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South Africa

6 - 11 Jan. 61

- Talks between D.H. and S. Africa's Prime Minister at Pretoria.
- D.H.'s memorandum on discussions with Mr. Verwoerd at Pretoria.
- P. Lind's letter to D.H. with
- U. N. press communique on talks at Pretoria

It might interest you
to have a look at my
rough notes from the
meetings in Victoria.

I do not think they
can add anything to the
systematization of your argu-
mentation as outlined in
your Memorandum, but they
may have some value for
future reference purposes.

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Confidential

I

Meeting 6 January 8.30 p.m. at Prime Minister's Residence

The Prime Minister started out by greeting the Secretary-General welcome to South Africa. He recalled the terms under which the discussions were to proceed and stressed that these should not be taken as implying a recognition by the South African Government of the competence of the United Nations in matters that were basically internal matters of South Africa. This had to be understood from the beginning and to be spelled out somehow in the final résumé of the discussions. This meant that there could not be any talk of "negotiations", just discussions.

The Secretary-General recalled the Security Council resolutions and his two preliminary reports. He confirmed that there was no question of "negotiations" and pointed to the explicit distinction between paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of the resolution. His interpretation of paragraph 5 was that he should consult with the Union Government on "arrangements" to be undertaken (by the Government under its sovereignty).

It was decided that no records should be made but the intention was that the discussions should be summed up in a final aide-mémoire or some other form.

The Prime Minister then made a survey of the view of the South African Government on their policy and the criticism voiced from abroad. He made the following three points:

- (1) The Union was, though geographically part of the African continent, very different from the rest of the continent. It was just as the difference between Western Europe and the rest of the Eurasian continent. The critics had to keep this in mind. The situation in the Union was unique.
- (2) Why should the Union be the international "whipping boy" because of its internal policy? The Union should rather be judged from its international record. It was necessary to doubt the motives of the critics. As for the

communists and the ultra nationalists of Asia and Africa the motives were obvious. But what about those who traditionally are our friends, why do they attack South Africa?

- (3) The Western Powers should understand what the Union means for the protection of Africa from communism and thus for the safety of Europe. They should in any case strive to understand the motives of South African policy.

II

7 January, 8.30 - 11.30 a.m.

P.M. Unique situation. No colonisation in traditional sense:
Practically all people presently here entered country at same time.
Large proportion of urban influx of natives is relatively new.
Integration would have meant national suicide. It would have led
to dictatorship by a small number of Bantu leaders. Separation,
separate development, means recognition on the basic differences of
the races. It is a good neighbour policy.

Home lands. It is true that these are not entirely economically
viable by themselves. This however can be overcome through economical
co-ordination. Government is helping ^{the Natives} them in developing the home lands.
These will be entirely handed over to them when they reach the stage
where they can govern themselves on their own. Their ability to do
this is being gradually built up on the basis of their existing
authority system. They are being educated under their own control
natives in white areas. Partial integration in these areas would be
practically the same as total integration.

Integration of whites in black areas as is done in the territories
under British jurisdiction, is to us immoral.

Our solution is that of self-preservation, but also a development
of native areas to self-determination.

S.G.

There is a built-in ambiguity in the concept of a Union with
enclaves of different races. Once you recognize a central authority
it is difficult, from a public-law point of view, to accept the
notion of different enclaves with less rights than others.

Practicability. Can the problem be solved, as envisaged, within
the "home lands". This would imply a very high investment. The
economic possibilities are so limited that it is difficult to see how
a solution could be found without considerable investment.

Against this background the critics of South Africa have genuine
worries.

E.g. worries are whether the procedure you adopt is a way to lead to self-preservation. There are different ways to self-preservation. One way is to resist squarely the current. Another is to swim with the current. A third one is to consider alternatives in competition to what the critics are pressing for.

P.M.

I cannot really see any alternative. A partial integration would not solve any problems. Those who worry do it about the black man. Why do they not worry about the white people? The Western Powers should have all reason to do that.

