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Somalia

March 1960

- 1) Report on Mission to Somalia
by Henry S. Bloch, U.N. Technical Assistance
- 2) Bloch, Henry S. (Dir., Bureau of Tech. Assist. Operations, U.N.)
- 2 letters to D.H.

UNITED NATIONS



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FILE NO.:

7 March 1960

My dear Mr. Secretary-General:

Allow me to add the following points to the talk of Saturday morning:

a. Through Cebe-Habersky and with the knowledge of the Prime Minister, I saw the representatives of the opposition in Somalia and explained to them that my mission was technical, not political. They indicated special interest in help for the textile industry in Benadir.

b. Minister El Zayyat, the Chairman of the UN Advisory Council, received me at his home for luncheon with the Somali Minister of Industry and Commerce and other officials. Upon his invitation, I also gave a brief non-political and factual statement on the possibilities of technical assistance at a Council meeting.

c. Regarding the TAB Agreement, there will not be much difficulty. I think the Resident Representative should be a "technical personality" (I will make some suggestions to Owen) in contrast to the "elder statesman" and "sagacious" type needed for the "presence".

d. In the report, which I am submitting to you in writing, I have elaborated in some detail the role of the "consultative groups" to be composed of UN experts and Somalis, which may come into being during the second phase, i.e. after independence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Henry S. Bloch".

Henry S. Bloch

Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

cc: Secretary-General
Mr. Ralph Bunche
Commissioner for Technical Assistance

9 March 1960

Dear Mekki:

First of all, I wish to thank you for the excellent briefing which you gave me over the telephone and to express my regret that it could not be followed by personal discussions. As I have indicated to the Secretary-General in my oral presentation as well as in my written report, your thoughts have been taken into account in my approach to technical assistance recommendations. Since Acock did not come, however, I was unable to go into the details of the scheme.

Secondly, I wish to thank you for the services of Robert Gardiner who was most useful and who helped, in particular, to integrate technical assistance plans with ECA activities, to wit: (a) work in housing via Koenigsberger; (b) work in statistics via statistical survey; (c) work in public administration via consultations. I was able to convey to him the general thinking underlying the Special Fund project around which I believe most of our technical assistance in Somalia will have to be built.

Thirdly, the reason I have left some of my recommendations in a fairly vague state is because conditions are quite fluid and after independence there may be some radical changes. I am confident that we must make a major effort in Somalia and that the very proximity of Mogadiscio to Addis Ababa will make it possible for you to exercise an intellectual influence during the crucial period to come. At present I cannot escape the feeling that neither the administration nor the Government have a very clear understanding of the requirements and it is in this respect that intensive exchange of ideas is essential before any rigid pattern can be evolved.

You will find that my report does not recommend a solution to the basic question of education, but refers to it as one of the major problems in the country. The reason I have not made any proposals is

Mr. Mekki Abbas
Executive Secretary
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
PO Box 3001
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

because the matter requires careful diagnosis, most likely by UNESCO. In the meanwhile, I am attempting to contact here whomever I can find among the Somali elite. ICA has two very good people at American universities whom I am inviting to headquarters.

You will also find that I have proposed an approach in the field of housing which leads directly into the activities of the Special Fund project, village lay-out, water construction works, etc., yet it starts in the capital, because the building boom will start there. I shall talk this matter over with Doxiades who is coming to New York this month and who has helped the United Nations significantly in the Arab refugees resettlement schemes as well as undertaken several projects of this kind for the IBRD.

The photogrammetric job leads of course directly into the Special Fund project. It could help this project to come off to a flying start, particularly if you are able to put an advance team on its feet in the irrigation field. Yet, even if the Special Fund project should not be approved, the photogrammetric work is of high urgency because of the danger of losing valuable maps and wasting available material.

Statistics as I conceive it here is merely a prelude to planning. In some countries the government statistician has served as the economic officer until an economic staff was set up. In this connexion I have however advised the Italians to bring in some top people from Italy, possibly of the SWIMEZ organization, rather than rely exclusively on their Africa service. This would be important pre-independence help on their part.

We can definitely help the Somalis to obtain some funds from the United States Development Loan Fund if we send them experts who will help to prepare projects and if we provide operating personnel to be lent to private industry until Somalis are trained.

The consultative group concept is partly in order to work advanced short-term ECA assignments into the technical assistance scheme.

For the rest I believe the report speaks for itself. Mr. Ionides, who is exploring the project for the Special Fund on assignment from FAO, made a very good impression on me. The more we concentrate on that project in any external support via TAO, via ECA and otherwise, the more likely is it that the full sum of \$800,000 will be approved. For this reason I have suggested that other projects, like a leather project or a veterinary project, should be launched only after the pending one is securely approved and has been started. The greatest danger would be to spread our efforts

over a wide surface and lose the force of impact. Over the next years the country will require rather a large number of experts, yet the tasks of the experts should be evolved in stages and for this reason I was more concerned with "jobs to be done" than people to be furnished.

I also told the Prime Minister that it would be most difficult to furnish expertise before the Government creates the working conditions under which the expert is likely to succeed. Thus, both Gardiner and I were cautious in recommending the public administration expert as long as the Government insists upon having civil servants serve in Parliament and that each Minister should do his own buying.

With best wishes for your health and compliments to Mrs. Abbas, I remain,

Very sincerely yours,

Henry S. Bloch
Director
Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations

P.S. A copy of this letter will be sent to the Secretary-General and the Commissioner for Technical Assistance.

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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld
Secretary-General

Date: 14 March 19560

FROM: Henry S. Bloch, Director, Bureau of
Technical Assistance Operations

FILE NO.: _____

SENDER'S TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2201

SUBJECT: Report on Somalia

..... Please find attached copy of my report on Somalia.

..... I have taken the liberty to attach to the report copy of a
letter which I have sent to Mr. Mekki Abbas.

