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
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Middle East conflict 1958 - July 30

SECCO documents

Second Report of UYOGIL - to SECCO

L 179: 100



UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/4069
30 July 1958

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Second Report of the United Nations Observation Group
in Lebanon

Submitted through the Secretary-General in pursuance of the resolution
of the Security Council of 11 June 1958 (S/4023)

Sir,

.....
The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon has the
honour to transmit to you its Second Report to the Security
Council.

(Signed) Galo Plaza
Chairman

(Signed) Rajeshwar Dayal
Member

(Signed) Odd Bull,
Major-General
Executive Member

SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP
IN LEBANON TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report of the Group covers its activities and observations from 2 to 15 July 1958. It should be read in conjunction with the first and second interim reports of the Group to the Security Council dated 15 to 17 July which deal respectively with the success achieved in overcoming the difficulties referred to in the first report concerning the denial of access to the frontier in opposition-held areas, and with the proposals of the Group for expanding the scope of its activities as a result of that success.
2. Prior and up to 15 July, the Group was engaged in preparing and evaluating material for its second report to the Security Council, which it had hoped to transmit to the Secretary-General shortly thereafter. On that date, however, two events of significance interrupted this work. First, the members of the Group finally succeeded in making arrangements with opposition leaders for unimpeded access of its observers to the frontier in all opposition-held areas, a fact which was considered of sufficient importance to require the immediate submission of the two interim reports to the Security Council. Secondly, United States armed forces landed in the Beirut area that afternoon. The impact of this event on the inhabitants of opposition-held areas where Observers were operating, occasioned difficulties and caused setbacks to the task of observation. As a result, the Group had to devote for some time its full attention to the new problems which had arisen with a view to their solution, in order to enable the activities of Observers to be continued unimpeded. These efforts are meeting with some success.
3. When the Group was able to resume work on its second report, it seemed advisable to restrict it to information already assembled for the period up to 15 July. The Group wishes, however, to state unequivocally that it has received no reports from its Observers subsequent to that date, which would tend to alter the general nature of the evaluations made in the present report.

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ACTION ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

4. In carrying out its task, an important source of information for the Group is contained in the communications received by it from a Liaison Committee established by the Lebanese Government. A preliminary analysis of the type of information thus provided appears in paragraph 14 (f) of the Group's first report. This analysis remains broadly correct, but it seems appropriate in the second report to repeat it in somewhat greater detail and to deal with certain special problems raised by certain of these communications.

5. In all, 102 communications had been received from the Lebanese Government by 15 July. Of these, eighteen contained information relating to alleged subversion within Lebanon or to reports of alleged infiltration prior to the date of the Group's commencement of operations, while a further twenty-one referred to such matters as the destruction of bridges and buildings, the mining of roads, clashes between Government and opposition forces, news broadcasts from the United Arab Republic stations and the expulsion of certain United Arab Republic diplomats, etc. These reports were treated by the Group as for information purposes only.

6. Thirty-three of these communications contained reports of alleged acts of infiltration, of the routes said to have been used for that purpose or of the presence of foreign nationals amongst the opposition forces. Three of these reports were urgent ones concerning infiltration said to be actually occurring at the time. Air patrols were dispatched as soon as possible, but when they arrived on the scene they found nothing to observe. The remainder of the communications were received usually several days after the events complained of. In these cases, the information was transmitted by the Group to the outstation in the area concerned for inquiry and reports were requested. In no case was it possible to find explicit confirmation of specific allegations and only in a few cases was the information obtained of such a nature as to require further action by the Group. These cases are dealt with later in the report. However, the information has also been used by the outstations to maintain special vigilance along certain routes.

7. The thoroughness of the watch carried out by the United Nations Observers is revealed by the following specific example. In their communication dated 11 July, the Government Liaison Committee stated that on 4 July three Syrian trucks loaded with slaughtered cattle and ammunition preceded by a pilot car with private Syrian licence number 8445 had passed by the intersection of the Damascus-Beirut road and the road south to Rachaya at Masnaa. This intersection is situated at a distance of six kilometres from the frontier and falls within the eighteen kilometres of the frontier which the Group was informed was under government control. The Liaison Committee inquired if the Observer on duty had noticed this infiltrating convoy. A United Nations observation post is in fact stationed at this important point during the hours of daylight. The report of the Observers on duty on 4 July, which is annexed, contains a full log of all vehicular movements on that day and shows that no such convoy passed by. It should be added that during the day, Lebanese forces were not present at this most strategic point of entry into the country, but were stationed some two kilometres to the north-west on the road towards Beirut.

