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Middle East conflict [1958] - July 18

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Verbatim Record of the 833 Meeting

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UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



GENERAL  
S/PV.833  
18 July 1958  
ENGLISH

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Friday, 18 July 1958, at 10.30 p.m.

- |                   |   |                   |
|-------------------|---|-------------------|
| <u>President:</u> | Mr. ARAUJO  | Colombia          |
| <u>Members:</u>   | Canada  | Mr. HOLMES        |
|                   | China   | Mr. TSIANG        |
|                   | France  | Mr. de VAUCHELLES |
|                   | Iraq  | Mr. ABBASS        |
|                   | Japan   | Mr. MATSUDAIRA    |
|                   | Panama  | Mr. ILLUECA       |
|                   | Sweden  | Mr. JARRING       |
|                   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                     | Mr. SOBOLEV       |
|                   | United Kingdom of Great Britain<br>and Northern Ireland | Sir Pierson DIXON |
|                   | United States of America                                | Mr. LODGE         |

This record contains original speeches and interpretations. The final text, containing translations, will be distributed as soon as possible.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be sent in duplicate, within two working days, to the Chief, Meetings Service, Department of Conference Services, Room 1104, and also incorporated in mimeographed copies of the record.

AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED AT 0930 HOURS ON 21 JULY 1958,  
THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 0930 HOURS ON 23 JULY 1958.

Publication of the final printed records being subject to a rigid schedule, the co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

## ADDITION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING:

"COMPLAINT BY LEBANON IN RESPECT OF A SITUATION ARISING FROM THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON, THE CONTINUANCE OF WHICH IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" (S/4007).

LETTER DATED 17 JULY 1958 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING:

"COMPLAINT BY THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN OF INTERFERENCE IN ITS DOMESTIC AFFAIRS BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC" (S/4053).

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Toukan, representative of Jordan, Mr. Azkoul, representative of Lebanon, and Mr. Loutfi, representative of the United Arab Republic, took their places at the Security Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The Council will continue its discussion on the basis of the draft resolutions submitted by delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (S/4047/Rev.1), the United States of America (S/4050/Rev.1) and Sweden (S/4054).

Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon)(interpretation from French): Before making the statement I had planned, I should like briefly to inform the Council of the preliminary remarks I have just received from my Government regarding the second interim report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (S/4052) which came to the Council yesterday.

First, the report does not indicate clearly that observation posts have been set up on the border.

Secondly, access by the observers to the frontier does not mean that observation has in fact become effective.

Thirdly, limited observation which the observers are at present able to carry out continues in the daytime as in the past. According to all our

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

official information, infiltration of armed men and the shipment of weapons on a large scale are carried out at night.

Fourthly, the entry of the observers into rebel territory often takes place in the company of the rebels themselves at certain definite times; that is to say, when the rebels have nothing to hide from the observers.

Fifthly, we have quite recent and reliable information that observers were repulsed in the Baalbeck region, that they were sometimes even fired upon to intimidate them and that, always taking into account the dangers to which they can expose themselves, they avoid carrying out their observation during the night and conduct their inquiry only during the day when they are sure of being sheltered from all danger.

Sixthly, the Government of Lebanon has just published this morning an important communication on the subject of the recent acts of infiltration and the shipment of weapons to Lebanon.

These remarks are not criticisms of the Observation Group with which my Government wishes fully to co-operate and to which it wishes to lend all necessary assistance so that the Group may successfully carry out its assignment. These comments are designed to complement the second interim report which the Observation Group submitted to the Council yesterday.

I should like to pass now to the main statement that I am going to make this morning to the members of the Council. During the last two days, the representative of the Soviet Union said much about the events which are actually occurring in Lebanon and about the international repercussions that they could have. It seems to me that his remarks should be objectively and seriously analysed. If we do this, we will be able to see what is in fact the true state of affairs as a result of the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the domestic affairs of Lebanon.

