953 between Syria and Jordan, "without consultation with Israel", for the development of the Yarmouk River.

The Johnston Plan

The Plan is centered about the use of Lake Tiberias as a common storage reservoir for the waters of the entire river system. "Deposits" and "withdrawals" to the credit of a party would be measured by automatic gauges under supervision of a neutral Watermaster. A neutral Engineering Board would decide on whether Yarmouk flood waters should be stored in Tiberias or elsewhere. This decision would be based "solely on irrigation requirements of Arab lands in the Lower Jordan valley". The decision would be final; all parties would be committed to accept it in advance. Thus "the question of the use of Tiberias is taken out of the hands of the interested parties and left to the judgment of impartial, neutral experts". This was considered as a necessary condition for financial support of the Plan by the United States.

Under this arrangement HJK would have available to it 300 m.c.m. of storage capacity in Lake Tiberias. This, however, would only be water which had been "deposited" from the Yarmouk.

As regards use-allocation from the river system, apart from storage, the figures in the State Department memorandum of 30 September 1955 correspond with those quoted in Mr. Ben Gurion's letter in respect of Lebanon and Syria. The Arab Technical Committee established to negotiate with Mr. Johnston recommended 35 m.c.m. for Lebanon from the Hasbani. For Syria, it recommended 20 m.c.m. from the Baniyas, and 22 m.c.m. from the Jordan for the Boteiha Farm area. The total 42 m.c.m. for Syria corresponds to the figure quoted by Mr. Ben Gurion.

The allocation for HJK is more complicated. The Beirut memorandum of 19 February 1955 set the HJK requirements at 760 m.c.m. This figure was reduced by 40 m.c.m. because of a larger allowance (8%) for temporary non-use of land.

The HJK allocation was broken down as follows:

243 m.c.m. from wadis and wells

377 m.c.m. from the Yarmouk

25 m.c.m. for Israel's use in the Jordan-Yarmouk triangle

14 m.c.m. for evaporation and other losses

100 m.c.m. from the Upper Jordan River

Total 759 (Deducting 25 m.c.m. for Israel and 14 m.c.m. for evaporation, -(total 39 m.c.m.)- brings the figure down to 720 m.c.m. for Jordan without the 8% reduction for temporary non-use of land).

The 100 m.c.m. allocation from the Upper Jordan in the Johnston Plan corresponds to the total allocation for Jordan given in Mr. Ben Gurion's letter, subject to the breakdown of this figure in Mr. Ben Gurion's letter into 70 m.c.m. sweet water and 30 m.c.m. salt water being accurate. If, as the State Department memo indicates, the 100 m.c.m. is derived from the Upper Jordan, is it not all likely to be sweet water? In this memorandum the problem of salinity is raised only in relation to waters derived from Lake Tiberias and certain springs flowing into Lake Tiberias.

The State Department memorandum of 30 September 1955 and Mr. Ben Gurion's letter agree in the allocation to Syria of 90 m.c.m. from the Yarmouk, but not in the allocation to Israel by HJK. The memorandum gives the figure of 25 m.c.m. for use by Israel in the Jordan-Yarmouk triangle. Mr. Ben Gurion mentions an allocation of 40 m.c.m. (Could he be including 14 m.c.m. foreseen for evaporation? This is not likely).

Here again, as at an earlier stage in the Johnston negotiations, the discrepancy is small enough to be puzzling: The mention of 30 m.c.m. of salt water by Mr. Ben Gurion within a total which otherwise corresponds to the figure in the State Department memorandum, and a difference of only 15 m.c.m. in the allocation to Israel from the Yarmouk. Why these small discrepancies?

Israel's Plan

A publication of the Israel Ministry of Defence in October-November 1959, which is available to the Secretariat but which, although not secret, can not be used in discussions with the parties, gives a detailed account of Israel's water problem and water planning.

The pamphlet states that Israel's needs, especially for the irrigation of the Negev, "made it imperative for Israel to hold up no longer the implementation of her plans pending an international settlement for a joint regional utilization". Such a settlement would have given "something like an 'Arab Right' to veto Israel's development operations." The first step was "to divert the Jordan waters to the interior of the country and carry them to large conservation pools inside Israel". Hence the Banat Yacoub project.