8. In one of these communications, it is alleged that United Nations Observers are not prepared to go out at night to investigate cases of possible infiltration. It is correct that regular ground patrols have not been carried out by night. The Group has given careful consideration to the question of checking by means of night patrols possible infiltration routes, but, in view of the harassments suffered by its Observers in such areas even by day, it reluctantly came to the conclusion that night patrols would involve a degree of risk to the Observers which it could not accept. It was confirmed in this view by the fact that well-armed Lebanese forces have established no control along the routes in question. Further confirmation was provided subsequent to the period covered by this report, when a lighted United Nations jeep proceeding by night under a previously concluded arrangement to a village near an infiltration route came under heavy fire and was hit several times. The Group wishes to take this occasion of paying tribute to the courage and devotion to duty shown by its Observers, who have carried out their responsibilities with firmness and tact in areas where, in addition to the risks represented by actual hostilities, law and order is by no means ensured.

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9. A further two of the communications received from the Lebanese Government Liaison Committee are unusual in that they contain inaccurate accounts of incidents in which Observers were actually involved. One of these incidents, the finding of a group of armed men near Masnaa on 10 July is referred to later in the report. The second turned out to be another case of firing on United Nations Military Observers by a band of armed men.

10. The remaining twenty-eight communications contained reports of alleged infiltration based on statements made to Lebanese authorities by persons said to have been arrested in the course of the commission of subversive acts. In all, seventy-five persons under arrest were involved, of whom fourteen were said to be Syrians and sixty-one Lebanese. It was considered that the interrogation of such persons, provided it was obtained under conditions which would ensure that it was freely given and that it would be relevant to the specific mandate of the Group, might provide a useful basis for observation purposes.

11. It may be recalled that at the specific request of the Lebanese Foreign Minister conveyed through the Secretary-General, the Group carried out at an early stage of its operations the interrogation of two persons in Lebanese custody. Reference is made to this in paragraphs 27 et seq. of its first report. Subsequently the Group requested that persons in custody mentioned in other communications should be made available to it for interrogation and the Group adopted a suitable procedure for their interrogation. However, it will be seen from the subsequent paragraphs that the Group was unable to utilize this source of information, for the reasons clearly brought out in the correspondence.

12. In a letter dated 8 July, the Group informed the Lebanese authorities as follows:

"It is anxious that the procedure followed for the interrogation of these persons should permit them to be questioned as soon as possible. It feels that in order that the interrogation may have the greatest value, it should take place at the Headquarters of the Observation Group with only the United Nations interrogation team present. However, it should be pointed out that throughout the period of interrogation, the custody of the prisoners will remain the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities and Lebanese guards, if so desired, may be stationed outside the room in which the interrogation is taking place".

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13. In a letter dated 10 July, the Lebanese Minister in charge of relations with the Group, Dr. Albert Moukheiber, replied as follows:

"I have referred the letter to the Ministry of Justice for advice. The said Ministry informed me that the Lebanese laws do not permit that any interrogation of a person accused of a crime could be undertaken on the Lebanese territories by any other authority than the Lebanese judicial authorities. Article 71 of Criminal Procedure provides that during the interrogation of an accused the following persons could only be present: the attorney-at-law of the accused, the plaintiff or his attorney-at-law. Nevertheless the Ministry of Justice is willing to provide you with certified copies of the interrogation records of the persons in whom you might be interested for the purposes of your investigation together with copies of the sentences rendered by the court."

14. The Group gave careful consideration to the question and in a further letter dated 14 July it brought the following points to the Minister's attention:

"(a) The right to interrogate persons in a position to tender information relevant to their activities has been freely granted to other United Nations missions by the Government concerned.

"(b) It was at the specific request of the Lebanese Foreign Minister conveyed through the Secretary-General that two persons in Lebanese custody have already been interrogated by the Group.

"(c) You have yourself offered in communications Nos. 4/50/42/57 and 76 to have the persons concerned produced for interrogation by the Group."

In the light of these considerations, the Group inquired whether, without infringing Lebanese law, it would be possible for the Lebanese authorities to make persons in custody available to the Group upon its request for interrogation according to the procedure previously suggested by it.

Up to the present, no reply to the letter of 14 July has been received.

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OBSERVATIONS

15. As in its interim report, the Group intends to deal in turn with each section of the frontier and other opposition-held areas and describe any significant observations of its ground or air patrols in that particular area. In doing so, it will give such information about the population and economy of these areas as will enable the observations to be evaluated in their proper context.

Akkar Plain

16. The first of the frontier areas held by the opposition - the Akkar plain - extends from Tripoli north and east to the Syrian border. The frontier on the north is flat and is crossed by the main Tripoli-Latakia road at Arida, by the main Tripoli-Homs road at Aziziye and by a secondary road from Halba at Braghite. On the east, the area is bounded by the Lebanon range.

