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27 Nov. 56

D. H.'s memorandum conc. conversation
with Selwyn Lloyd and Dr. Fawzi.

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MEMORANDUM

Seen by Selwyn Lloyd
and Fawzi.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd saw me today at noon. The following possible procedure for a clinch was mentioned by him.

In Parliament on Thursday at 3.30 p.m. he might announce that a withdrawal would take place, to be completed within a fortnight. That would mean that the British troops would have left 14 December.

Such a declaration, however, had to be conditioned by certain other arrangements.

There must be a presentation of the size and structure of the UNEF, indicating that the first build-up was properly in hand. I promised to give such a presentation. Mr. Lloyd found the inclusion of a Canadian battalion to be of special importance. I replied, that although I would welcome such a development, I could not say anything definite.

Mr. Lloyd further needed a time-table for the United Nations clearing operation which made it clear that the operation would start by our bringing teams in around the middle of December. I said that I thought that to be possible, but that I wanted to give more detailed information as soon as I could get it from those responsible for the operation. I wanted to get the survey teams in as quickly as possible (my thought being that, as soon as the clinch was achieved, I wished to get them in at once).

As to the question of a settlement of the Canal issue, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's attitude was that if the Egyptian reply of 2 November meant that the Egyptian Government accepted my proposals as a basis for negotiations, the British Government would accept them as such a basis.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd left open what kind of formula I might devise for the linking of the withdrawal and the clearing. The term he used was a development pari passu. I said that I felt that it would be best to have an arrangement with two separate statements, one concerning the plan for a withdrawal ending on 14 December, and one concerning our time-table for the clearing, putting on the working teams ~~in~~ December.

H1 mid.

I had a conversation with Dr. Fawzi at 2 p.m., setting out the above points with the request for his immediate action and support.



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Dr. Fawzi said that he would transmit my evaluation of the situation at once to Cairo and that he would support a solution with a clinch arrangement as suggested. However, he wanted to point out that he would have difficulties selling the two-week margin, but would do his very best.

On the question of the presentation of the clinch he wanted to make the following suggestion. He felt that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd might say, concerning the clearing, that the Secretary-General had informed him that he had the formal assurances of the Egyptian Government that the clearing operation could begin immediately on withdrawal, and that he further had the information from me that technically we would be able to start operating arrangements by the middle of December. Dr. Fawzi said that he had a couple of reasons for this proposal. One was to protect me against one-sidedly interpreting the Egyptian stand, without the possibility to refer to formal assurances. Another one was a wish to avoid that I, in doing so, would imply that the Government of Egypt had so to say approved of the fortnight - or any other - interval as a basis for their action.

I pointed out to Dr. Fawzi the extremely narrow timetable on which we had to run the whole operation. I also pointed out the increased need for the utmost caution on such moves, as the one suggested by Mr. Menon, or as the moves planned in relation to British and French citizens.

Dr. Fawzi said that he had not asked me about the French stand, on the obvious assumption that the French would follow the British decision. As to the Israelis he had, of course, professionally to insist on full withdrawal also in their case. However, negotiation-wise he would only insist on such a move backwards as would eliminate a possible argument against the beginning of the clearing operation.

27 November 1956.

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In Parliament on Thursday at 3.30 p.m. he might announce that a withdrawal would take place, to be completed within a fortnight.

That would mean that the British troops would have left 14 December.

Such a declaration ^{however, had to} ~~would~~ be conditioned by certain other arrangements.

~~He needed~~ ^{// There must be} a presentation of the size and structure of the UNEF, indicating that the first build-up was properly in hand. I promised to give such

a presentation. P

^{Mr Lloyd} ~~He~~ further needed a time-table for the United Nations clearing operation which made it clear that the operation would start by our

bringing ~~the~~ working teams in around the middle of December. I said

that I ^{thought} ~~found~~ that to be possible, but that I wanted to give ^{more} ~~him~~ detailed information as soon as I could get it from those responsible for the

operation. I wanted to get the survey teams in as quickly as possible

(my thought being that, as soon as the clinch was achieved, I ^{wished} ~~hoped to~~ ~~be able~~ to get them in at once).

As to the question of a settlement of the Canal issue, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's attitude was that if the Egyptian reply of 2 November meant that the Egyptian Government accepted my proposals as a basis for negotiations the British Government would accept them as such a basis.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd left open what kind of formula I might ^{de} ~~advise~~ for the linking of the withdrawal and the clearing. The term he used was a

^{development} pari passu. I said that I felt that it would be ^{best} ~~better~~ to have an arrangement with two separate statements, one concerning the ⁿ ~~place~~ for a withdrawal ending on 14 December, and one concerning our time-table for the clearing, putting on the ^{working teams} ~~full operation~~ in December.

Mr Lloyd found the inclusion of a Canadian battalion to be of special importance. I replied, that although I would welcome such a development, I could now say anything definite.

I had a conversation with Dr. Fawzi at 2 p.m., setting out the above points with the request for his immediate action and support.

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On the question of the presentation of the clinch he wanted to make the following suggestion. He felt that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ^{might} ~~could~~ say, concerning the clearing, that the Secretary-General had informed him that he had the formal assurances of the Egyptian Government that the clearing operation could begin immediately on withdrawal, and ^{that} he further had the information from me that technically we would be able to start operating arrangements ^{by} ~~in~~ the middle of December. ^{Dr Fawzi} ~~He~~ said that he had a couple of reasons for this proposals. One was to protect me ^{against} ~~as~~ one-sidedly interpreting the Egyptian stand, ^{the possibility to refer to} without ~~any basis in~~ formal assurances. Another one was a wish to avoid that I, in doing so, would imply that the Government of Egypt had so to say approved of the fortnight ^{- or any other -} interval as a basis for their action.

I pointed out to Dr. Fawzi the extremely narrow timetable on which we had to run the whole operation. I also pointed out the increased need for the utmost caution ^{such as the one} on moves, ~~like the one~~ ^{as} suggested by Mr. Menon, ^{on} ~~on~~ the moves planned in relation to British and French citizens, ~~which might disturb the emerging balance of~~

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