The thesis advanced by the Soviet Union, as I understand it, can be summed up as follows: Since there is no external intervention in Lebanon and since the Lebanese crisis is purely domestic in nature, the shipment of United States troops to Lebanon is unjustified and constitutes an act of illegal intervention which can only be explained by American imperialistic aspirations.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

I do not propose to deal with this thesis concerning the United States. The representative of the United States can do so if he chooses, and indeed he has done so with success. But since the whole Soviet thesis is based on the denial of the Lebanese complaint to the effect that there has been and still is mass intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon on the part of the United Arab Republic it is important for my delegation to deal with this basic aspect of it.

In order to judge the validity of the Soviet thesis, it is necessary to pose the following four fundamental questions:

First, is the present Lebanese Government the legitimate Government of the country which is alone officially responsible for the protection of Lebanon from outside intervention?

Secondly, if this intervention really exists, is this legitimate Government of Lebanon entitled to request the United Nations for assistance with a view to overcoming the threat to the independence of Lebanon?

Thirdly, does this legitimate Government have the right, if the threat to the independence of the country becomes imminent and if it is not possible to wait for the United Nations to decide to recruit and organize the necessary assistance, to request such assistance from friendly countries under the Charter of the United Nations?

Fourthly, is there or is there not in fact external intervention on the part of the United Arab Republic in the domestic affairs of Lebanon?

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

I think that nobody here or elsewhere will hesitate to answer in the affirmative to the two first questions, namely, that the Government of Lebanon is the legitimate government of the country-- even the rebels themselves who are struggling against it have never denied it -- and that it is entitled and it has the duty to request assistance from the United Nations if it judges that the independence of Lebanon is really threatened by foreign intervention.

As regards the third question, whether it is entitled to request assistance from friendly countries, certain delegations here seem to dispute this right allegedly because this right could be invoked under Article 51 of the Charter only in the case of direct armed attack from outside. In answer to them, I will draw their attention to the fact that Article 51 of the Charter does not speak of direct armed attack. It speaks of armed attack. It wishes to cover all cases of attack, direct or indirect, so long as it is an armed attack.

Indeed, is there any difference from the point of view of the effects between direct armed attack or indirect armed attack if both of them are armed and if both of them are designed to menace the independence of a country? What difference is there? What difference is there as regards the effects between direct attack and indirect attack, if both of them are armed and if both of them are designed to suppress the independence of a country or could even threaten that independence? What difference is there between armed soldiers in uniform attacking a given region in a given country and these same troops still armed but without uniforms infiltrating secretly this area in order to regroup themselves there and then start hostilities, the same type of hostilities as those which would be started by uniformed troops?

It seems quite clear, therefore, that this distinction between direct armed attack and indirect armed attack is strictly fictitious from the point of view of the issue before us.

We have to consider the fourth issue, which is the basic one here, namely, whether there is or there is not in Lebanon examples of armed attack including the infiltration of armed men and the shipment of arms and war material. To this question the representative of the Soviet Union replies in the negative. He says that the intervention of which we are speaking does not simply exist.

This assertion can be based only on one of the two following hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that he knows that there is intervention but is interested in seeing this intervention continue and would like to prevent any assistance that would put an end to this intervention. In that case, I am convinced that no other member of the Council would wish to follow him in this direction.

But there is another hypothesis, namely, that the representative of the Soviet Union knows, for reasons of his own, perhaps for magical reasons of his own, that all the facts which we have stated before this Council and all those which we have received since -- all the facts that have been collated by other States independently of us and all the facts which the world press has reported and which prove the existence of such intervention -- are completely fallacious and unsubstantiated. If that is the case, then we would be most grateful to him if he could share with us his omissions so that we might in our turn endorse his thesis.

Before being able to decide which of these two hypotheses should be upheld, I think that I should dwell for a minute on the fact that the Lebanese delegation has stated before this Council during the submission of our original complaint a large number of facts which has convinced the Lebanese authority of the existence of mass intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic. These facts were not all the facts which we knew about. They were merely typical examples, typical instances, of the different ways in which this mass intervention is being carried out. But it was these facts which we submitted to the Council, as well as the ones which other Governments had wind of, which convinced the Security Council of the gravity of the situation in Lebanon and which prompted it to send the Observation Group with the assignment to see to it that there be no illegal infiltration of men or shipment of weapons over the Lebanese borders.