17. The only road and railway connexion between the Akkar Plain and Tripoli and the rest of Lebanon has been severely damaged between the opposition-held town of Munie and the Government lines north-east of Tripoli and there is no wheeled traffic between these points. There is a road block near Saidnaya on the Braghite-Halba road, but this can be by-passed. On all roads, a number of bridges are damaged and the surface is frequently broken, forcing the vehicles to go slowly.

18. In this area, air reconnaissance has been of particular importance because, until 9 July, ground patrols had not begun to reach the frontier regularly, jeep patrols of Military Observers had, however, been into the Akkar plain intermittently since 3 July when, for the first time, the frontiers at Arida and Aziziye were visited. Permanent observation posts by the Military Observers could not be established in the Akkar plain, as the full freedom of movement demanded was not forthcoming.

19. Between 2 and 15 July 1958, thirty-nine reconnaissance sorties were flown, sixteen of which were by helicopter. The Akkar area was thus observed on thirty-five occasions, twenty times during the night.

20. The first air patrols by day revealed only sporadic traffic along the three roads crossing the frontier. At night, the traffic movements observed on the Arida-Tripoli road, as well as the Aziziye-Abde-Tripoli road, were insignificant.

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However, eight vehicles were observed actually crossing the border into Lebanon at 2000 hours on 9 July. The greatest amount of traffic was observed on the Braghite-Halba road. On the nights of 5 - 11 July, 50, 5, 20, 10, 25 and 25 headlights respectively were seen moving southwards in what appeared to be convoys at various times between 2100 hours and 2400 hours LT.

21. It cannot be assumed that all the existing traffic has been observed by air. The traffic along the above three roads has proved to be heavier at night than during the daytime. A large majority of the vehicles observed were moving southwards and westwards.

22. It has been observed that after the second night of aerial reconnaissance the lights of vehicles have been switched off or dimmed when an aircraft is in the vicinity. What appeared to be a strong flashing light was observed on a hill-top, presumably to warn the vehicles on the Braghite-Halba road of the approach of aircraft. Up to 6 July, the villages in this area were well illuminated at night. On successive nights, however, aerial observations have established that the villages along this road have been blacked out, except for a few odd lights.

23. This may perhaps be a normal reaction since the area has been subject to air attack in the past and even now the government air forces have been attacking the Jabal Tarbol area. The people of the area have complained particularly against strafing and against shelling from the sea by government gun-boats at Abde. The natural reaction of villages on hearing the sound of an aircraft in the air, would be to black out as many lights as possible. The convoys returning from Syria might well have arranged a system of warning-lights for their safety.

24. Every effort was made to ascertain on the ground the nature of the traffic seen at night from the air, but since permission to establish permanent stations in the area had not been secured, no direct ground observation of it was possible. However, ground patrols at the border at Arida and Aziziye and in the interior of the region have frequently seen lively vehicular and other traffic moving in both directions in the daytime and have observed nothing which would lead them to believe that it was anything but the normal movement of goods and passengers.

25. In default of direct ground observation at night, ground patrols during the day have paid close attention to the arms at the disposal of opposition forces in the Tripoli area. They have observed no change in the general character of the

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arms carried by these forces as indicated in the First Report and, in particular, no evidence of the use of heavy weapons or their presence at strategic positions. There have been no such movements as might indicate a major build-up. The possibility of the infiltration of a certain amount of the type of arms and ammunition previously observed is not, however, excluded.

26. More generally, the Group has been informed that the Akkar plain - more than 500 sq.kms. in area and relatively fertile - has always depended partly on the Syrian cities in the north and partly on Tripoli and Beirut to the south. The area is a rich grain and fruit producing area and this is the harvesting season. By agreement between Syria and Lebanon such produce is allowed free movement across the frontiers without customs duties and without the need for export or import licences. The normal traffic across this border in untroubled times, is said to have been heavier than it is now. The farmers reap their fruit and crops in the forenoon, proceed across the border to Homs and other markets in the late afternoon and, if possible, return at night. It is reasonable to assume that with the only easily accessible markets lying on the other side of the border, this traffic is continuing and that among the vehicles seen at night there may have been trucks and buses returning from Syria after disposing of their merchandise.

27. With a view to making an evaluation of the road traffic in this area on a sounder basis, the Group recently intensified its efforts to gain complete access to all parts of the area, and in particular to establish permanent posts at the frontier and at other key points. A group of Observers stayed overnight at Halba on the night of 13/14 July. On the morning of 15 July, as noted in the first interim report, the opposition leader in the area gave assurances to two members of the Group that it would be able to establish permanent observation posts at the three border crossings at Arida, Aziziye and Braghite and offered at the same time to provide facilities to examine the contents of trucks crossing the border. The Group thus had reason to hope that the nature of the traffic would be finally determined in the near future.