The pamphlet goes on to say "The Syrians presumed to negate Israel's right to operate in this zone (DZ) even if operations were of a distinctly civilian character". It restates Israel's thesis of sovereignty over the DZ. The whole international dispute is presented as a tactic to cover up a race against time in the construction of the diversion canal (p.35). It is made quite clear that at the first opportunity this work will be resumed (p.36). "Israel has never given up her right to pump the Jordan waters from any point at which the river flows within her boundaries, including the Territory of demilitarized zones." (p.44).

Reviewing Israel's water development projects, this official publication describes the Huleh reclamation project as "rather more than the drainage of the swamps" (p.39). Lake Tiberias on which Johnston counted as the key to the international utilization of the Jordan river system is destined, according to the Israel publication, to become "the corner stone and foundation of Israel's National Water Project." (p.42). It is evident that Israel has no intention to make this reservoir available to any other country. The storage capacity of Lake Tiberias is estimated at 750 m.c.m. while Israel's plans call for a storage capacity of 1,200 m.c.m. (p. 45-46).

The basic difference, however, is in the objectives. Israel's objective is to irrigate the Negev.

As for the financing of this project, the pamphlet refers to recent negotiations with the United States Government and the World Bank (p.66). The first stage of the cross-country pipe-line is expected to be completed by 1963. The study concludes by quoting the Minister of Finance, Mr. Eshkol, as saying that the development of the water economy in Israel has first priority in the development plans of Israel. (Cf. Mr. Eshkol's discussion with Mr. Johnston in 1955, p.2 above).

Out of an estimated total of 1,770 m.c.m. of water available to Israel the pamphlet estimates 500 m.c.m. as coming from Jordan waters (p.27). This is not far from the Johnston figures.

The original Johnston proposals (November 1953) tentatively allocated 425 m.c.m. to Israel. Later the allocation was raised. The precise figure finally established for Israel is not stated. If a figure was indicated it is likely to have been fairly close to 500 m.c.m., but it is not clear whether any kind of maximum was fixed as in the case of the Arab States, or whether it was understood that what remained of the allocation to the Arab States would be left for Israel. However, the basic condition of the Johnston plan was that these waters be used in the Jordan valley. "Israel was not prepared to accept" (p.30). Israel proposed instead the inclusion of the Littany river in the Jordan river system and the allocation to Israel of 775 m.c.m. more water for irrigation of the Negev.

As far as Israel is concerned the publication states that Johnston's failure to accept Israel's proposal for the use of the Littany River (i.e. for the use of water in the Negev) shelved the regional plan, and Israel proceeded on her own.

UNATIONS NY

UNTSO 832 CORDIER FROM VON HORN STOP JERUSALEM POST 28 JULY
STOP QUOTE STOP THE UUNN SECRETARY GENERAL MR DAG HAMMARSKJOLD
CMA IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT ISRAEL ACCEPT NASSERS
TERMS FOR THE SHIPPING OF ISRAEL CARGOES THROUGH THE SUEZ CA NAL
AS AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CMA

P2

ALTHOUGH HE MAINTAINS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE NAVIGATION THROUGH
THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY SHOULD BE UPHELD STOP PARA STOP UP
TO NOW MR HAMMARSKJOLD HAD ONLY CONVEYED TO ISRAEL NASSERS
CONDITIONS WHICH EMERGED AT THE CAIRO TALKS EARLIER THIS MONTH
CMA AND IT WAS ONLY AT SATURDAYS MEETING IN NEW

P3

YORK WITH THE ACTING PERMANENT ISRAEL UUNN REPRESENTATIVE CMA
MR YOSEF TEKOAH CMA THAT HE TOOK A STAND ON CAIROS TERMS HIMSELF
STOP PARA STOP IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT ISRAEL IS
CONSIDERING A DEMAND TO INCLUDE THE SUEZ BLOCKADE ISSUE IN THE
AGENDA OF THE UUNN ASSEMBLY NEXT SEPTEMBER

P4

IN NEWYORK STOP PARA STOP ALTHOUGH POLITICAL QUARTERS IN JERUSALEM
DO NOT USUALLY COMMENT ON NASSERS SPEECHES CMA WHICH ARE CONSIDERED
TO BE MAINLY FOR HOME CONSUMPTION CMA HIS VIOLENT ANTI-ISRAEL
EN ATTACK ON SUNDAY WAS THOUGHT HERE TO BE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO
SIDETRACK THE SUEZ ISSUE STOP NASSERS MORE SHARPLY