There is criticism against certain legislation. Take, for example, influx control. This is alleged to be a means to preventing natives from labour opportunities in urban areas. Without these restrictions it would have been impossible to solve the housing problem and do away with the unemployment situation. Thus the restrictions are in the interest of the natives already in urban areas.

S.G.

This is the well-known urbanisation problem with racial overtones. Your critics tend to underestimate the urbanisation problem and concentrate on the racial basis for the control.

P.M.

This is true. But how can we avoid the racial basis as our problems basically flow from the racial situation. We have also the influx of foreign natives. Regular immigration control is technically impossible. We therefore have to resort to control through our influx control into urban areas.

Regarding the ambiguity argument you have to recognise the progress made, the purpose, the motives. These are to increase the rights and liberties of the natives within their areas with a final view to self-government. An ultimate goal is a commonwealth of South Africa, including white and black states.

S.G.

I see that if you take into account the "end station" the situation takes on a somewhat different view. The weak point is, however, the fact that the natives have no saying in the central Government and its preparation for the future.

P.M.

The problem there is that the native does not see his own interest in this development. If we gave them a representation in Parliament the result would only be an agitation from the most radical elements which could only lead to trouble that would slow down the development. Instead of representatives in the Legislature we provide them with our representatives to their territories. They are their liaison with the Government. We are now prepared to go further. We have in view a consultative group, where the P.M. would meet - annually or more often - with representatives of the native areas. This would be similar to the Commonwealth P.M. meetings, thus anticipating the development of a kind of commonwealth.

S.G.

This is encouraging but I am afraid it does not take care of the day-^{long} problem, as the natives would not have any power of decision.

Let me come back to the practicability question. The problem of black majority outside the homeland remains. Further, the difficulty with the distribution of the homelands within the Union. They are "intermingled" in the Union. It would have been easier if the homelands had been one solid area.

P.M.

The problem of scattered homeland areas is gradually being tackled through voluntary shifts of territory and people.

As for practicability we feel that our economy can carry the burden of this development. As a matter of fact it will be less expensive to locate new industries near the homelands. Then living quarters can be provided at less cost to the tenant within the native areas. There

will also be more social and other facilities available to the workers.

S.G.

The Commonwealth concept, some will argue, will lead to a quasi-international character of some sort of the arrangement. It can therefore be argued that, as that is the case, why cannot the Government accept the legitimacy of an international interest in the development.

P.M.

It would be difficult to evaluate this without knowing what kind of safeguards you have in mind. Further, a recognition of an international co-interest would lay us open to worse dangers than those we try to avoid.

10 January

P.M.

We have now dealt with generalities. We want to live in friendship with other nations. The U.N. criterion for a "friendly nation" should be relations of a country with other countries, rather than what happens within the country. Regarding our internal affairs we want to arrive at a situation where our interracial relations will correspond to those between friendly countries.

You said that our racial policy gave rise to international concern, and you kindly said you were prepared to help us to find a way to overcoming some of this unpleasant attitude. We realize the opportunity for frank discussions with you as a friend and as Secretary-General of the only purely international instrument of sovereign states, on a basis of non-intervention.

A small power cannot afford to allow foreign intervention in internal affairs. This is particularly the case for us who have recriminations against us from so many different countries with varying motives of their own.

We completely trust your motives and your constructive approach. I wonder if you are not in a position to make any suggestions in view of what I have just said.

S.G.

My recent four-day trip has usefully filled in my picture. This is necessarily superficial but I still think that time has come to talk more concretely.

I do not believe in integration as the solution of your problem. The solution does not lie in that direction. The international discussion, however, goes in a trend of integration. This puts the Western Powers in a very awkward position - any departure from integration as a goal will be played against the Western Powers. It is therefore, for tactical reasons, impossible to rely on a clearcut stand from the Western Powers. They will probably be "fairly weak".

What I have to say from U.N. point of view must be seen in the context I just outlined.

The Africans do not want the Asians to take initiatives. The Afro-Asians do not want the communists to take initiatives. But there is much pressure for a "break through" in the background. Such a breakthrough would be most regrettable.