The North Bekaa Valley

28. The second of the opposition-held areas near the frontier, separated from the first by one of the highest portions of the Lebanon range, is the Bekaa Valley north and east of Baalbek. The northern frontier with Syria consists of open

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country and is crossed at Koussair (Lebanon) by a minor road and north of El Kah by a main road and standard-gauge railway leading to Homs in Syria. The eastern frontier consists of the roadless Anti-Lebanon range. Government positions south and west of Baalbek are astride the road and rail communication with the rest of the country, but buses, taxis, private cars and trucks have been seen crossing these positions in both directions. On one occasion, some twenty-five brand-new truck chassis were allowed to pass northward in transit across the frontier from the Free Port of Beirut.

29. From Baalbek to El-Laboue, the Bekaa Valley consists of a bare and relatively waterless plain. From El-Laboue northward the river Orontes flows into Syria and the section close to the border is irrigated to a certain extent. The population is grouped in village societies. The principal opposition leader of the north Bekaa resides at Hermel and is an important landowner in an area extending northward across the Syrian border. The growing of wheat and sheep raising are among the main occupations of the inhabitants of the area.

30. Access to the area was restricted at first, but subsequently our patrols were in a position to reach every part of it during the day. Until 11 July, patrols were being held up at El-Laboue, 30 kms. from the border. Despite this, day observation of the northern Bekaa valley was possible, to an extent limited by frequent poor visibility on account of fog and haze, from observation posts established on the Lebanon range and at Btedai. Beginning on 11 July, day patrols from Chtaura outstation began to reach the frontier in this area and on 15 July agreement was reached with the local opposition leaders to establish stations at Baalbek and near the northern frontier. Pending their establishment, however, air observation has also been of considerable importance in this area.

31. Day patrols have reported that the Lebanese customs post at El Kah on the main road is intact, but unmanned; there is a Syrian customs post on the other side of the frontier. Vehicles have been seen crossing the border on both the main and subsidiary roads, though traffic north of Baalbek has not seemed to be heavy. Air observations confirm this, except that on the nights of 5 and 6 July at about 10 p.m., a considerable number of vehicles not in regular formation was seen proceeding south towards Baalbek. It may be noted that a similar number of vehicle lights in more regular formation was seen on the same nights in the government-controlled area south of Baalbek proceeding in both directions.

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32. Since an unsuccessful attack by opposition forces on government positions near Baalbek on 17 June, in which, in addition to small arms, bazookas and mortars were said to have been used, and in which one government soldier was killed and five were wounded, there has been no major military activity in the area, but there has been at times considerable firing of small arms, to which the government forces have replied with small arms and mortar fire. The opposition forces, who are in part posted among the celebrated ruins of the town, have drawn the attention of Observers to some damage done to the ruins by government fire.

33. The considerations mentioned by the Group in describing the situation in area north of Tripoli no doubt apply, with certain modifications, to the area north of Baalbek. In particular, the arrangements made on 15 July to establish frontier posts at Koussair and Baalbek would provide an opportunity for observation of wheeled traffic in the area in the future. It is the intention of the Group to establish a further station, as soon as possible, at El Kah.

The Central Bekaa Valley

34. The Bekaa Valley in this region consists of a broad and fertile valley, irrigated in large measure by the waters of the Litani river and producing rich crops of wheat, vegetables, grapes, melons and other fruits. The eastern frontier in this region consists of hilly country, which is crossed by two main routes of communication, the Beirut-Damascus railway east of Rayak and the Beirut-Damascus highway, which passes through Masnaa. The railway operated normally until 6 July, when a bridge was blown up near Yahfoufa. A poor road from Baalbek to Zebedani in Syria crosses the frontier near the railway. The hills along the frontier are for the most part under the control of small opposition bands, but the government forces have control of the important centres and the roads linking them.

35. Adequate ground observation of this area has been possible from Chtaura outstation and substations at Btedai, American University Experimental Farm and Zahle and Observers have experienced no great difficulty in access to the frontier here, although they were fired at on two occasions and had to withdraw. Day observation posts have been established near the frontier at Masnaa on the main road and on occasion at Yahfoufa on the railway. The log kept at the

former post shows a considerable movement of traffic across the frontier in both directions, but there has been nothing to indicate that any infiltration of arms or ammunition has occurred. As noted above, government forces are in a position to control the important road junction at Masnaa on the Beirut-Damascas highway, although they have not done so due to the fact that they have not been stationed at the road junction during dark hours and have only lately taken up position in daytime as far eastward. There are, however, no government posts from the Masmaa road crossing to the frontier.