Since then, the number of facts proving mass intervention, foreign intervention, has become still more numerous. My delegation has not yet had an opportunity of listing these new facts before this Council, but the Government of Lebanon has submitted most of these instances directly to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

The question may, therefore, arise, and with good reason, if the Observation Group was aware of these facts and if these facts were valid, why did not the Observation Group mention them in its first report to the Council as evidence of infiltration. In order to reply to this question, I think we should, first of all, remember that the first report of the Observation Group covered only a period of approximately ten days during which it was still in a process of formation and during which it was not able to enter rebel-held territory or approach the Lebanese-Syrian frontier over which this infiltration is being carried out.

We should also bear in mind the following three considerations: Firstly, the nature of observation as understood by the Observation Group, namely, the fact that it can report to the Council only the incidents which it alone has personally and directly observed; and, secondly, the nature of the report which the Lebanese Government submits to the Observation Group. These reports contain mostly facts which were observed by agents of the Lebanese authorities and which often reach the Observation Group only when these facts will have already taken place and are no longer observable. For example, a report reaches the Beirut authorities from one of the agents of Army Intelligence regarding the fact that a mule convoy loaded with ammunition and weapons will have crossed the Lebanese frontier at such-and-such a point and on such-and-such a date. When this report, which as far as the Lebanese authorities are concerned represents proof of continuing infiltration, reaches the Observation Group, it becomes obsolete because the Observation Group can no longer check the facts which are mentioned, and, therefore, they cannot take this incident into account.

The third point which we have to bear in mind is the manner in which the Observation Group observes in accordance with the instructions of the Council. The Council did not send to Lebanon an investigation group whose principal or sole task would be to report back to the Council the results of its investigation. It has sent to Lebanon an Observation Group whose mission is to see to it that there is no infiltration of men or material in Lebanon. This means that the duty of the Group is not to tell the Council whether there is or is not infiltration. Its duty is to put an end to this infiltration and to report on the results of this effort to the Council. In other words, what must be expected from the Observation Group is not a report indicating whether there is or there is not infiltration or listing the different cases of infiltration,

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(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

but merely whether it was able or was not able to exercise the function which was assigned to it, which was to put an end to such infiltration, and, thus, whether the infiltration has ended or whether it is nevertheless continuing.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

For according to the interpretation given to the resolution of the Council, it is only through observation that it was hoped the Observation Group might put an end to the infiltration of armed men and the shipment of material. Now the Group has just told us in its first report that it was not yet in a position to observe, and therefore it could not judge whether it was able or not to put an end to infiltration. It is this conclusion of the Observation Group that we should bear in mind and which is of interest to us, not the fact that they were not able to arrive at any conclusions regarding the existence or non-existence of infiltration. I conclude that the preliminary conclusions arrived at by the observers in their first report do not justify the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union to the effect that there is no infiltration of men and material into Lebanon. He cannot say that he bases himself on the report of the Observation Group and then say that there is no infiltration. Then on what does he base himself?

If the representative of the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the many and impressive facts which we have and which prove the existence of mass intervention into our affairs, claims that this intervention does not exist, there is only one explanation, namely, that he is possessed of an extraordinary power of omniscience which we do not all enjoy. If that is the case, then he should be able to answer the following questions which those people, like myself, who do not know everything, cannot reply to. These questions which I will put to him are completely apart from the facts which we have submitted to the Council and which we know; we will be able to submit these to the Council if required. These are questions which in too many cases the United Nations Observation Group submitted to the Council and from which the representative of the Soviet Union concluded that it was all within the domestic affairs of Lebanon. I hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will be able to reply to all of these questions.

First of all, on 25 June 1958, what were the company of Syrian troops doing in uniform on both sides of the road from Deir-El-Atchayer, which is the headquarters of one of the rebel leaders -- it leads to Syria -- or the road between Syria and this town -- this was noted by the observers. Secondly, who opened a mortar barrage that the Observer Group saw coming from Halba, two kilometres inside the Lebanese border, close to the Syrian border?

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

Thirdly, when the report says that there is little doubt that most of the armed men seen by the Observation Group were composed of Lebanese, what was the nationality of the minority among these armed men?