It is therefore natural that I especially want to take into account the "respectable" Africans.

Another point worth mentioning: Africa sailed out with its shortlived principle of "African solidarity within the U.N." This broke up over the Congo issue but all are keen to remold the unity. The South African problem is an issue where they are likely to agree within themselves. This gives an added element of urgency and seriousness to the situation.

If on the basis of separation something can be done to make this line "competitive" with any other line of action I think it would be to present the line in a tangible and simple way and in a short time.

At the end of your line of thinking I find the situation of the nations outside the homelands as that of "foreign labour" with the rights and limitation of rights characteristic to them.

a) The economic problem. This is closely related to the entire separation problem. If the natives who "go home" do that at the price of worsened economic conditions this will be played against the scheme as such. The problem has therefore to be given serious consideration.

b) The human rights problem. This has a considerable emotional overtone. This is also the case in quarters which we all take seriously and whose goodwill we do not question.

c) The UN aspect. First we have the problem of substance and presentation, or tactics, if you prefer.

During the discussion in London I "played with" a thought of a kind of "self-imposed political audit". This would mean the establishment of a body that should draw to the attention of the Government any deviation from the right road towards the target you have defined. This would tend to reassure the outside world that you are looking at the problem from new angles. The political value of the arrangement would result if the body could keep a sort of contact

with the office of the S.G. In the Mideast there are such informal arrangements.

If nothing of this kind should be in the range of your possibilities, although I think it should be, it is necessary, I think, as a minimum, ^{that we} ~~we~~ make a declaration that the consultation we have just had will remain part of the further development. This would recognise our consultation as a normal channel of contact. This would probably be appreciated by those seriously and with good will interested, and thus also affect those behind them.

I think it would be ^{helpful} both to you and to me if we would have to refer to lack of time as an excuse for not having reached any results.

P.M.

Regarding your second proposal I wish to say that we have found in you a person with whom we can talk. But where were we with a successor of yours who would not have this qualification?

S.G.

There is an ambiguity between the office and the person. But the character of the arrangement would be obviously ad hoc.

P.M.

How would it fit in with your suggestion if we say this: I have found our discussion so valuable that I shall propose to my cabinet colleagues that we invite you from time to time for continuing our contacts. This would meet your request for continued contact, not only on a purely personal basis, while stressing our sovereignty and right of initiative.

S.G.

I do not think that the sovereignty problem will be a serious one. It is anyway being understood by those we have in mind. Your suggestion might tend to thin out the declaration too much and jeopardise the political advantage. I referred to above. The general intention of the Government as understood by other governments is the main thing.

P.M.

Our main point of departure with which we cannot compromise is the policy of ^{self} preservation. I am therefore glad that you agree with us on the impracticability of integration.

Now regarding presentation and timing. What is "short time"? This has to be defined in some way. We have for instance the concept of the natives regarding time. Where we meet difficulties is when we try to introduce reforms of agriculture.

S.G.

May I clarify my position. With timing I meant defining of policy, not of implementation which naturally has to take into account, among other things, the psychological facts you referred to. To refrain from giving a policy line, however, would be interpreted as evasion. It is better to define the policy, thus forcing the natives to use the time argument as "self-protection".

P.M.

I see your point. But what you suggest is exactly what we have already done. But both the natives and the outside world do not think we are sincere. If we speed up implementation of the Bantu independence we are up to trouble. We therefore have to be careful with the time factor. We shall try to increase the pace but it is very difficult.

Re: presentation I cannot see how we can present our ultimate purposes more clearly than to say that they will obtain full self-government.

S.G.

The independence concept as presented so far seems to be rather diffuse in the minds of the international community.

A side-point. The fall back on chief or tribal system is generally understood as a measure to preservation of the existing system also in other, non-related respects.

I think that the granting to the natives of some civic rights would be regarded as a prerecognition of future self-government. It need not necessarily be interpreted as a concession to integration.

P.M.