36. Military Observers have, from time to time, patrolled from the Masnaa road junction and adjacent customs post to the actual frontier some 6 kms. to the east. On 10 July 1958, following a clash between government troops and opposition partisans near the customs post, a patrol led by the officer in charge of Chtaura outstation was stopped at a point 4.3 kms. east of the Masnaa road junction by six well-armed uniformed men, one of whom was French-speaking and seemed to be an officer although he had no insignia. He was wearing what appeared to be a Syrian type headgear which he took off and held behind his back. He claimed to be a Lebanese citizen and produced an identification card which, however, he refused to allow the patrol to inspect, saying that he did not want it to know his name. On two subsequent occasions, patrols along this road met a man answering to the same description, who claimed to be a leader of several hundred opposition supporters in the area. The area in which the party was encountered is a sort of no-man's-land, since from Masnaa to the frontier there is no evidence of any government troops.

37. The Group has mentioned this incident in some detail, because it has already been publicized as an instance of Syrian infiltration into Lebanon, which the facts do not substantiate.

The South Bekaa Valley

38. Further south, the Bekaa valley narrows and from Machghara south the Litani flows through the hills. From this point an important project to drive a tunnel to divert some of the waters of the river through the Lebanon range to near Jezzine is now under construction. Between the southern section of the valley and the Deir-el-Aachayer salient into Syria, there is a zone of hills extending

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to a width of some 20 kms. of relatively infertile land with indifferent water supplies. These hills are bare and are of fairly easy access. The population here is grouped largely on a confessional basis in villages, which are situated for the most part on hilltops. In the vicinity of Deir-el-Aachayer the Syrian-Lebanese frontier is crossed by two indifferent roads which proceed generally westward through the hilly country, linking up with the Masnaa-Rachaya main road and hence with the rest of the Lebanese road system.

39. Opposition forces are in control of most of the area between the Masnaa-Rachaya road and the frontier and appear to have recently exercised control even in the daytime over the main road from Masnaa to Rachaya. When members of the Group visited the latter town on 9 July, they passed a notice placed in the centre of the road warning travellers that they proceeded further on their own responsibility. Many of the villages to the west of the road appear to contain opposition sympathizers and a number of armed men have been seen in them regularly. Sporadic firing occurs between villages at night, but the only activity by government forces in the area was the recapture of the village of Aiha by a government armoured column which proceeded to Rachaya on 6 July and occasional machine-gun and mortar fire from government forces in the citadel of Rachaya, mostly in the direction of Kfar Kouk. A government post has existed there throughout the disturbances, but it has been practically cut off from outside contact.

40. The ground observation in this area is carried out from a sub-station at Rachaya on the northern foothills of Mount Hermon and that of Saghbine at a point overlooking the Bekaa valley from the west. A subsidiary night observation post was established on 11 July near Kafraya on the Saghbine-Chtaura road. Access to the frontier areas near Deir-el-Aachayer has presented no particular difficulty and a day observation post has been established in the region on a regular basis. However, the Observers have been allowed to use only the northern road into this area. Traffic on the road leading in Kfar Kouk has not been possible since 26 June, since the road is said to be mined. Opposition forces seen in this area have been considerably less than the thousand men noted in the first report. It should be added that this area consists also of Druze tribesmen, whose homeland extends well across the border.

41. In its first report, the Group reported that its Observers had noticed approximately one company of uniformed Syrian soldiers on both sides of a road leading from Deir-el-Aachayer into Syria in an area where the location of the border is under dispute. This matter has received the further careful consideration of the Group. On 11 July the Executive Member of the Group personally visited the area and made an inspection tour there in order to check the findings of the Observers as regards the exact location of the Syrian company's camp. The camp lies some 4-1/2 kms. southwest of Deir-el-Aachayer along the road from that village leading towards Kfer Kouk, at a junction where a side road branches off to Rahle in Syria. It was verified that the company had remained in this position at least since 25 June. The road junction in question is only about 1/2 kilometer from the border as shown on the maps officially transmitted to the Group by the Lebanese authorities and is well inside the area which, according to the Lebanese authorities, has been claimed by Syria and hence is subject to dispute. The Syrian company was found to be entirely within territory claimed to be Syrian; some further tents in indisputably Lebanese territory were found to be occupied by nomads. The Executive Member was of the impression that the company was an ordinary border patrol.

42. In its first report the Group stated that in the Rachaya and Saghbine areas Observer teams had experienced difficulty and that they appeared to have touched on sensitive spots in areas claimed by government sources to be supply and infiltration routes.

43. The government has in fact submitted to the Group several intelligence reports to the effect that there is passage by night of caravans of armed men and munition from the vicinity of Deir-el-Aachayer via Aita-el-Foukhar, Joub-Jannine, Ain Zebde over the Lebanon range to the Chouf area south-east of Beirut. It has even been alleged that such movements have taken place by vehicle as far as Joub-Jannine, where the bridge over the Litani has been blown up by the opposition. Other routes north and south of the one mentioned above are also reported and in fact the terrain would offer no obstacle to the passage of mule traffic over a wide variety of routes. Observers have received several reports of such traffic from other sources.