Fourthly: how can one explain, if not by the proximity of the Syrian border from which the rebels can receive the necessary assistance, the very significant fact that the rebels are holding, with only very few exceptions, only the border areas of Lebanon, the border areas between Syria and Lebanon, only that part of the country?

Fifthly, what reasons do the rebels have for preventing the observers from entering their territory, destroying the bridges which lead to their territory and placing mines in their way and firing upon the observers, if they had nothing to hide from the observers?

My sixth and last question I draw from the last interim report which we received yesterday from the Observation Group. The Group describes its various needs in men, material, aircraft and helicopters that are needed to carry out the task which the Council assigned to it. The question that follows from this request of the Group: if the Observation Group was convinced, as the representative of the Soviet Union claims, that there was no infiltration why then does the Observation Group ask for all these measures which are needed in order for it to bring to a successful conclusion its observation task on the Lebanese border?

This is the first series of questions which are based strictly on the information in the reports of the Observation Group.

I should now like to put three further questions which stem from common sense. It is well known that the Lebanese Government recently had to request more arms and munitions from the United States in order to resist the armed attacks of the rebels. Could the representative of the Soviet Union tell us, since he claims to know that there is no illegal infiltration of weapons into Lebanon, from where the rebels receive the vast amounts of weapons and ammunition by means of which they have been able to hold off the regular army of Lebanon for the last two months? This question is all the more pressing since the weapons which the rebels own include heavy weapons which only Governments can supply, weapons which the rebels themselves never claimed they captured from the Lebanese armed forces. Therefore, where do these weapons come from?

My second question is this. It is well known that the Government of Lebanon recently had to ask for financial assistance from the United States in order to meet the budgetary deficit of the Lebanese budget caused by the rebellion. Could the representative of the Soviet Union tell us where the rebels get their vast sums of money which apparently are inexhaustible and which are needed to sustain a vast rebellion which has lasted for more than two months without apparently incurring any visible financial difficulties? How is it that a Government which has all the financial resources of a country needs money to cover a budgetary deficit whereas the rebels, who are not presumed to have the means of the Government of Lebanon, are able to conduct this rebellion without incurring any financial difficulties?

Thirdly, how do you explain, if the crisis in Lebanon is strictly a domestic affair, the following statements made recently by one of the leaders of the Lebanese opposition, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Hossein Oueini to Mr. Jahia Mohammed Abdel Kader, correspondent of the Sudanese newspaper Anba Alsoudan:

"We do not deny that we are receiving assistance on the part of the United Arab Republic and that weapons are constantly coming from Syria. It has been said" -- and I am quoting this Lebanese leader -- "that there were more than 25,000 Arabs struggling with us. The truth is that the number of persons who have joined us from Syria is not more than a few thousand armed men. It is normal that the Syrian should assist his Lebanese brother against the tyrants".

If the representative of the Soviet Union cannot reply to these questions in a convincing way, he will have to agree with us if we conclude that only the existence of mass intervention in Lebanon on the part of outside Powers can explain all these phenomena. Under these circumstances, it becomes very clear and without any ambiguity that the Government of Lebanon, which is the legitimate Government of the country, in order to defend itself against mass intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon, is fully entitled to request the United Nations to come to its assistance in order to uphold the independence of the country just as it is fully entitled, pending such assistance, to request friendly countries to lend it all the necessary assistance.

(Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon)

Under these circumstances, we believe that what alone is unjustified is the attempt of those who wish to deprive Lebanon of its inherent right to self-defence and prevent it from receiving the assistance which is necessary in order to uphold its threatened independence.

I would like to state solemnly, in conclusion, that the historical responsibility which might stem from this assistance will have to be borne by those who through mass intervention have made it necessary and by those who through their obstructive measures are trying to make it impossible.

Mr. LOUFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I would like to communicate to the Security Council a message which I received from Cairo this morning. Yesterday, on 18 July, at 1.30 a.m., the Ambassador of the United States in Cairo asked to see the Acting Foreign Minister who received him at 3 a.m. The Ambassador communicated to him a note verbale with the following contents:

"The landing of American troops is designed to uphold the independence of Lebanon and to protect American nationals."

He also communicated to the Acting Foreign Minister the desire of the United States Government to withdraw the troops as soon as circumstances permit.