I am sure it will be accepted as such unless it is gradually introduced as linked up to the process of self-government. I hardly see what we can do more than we are doing in this respect.

Where, by the way, does the U.N. come in to help us in the speeding up of our intentions?

S.G.

This is more than a tactical problem. Your separation line has to be made better known and appreciated in the world. If not, the integration line will be pursued with increased vigor in the discussion.

In the economic field the separation line is considered to be unrealistic. The same refers to the human rights aspects: people will be transferred etc. Even after separation, the critics say, the Union will still be a multiracial society, with perhaps still a native majority. Therefore the critics will hardly see any progress without some progress in the field of civic rights. They will counter that the racial problem is still not nearer any solution. They belittle the value of the homelands and believe that this is a convenient scheme for creating reserves of natives without solving the human rights problem.

Regarding the internal situation in the Union after separation one would have to make a distinction between two groups of natives: those who are settled would be like other citizens of the Union on one side, and migratory workers to be regarded as foreign workers. The former ones would have all civic rights. The latter category would have the rights of foreign labour under international law and practice.

P.M.

This line of thinking is not acceptable to us. It would mean that we would be absorbed by 7 million instead of 10 million. It would mean to give away our country in the hands of the natives. The white man would lose South Africa. The line of thinking is against the basic principle of our national policy.

S.G.

I see your point there. Your problem is to achieve a full success of the homeland concept. If this becomes a success you may even be left with a native minority in the Union.

P.M.

We believe that our plans for homelands will be sufficiently attractive for the migrant labour but not for those established there. But in the meanwhile we have to maintain the political control in our own hands. Otherwise the natives, with the help of international forces, will overwhelm us.

Moral and human rights. We do not think that we can do anything to one part without any cost to another. We ^{approve} ~~approve~~ for instance what the British are doing in the protection areas in bringing in white elements there. We want to avoid a Kenya here.

S.G.

Human rights go much further than civic and economic rights, however important these are. You have the human relations sphere. ^{What} ~~Where~~ I do not understand is the degree of separation that you apply here. There is anywhere a natural, human separation feeling.

I therefore now have in mind only human relations, not the civic and economic rights which are power producing. There I see your points. The human discrimination, however, cuts into human dignity. That is where I cannot follow your reasoning.

I think in the respect separation is unnecessary and contra-producing. The natural protection built into the human being is a sufficient guarantee against dangerous developments. This kind of discrimination is bound to cast doubt of the so-to-say rational arguments for segregation.

P.M.

This is a question of the number of natives. America can afford to give their negro children the same education as the white. We cannot possibly do that for economic reasons. It is a matter of building up the lagging education for the black and we are catching up quickly, and much quicker than other countries in Africa.

Take then the hotel example. Integration would only mean that the whites would withdraw to their private clubs. Nothing would be gained in human relations. The only significance would be that the Government gave up its responsibility.

S.G.

We have the question of "arrangements". I must give account to my numerous bosses. We have to look at this very carefully. I for my part can hardly be more precise than I was to-day.

Then I have another point. I would like to meet true representatives of natives and coloured. I think without such contacts both you and I will run into difficulties.

P.M.

In substance I have of course nothing against your meeting such people. Their views are already known to you. But from another standpoint I am concerned. These peoples will interpret such interviews as an arbitration by you on U.N. instructions, as an appeal by them to higher authority. This would land us in difficulties.

S.G.

The trouble is that we have difficulties however we turn. If the interviews follow after the termination of our discussions, they could hardly be construed as an intervention of umpire.

The U.N. practice in this respect is very generous by member Governments. I naturally treat these matters with prudence. (S.G. mentioned his interviews in Congo and Kenya last year.)

I find it very difficult to give up the idea of seeing some of these people. This is my problem and I wonder if we could not find a formula to solve this impasse.

P.M.

We shall see if we can suggest some people for you to see. We do not, however, wish you to see representatives of illegal organisations or people under ban for political reasons.

S.G. Another related question. It would interest me to see some representatives of the Church.

11 January

P. M.

I turn to your suggestions of yesterday.