44. The day patrols carried out by Observers have revealed no significant movements in the area by day. Instances of interference with patrols have, however,

continued to occur. The following instances occurred on the Rachaya-Masnaa road:

- (a) On 10 July at 1815 hrs., as a United Nations jeep passed by the road junction to Ain Arab, fire was opened in the direction of the jeep by three armed men, of whom one was dressed in an improvised khaki uniform.
- (b) On 12 July at 1230 hrs., a patrol at the road junction Aita-el-Foukhar met an armed man in khaki, who pointed out that both sides of the road junction were mined with anti-personnel mines and fenced.
- (c) On 12 July at 1850 hrs., light machine-gun fire was directed 5 metres in front of a patrol on the Rachaya road. Seven armed men informed the patrol that the road was closed until 0800 hrs. the next day. They allowed the patrol to proceed to Rachaya.
- (d) On 13 July, three anti-personnel mines were observed at road junction Aita-el-Foukhar.

The following events have taken place near Ain Zebde, just north of Saghbine on the road to Chtaura:

- (a) On 30 June, prior to the adoption of the first report, a patrol from Saghbine to the damaged bridge at Ain Zebde heard a few rifle shots and a few bursts of light machine-gun fire close to the jeep. Twelve men armed with rifles and two light machine-guns surrounded the car, switched off the radio and searched thoroughly for weapons. Not finding them they let the patrol proceed. (On 4 July the bridge at Ain Zebde was repaired, reportedly by supporters of the opposition leader in the Chouf on the insistence of the local population.)
- (b) On 6 July while a patrol was examining the blown up bridge along the Litani, warning shots were heard from the direction of Joub Jannine.
- (c) On 10 July a patrol from Chtaura to Saghbine was stopped by three armed men at 1815 hrs. and was told that it must not pass after 1900 hrs. or it would be shot at irrespective of the white flag. Another patrol passing the area at 1845 hrs. received the same warning.

45. Night watches have been kept at the sub-station at Saghbine and since 11 July, at an observation post in a building at Kafraya with a good command of the area. The following observations were made:

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(a) On the night 7-8 July, a number of moving lights indicated that there was traffic between Baaloul and Lela.

(b) On the night 8-9 July, fewer lights were observed in the Lela-Baaloul area.

(c) On 10 July, at 1920 hours Observers noted signs of movements, which were thought to be vehicles (at least seven). This was followed by flashing lights from Baaloul directed towards Ain Zebde. Between 2300-0100 hours, two vehicles were observed proceeding from Karaoun to the blasted bridge at Camp de Karaoun. At the same time, light signals emanating from this bridge were flashed to the road junction north of Baab El Maraa. The patrol which checked this location found six 7.5 mm. ammunition clips.

(d) During a night watch on the night 11-12 July between 1900-2359 hours moving lights were observed at Baaloul, Lela and Karaoun. In addition, some flashing light signals were observed between these villages and Ain Zebde. The same observations were reported by the night Observers at Saghbine. At 2130 hours, the observation post at Kafraya observed two passenger cars leaving Joub Jannine and proceeding in the direction of Lela. The observation post at Saghbine observed two passenger cars departing from Lela in the direction of Baaloul at 2300 hours. At 2000 hours a strong spotlight was observed on a mule track between Lela and the Litani river. In addition, twelve smaller lights grouped in three and in intervals of 200-300 yards were observed in the same region. It would appear that several different routes were being used to cross the river, presumably in the direction of Maaser Chouf and El Barrouk.

46. Subsequent to the period covered by the report, convoys of from fifteen to thirty unloaded mules escorted by armed men have been observed on three occasions moving eastward in the evening, while at a later hour one such convoy has been observed at a distance of some 400-500 metres moving westwards.

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47. The Group has carefully evaluated the observations mentioned above. It has noted that while few vehicles have been reported crossing in the Deir-el-Aachayer area the frontier there is quite unguarded. Similarly the roads from that area to villages in the South Bekaa Valley are open to passage and there is some evidence of a few trucks having arrived in these villages from time to time. There is also convincing evidence that mule caravans have proceeded frequently from these villages in the direction of the Chouf.

48. Finally, the arms which have been observed in the Chouf area and the nature of such military operations as have occurred would imply the existence of some source of supply and it may therefore be presumed that arms and ammunition are entering the area along the route indicated, although it should be added that it has not been possible for Observers to ascertain the exact nature of the cargo.