"These troops do not have hostile intentions. The need to lend assistance to Lebanon is brought about by the change of Government in Iraq. The United Arab Republic must understand that if American troops are attacked by troops of the United Arab Republic or elements which the Government of the United States knows to be under the control of the United Arab Republic or which the United States is convinced are carrying out instructions of the United Arab Republic, then there is a danger that the problem will grow and acquire major proportions."

This last part of the message is very grave indeed. It speaks of elements which are under our control, allegedly, or which are allegedly carrying on under our directives. We can understand that the Government of the United States is not prepared to have its troops attacked by the regular forces of the United Arab Republic, but what is important and serious is that the United States wishes to be the judge as to which are the elements under our control or accepting our directives. In making that decision, the United States will base itself on the unilateral reports which it receives from its own information services. It has

(Mr. Loutfi, United Arab Republic)

already done that in the case of its intervention in Lebanon, contrary to the report of the Observation Group.

As I have already explained to the Council on several occasions, this note gives us an idea of the real intentions of the Government of the United States as regards its policy in the Middle East in general, upon which I dwelt at length yesterday.

The threat inherent in this position of the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, is fraught with grave consequences. It is a sinister augury of the dangers to the peace in that part of the world.

Nevertheless, the situation in Iraq, according to press reports from Baghdad, is quite stabilized. For example, in The New York Times of today we read: "Capital of Iraq back to normal. Rebel regime is seen in full control. Banks and shops resume business." I do not have to read more of this. The article gives all the details.

However, over the radio this morning we have heard that the King of Jordan is still speaking of the liberation of Iraq. I think it is superfluous to stress that this position is most dangerous and that it is a threat to the peace in the Middle East, the more so, as I have already said, since the Arab Union has ceased to exist. In reporting this yesterday, I referred to a statement of the present Government of Iraq which, as representatives will see, is in control of the country and has, in fact, already been recognized by many States.

The representative of Lebanon has today communicated to us the existence of information which we do not possess, and he has put questions which have already been answered. He arrived at conclusions which were not based on any premises that would enable me to reply.

I would like to say to the Council that we are a small State. We possess no atomic bombs. We do not have any aggressive intentions. We ask the world to bear witness to our pacific intentions. We have a policy of non-alignment, which may not be agreeable to all, but we will continue to pursue that policy, in co-operation with the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter, which we respect. We have on several occasions proved that we are always ready to co-operate with the United Nations to solve international problems and to maintain world peace.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): At the Council session last night the representative of Iraq raised a question concerning the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon in the event that this was desired by the Government of Lebanon. I wish to respond to this question now. Our assurances on the question raised by the representative of Iraq have been categorically clear in my previous statements on this point. The answer to Mr. Abbass is definitely in the affirmative. Forces of the United States now in Lebanon at the specific request of the lawfully-constituted Government of Lebanon would not remain if their withdrawal were requested by that Government.

Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): Mr. Abbass, who occupies here the seat of the representative of Iraq -- and I would say right away that he illegally occupies this seat, because the Government of Iraq has already recalled Mr. Abbass and appointed another representative in his stead -- said yesterday:

(continued in English)

"Both the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic have made the contention that the Arab Union no longer exists.... I maintain that no change has taken place and that the Arab Union as a constitutional entity still exists". (S/PV.832, p.21)

(continued in Russian)

Thus, Mr. Abbass, speaking allegedly on behalf of Iraq, states that there have been no changes whatsoever and the Union of Iraq and Jordan continues in being. But what is the true state of affairs? The Government of Iraq has announced, and the whole world knows, that it is withdrawing from the Arab Union. This statement has been published, but so that there be no doubts, I shall read it out once again. In this declaration it is said that the Union:

"under the old regime was not a true federation with an aim of benefitting the people of the two countries but had been proclaimed to strengthen a corrupt monarchy and to destroy the unity of the Arabs.

"Therefore, the Iraqi republic announces its immediate withdrawal from the federation and considers all decisions concluded under the federation null and void. The republic considers itself not responsible for the financial and military obligations which were incurred by Iraq as a result of this federation."

This is a declaration which, as well as being known to the whole world, was also reproduced yesterday in The New York Times.