Final

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT ON MISSION TO SOMALIA

13 February - 2 March 1960

by

Henry S. Bloch, Director, Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations

9 March, 1960

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CONSULTATIONS AND FINDINGS

1. In his detailed political briefing on Friday, 12 February the Secretary-General made it clear that there would be a strong link between the establishment of a "presence" and technical assistance. Both were considered important for the stability of the country. I had also received a telephonic briefing from Mr. Mekki ABBAS and his views, of course, influenced my proposals.
2. Technical Assistance in Somalia has had a disappointing history; it has consisted until now in a community development study tour and a few fellowships in the African Training Programme at headquarters. In spite of several suggestions no requests had been received for United Nations expert assistance.
3. The technical assistance granted to Somalia in the past by the specialized agencies was of rather minor importance, except for the activities of WHO and UNICEF.
4. On Monday, 15 February, I consulted in Rome with Mr. FOLCHI, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs at his request, and with the Director General of the Office for Somalia Affairs and other officials who had been contacted in advance by Ambassador ORTONA.
5. The conferences showed that there was some suspicion of United Nations activities, since, Under-Secretary FOLCHI confirmed, Italy felt that she could continue to support the Somali economy only if she could continue to be "respected" and maintain her "position".
6. My explanation to Mr. FOLCHI was that United Nations technical assistance would support the country's economy and therefore make Italian and other bilateral technical assistance more effective rather than replace it. The United Nations could not deny to Somalia the services which it rendered to its Members once independence was achieved. I added that the United Nations was obliged to put before the Government of Somalia, while it was still under trusteeship, the specific benefits available under the technical assistance programme which are currently accruing to other countries who have either made requests on their own or through administering powers. The original Italian theory was that the only role for

Consultations
with the Italian
Government

United Nations technical assistance would be to "mask" the "presence" whose prime role would be in connexion with the border problem. I made it clear to the Italian administration that an independent Somalia would ask for technical assistance, particularly if informed of the assistance given to Ethiopia, the UAR and other African countries. Under-Secretary FOLCHI reacted positively to these explanations and it can be expected that he will support the principle of United Nations technical assistance to Somalia.

7. Within the Italian Government administration there was an apparent lack of communication between the economic services, in particular the SVIMEZ, the Economic Affairs Section of the Foreign Ministry and the officials of the Cassa di Circolazione in Mogadiscio (detached from the Banco d'Italia), on one hand, and the political services, i.e. the Department for Somali Affairs in the Foreign Ministry and the Italian Administration in Mogadiscio on the other. I therefore suggested informally to the Italian Administration to request some leading experts from SVIMEZ, possibly Professor MOLINARI or Professor SARACENO, to examine the Somali situation before independence. Although the IBRD report is better known, the most extensive economic survey has been the MALAGORDI Report, much of the technical work for which had been prepared by a young official of SVIMEZ.

Consultations
with FAO

8. Before proceeding to Somalia on Wednesday, 17 February, I conferred also with the FAO. These talks revealed a concern that the United Nations would use technical assistance for political purposes. It was also the feeling at FAO that it would be a dangerous precedent to increase country targets for new countries at the expense of older ones. Our position, which I stated to FAO, was that the United Nations had no intention of using technical assistance as a political instrument and that rather the reverse was true, in the sense that political tensions would be mitigated by measures leading to economic and social progress. I also pointed out that the marginal utility of a few hundred thousand dollars spent on technical assistance to Somalia would be particularly high and that the argument for increasing targets in such countries had therefore a strong economic foundation. This was especially so because countries like Somalia are a burden to others and through intelligent technical assistance this burden could be alleviated.

9. While FAO officials were friendly, it seemed certain that they would not seek an increase in their targets. On the other hand, they are interested in the promotion of new Special Fund projects and intend to maximize their efforts relating to the project which they are now investigating on behalf of the Fund. I should also indicate that FAO officials were most helpful in preparing special technical memoranda on Somalia at my request.

Consultations
with Italian
Officials in
Mogadiscio

10. In Somalia, where I stayed from 19 to 26 February, I conferred with the Italian Administrator, senior Italian officials, the Prime Minister of Somalia, the President of the Legislative Assembly and Members of the Cabinet, as well as with ICA and British officials and with private entrepreneurs. Practically all these conferences were conducted with the collaboration of Mr. CEBE-HABERSKY. Mr. Robert GARDNER, Deputy-Secretary of the ECA, came for two days to join in talks with the Prime Minister and to assure overall coordination with ECA. I made a brief statement to the opposition indicating that I was on a technical and not on a political mission. I also explained the purposes of my mission to the United Nations Advisory Council on the invitation of the Chairman.

.....

11. The Italian Administrator felt that the Somalis wanted border guarantees rather than technical assistance, as they would continue to receive technical assistance from Italy through 250 Italian experts promised under the Agreement (List attached). At present there are between 350 and 400 Italian experts, but many are in minor positions.

12. The position of the other Italian officials varied somewhat. Mr. GASBARRI, Vice-Secretary General and Economic Adviser, was negative on technical assistance in the budget field, but quite eager to have technical assistance in statistics after we had discussed specific possibilities. The General-Manager of the Cassa di Circolazione was eager to obtain technical assistance in external payments' matters both as an assurance to the Somalis and as aid in his own work. (The Board of the Cassa is in Rome and there is disagreement between Italian and Somali officials regarding its early transfer to Mogadiscio).

Consultations
with the Prime
Minister of
Somalia and
Somali officials

13. The Prime Minister indicated some general ideas as to his concepts of the economic future. Although he does not intend to have a detailed programme ready for independence, he is concerned with building up the infra-structure of the country. He and his aides are particularly interested in the following projects:

- (a) The construction of a port in Chisimayo with a contribution from the United States; pressure for this project is very strong and high priority is being given to it;
- (b) Various road networks and the construction of an aqueduct for the supply of water for the city of Mogadiscio;
- (c) The creation of a financial institution, somewhat in the nature of a Development Bank (based on the Credito Somalo and the eventual "somalization" of the Issuing Institute);
- (d) Of the 10 million Somalos made available by Italy as a special contribution, 9.5 million would be used for the construction of two luxury hotels, with all building material imported from Italy;
- (e) A contribution of 1.5 million dollars expected from the European Development Fund is to be used for the building of a hospital in Mogadiscio.

