

**Middle East - Suez story No
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story No 27-32 - 48**

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Suez story - 31

25 Nov. 56

D.H.'s Aide-memoire

SECRETA I D E M E M O I R E

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25 November 1956.

ASL.

25 November 1956

Note on Replies to Queries about the Force

made by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd in the Office of the Secretary-General
on 25 November 1956

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Present numbers and disposition ?

In Egypt ?

1067 at Abu Suweir

190 at Port Said

(721 Yugoslavs en route to Egypt by sea in three merchant ships due at Port Said Wednesday morning, the twenty-eighth, at latest.)

At Naples ?

512, not including 194 RCAF ground personnel for the Air Transport Squadron.

Numbers in Egypt by next week and later ?

By November 28 :	2200 - 2300
By December 2 :	3400
By December 8 :	3900
By December 10 :	4100

It was made clear that the figures mentioned were based on offers accepted from only 8 of the 23 States offering troops.

I explained that the figure of 714 officers and men for India included some supporting and service units as well as the infantry battalion.

.../...

I also pointed out that the figure of 765 officers and men for Yugoslavia included an augmented company of engineers to serve the entire Force.

Mr. Lloyd was informed that the Canadian Government had made a total of 2500 officers and men, including an infantry battalion, available to the Force, of which about one-third is now being employed.

As to the ultimate overall size of the Force, I stated that in this early stage General Burns has been thinking in terms of two combat brigades.

It was also pointed out that in addition to the personnel, very large tonnages of equipment and supplies have been airlifted to Egypt and Naples.

It was further stated that although the decision will be made by General Burns, it is being recommended to him that he move upwards of 1000 of the Force into Port Said as soon as he can make arrangements to that effect. He has sufficient personnel at his disposal to do so now.

RAB

Copia

SECRET

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