P5

AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL IS TAKEN AS A SIGN OF ARAB
AND SOVIET PRESSURE ON HIM TO COME TO TERMS WITH KASSEM STOP IT
IS POINTED OUT THAT NO ARRANGEMENT MADE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS CAN
BE CONSIDERED RELIABLE CMA PARTICULARLY WHEN ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS FOR THE PASSAGE OF ISRAEL

P6

GOODS CMA VIZ SECRECY CMA CAN SO EASILY BE STAGED BY THE EGYPTIANS THEMSELVES AT ANY MOMENT THAT SUITS THEM STOP UNQUOTE STOP PARA STOP ACCORDING TO HEBREW PRESS QUOTE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN UNQUOTE BEING CONTEMPLATED BY GOVERNMENT TO BE LAUNCHED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD CMA ESPECIALLY IN THE

P7

USA CMA AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN BLOCKADE OF THE SUEZ CANAL STOP HARETZ STOP QUOTE STOP HAMMARSKJOLD RECOMMENDS ACCEPTANCE OF UUAARR CONDITIONS UNQUOTE STOP HERUT STOP QUOTE STOP HAMMARSKJOLD DEMAND OF ISRAEL REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCEPT ALL NASSERS PROPOSALS STOP UNQUOTE STOP DAVAR AND HARETZ WRITE INTER LINEA THAT QUOTE MEANWHILE CMA

P8

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN HIS TALK WITH JOSEPH TEKOAHA CMA DAG HAMMARSKJOLD HAS TRIED IN EFFECT TO MOVE ISRAEL TO ACQUIESCE IN NASSERS SUBQUOTE CONDITIONS UNSUBQUOTE RESPECTING THE PASSAGE OF ISRAEL CARGOES THROUGH SUEZ STOP ALTHOUGH MR HAMMARSKJOLD WHO WAS REPORTING ON HIS LATEST DEMARCHES FOR SUBQUOTE ELUCIDATIONS

P9

UNSUBQUOTE IN CAIRO WAS ACTUALLY CONVEYING A MESSAGE ON BEHALF OF UUAARR CMA THERE WAS IMPLICIT IN HIS WORDS SOMETHING OF A RECOMMENDATION TO ACCEPT THE UUAARR CONDITIONS UNQUOTE STOP HADOKER POLITICAL REPORTER PREDICTS A CABINET DECISION QUOTE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNQUOTE CMA NOW THAT MR

P10

TEKOAHA REPORT HAS BEEN RECEIVED STOP IT IS NOT INTENDED BY ISRAEL TO ACT UPON THE QUOTE ADVICE UNQUOTE OFFERED TO HER TO ACCEPT THE UUAARR CONDITIONS STOP DAVAR LINKS THE REPORT ON THE INTENDED CAMPAIGN OF INFORMATION WITH SEMI OFFICIAL ISRAELI REACTIONS TO

PRESIDENT NASSERS LATEST SPEECH

IN ALEXANDRIA

II

Code Message telephoned by Cable Office 12:50 p.m. 9 November
SECRETARY GENERAL FROM BURNS
No. 1216

I HAD INTERVIEW WITH FAWZI AT 1030Z. HE HAD RECEIVED YOUR LATEST PLEA FOR SPEED BUT STATED THAT WHILE EGYPT IS AS GREATLY CONCERNED AS ANYONE IN SPEEDING ACTION IN REGARD TO EMERGENCY FORCE AND WHILE THEY HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO RECEIVE THIS FORCE AND STAND BY THIS AGREEMENT, THEY FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD KNOW FUNCTIONS OF THE FORCE IN CLEARER TERMS THAN HAD BEEN SO FAR INDICATED INCLUDING THOSE IN YOUR SECOND REPORT, BEFORE ~~WE~~^{THEY} CAN AGREE TO RECEIVE TROOPS IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND COOPERATE IN THE WAYS NECESSARY FOR THE ASSEMBLY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE HERE.