14. Foremost in the Prime Minister's mind, however, is the establishment of an armed force which would bring some 3,000 men into the army in addition to the present 5,000 who serve in the regular and tribal police forces. The cost of maintaining these military activities must be taken into consideration when appraising the financial resources at the disposal of Somalia.

15. The Prime Minister showed a definite interest in searching for foreign markets for Somali products and in developing the fishing industry for domestic consumption and exports. The opposition showed interest in help for the Benadir textile industry. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce is especially interested in establishing a textile industry, a leather industry (based on the indigenous processing of skins and hides), meat and other food processing industries.

16. The Prime Minister was initially rather negative with respect to immediate United Nations technical assistance. It was clear that he had originally thought of postponing the whole question of technical assistance until after independence (perhaps even in part to have a completely free hand, thus pleasing some elements in the Italian Administration and rendering himself a service at the same time), though he was also aware of the fact that such delay in formulating requests could be quite costly to Somalia. However, when we discussed technical assistance in terms of possible projects and monetary equivalents rather than in terms of numbers of experts and specific job descriptions, the Prime Minister evinced an active interest.

17. The Prime Minister was also interested in learning that: (a) the projects for the Special Fund could not possibly be accepted in the way in which they had been presented; and (b) no part of the \$2 million allocated to Somalia since April 1959 by the United States Development Loan Fund had as yet been spent simply because the project preparation was deficient and no guarantee had been proffered for the proper execution of the projects.

18. The Prime Minister was attracted by the possibility of linking other technical assistance with the project now being considered for financing by the Special Fund. This indeed seems to offer a key for initiating technical assistance in Somalia. As Mr. IONIDES, a distinguished British irrigation engineer, is going in March to begin the inquiry for the Special Fund project, on assignment from FAO, other technical assistance activities should not be undertaken without close coordination.

19. A most serious difficulty in Somalia is the lack of education. Although a crash education programme is obviously needed, the problem requires detailed investigation. The very basis of an education system seems to be absent and proper diagnosis of the situation in all its aspects should precede any proposal for remedial action. I discussed the matter with Government officials but had to consider it as falling outside the scope of my short mission.

Background for
UN technical
assistance

20. In planning all technical assistance it is important to remember that the projects which have been submitted to the Special Fund, including those which have been rejected, provide the best guidelines so far for ascertaining the views and desires of the Italian Administration as well as those of the Somali Government as regards the support expected from the United Nations.

21. There will be no difficulty in obtaining the normal TAB Agreement with Somalia, and the role of the Resident Representative has been clearly explained by Mr. CERE-HABERSKY.

Special Fund
Project

22. The Special Fund project as first proposed (involving a request for an \$800,000 contribution from the Special Fund) was to cover a survey of three important areas as a basis for eventually securing external financial assistance for major reservoir works, for the modernization of the port of Chisimayo, and for the construction of water works, including irrigation and river drainage.

23. While the original project envisaged incidentally a certain amount of research, promotion and education, Mr. IONIDES favours orienting the project in this direction and de-emphasising the aim of securing external financial support for the harbour and other specific construction work.

He has in mind several specific fields of investigation:

- (a) Research in crops and animal husbandry;
- (b) Research in land and water conservation;
- (c) Hydrometric research on rivers;
- (d) Geophysical exploration of groundwater;
- (e) Research into methods of construction of works which would minimise the expenditure of foreign exchange;
- (f) Finally, education and training in the above fields, including especially the teaching of water uses to the Somali population resident in the areas.

24. This orientation points towards research, complementary educational activities, and the identification of pre-investment needs. This would lead eventually inter alia to the establishing of hydrometric gauge stations, pluviometric stations and other necessary work for improved land use. This would call for smaller but adequately equipped teams of experts working over longer periods of time, as against the use of larger teams for shorter periods who would concentrate on surveys of a general nature.

25. Instead of stimulating new undertakings now, I believe it would be sound to concentrate on a major effort of significant impact to justify the allocation of the requested \$800,000. For this reason, and also because the regions covered by the Special Fund project are the most important ones in Somalia, it would be useful to provide a certain amount of other technical assistance around this project in order to give all United Nations activities an early start and ensure their subsequent continuity. Technical assistance should start off with an immediate link to the Special Fund project.

Photogrammetry

.....

26. On this basis I drafted in Somalia a suggestion for an initial request for a photogrammetrist (copy attached) so that he could plan with Mr. IONIDES to begin his work as soon as possible independently of whether the Special Fund project is approved or not. If the Special Fund project is approved, his work should be related to the project (see paragraphs 45 to 53 infra).

27. Before the independence of Somalia, an attempt should be made to survey and collect all the maps drawn by Italian and British authorities as well as by private companies, as a basis for a systematic inquiry into the use of such maps for economic purposes. In this connexion, it should also be determined which maps prepared by the British for Northern Kenya and British Somalia might have some bearing on the geological picture of Somalia.

28. It will also be essential to start photogrammetry at least in a limited region where maps could be used for economic purposes as set out in the description of Project No. 1 (see infra Recommendations). Specifically, the uses of photogrammetry as envisaged here would be:

1. Planning land use, particularly in irrigated areas;
2. Assistance in solving land tenure problems;
3. Locating of water holes;
4. Planning soil and water conservation, forestry, range management and other projects.

29. The Italian plan for technical assistance did not foresee the provision of a geographical service, nor are there any Somalis with such training available. Neither, so far as I know, has a general approach to the problem been planned by the ICA. All authorities and the oil companies are willing to make maps available, and equipment now owned by oil companies in Somalia can be rented as needed.

Housing and
Construction

30. One of the most striking problems facing the Government in connexion with the creation of a new capital is the immediate requirement for construction of embassies, offices and housing facilities. The Special Fund project will also raise practical problems involving construction works, provision of building materials, as well as training of supervisors and artisans.

31. As the Economic Commission for Africa is undertaking work in this field, Mr. GARDINER and I have suggested that an early request be made for help in advising the Government on town planning, construction and financing of housing. (One problem: no housing loans have yet been granted to Somalis). There has already been a good deal of emphasis on a related question, i.e. water supply for the capital.