49. It remains to make some estimate of the scale of such infiltration as may be occurring. There is no evidence of substantial road traffic into the villages of the South Bekaa Valley. The size of the mule caravans subsequently seen would set an upper limit on the scale of the operation. Previous negative observations would tend to suggest that any infiltration which has taken place has occurred in the recent dark nights and not in the previous period of moonlight. It can be assumed therefore that the operations have been on a limited scale sufficient perhaps to supply the Druse tribesmen and others of the Chouf with a certain amount of arms and ammunition, but scarcely sufficient to transform them into a force capable of operating effectively outside their own mountain fastnesses or against well-armed military forces. The observations recorded later in the report in the section on South-West Lebanon indicate this.

50. In its second interim report, the Group has proposed that the observation post which it has maintained by day in the Deir-el-Aachayer area should be transformed into a permanent station. It has already established a night observation post at Ain Zebde. It hopes that these measures will tend to prevent any infiltration which may be occurring. The

difficulties of operating along smuggling routes in an area where law and order is ill assured are, however, considerable. The Group wishes to point out further that while Lebanese intelligence services seem to be well aware of the possible infiltration routes, Lebanese armed forces or other authorities which have access to the area, have, to the Group's knowledge, taken no preventive action on the basis of this intelligence.

South-East Lebanon

51. The remaining section of the frontier with Syria consists of the mountainous region of Mount Hermon (2,814 metres), but just before the Israel border it falls away into the upper Jordan valley and is passed by a second-class road leading to Baniyas and Kuneitra in Syria. The high ground along the frontier is controlled by opposition forces, who have made themselves more secure by blowing the bridges and mining the roads leading up the hills. It was not until 12 July that Observers proceeding on horseback were able to reach the opposition headquarters in this area, at Chebaa.

52. The main government force in this area is stationed at Marjayoun, a town strategically situated on high ground between the Jordan and Litani rivers. This is also the outstation from which Military Observers patrol the main road north-east to Rachaya and southward along a section of the frontier with Israel. In its first report, the Group noted that Marjayoun and Khiam had been fired at on several occasions from mortars in opposition-held territory near Halta within Lebanon. There have been no further reports of such fire during the period 2-15 July. The only action reported during the period was an attempt by the government forces to recover a number of its supporters, who had been ambushed and held prisoner near Hasbaya.

53. In certain of the communications received from the Lebanese Government, the area round Chebaa has been mentioned as the starting point of routes for the despatch of mule trains carrying arms to the Chouf and other opposition-held areas in the interior. The Group has made no direct observations, either from the ground or the air, tending to confirm this. In any case, it intends to establish sub-stations at Chebaa and Kherouia in the area in question.

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South-West Lebanon

54. The Group's outstation at Saida has direct access to the southern border with Israel and to the sea coast northward towards Beirut. Sub-stations have been established at Tyr further south on the coast and at Jezzine south on the opposition-held Chouf area. There are opposition-held sections in the towns of Saida and Tyr.

55. A particular concern of the Group has been to guard against possible infiltration from the sea. In addition to ground patrols from Saida and Tyr, air patrols have been ordered from time to time on this and other sections of the sea frontier. No significant observations have, however, been reported. Sea patrolling of the coast has been considered, but the Group felt that that was primarily the duty of the Lebanese authorities.

56. Another activity of Observers has been to endeavour to ascertain if arms and ammunition are being moved to the opposition quarters of Saida and Tyr and to the southern part of the Chouf from the eastern and south-eastern frontier. The sub-station at Jezzine is particularly well located to patrol roads and tracks which might be used for this purpose. Here again, however, no significant observations have been made.

57. The areas controlled by the opposition have been visited at frequent intervals with a view to ascertaining possible changes in the arms at their disposal. There has been considerable exchange of small arms fire at both Saida and Tyr. The symbolic nature of much of it, is, however, revealed by the fact that there is a sort of informal truce at Saida and Tyr each evening from 5-7 p.m. to enable shopping to be done. Members of the Group, while visiting Saida on 3 July, were able to see government soldiers moving freely in an area commanded by houses fifty yards away where the opposition forces were standing guard on the roof tops.

58. Military Observers from Saida have also on several occasions visited Moukhtara, the opposition headquarters in the Chouf. These visits have revealed no particular change in the situation as described in the first report. It should be noted that in the first few days of July, Druzes from the Chouf advanced to Chemlane and other hill stations overlooking Beirut city and airport from the south-east. These attacks were observed by Military Observers

from Headquarters at Beirut. The opposition forces, who were using only small arms, were repelled without undue difficulty by government forces with armoured cars, with the assistance of government partisans.

59. Since that time, opposition forces in the Chouf area have been quiescent.

60. Finally, it should be noted that the opposition-held quarter of Beirut has continued to be held behind barricades, although most of the civic services there are said to be functioning. There have been frequent bursts of firing on both sides as well as a certain number of acts of terrorism and sporadic firing in other quarters of the city. Observers have entered the opposition-held quarter in Beirut only for discussions concerned with arrangements for access to opposition-held frontier areas.