THE POINTS UPON WHICH THEY REQUIRE CLARIFICATION ARE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WHEN FORCE REACHES THE FORMER DEMARCATION LINE AFTER EVACUATION OF SINAI BY ISRAELIS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AREA THE FORCE OCCUPIES WOULD BE AGREED TO BY THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

(B) HOW LONG IS IT CONTEMPLATED THE FORCE WILL STAY IN THE DEMARCATION LINE AREA.

(C) IN THE AREA OF PORT SAID AND THE CANAL WHAT WOULD THE FORCE DO BESIDES OBSERVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ANGLO FRENCH FORCES. WOULD THE EMERGENCY FORCE STAY AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF THE ANGLO FRENCH AND IF SO WHAT WOULD THEY DO? THEY WOULD HAVE NO FUNCTIONS IN REGARD TO MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER WHICH APPERTAINS TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

I ENDEAVOURED TO STRESS TO FAWZI THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT REPEAT NOT LOSING THE FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EFFECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELIS AND ANGLO FRENCH FORCES BY TRYING TO HAVE ALL CONTINGENCIES RELATING TO FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE SETTLED AT THIS TIME. I SAID THE MOMENT MIGHT BE LOST AND MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECAPTURE WITH VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

HE WILL SEE PRESIDENT AT 1200 Z BUT REQUESTED THAT I ENDEAVOUR TO GET ANSWERS FROM YOU TO ABOVE QUESTIONS WHICH OF COURSE I COULD NOT ANSWER MYSELF. I AM STAYING IN CAIRO TILL TOMORROW 0800Z AND WILL TAKE UP MATTER AGAIN IMMEDIATELY ON RECEIPT OF YOUR CABLE.

III

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BURNS CAIRO (VIA JERUSALEM)
FROM: SECGEN
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1956
NO.:

YOUR 1216 IN ORDER TO GAIN TIME I WISH TO REFRAIN FROM FULLER EXPLANATION AND GIVE CLARIFICATIONS SHORTEST POSSIBLE FORM.

EGYPTIAN POINT ONE/ REPLY IS YES REPEAT YES.

EGYPTIAN POINT B. A DEFINITE REPLY IS AT PRESENT IMPOSSIBLE BUT THE EMERGENCY CHARACTER OF THE FORCE LINKS IT TO THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 2 NOVEMBER AND ITS LIQUIDATION. IN CASE OF DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO WHEN THE CRISIS DOES NOT ANY LONGER WARRANT THE PRESENCE OF THE TROOPS, THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE PARTIES.

EGYPTIAN POINT C. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE DECISION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS BASED ON MY REPORT - WHICH TREATS THIS POINT IN PARA 8 AND 12 CLARIFIED BY ME IN THE DEBATE - THAT AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF ANGLO-FRENCH FORCES THE EMERGENCY FORCE WOULD HAVE NO REPEAT NO FUNCTIONS IN PORT SAID AND THE CANAL AREA AS SOON AS THOSE AREAS ARE CLEARLY OUTSIDE WHERE FIGHTING MIGHT THREATEN. IT IS ANOTHER MATTER TO WHAT EXTENT AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED WITH THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES FOR USING SOME PLACES PRESUMABLY WEST OF THE CANAL AS STATIONING AREA FOR THE TROOPS WHICH GO UP TO THE DEMARCATION LINE.

IV

Code message telephoned by Cable Office at 12:30 9 November
SECRETARY GENERAL FROM BURNS
No. 1219

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL. IN CONVERSATION REPORTED MY 1216
FAWZI INDICATED EGYPT MIGHT MAKE DIFFICULTIES OVER INCLUSION
OF CANADIANS IN CONTINGENT BECAUSE CANADA WAS PART OF COMMONWEALTH
AND OWED ALLEGIANCE TO QUEEN. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CANADA'S
INDEPENDENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND MR. PEARSON'S HELPFUL ATTITUDE
PRESENT CRISIS BUT THE "MAN IN THE STREET" WOULD SEE TROOPS
APPARENTLY BRITISH. IN ~~MY~~ REPLY TO MY DIRECT QUESTION HE SAID
THIS WAS NOT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT A FIRM REPLY TO YOUR QUERY IF
EGYPT WOULD ACCEPT CANADIANS IN THE FORCE, BUT HE WANTED ME TO
PASS THIS THOUGHT ON TO YOU.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: BURNS, JERUSALEM
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1956
NUMBER: UNTSO 1223