32. Mr. GARDINER suggested as a first step sending Mr. KÖNIGSBERGER, an Indian expert, to survey the situation. After discussion with Mr. IONIDES, I felt that it also may be useful to discuss follow-up possibilities with the firm of DOXIADES of Athens, which has done significant jobs in the Middle East and Latin America for the IBRD, especially if this firm were to be engaged on the Special Fund project. I am attaching a copy of a cable from IONIDES on this matter. The occasion of Mr. DOXIADES' visit to New York in mid-March should be used to discuss the various possibilities with him on the substantive level.

.....

33. It is particularly interesting to note that the Prime Minister, who usually answered in the negative my questions regarding financial participation by the Government in specific technical assistance projects, answered "yes" when I brought up the matter of housing and construction of water works.

34. My recommendation for a housing project (paragraphs 54-62 below) is worded so as to keep it as flexible as possible until Mr. KÖNIGSBERGER has made his preliminary survey.

Economic
Programming

35. Dr. GASBARRI indicated that there were considerable gaps in statistical data and a lack of statistical experts and that the one statistician to be provided under the Italian expert scheme would not be sufficient.

36. I therefore suggested that we initiate technical assistance in this field by providing statistical expertise in connexion with the forthcoming ECA Statistical Survey. I also suggested that a statistician be sent out to prepare quantitative data needed to assist the Government in its programming task. He, and one or more other statisticians, should also be concerned with the organization of basic agricultural and industrial censuses.

37. In a way, it is fortunate that the UN will not be asked for a planning adviser in the very near future, since at this moment the Prime Minister does not envisage a plan in the usual sense of the word, and since there is thus little likelihood that any economic advice on planning would be actually implemented. In fact, the present seven-year plan for Somalia comes to an end in 1960 and no further plan has been prepared as yet. It would thus be much better to begin with statistics and to create at least some of the conditions necessary for the establishment of a development programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. - GENERAL APPROACH

38. The technical assistance projects which I proposed to the Government and which are set out below were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- (a) Urgency and impact;
- (b) Acceptability to the Somali Government;
- (c) Likelihood of success.

39. Timing is an important matter in the programme and the proposals are therefore grouped into two phases:

Phase 1 - Actions preferably to be started before independence; and

Phase 2 - Actions preferably to be started after independence.

40. The second phase has been conceived not as a specific blueprint, but as a series of alternatives from which a blueprint should emerge after several months of United Nations technical assistance in Somalia.

41. The projects, as proposed, have two essential features:

- (a) Features of an operational character;
- (b) Features of a general administrative, planning, or diagnostic character.

42. Care was taken that proposals relating to general administration, planning and investigation were not divorced from operational activities. It was especially important to present the possibilities of technical assistance in terms of:

- (a) Financial implications (over-all targets);
- (b) Support of projects either in terms of obtaining finances or through aid in technical preparation and execution;
- (c) Maximization of the utilization of resources;
- (d) Emphasis on training activities and pilot projects.

43. This approach was definitely more acceptable to both the Italian Administration and the Somali Government than an approach based on numbers of experts and individual job descriptions.
44. The likelihood of success was largely evaluated in terms of the frame of reference in which the work would be carried out, related activities which the Government or bilateral technical assistance would undertake.

° II. - THE PROPOSALS FOR PHASE 1

1. Photogrammetry

Definition of the Project

45. It is proposed to provide the Government immediately with a photogrammetrist who would:
- (a) Conduct a survey for the collection of existing photogrammetric information;
 - (b) Conduct discussions with the FAO, the Italian Administration, ICA and private companies having undertaken photogrammetric work in Somalia in order to ascertain what has been done and what is projected;
 - (c) Determine possibilities for United Nations activities in the field of geophysical surveys, and, more particularly, in photogrammetry, either through the Special Fund project or through technical assistance, for the purpose of:
 - (1) Planning land use, particularly in irrigated areas;
 - (2) Solving land tenure problems;
 - (3) Locating water holes;
 - (4) Planning soil and water conservation, forestry, range management and other projects.
46. United Nations activities in photogrammetry should concentrate on selected areas where the utilization of the maps would be of definite practical use.

47. The immediate objective is to make sure that all of the existing material is secured and utilized. This will serve to make the Special Fund project, which cannot normally start before early 1961, yield quicker results because preliminary work will have been done. In addition, the photogrammetric work will have direct practical relevance to some of the activities in the agricultural field undertaken by ICA.

Manner of Execution

48. It is contemplated to have first a quick survey made by an experienced photogrammetrist. This preliminary survey should be carried out in close coordination with Mr. IONIDES who is investigating the Special Fund project on behalf of FAO during March and April.

49. The expert should establish a programme under the supervision of the Prime Minister of Somalia for execution in 1961/62 during which period a team of specialists will be made available through the Special Fund project, if it is approved. An attempt should be made to rent equipment owned by private oil companies currently active in Somalia.

50. In this connection, the expert in photogrammetry should examine in detail the surveys available in Rome and London and the material produced by the ICA and private companies which have undertaken mapping. He should also arrange for the analysis of photogrammetric work done in North Kenya and British Somalia insofar as it has relevance for the contiguous area in Somalia. In any case he should make sure that none of the existing material is lost.

51. The Special Fund project will probably include aerial surveys of strictly limited regions within Somalia, and the photogrammetric assistance to be rendered before the implementation of the Special Fund project should be so arranged as to make its results useful for those surveys. Conversely, a national geographical service may have to be established in the Prime Minister's office which will utilize the material provided by international and bilateral technical assistance.

Caveat

52. Photogrammetric work has already been undertaken but efforts were not coordinated. The coordination and use of the results of this work is an important task in which UN could provide valuable assistance. Further photogrammetric work will be undertaken by the United Nations in the contemplated Special Fund project, by the oil companies and possibly by ICA, and the future plans of our technical assistance operations should make allowance for such work.