Thus, the assertions of Mr. Abbass to the effect that the Arab Union continues do not accord with the facts. The Government of Iraq has stated that it is withdrawing from the federation, and therefore this federation no longer exists. Why was it necessary to state that the federation continues to exist when it does not? That is something to which I think we should pay attention,

(Mr. Sobolev, USSR)

and here Mr. Abbass is not alone in advancing this claim. The statement would not have been of very great importance, indeed, if it did not happen to coincide with the position which has been taken by the forces that stand behind Mr. Abbass. These forces are the United States and the United Kingdom, which has sent troops to Jordan. They, too, consider that this Union continues to exist. Why is it necessary to maintain this political fiction? I will explain why; the reason is simple. It is wished to bring order in the new Iraq, re-establish the status quo ante that existed before 14 July, and in order to re-establish this type of order it is necessary, of course, to invoke an honourable pretext, and the pretext is simple: since the Federation exists, this means that one part of the Federation can act against the other part of the Federation, and that is how the State Department and the Foreign Office regard the situation, as a sort of internal action on the basis of internal laws.

Mr. Abbass has openly stated: (continued in English) "No question of aggression could arise between Jordan and Iraq". (S/PV.832, p. 21)

(continued in Russian)

What does this mean? If Iraq is not a part of the Federation, if Iraq and Jordan are two different States, two different countries, and if Jordan attacks Iraq, then how can you overlook the factor of aggression? Of course, there is a factor of aggression. This means that the continuation of the fiction that the Arab Union continues is necessary in order to justify the aggression that is being planned against Iraq -- and the Security Council must pay very earnest attention to this -- and that such aggression is being prepared and planned is openly announced in the radio and the press.

I will put a question to the representative of Jordan now. Is it true -- and I am going to quote a report which is attributed to the Jordan Radio --

(continued in English)

"The Jordan Radio, heard in Jerusalem, said today that the Jordanian Government will take action at whatever cost necessary to liberate Iraq. It stressed that King Hussein, as acting head of the Jordan-Iraq Arab Union, is the only person with authority to restore order in Iraq".

(Mr. Sobolev, USSR)

(continued in Russian)

The Iraqi people have never entrusted such a matter to King Hussein, that he restore order in Iraq, and we know full well what it means to restore order in a country that has just undergone a revolution.

In this same communique of the Jordan Radio we read:

(continued in English)

"Hussein might have the British troops cover Jordanian bases while the Jordanian army moved against the rebel forces".

(continued in Russian)

I am drawing the Council's attention to these facts so that the Council may be forewarned and alerted, and that everyone who is interested in the maintenance of peace be alerted and forewarned that aggression against the new Government of Iraq is being planned and prepared. And if it is not being prepared, then let this be stated openly. If it is not being prepared, let the sending of troops to the Iraqi border cease. If it is not being prepared, why are the British troops in Jordan? Why have they not been withdrawn to their original bases?

We know from our own experience what pretexts are invoked for armed intervention in the domestic affairs of a State in order to restore the status quo ante. In 1917 when the Russian people carried out a revolution, within less than a year afterwards approximately ten different Governments cropped up on Russian territory that claimed to represent the Russian people, and this was also in the territory of Russia itself. Nearly every major Power organized a Government according to its own liking in different parts of Soviet Russia at the time. In accordance with the interests of the United Kingdom and the United States, a Government was set up in the North, in Archangel. A Government which upheld the interests of the United States and Japan was organized in Vladivostok. There were Governments set up also in other parts of the country. There was a plethora of Governments and all of them were recognized by those States which assisted them in restoring order, as it is now suggested that King Hussein restore order in Iraq.

But history has also shown what this led to. The intervention against the Soviet Union led to a complete defeat not only of all these Governments

(Mr. Sobolev, USSR)

but also of all the armies of the fourteen countries which were sent to the Soviet Union and which had to leave the Soviet Union in shame after having been defeated and crushed by the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union.

The Security Council must not allow such historical examples to recur in regard to the countries of the Arab East. If Iraq's turn is next, I think this aggression that has been planned should be stopped in time, nipped in the bud, and those who planned to unleash this aggression must be slapped down.