AT 1600Z HAD LONG INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT NASSER AND DR. FAWZI. NASSER SAID THERE WOULD BE A CABINET MEETING TONIGHT ABOUT 1800 Z AT WHICH THE ENTRY OF U.N. EMERGENCY FORCE WOULD BE DISCUSSED BUT THERE COULD HARDLY BE A FIRM DECISION UNTIL HE HAD ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. * DIFFICULTY IS TO BE CLEAR AS TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER EMERGENCY FORCE TAKES OVER PORT SAID WHEN ANGLO-FRENCH FORCES EVACUATE. THERE IS SUSPICION THAT IT IS A TRICK TO OCCUPY CANAL ZONE OR PART OF IT WITH A FORCE TO ALLOW THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL. HE WANTS AN ASSURANCE THAT THIS IS NOT CONTEMPLATED. I SAY I KNEW NOTHING OF SUCH AN INTENTION. I WAS NOT SURE WHETHER YOU COULD GIVE REQUISITE ASSURANCE. BUT I SAID THE EMERGENCY FORCE WAS SET UP ON AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS TASKS WOULD BE SET BY THAT BODY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CONSIDERING THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY ON THE PRESENT CONFLICT, WOULD COUNTERMANCE SUCH USE OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE. NEVERTHELESS HE WANTS ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT FROM YOU.

3. HE ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE COMPONENTS ON THE FORCE WHEN IT REACHES THE DEMARCATION LINE. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AS WELL AS THE EGYPTIAN. I SUGGESTED PART IN THE AREA EL ARISH-RAFAH AND PART IN THE EL AUJA D.Z.. HE ALSO ASKED IF IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FORCE WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS LOCATIONS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF EGYPT. HE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON THESE POINTS.

4. HIS THIRD POINT WAS IN REGARD TO THE INCLUSION OF CANADIAN TROOPS IN THE FORCE. WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL POSITION OF CANADA HE WAS AFRAID THAT THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WOULD ONLY SEE SOLDIERS IN BRITISH UNIFORMS WHO BORE ALLEGIANCE TO THE QUEEN OF ENGLAND. IT WOULD BE EASY FOR AGITATORS TO INCITE SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE VERY BITTER AGAINST THE BRITISH ON ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON PORT SAID TO ATTACK GROUPS OF CANADIAN SOLDIERS. MESSAGE CONTINUES.

* Several groups missing.

Code message telephoned by Cable Office 9:55 p.m.

CONTINUING OUR 1223

HE DID NOT WANT TO RISK BECOMING EMBROLLED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND CANADA. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS WAS A RISK WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BUT I WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS TO YOU. I THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS HE ALSO DID NOT WANT CANADIANS AS PART OF THE FORCE SINCE THEY MIGHT ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH "WESTERN" POLICY AS IN THE BRITISH VIEWPOINT REGARDING THE CANAL NATIONALIZATION.

5. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE COULD HARDLY EXPECT IN THIS SITUATION TO HAVE ALL THE FUTURE POSSIBLE ACTIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE SPELLED OUT TO HIM BUT THAT ITS ESTABLISHMENT IMMEDIATELY WOULD HAVE GREAT ADVANTAGES TO EGYPT. IT WAS UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH SHOULD BE TRUSTED IN FURTHER ELABORATION OF ITS TASKS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTERESTS OF EGYPT. HE SHOULD LOOK ON THE FORCE AS ALLIES OF EGYPT RATHER THAN A POTENTIAL ENEMY. IT WOULD BE HERE TO HELP RESTORE THE SITUATION PRODUCED BY AGGRESSION AND WOULD BE A SYMBOL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH EGYPT IN HER DESIRE TO FREE HER SOIL FROM INVADERS.

6. NASSER SAID THE REASONS WHICH LED THE GOVERNMENT TO AGREE TO THE ENTRY OF THE EMERGENCY FORCE INTO EGYPT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXPLAINED TO THE PEOPLE, IF IT DID ENTER. THEREFORE HE HAD TO BE CERTAIN ABOUT THE POINTS ON WHICH HE HAD ASKED FOR ASSURANCES OR EXPLANATIONS. IT WAS BETTER TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING NOW SO AS TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES LATER.