53. It should be remembered that after aerial surveys had determined the possibilities for irrigation and considerable initial work had been started for improving land use, projects have been abandoned. Therefore no new activity of an operational character should be initiated without assurance that there are enough funds, from internal or external sources, to continue operational support, at least until the project is formally established and able to continue on its own.

2. Housing

Definition of the Project

54. The project should involve a rapid survey of town and village planning and construction possibilities, including production of local building materials. It should begin with a survey of Mogadiscio and also cover the question of water supply.

Objective

55. The objective in the first phase is to aid the Government to avoid the worst consequences of a sudden building boom which is about to start and will be linked to the imminent independence. As it is projected to build two luxury hotels with Italian funds (see paragraph 13(d)), as Embassies are being planned, as a hospital is likely to be built (from money obtained from European Development Fund), the question of town planning and housing has gained sudden importance.

56. The United Nations activities should have social significance. They should be concentrated on the poorer groups, they should eventually extend to other parts of the country, and to construction of basic facilities, especially water supply. This is a first step towards community development work.

57. The long-range objective is to expand the activities of the housing survey to two other types of activity:

- (a) the area of the Port of Chisimayo which may be financed from United States funds;
- (b) the irrigation project which, if undertaken by the Special Fund, will involve preliminary work leading to the construction of water works, village layout, and rural housing surveys; the latter two have particular relevance for settlement work and community development.

Manner of Execution

58. The first survey will be undertaken by the ECA group concerned with housing in Africa. Mr. KÖNIGSBERGER might be asked to undertake a quick survey, such as he has done in Ghana and various other countries.
59. Plans for the hotels and other new buildings contemplate the exclusive use of foreign building materials. It would be desirable at least for low income housing, for construction of water works, and other, including industrial facilities, to work towards the production of local building materials.
60. On the basis of the plans, it might be possible to furnish a rammed earth block-making machine and other equipment for demonstration purposes.

Caveat

61. It is clear that the housing survey for Mogadiscio is a completely different matter from the construction survey contemplated in connection with the Special Fund project. In order not to create confusion, I have not linked the two matters in my discussion with the Prime Minister but have requested Mr. IONIDES to take the housing project into account when he makes his recommendations to the Special Fund.
62. The provision of machinery for making local building materials, plus expertise in housing for purposes other than that related to the Special Fund project, will continue to have to be made from EPTA and the Regular programmes (Res. 418) during 1961 and 1962, with recourse to contingency financing with respect to the Expanded Programme. In order to have

any impact at all, a minimum of at least \$250,000 will have to be made available for the two years of this programme to avoid repetition of past experiences in Somalia, when equipment had been given and demonstration projects started, which had later to be abandoned.

3. Statistics

Definition of the Project

63. The Italian Government will furnish only one statistician under its programme of 250 experts. This is definitely insufficient.
64. The project should begin with the team working on the ECA Statistical Survey. The ECA Statistical Survey must determine what kind of statistical unit is required. It must also determine how to establish a continuing national statistical service, and where to locate it.
65. In the early stage, it should lead to the following activities:
 - (a) The setting up of machinery for providing quantitative data needed for economic programming. This would definitely be conceived as a pre-planning activity;
 - (b) Preparations for a population, an agricultural, and an industrial census.
66. Before such work can actually be started, an evaluation is needed to determine which techniques, sampling or other, would be most useful.

Caveat

67. There has been considerable resistance to a population census in the past.
68. As there is no programming or planning machinery of any kind, and as it would be premature to plan such machinery, the statistical expert might be the expert who will become the economic programming officer proposed for the Second Phase. This is in fact what happened in Ghana where the Government statistician was the economic adviser before economic advisory services were organized.

69. It should be kept in mind that it is contemplated to establish a planning office and that it is likely that the Italians will furnish a planning adviser. I have suggested to the Italians that they themselves might wish, before independence, to invite one or two of the top personalities from SVIMEZ, such as Professor MOLINARI, or Professor SARACENO, to make a rapid survey of the situation.

4. Balance of Payments

Definition of the Project

70. This project would consist of a rapid survey of the assets and liabilities of Somalia, a projection of balance of payment requirements and the establishment of a foreign exchange budget.

71. There is considerable concern amongst Somalis about the somalization of the issuing institute which is still governed by a board located in Rome.

72. On the other hand the officials of the Banco d'Italia may find it difficult to abandon control of the institute before independence.

73. It is also important to consider that, in Mogadiscio, the institute is managed by an excellent Italian Director-General, Mr. PALAMENGI-CRISPI, who would welcome assistance in the field of balance of payments.

74. We should weigh the advantages of an independent expert who could allay possible misgiving among Somalis, in the arrangement of what is in fact "a settlement of financial accounts upon independence".

Manner of Execution

75. This project is not yet approved by the Italian Administration but will be discussed first in Rome because it requires the approval of the board of the issuing institute, and possibly also of the Banco d'Italia.

76. Once this project is approved, an experienced regular staff member, or an experienced expert who has done similar work, should be detached to carry out the task both in Rome and Mogadiscio. The kind of person I have in mind would be either Mr. KAFKA (Brazil) or Mr. VIGNARAJ (a member of the staff of the Central Bank of Ceylon who has done some work with the Central Bank of Libya). But the expert may also be provided by the IMF.

Caveat

77. This project, which can only be effective if it is quickly executed, poses the difficult problem of reconciling the canons of credit worthiness and financial soundness with certain national ambitions in Somalia.

III. - THE PROPOSALS FOR PHASE 2

1. General Observations

78. The general approach in phase No. 2 should be dominated by the following considerations: the experts who will be assigned to projects of a general administrative, planning or investigative nature should also undertake connected training responsibilities and should be grouped with Somalis in what might be called a nucleus for the establishment of a Bureau d'études or consultative group. They may include one or two Italians, though preferably at junior levels. It should not be made a general rule to have all United Nations experts attached to this consultative group (or Bureau d'études), as some of them might not fit into such a pattern and consequently might have their effectiveness impaired by incorporation into a team. This should be a particularly important consideration for experts concerned with highly confidential tasks.
79. Actual project implementation should be staffed "in depth". In principle it should be concentrated on a very few activities of obvious practical usefulness for which adequate financing is available. In a few cases one or two technical experts assigned to a specific project could help the Somalis to obtain outside financing by serving as catalysts and initiators and by establishing, as it were through their presence, a guarantee for implementation.
80. In this connexion there is a particular need for two types of personnel: (a) project officers who will prepare submissions for projects requiring outside help and who will train Somalis to do such work and (b) operational personnel which can be lent to private or public industries to set up an operation and conduct it until Somalis are trained to take it over. This would enable the Somalis to secure access to certain sources of finance, such as loans from the United States Development Loan Fund, which is conditioned upon adequate preparation of projects and guarantees of effective operation.