"1) Self-imposed political audit". Government will probably not be able to accept such an arrangement. It gives the impression of accountability to the United Nations. Further, anything that we set up for people to voice their grievances is misused. It would mean practically an open court. See, for instance, the investigation commission on Sharpville. The result may be an agitation with consequences that are worse than those to be corrected.

S. G.

I do not think an arrangement like this one would bring something really new into the picture. I think the difficulty mentioned could be met. The abuse argument does not seem to be too serious. It would be an encouragement to the moderate and respectable critics.

I would appreciate it if you would put it to your colleagues for consideration.

P. M.

Another difficulty. This body, or this man, would give the impression of taking sovereignty. In addition, the man would be considered to be biased against one group.

S. G.

As for your argument that the body would "override" the Government and even Parliament. This is true in a sense, but in a capacity as adviser, not as master.

P. M.

I wonder if what we are doing does not to a certain extent meet what you have in mind. We could of course have a yearly meeting to consult with the leaders of different groups to the extent they have and receive power. This would be something like the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conferences.

S. G.

I think this would be worthwhile. But it does not exactly take care of the problem I had in mind. I thought in the first instance of the human

rights questions and not of the independence development. With your suggestion you would not score any big point internationally.

P. M.

People generally are not keen on anticipating future arrangements. It is considered that the final result will be less impressive if it is anticipated.

To make reports from such a body to Parliament available to the United Nations would be interpreted as accountability.

"2) Possibility of reaching an 'understanding'".

I mentioned the possibility of our making a declaration that we would on our own initiative invite you to continued discussions from time to time. This would testify both that we find discussions with the Secretary-General useful and that we intend to make progress.

We have decided to spend a considerable number of millions of pounds in the areas in the coming year. The Government is further considering the drawing up of a five-year plan of the economic development. This would meet your request for more detailed and concrete information on our intentions.

Now one question. Could we have some help from the United Nations in speeding up one progress by curtailing criticism at least for some time.

S. G.

There is certainly a value in your invitation formula. But there is one point that we have to consider in this context. If no "arrangement" comes out of our discussions, but only your formula, the latter will be taken as the "arrangement" referred to in paragraph 5 of the resolution.

This is not an argument against your suggestion but it shows that the latter one is a fairly weak alternative and in some way a dangerous one.

Here I think we have to think in alternatives. If no arrangement in the sense of the resolution is arrived at, I am afraid we face the risk of a Security Council meeting with a strengthened resolution as a result.

Mr. Jooste

Our experience makes us extremely cautious as far as giving reports and information to the United Nations is concerned.

S. G.

I agree that there are tendencies in the United Nations now to expand the borders and minimize the legal arguments. In the case we now are dealing

with we have, however, not yet drifted in such direction. My conclusion is that we should try and meet those tendencies by keeping the situation in our hands and the initiative in your hands.

P. M.

Regarding the invitation point, I wonder whether you could not draft a formula on the basis of our suggestion but with amendments that take care also of your difficulties.

Confidential

W.

Memorandum on discussions with Mr. Verwoerd in January 1961
at Pretoria

1. In the following I set out the main line of argument which I followed in my discussions regarding the Union's racial policy.
2. I noted that the "stand of the United Nations" undoubtedly would be one in favour of speedy integration; in fact, if the issue were or could be brought up for voting, I felt quite certain to get a two-thirds majority for a recommendation to that effect. Personally I was not in favour of a policy so formulated but my own views were irrelevant and we could regard the indicated stand as a basic element in the present situation.
3. My mandate was not concerned with the racial policy directly but covered the question of "arrangements", to be established in consultation with the Government, with a view to safeguarding human rights in line with United Nations principles. To make a consultation on such arrangements fruitful I felt that it was better for me to discuss so to say on the assumptions of the Union Government, as I understood that, for the time being at least, the integration line not only was totally unacceptable to the Prime Minister but also politically unrealistic in view of the parliamentary situation. With the international opinion, as represented in the United Nations, being what it was, my line was to seek whether and if so how the line followed by the Union could be developed into what I called "a competitive alternative" to integration. I envisaged "arrangements"

from the Union viewpoint as a possible part of such a competitive alternative.