7. AM STAYING OVER IN CAIRO UNTIL TOMORROW AND HOPE I SHALL BE ABLE TO CONCLUDE NECESSARY BUSINESS THEN AS SOON AS I GET YOUR REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE. IF I CAN'T FINISH TOMORROW I PROPOSE TO RETURN TO JERUSALEM BRIEFLY TO BRING MORE STAFF HERE BUT CAN RETURN IN FEW HOURS IF NECESSARY.

VII

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BURNS CAIRO (VIA JERUSALEM)

FROM: SEC GEN

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1956

NO.:

YOUR 1223. I THINK MOST OF THE QUESTIONS ARE COVERED ALREADY BY MY REPLIES TO THE DEMANDS FOR CLARIFICATION WHICH YOU TRANSMITTED FROM FAWZI. I WILL ALL THE SAME TRY TO AMPLIFY.

YOUR REPLIES TO QUESTION OF INTENTIONS AND CONCERNING RISKS THAT UN FORCE WOULD QUOTE OCCUPY CANAL ZONE OR PART OF IT UNQUOTE SO AS TO ALLOW INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL, WERE QUITE CORRECT. I CAN GIVE DEFINITE ASSURANCE THAT NO REPEAT NO SUCH PURPOSE FOR THE FORCE IS INTENDED. WHATEVER WEIGHT COLONEL NASSER MAY ATTACH TO MY OWN ASSURANCES, HE SHOULD NOTE THAT GENERAL ASSEMBLY SO OBVIOUSLY GAVE A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION TO MY STATEMENTS ON THE SUBJECT WHICH ALREADY IN THEMSELVES WERE RESTRICTIVE. I FRANKLY FAIL TO SEE HOW, AS CONSTRUCTED, UN FORCE COULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN FORCING ON EGYPT SOLUTION OF CANAL QUESTION OTHER THAN ONE FREELY NEGOTIATED.

THE IDEA THAT THE FORCE SHOULD BE ALSO ON THE ISRAELI SIDE SEEMS BASED ON MISCONCEPTION. IT IS AFTER ALL A FORCE INTRODUCED IN INTEREST OF EGYPT AS MEASURE AGAINST AGGRESSION AND IN ORDER TO GET THE ISRAELI FORCES BACK BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES. THERE IS NO INTENTION THAT THE FORCE SHOULD TAKE OVER THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS OF UNTSO. THE PLACING OF UNTSO OBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES OF DEMARCATION LINES IS BASED ON THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE UN FORCE.

THE SITUATION AS CONCERNS CANADIAN TROOPS HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR IN MY PREVIOUS REPLY.

I STRONGLY ENDORSE THE VIEWS YOU EXPRESS IN YOUR POINT FIVE AND, WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES REFERRED TO IN POINT SIX, I WISH WITH ALL POSSIBLE EMPHASIS TO SAY THAT IT IS MY PERSONAL CONVICTION, CORROBORATED BY ALL THE EXPERIENCES I HAVE HAD DURING THE HANDLING OF THESE QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THAT COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS CASE HAS DECISIVE ADVANTAGES FOR EGYPT AND THAT IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE I DO NOT SEE

THAT EGYPT IS RUNNING ANY RISK. THIS IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY, IT DOES NOT DETRACT FROM ITS POSSIBILITIES TO NEGOTIATE SUEZ CANAL ARRANGEMENTS FREELY, IT DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS CREATED BY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST EGYPT, IT DOES NOT SUBMIT EGYPT TO ANY NEW CONTROL FROM OUTSIDE. BUT IT DOES MEAN A GUARANTEE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND IT DOES MEAN THAT EGYPT MAINTAINS INDEPENDANCE IN RELATION TO ALL THOSE INFLUENCES WHICH SHORT OF THIS SOLUTION MIGHT TRY TO MAKE THEMSELVES FELT. THE MAIN POINT HOWEVER, AS POINTED OUT EARLIER TODAY IN MY REPLY TO DR. FAWZI'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION IS THIS: THAT AS THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE WOULD COME WITH EGYPT'S CONSENT THEY CANNOT STAY NOR OPERATE UNLESS EGYPT CONTINUES TO CONSENT. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FORCE IS SUCH THAT THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF CONFLICTS IN THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE AND EGYPT. FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT A CHANGE OF THE WHOLE CHARACTER OF THE OPERATION WOULD BE NECESSARY WHICH I DO NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL THAT EGYPT HAS ANY REASON TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF WHAT IS NOW PROPOSED.