(Mr. Sobolev, USSR)

Mr. Loutfi has just informed the Council of a new and very alarming fact concerning the note verbale addressed by the United States to the Egyptian Government on the subject of the landing of United States troops in Lebanon. That, too, should be a warning to the Security Council and to all peace-loving peoples, for in that note there is a direct threat of action against the United Arab Republic. The pretext for such action would be determined by the United States itself, and it would be the United States also which would be searching for the excuses to justify such action.

The Security Council cannot, I submit, pass over such a threat in silence. I think that it would be acting properly if it were to adopt decisive steps to eliminate the threat of a new world war which exists very definitely in the Middle and Near East, and the only way to do that would be to withdraw the United States and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan forthwith. The Security Council has before it a draft resolution which seeks to accomplish that very purpose. I think that the time has come for the Council to take action in this sense and to demand of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments that they withdraw their troops forthwith since they constitute a serious threat to peace not only in the Middle and Near East but throughout the world.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about procedure. Yesterday, the United States representative, Mr. Lodge, stated that he was demanding priority for the United States draft resolution. He did not explain why it should be accorded such priority, and in fact did not give any reason at all for his request. Rule 32 of our rules of procedure lays down a definite form to be followed in such cases. The rule states:

"Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission".

There is absolutely no provision in any rule that priority should be granted to certain draft resolutions. Therefore, there is no justification for granting priority to the United States draft resolution.

I think that when the Council reaches the voting stage it should act strictly in accordance with the rules governing the proceedings of the Security Council which have been adopted unanimously and accepted also by the United States. I shall, therefore, insist that the draft resolutions be voted upon in the order in which they were submitted, in which case, of course, the Soviet draft resolution must come first.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): We have no further names on the list of speakers for this morning's meeting.

In accordance with the rules of procedure, we should immediately pass on to voting on the draft resolutions now before the Council. However, it is the opinion of the President that it would be inappropriate to have the voting divided between two different meetings of the Council. Therefore, I suggest that we should adjourn now and reconvene at 3.30 in order that we may continue and conclude the voting this afternoon.

Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I do not object to the President's proposal that we suspend our meeting now, but I would like to put a question which he might be able to answer.

Yesterday, before we adjourned, we heard -- at least, there was an implication or a hint -- that new draft resolutions were to be forthcoming. Since my delegation is not aware of the situation, we would not like to be taken by surprise. We would not like to have to vote on a draft resolution which was introduced and then put to a vote right away.

I would like to ask if there are any other draft resolutions to be proposed, or if we will have at 3.30 the three draft resolutions with which we are acquainted and on which we can, therefore, vote.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The President at present has no information concerning the submission of any new draft resolutions. We have been advised, however, by the representative of Japan that his delegation is preparing a draft resolution, but that this draft resolution will only be presented after the draft resolutions now before the Council at the moment have been voted on.

Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): It seems to me a very sensible idea if I may say so, to visualize adjourning the session now and not proceeding at this moment to the voting. However, I take it that that procedure would not exclude when we resume at 3.30 any further speeches that the members of the Council might wish to make. I, myself, might wish to say a little more. On that understanding, which I feel certain will meet with his approval, I readily fall in with the suggestion which the President has made.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The President would like to say that he agrees with the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): Let me say, first, that it is quite agreeable to me to adjourn this meeting until 3.30 p.m. this afternoon, as you suggest, Mr. President.

Mr. Sobolev said that I had demanded priority for the United States draft resolution -- at least that is what I heard in the English interpretation of his remarks. That is not quite correct. I did not demand priority. I made a motion for priority, which is something that is done here in the United Nations all the time, as the records of the Security Council will demonstrate. A member has a right to make that motion; then it is up to the members of the Council to vote either for or against it.

I am not demanding anything, I am moving something. A motion for priority is not precluded by any rules that I have ever heard of in any parliamentary body. Our own rules here in the Security Council are provisional rules. They were adopted in that form, I believe, when Mr. Sobolev was Secretary of the Security Council, if I am not mistaken. So I am sure he appreciates that fact. Underlying all these considerations is the fact that the Security Council is the master of its own procedure. It can take anything it wants to and put it ahead of anything else. That is an inherent basic right which is possessed by any parliamentary body.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): We shall meet again this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.