CONCLUSION

61. It will be clear from the report that considerable progress has been made in extending and intensifying observation activities over most of the significant areas, both along the borders and in the areas adjacent to them. United Nations Military Observers have operated with skill and devotion and often in conditions of considerable danger and difficulty in areas where there is no effective governmental authority of any kind and where they have to depend for their safety largely on the good will of the inhabitants or on such influence as the local opposition leaders may exercise.

62. The extent of the infiltration of arms which may be taking place has been indicated in the report. It is clear that it cannot be on anything more than a limited scale, and is largely confined to small arms and ammunition. In conditions of civil conflict, when the frontier is practically throughout its length, open and unguarded, some movement of this kind may well be expected.

63. As regards the question of the illegal infiltration of personnel, the nature of the frontier, the existence of traditional tribal and other bonds on both sides of it, the free movement of produce in both directions, are among the factors which must be taken into account in making an evaluation. It must, however, be said that in no case have United Nations Observers, who have been vigilantly patrolling the opposition-held areas and have frequently observed the armed bands there, been able to detect the presence of persons who have indubitably entered from across the border for the purpose of fighting.

64. It must be emphasized that from the observations made of the arms and organization obtaining in the opposition-held areas, the fighting strength of opposition elements is not such as to be able successfully to cope with hostilities against a well-armed regular military force. There is no evidence of the existence of radio contact between the opposition forces scattered over different parts of the country nor of any co-ordinated military planning and control.

65. These observations are based upon the results of incessant patrolling both in the air and on the ground. Whatever information has been received, whether from the Lebanese Government Liaison Committee or from other sources or clues, has been followed up with great care. Intensive air patrolling has been carried

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out by day as well as by night, and the observations thus made have been closely checked against the results of ground patrolling and observation. All-night watches have been instituted at the outstations and sub-stations and occasionally, Observers have patrolled at night.

66. In the report, everything of consequence or significance observed has been fully assessed and set out, irrespective of whether the results have been of a positive or negative nature. The observations therefore accurately reflect the situation in regard to the question of the "illegal infiltration of personnel or smuggling of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders".

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ANNEX I

OP MASNAA

4 July 1958

IN-COMING

| <u>Time</u> | <u>Lorry</u> | <u>Car</u> | <u>Bus</u> | <u>Passengers</u> | <u>Notes</u> |
|-------------|--------------|------------|------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| 0545 | | 1 Taxi | | Driver only | Syrian No. 2067 |
| 0655 | 1 | | | 2 | Cattle |
| 0745 | 1 | | | 2 | " |
| 0815 | | 1 | | 4 | |
| 0955 | 2 | | | 2 each | Potatoes |
| 1023 | | 1 | | - | |
| 1030 | 1 | | | 3 | |
| 1043 | 1 | | | | Cattle |
| 1048 | 4 | | | | Empty |
| 1200 | 2 | | | | " |
| 1233 | 1 | | | | " |
| 1345 | | 1 Taxi | | | " |
| 1355 | | | 1 | 16 | |
| 1528 | | 1 | | 5 | |
| 1558 | | 1 | | | Empty |
| 1825 | 1 | | | | Lebanese No. 60040 |
| 1830 | | 1 | | 1 | |

OUTGOING

| | | | | | |
|------|---|---|---|--------|---------------|
| 0630 | 1 | | | 2 | Empty |
| 0700 | 1 | | | 1 | Potatoes |
| 0710 | 3 | | | | Empty |
| 0713 | 1 | | | 3 | Potatoes |
| 0730 | 7 | | | | " |
| 0810 | | 1 | | 4 | |
| 0810 | 1 | | | 4 | No load |
| 0815 | 2 | | | 2 each | Potatoes |
| 0905 | | 1 | | 8 | |
| 1015 | 1 | | | | Apples |
| 1020 | 1 | | | 6 | No load |
| 1055 | | 1 | | 4 | Taxi |
| 1056 | 1 | | | | Apples |
| 1405 | | | 1 | 30 | From MASNAA |
| 1455 | 1 | | | | Empty |
| 1522 | | 1 | | 5 | |
| 1527 | | 1 | | 5 | |
| 1527 | | 1 | | 6 | To RACHAYA |
| 1603 | 1 | | | 1 | without boxes |
| 1605 | 1 | | | 1 | " |
| 1606 | 1 | | | 1 | " |
| 1606 | 3 | | | 3 | " |
| 1607 | 1 | | | 1 | " |
| 1608 | 2 | | | 1 | " |
| 1608 | 2 | | | | Empty |
| 1609 | | | 2 | 4 | |

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SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON : ANNEX II