ANY FURTHER DELAY IN REACHING AGREEMENT WOULD FORCE ME TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATION THROUGH OPEN NOTES, ALTHOUGH I FEAR CONSEQUENCES OF RESORT TO SUCH PROCEDURE.

YOU MAY GIVE THE FULL TEXT ABOVE IN WRITING TO FAWZI.

XIII

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: BURNS CAIRO
DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1956
NO.: UNEF 1

I HAD INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT NASSER FROM APPROXIMATELY 1030Z TO 1130Z. HE REQUESTED ME TO FORWARD THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOU FROM HIM PERSONALLY "YOUR MESSAGE TO ME RELATING TO THE COMPOSITION OF THE U.N. FORCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED TODAY.

I CONTINUE TO TRUST THAT WE ALL WORK FOR THE SAME PURPOSE OF SPEEDELY ENDING THE PRESENT CRISIS. WITH THIS IN VIEW AND IN MY EXTREME DESIRE TO SERVE THIS PURPOSE, THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT ACCEPTS DANISH AND NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION. AT THE SAME TIME IT EARNESTLY URGES ACCEPTANCE OF INDIAN, INDONESIAN AND YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION. THE U.N. FORCE WOULD THUS BE BETTER BALANCED AS COMPOSED OF: COLOMBIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, INDIA, INDONESIA AND YUGOSLAVIA."

YOU WILL NOTE THAT CANADA IS STILL LEFT OUT OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE. I HAVE NO WORD OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THIS RESPECT AS BETWEEN YOU AND THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: BURNS JERUSALEM
DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1956
NUMBER: UNTSO 1264

FURTHER TO MY UNEF 1 AND 2. ARRIVED BACK JERUSALEM 1600Z AND AM LEAVING LYDDA TOMORROW 0800Z FOR NEW YORK VIA AIR FRANCE.

PRESIDENT NASSER TALKED FOR SOME TIME ABOUT WHY HE DOES NOT WISH TO AGREE TO INCLUSION OF CANADIAN TROOPS. HE SAID THE PEOPLE WILL SEE THAT THESE ARE TROOPS OF "HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH" AND WILL NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE NOT THE SAME AS HER MAJESTY'S TROOPS WHICH ATTACKED EGYPT AT FORT SAID ETC. WHILE HE HIMSELF UNDERSTANDS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF CANADA AND APPRECIATES THE HELP THAT CANADA HAS GIVEN IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT POLITICALLY FOR HIM TO AGREE TO INCLUSION IN UNATIONS FORCES OF ANY TROOPS THAT WOULD SEEM TO THE POPULACE TO BE BRITISH. HIS OBJECT, HE SAID, WAS TO AVOID TROUBLE AND TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE. HE HOPED THAT MR PEARSON WOULD UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION AND THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE AGAINST CANADA.

YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DRAW YOUR CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS AND THE PREVIOUS TWO MESSAGES. IT APPEARED TO ME THAT NASSER IS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IMPAIR HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE - WHICH MEANS THE PRESTIGE OF THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT.

HE SEEMED TO THINK FROM YOUR PREVIOUS MESSAGES THAT YOU MIGHT BE ARRIVING TOMORROW OR THE NEXT DAY. I SAID THAT AS YOU HAD CALLED ME TO NEW YORK AND

INFORMED ME THAT I SHOULD BE RETURNING THURSDAY NIGHT, THE 15TH, I THOUGHT THAT YOU WOULD BE LEAVING THEN TOO.

His attitude was friendly and agreeable throughout and he appeared anxious TO COOPERATE, APART FROM THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE.

PENDING ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENTRY OF THE UNEF ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, THE SKELETON STAFF I TOOK DOWN TODAY, INCLUDING COLONEL MOE, WILL BE NOMINALLY STILL UNKOS AS A TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF LT COLONEL KLY'S LIAISON ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER NASSER UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD BE DOING PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE FORCE AS STATED IN MY UNEF 2.