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D.H.'s memorandum on talks with
Sir Pierson Dixon and Selwyn Lloyd, U.K.

11 April 1960

M E M O R A N D U M

On 10 April in the evening I had dinner at Sir Pierson Dixon's home with Selwyn Lloyd. Outside guests were only Cordier and myself. The discussion concerned disarmament (IDO), Bureimi and, most of the time, South Africa.

Selwyn Lloyd was entirely at a loss as regards what could be done in order to ameliorate the situation. One thing was to gain time, but another thing was the use to which to put the time, and in that latter respect he failed to see what the U.K., the Commonwealth or the U.N. could achieve, as the necessary change would have to come from within.

I tried to formulate the objective as follows: If we agree that the necessary change can come only from within and if, on the other hand, as the British hold, there are ^{within the Union,} moderating forces strongly at work which, however, need time, the target for outsiders should be to play for time but in such forms as not to let the moderates down. That is to say, the pressure should be maintained in support of the moderates, but in such a form as not to lead to any international showdown with ensuing entrenchment of the die-hards in their positions, before a counter-balancing influence within the Union can have made itself felt. Selwyn Lloyd said that he agreed entirely, but with that background he needed to make up his mind on the next steps as H.M.G. would have to take action as soon as Selwyn Lloyd and I had had this chance to compare notes. He asked me what would happen if the Union delayed their reply for any length of time. I said that it was my view that in such circumstances I would have to go on record, with the probable result that there would be a new Security Council meeting;

anyway, I could not play the whole matter in the present form for more than maximum another week. He further asked me what would happen in case of a "no" all along the line. I said it would lead me to an immediate report which undoubtedly would provoke an immediate Security Council meeting likely to decide at least ^{on} ~~a~~ withdrawal of diplomatic representation. It followed that the target we were pursuing made it necessary to try ^{to} and get a reply very soon from the Union, and a reply that was not negative. I would regard a simple reference to Fourie as spokesman far too weak for me to play with any chance of success.

After a lengthy discussion Selwyn Lloyd concluded that he should advise Macmillan to urge the Union to reply quickly and to follow in their message, in order of precedence, one of the following two lines:

a) to fall back ^{by saying} on their formal invitation to me to come to the Union, re-activating ^{it} that they would always be pleased to receive the S.G. and to discuss with him;

b) to declare that whoever goes as their representative to the Commonwealth meeting, would visit the UN before going to London, and that this visit would be prepared through ^{the} an ambassador who would provide me with all the necessary information.

^{A/} The third alternative, which we agreed could be regarded only as a fall-back line for the British, would be that they reply ^{only} that Fourie had been instructed to be available for consultations and would be able to provide me with all the necessary information. Selwyn Lloyd rejected entirely an idea, for which Sir Pierson Dixon had pleaded urgently the 6th, to the effect that I should come to London during the Commonwealth meeting. One reason

for this rejection was that Verwoerd would not be present, but the decisive argument against, from Selwyn Lloyd's side, was that he felt that the situation would unavoidably develop which would be highly embarrassing to me and to the British as well as the South Africans, as Nehru, Aiyub and Nkrumah in all probability would consider it necessary to discuss the South African situation directly with me, and as UN opinion would be likely to mind the UN, so to say, going in under the Commonwealth blanket (this made it obvious that Pierson Dixon's ~~rather insistent~~ demarche of the 6th, as I guessed, had been on his own initiative and without instructions).

We finally agreed on the following time-table: Macmillan would be informed Monday morning, the 11th. If I had had no reply Tuesday, the 12th, I would send a reminder to the Union Government. If still nothing had happened or I had got a negative reply as of Friday, I would formally appeal to the British Government for their support, and only after receiving their reaction, that is to say early in the week after Easter, I would put the negative outcome of all efforts publicly on record.