81. It might have been logical to consider OPEX assistance, but this seemed to me somewhat premature. While OPEX was not suggested by me, it was not excluded and in fact was mentioned. Whether or not the OPEX scheme should be used for a given request might perhaps be determined after independence. At present the size (amounts), the nature and the types of technical assistance Somalia will receive from the outside are not sufficiently clear to enable us to judge with accuracy the modus operandi of long-range United Nations technical assistance.
82. A training programme will have to be evolved during the second phase. No proposals have been made for the present because it would most likely have resulted in random requests for study tours and fellowships abroad. The determination of training requirements necessitates firstly the establishment of a manpower budget. In the second place training plans can only be made on the basis of an evaluation of specific needs. One of the complicating factors under present conditions is the scarcity of persons with adequate secondary school training and the presence of semi-trained personnel in positions requiring high-levels of competence.
83. The second phase should be worked out in detail by the Resident Representative. It is assumed here that (a) there would be both a Special Representative and a Resident Representative and (b) that there will be a standard type TAB agreement with Somalia at an early date, as both the Italian and the Somali Governments are in favour of such an agreement. Following such an agreement a Resident Representative should be appointed as soon as possible so that he may benefit from the advice of Mr. CERE-HABERSKY and of the Secretariat staff attached to the UN Advisory Council, especially its economic and social officers. At present, recommendations must be limited to the following projects and guidelines.

2. Specific Recommendations

1) Public Administration

Definition of the Project

84. Assistance in public administration must be concerned with organization and methods. Specific advice should be furnished in establishing a manpower budget and in organizing a procurement office. Particular attention should be given to the establishment of technical, including fiscal, services after independence.

Manner of Execution

85. It would not be difficult for ECA to furnish initial consultative services from Addis Ababa to the Government of Somalia. The experience of Mr. GARDINER, who was formerly Secretary of Establishments in Ghana, would be particularly useful because there is some understanding in the country for British methods, which was acquired during the ten years of British administration. Consultations with Mr. GARDINER and if possible also with Mr. ABBAS might determine the type and character of technical assistance to be furnished in public administration.

86. It is advisable not to proceed with the appointment of a group of experts in the public administration field until the character of their operations is understood. Hence the suggestion of preliminary consultations. Once administrative experts are appointed they might also form part of the Bureau d'études or consultative group.

87. There are basic weaknesses in the prevailing system which, unless remedied, make it difficult for public administration to operate effectively. One example is the fact that some senior civil servants are Members of Parliament. The other is the practice for each ministry to do its own buying: the establishment of a general procurement office for all purchases and for all ministries is necessary for economic reasons, in addition to its obvious administrative advantages.

ii) Programming officers

Definition of the Project

88. There is a need for one or more experts technically competent to establish overall economic targets and priorities among projects and to evaluate projects in consultation with project officers (see infra). In this general context they would be concerned with cost-benefit calculations, balance of payments implications and import substitution plans. They would also have to study international trade problems, including market possibilities and sources of supply.

Manner of Execution

89. The first programming officer should not arrive before independence. It would be desirable that by that time a certain amount of pre-planning work, particularly on the statistical side, would have been carried out. It might be useful to separate, after a few months, the international trade functions from the general economic programming functions. It may be particularly necessary for the expert concerned with international trade problems to aid the government in dealing with international trade missions, a function which would be less of a research nature than that of the programming officer dealing with overall targets and priorities.

Caveat

90. There is definite interest for these projects but it is not quite clear where these officers could be assigned before the blueprint for a planning office is finished and a decision has been made regarding the appointment of a top economic adviser or planner whom Somalia might request on a bilateral basis from Italy. For this reason the question of details regarding this project, including the number of experts required (probably two or three) should be left until the Resident Representative has been able to evaluate the situation. There are no Somali counterparts and training should be initiated promptly, especially in the international trade field, in order to develop Somali officials who can work with Ministers on trade missions.

111) Project Officers

Definition of the Project

91. Project officers will be required for short-term service to deal with the actual preparation of specific projects to be presented to outside lending and grant-giving agencies: the United States Development Loan Fund would already have paid out funds from its \$2 million loan allotment if adequately prepared projects had been presented. Project officers may be supported by UN technical experts, including engineers and geologists. Project officers should also be concerned with providing services to private industry by organizing the necessary technical background information for submission to national credit agencies (Credito Somalo).

92. Some project officers might be assigned to explore fields in which Special Fund aid might be obtained, since the technical requirements for Special Fund operations are evidently not understood in Somalia. Promising prospects might exist in connexion with animal disease control (compare the veterinary assistance project for Ethiopia) or in the leather tanning field (there is a precedent in the form of a FAO project carried out together with the West German and Dutch Governments in India which involved assistance in teaching the techniques of skinning and flaying animals and the establishment of a private plant).

Caveat

93. It is very difficult to choose priorities in this kind of work. At this moment there is talk about the possibility of a \$1 million loan for private industry from the United States Development Loan Fund if the textile industry can be reestablished in Mogadiscio. Expert assistance might or might not be required, because a strong Italian concern is interested in the matter. In the leather field certain activities do exist but if the Port of Chisimayo should become a reality, additional work could be undertaken so as to make experts of leather hides and skins a major source of income to Somalia.