4. In my presentation I formulated first my criticism of the Union's line of action, as presented by the Prime Minister, in the following points.

(a). The theory. The starting point for the Prime Minister's considerations was that the "home lands" were territories to which the Bantus had historic rights equal to those of the Afrikaans in relation to the territories which they had colonized and developed; he claimed that Afrikaans had shown generosity in even adding to the historical Bantu "home lands" in which they should be sole masters. If this starting point for the Union argument was accepted, one faced a built-in contradiction; how could the Union on the one side, relegate the Bantus to the "home lands" as their territory, and, on the other hand, claim authority for the Central Government within and over those same home lands? The "home land" concept could not justify a government there not based on the will of the governed. If the Union Government claimed authority over the "home lands", it seemed impossible for them also to hold that the inhabitants of the "home lands" could exercise civic rights only within the "home lands".

(b). Practicability of the "home lands" concept. Was the "home land" approach accepted, as a basis for the policy, it followed from human rights principles that the Bantu population in the rest of the area should be able to return to the "home lands"

without a loss of economic status which would render such a return for all practical purposes impossible. This required very major investments in the "home lands" and further a rounding off of the territories so as to create sufficiently big and viable territorial units. I failed to see the likelihood of such a territorial revision in favour of the Bantus and I asked myself how the Union would be able to afford the necessary investments in the "home lands" at the same time as it would lose an essential part of its labour force. For these reasons I felt very skeptical about the practicability of the approach.

(c). The means. The segregation policy in its other aspects was obviously regarded by the Prime Minister as being a means to the end of the establishing Bantu communities separated territorially from the white areas. It could be understood that the means to achieve this creation of separate "states" transitionally might involve certain hardships, perhaps temporarily even cutting through human rights principles, especially as regards civic rights. However, a major criticism of the segregation policy was that, to a large extent, steps which were against human rights principles could not be understood as being adequate means to the declared end. Various elements in the racial policy thus appeared as being impossible to justify in the light of the "home land" concept and other considerations must come into play; in many respects I simply did not understand the racial policies outside the "home lands", and in other respects the legislation or its application left me "frankly shocked".

(d). International aspects of the policy. The Union had not managed to explain its approach to the Bantu problem to the world in terms which convinced public opinion. Internationally the general tendency was to see the racial policies outside the "home lands" as the basic element to which the "home land" theory was added as a kind of ameliorating factor. Thus, it was not accepted that the "home land" concept was to be regarded as the primary one from which the various other policies were derived. I felt that the explanation of this was that these other policies could not be understood as adequate means to the end and, further, that the "home land" approach seemed to be a theoretical blueprint lacking the necessary support in action, territorially or economically. In these circumstances the Union policy provided very forceful arguments for criticism in the present international debate concerning the rights of the native population of Africa. Unless something was done about it, and done urgently, there was a risk that the whole structure might crumble and further progress along the lines envisaged by the Government/^{be}rendered impossible under the most tragic circumstances. I felt, therefore, that the Government had to choose between the present slow - and not properly understood - progress towards its self-established targets, with the risk of breaking, and a much bolder approach, catching the wind but progressing in the direction it had chosen itself; this latter approach would be to the benefit of the Bantus but would ultimately also best protect the white population. The question of a competitive alternative was, in the circumstances, extremely urgent,

and so was the question of its proper presentation in action.

5. Turning to the question of how I envisaged the so-called competitive alternative I made the following main points.

(a) The Government would have to approach the question of territorial separation - or perhaps partition - with considerable boldness and set aside a sufficient and coherent territory to serve as a basis for the national life of a Bantu state. (I was aware of the fact that this raised the question of the British-controlled territories but I could leave this question aside in my argument.)

(b) The Government had further to lay down a plan for a radical economic development providing for industries and economic growth within the Bantu territory of sufficient scope to bring about the voluntary return to the territory of those now earning their living in other parts of the Union.