Manner of Execution

94. At first one project officer might be sent for an initial period of six months to prepare the blueprints for any well defined undertaking for which external financing can be secured during the period 1961/62. He should be attached to the Prime Minister's office and should be at the disposal of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Credito Somalo and such other Ministries as may require his services.

iv) Statisticians

95. Continued assistance in this field should be based on the findings of Project 3 of the First Phase.

v) Technical Experts and Operational Personnel

96. Experts might be furnished to aid in the organization of new industries, agricultural and industrial, and to manage their operation until Somali personnel can be trained to replace them. A certain amount of equipment, especially for demonstration and training purposes, can also be furnished together with the experts. Enterprises to be assisted in this way would include particularly food processing, leather manufacture, textiles, furniture making. The Government has expressed considerable interest in this type of assistance.

vi) Other Technicians

97. Some technical assistance will also be coming from the Economic Commission for Africa. Mr. Mekki ABBAS has offered to send to Somalia an hydrologist, an irrigation engineer and an agronomist.

vii) Judicial and Legislative Assistance

98. The Prime Minister took the initiative in pointing out that Somalia required assistance in the judicial and legislative fields. He was concerned both with the question of judicial methods and the fact that it was difficult to obtain qualified magistrates. Foreign magistrates are difficult to recruit, in part because the District Commissioners rank higher and their qualifications often coincide with those required for magistrates.

99. Legislative drafting seemed to be mostly based on Italian experience plus paper comparisons with laws of foreign countries. What is necessary is the exchange of knowledge on the basis of actual working experience under different conditions.

100. These are important needs, but it is probably premature to formulate specific technical assistance projects. Since these matters, moreover, involve delicate political problems it would be preferable for the Resident Representative to take them up with the Prime Minister after independence.

IV. - TENTATIVE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

101. In 1960, the provision of two statisticians for six to eight months and of two expert missions, one for a photogrammetry survey and the other for a housing survey, may total approximately \$100,000.

102. During the two-year period 1961/62, the provision of a housing construction adviser and of machinery to make local building materials may cost \$250,000, out of which some \$75,000 should be made available under Resolution 418. The cost of the programming and project officers may be evaluated at \$80,000 to be met in part under Resolution 200. Provision for technicians may be put at \$60,000 and the need for other advisers, including those in public administration, may absorb \$30,000, to be financed in part from Resolutions 200 and 723. An amount of \$30,000 should be made available for training. Total assistance from United Nations technical assistance would then approximate \$450,000 for the biennium. This, of course, assumes that it will be possible to obtain some contingency funds from the Executive Chairman of TAB.

103. Special Fund assistance might be at the rate of \$160,000 a year for five years if the project which is now pending is accepted. Assistance from specialized agencies might amount to some \$175,000 per annum on the basis of existing programmes, assuming no increases. Total assistance from United Nations sources would therefore be slightly over half a million dollars a year for the period 1961/62. In addition, at least one additional Special Fund project might be developed some time in 1961.

LISTE DES TECHNICIENS ET EXPERTS ETRANGERS
DONT LA SOMALIE AURA BESOIN APRES 1960

Experts administratifs	11
Experts en comptabilité	5
Magistrats	8
Experts en statistique	1
Médecins	51
Chimistes et pharmaciens	2
Experts sanitaires	4
Vétérinaires	6
Instituteurs	70
Experts du travail	1
Experts de la pêche	2
Expert de charpenterie navale	1
Ingénieurs	6
Géomètres	12
Géophysiciens	2
Experts en agriculture	25 (a)
Experts en zootechnie	6 (b)
Experts de l'utilisation des produits zootechniques	5 (c)
Ouvriers pour les recherches hydriques	6 (d)
Experts en météorologie	1
Experts en services postaux	2
Expert en matière financière	1
Experts en matière fiscale	5 (e)
Experts pour les services de radiotélécommunications	10 (f)
Experts en matière cadastrale	3
Expert militaire	1
Dessinateur	1
Mécaniciens	2
TOTAL ...	<u>250</u>

- (a) Cinq d'entre eux seront employés dans l'application des "programmes de développement économique";
- (b) Cinq d'entre eux seront employés dans l'application des "programmes de développement économique";
- (c) Ces experts seront tous employés dans l'application des "programmes de développement économique";
- (d) Ces ouvriers seront tous employés dans l'application des "programmes de développement économique";
- (e) Deux d'entre eux seront affectés aux Services des Douanes;
- (f) Sept d'entre eux seront affectés aux Télécommunications internationales et un sera destiné aux services Presse.

PROPOSED REQUEST FOR EXPERT ASSISTANCE IN PHOTOGRAMMETRY

24 February 1960

The Government of Somalia requests the services of an expert in photogrammetry to come to the country for a period of two months in order to start the following projects:

A. Establish a survey and a collection of existing photogrammetric information.

Conduct discussions with the FAO, the Italian Administration, ICA and private companies that have undertaken photogrammetric work in Somalia in order to ascertain what has been done and what is projected.

Determine possibilities for United Nations activities in photogrammetry, either through the Special Fund project or through technical assistance, for the purpose of:

- 1) Planning land use, particularly in irrigated areas;
- 2) Solving land tenure problems;
- 3) Locating water holes;
- 4) Planning soil and water conservation, forestry, range management and other projects.

B. United Nations activities in photogrammetry would be determined with a view to cover limited areas where the utilization of the maps would be of definite practical use.

C. The expert will establish a programme under the supervision of the Prime Minister of Somalia for execution in 1961/1962 during which period a team of specialists will be made available through the Special Fund if the project is approved. An attempt should be made to rent equipment owned by private oil companies at this time active in Somalia.