(c) The Government would have to lay down a plan with fixed steps at short intervals leading to the establishment of such political institutions as were necessary as a basis for full independence and self-government. That, naturally, would have to be combined with the development of democratic rights and practices, including elections, within the territories so as to give the constitutional institutions a basis in the will of the people. It seemed that this could be done in combination with the preservation in appropriate form of traditional institutions.

(d) The Government would have to "telescope" the development and anticipate the creation of a fully independent and democratic

Bantu State (or states) in its treatment of Bantus generally. Bantus now working outside territories, set aside for the future Bantu State, should, thus, logically be regarded and treated as foreign workmen to whom accepted practices in respect of such workmen would apply. That meant first of all that the Bantus working outside the "home lands" would have not only their "human rights", as normally recognized, but such wider rights and such wider protection as was given in Western countries to foreign workmen admitted to them; this was all the more justified as the Union was dependent on the contribution of these "foreign" workers. As normal with foreigners working in a country for a certain length of time, prolonged residence and integration in the society where they were working should entitle them to acquire citizenship with full civic rights. I fully realized that these requirements now seemed utopic but they were the logical consequence of the "home land" concept, stated by the Prime Minister, to be the basis of the Union's approach to the racial problem. Were these conclusions from the "home land" concept not drawn, it would put in question the concept itself and the sincerity of the theory put forward in its defence. Talking in terms of alternatives the recognition of the status I had outlined for Bantu workmen seemed to be the only one that could be put up as competitive in comparison to integration.

(e) As time was of the essence, it seemed necessary that on all the various points raised the Government should now proceed to action to all possible extent even if the anticipated state of affairs could not be fully implemented immediately. What might

be justified as short transitional arrangements - with a clear commitment to final results which were both practicable and satisfactory - would most definitely not be acceptable if the transitional period were likely to be long or if the end result were in doubt or considered likely to be less than satisfactory.

(f) It was recognized that the transitional steps at all events would be difficult and raise important human rights issues. This being so it seemed to be a useful final part of a "competitive alternative" for the Government, on its own initiative, to set up an institution which would not be suspected of political bias; which would receive and consider complaints and draw the attention of the Government and Parliament to deviations from what seemed to be the sound way to approach the established target; and which, finally, could maintain adequate contact with the United Nations, represented by the Secretary-General, thus providing the "arrangement" requested by the Security Council. (When the Council had asked the Secretary-General to provide for arrangement, "in consultation with" the Government, it had obviously recognized that it required the consent of the Government; in these circumstances it is strongly indicated to reverse the roles and look for an arrangement by the Government, approved by the Secretary-General).

UNITED NATIONS

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C A U T I O N

Not for release before
5 p.m. (EST) 12 January

Press Release SG/999
12 January 1961

PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The talks between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which commenced on 6 January, have now been concluded.

These discussions were frank, constructive and helpful. The Prime Minister, while recalling that these talks did not imply recognition by the Union Government of United Nations authority, took the opportunity of explaining Union policies and their application. The Secretary-General, on his side, elaborated his views and suggestions on questions within his mandate.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary-General welcomed the exchange of views.

It is the intention of the Prime Minister to inform his Cabinet of the substance of the talks and after consultation with his colleagues, he will make a further public statement.

The Secretary-General will make a report to the Security Council.

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C A U T I O N

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12 January 1961

PRESS COMMUNIQUE ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The talks between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which commenced on 6 January, have now been concluded.

These discussions were frank, constructive and helpful. The Prime Minister, while recalling that these talks did not imply recognition by the Union Government of United Nations authority, took the opportunity of explaining Union policies and their application. The Secretary-General, on his side, elaborated his views and suggestions on questions within his mandate.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary-General welcomed the exchange of views.

It is the intention of the Prime Minister to inform his Cabinet of the substance of the talks and after consultation with his colleagues, he will make a further public statement.

The Secretary-General will make a report to the Security Council.

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