Copy of a cable from Mr. Ionides

2 MARCH 1960

UNATIONS NY

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BUN ACRF 1/CAML214 EK190 LONDON 97 1 1119

LT HENRY BLOCH UNTAO NEWYORKCITY

DOXIADIS ATHENS CAN ASSURE TEAM FOR MOGADISCIO AT FEW WEEK NOTICE STOP
THIS WOULD BE OF GREATEST VALUE TO MY OWN MISSION BECAUSE MOST IMPORTANT
THAT PRACTICAL PLANS FOR CONSTRUCTION WORKS AND ASSOCIATED BUILDING MATERIALS
INDUSTRIES AND TRAINING OF SUPERVISORS AND ARTISANS SHOULD BE PUT ON A
COMMON BASIS OF STUDY AND ACTION FROM OUTSET STOP SIMILAR PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES APPLY WHETHER WORKS ARE FOR WATER SUPPLY OR IRRIGATION OR HOUSING OR
OTHER JOBS STOP DOXIADIS WILL BE IN AMERICA MID MARCH FOLLOWING
VISIT LONDON AND COULD CONTACT YOU STOP REGARDS

IONIDES

S605ABST RHG

COPY OF A LETTER FROM Mr. M. G. IONIDES, dated 2 March 1960
to Mr. W. H. PAWLEY, F.A.O., Rome

Reference: 78/669

29th February, 1960

My dear Walter,

Dr. Bloch called this morning and we had an exhaustive talk. Apart from some extremely valuable background which he gave me, fresh from his visit to Mogadishu, there were certain specific points.

2. The first is Kisimayu harbour. We agreed that this can be regarded as being a separate issue, right outside the limits of the Special Fund investigation. The reasons are as follows:-

- (a) It is already being investigated, on the ground, under United States' sponsorship.
- (b) The probability is that it will be financed by the United States.
- (c) Therefore, it need not be regarded as competing for capital funds against other works which will arise out of the Special Fund's surveys.
- (d) On this basis, I take it as an extra tool of economic development which cannot fail to do good.

3. Dr. Bloch mentioned three specific projects to which he attaches great importance, namely:-

- (a) Photogrammetry.
- (b) Housing.
- (c) Statistical service for pre-planning.

4. Photogrammetry

As Dr. Bloch says, a good deal of air survey work of various kinds has already been done, or is now being done. Some was by the British Administration, some by the Italians; the oil companies now prospecting have certainly done some. Dr. Bloch suggested that it was important to gather as much of this as can be collected, and make the maximum use of it. I entirely agree. He suggested further that if a United Nations photogrammetry man can be put into the field straightaway, to start in on this work of collection and compilation, time might be saved. I agreed with that too. I regard it as pretty well certain, however, that the Special Fund investigation will need to commission some particular air survey investigation. I have already been in touch with sources of information in London, and I think it unlikely that air surveys devoted to the targets the British Administration were interested in, or the oil companies, will entirely meet our needs. We may need some special work done for water survey; for detailed examination of land usage problems, village layout, irrigation systems, etc. The likelihood is, therefore, that if a United Nation man is put into the field straightaway to do initial collecting and compiling, we shall need to weld his operations into the planning of the Special Fund investigation in due course.

This is a purely organisational point which seems to present no difficulties. The immediate work which a photogrammetry expert could do would probably start outside Somalia, in the western capitals, because it is there that he will find the organisational centres of those bodies who have done, or are doing, aerial survey. Some thought will need to be given to the diplomatic approach which is appropriate, especially in the case of the oil companies.

5. Housing

Dr. Bloch emphasized the United Nations interest in housing, with particular reference to lower income groups and the rural areas. This is a question that I did not specifically deal with in my note. However, questions relating to water supplies, land usage, and the associated problems of building construction, promotion of local materials manufacture, etc., are so closely connected with village and town planning and with housing, that the latter comes naturally into the picture. Moreover, a great deal of the basic study relating to the pattern of life and economics relates to housing as much as to other activities. On the constructional side, such as the evolution of locally produced materials, the training of artisans, etc., they are all of a piece. In fact, I am sure that the secret of success lies in a comprehensive approach, from the ground upwards, leading to precise and definable lines of organised action, in physical terms, to which funds can be devoted. This is, of course, exactly the approach in which my friends, Doxiadis Associates, and I are specialising. Dr. Bloch is convinced that the particular problems of Mogadishu itself need urgent attention. He thought, and I agree, that this could be the subject of a special and immediate action, for which I gathered that United Nations funds (i.e. other than Special Fund sources) could be made available. He received sympathetically my suggestion that Doxiadis Associates should be asked to supply a team, to act in conformity with general recommendations which would probably be made by an individual who would go to Mogadishu for a short period to lay the groundwork - possible, Dr. Koenigsberger. As in the case of photogrammetry, the question of lining up this immediate action with the general investigation by the Special Fund, later on, will be a matter for administrative decision in due course.

6. Statistical Service

Dr. Bloch speaks with authority on the lack of a statistical service and of statistics generally. I had already suspected as much, from the narrower point of view of physical data, such as that relating to water, rainfall, etc. This seems to be a question which can well be merged in with the Special Fund investigation; although some aspects of it, e.g. finance, commerce, census, etc., would seem to require highly specialised statistical and administrative expertise of a different kind from that associated with water, land use, etc. This, again, is an organisational point which seems to present no serious difficulty.

7. We also discussed two other questions, namely, the hydrometric service and the use of information from neighbouring territories, i.e., British Somaliland and Kenya.

8. Hydrometric Service

It seems likely that we shall have to start more or less from scratch. This will mean a team of several men, with Somali officials working alongside, to set up the gauging stations, collect and compile meteorological and other data, establish the statistical and hydrological service. It will of course need to be related closely to actual projects for works - irrigation, river draining, etc. Air survey will be an essential aid. By its nature, it is a service which will benefit greatly from continuous help from United Nations technical assistance agencies.

9. Data from Neighbouring Territories

I have already taken some soundings, and it is quite clear that there is a lot of valuable data from British Somaliland and Northern Kenya. This relates not only to physical data relating to geology, water supplies and methods, rainfall and the like; I would expect to find a lot of helpful data about land management, methods of organising and stimulating improvements in standards and the like. It will certainly be one of my recommendations that an early start should be made, as part of the Special Fund investigation, to find out all we can. The natural starting point of this would be in London, but visits to both British Somaliland and Kenya would be necessary. I would hope that this could be done in such a way that political problems need not arise.

10. To summarise:-

- (a) We can regard Kisimayu harbour project as being quite distinct from the Special Fund investigation, and give it our blessing.
- (b) If the United Nations can put a photogrammetry man into the field to start compiling and studying the survey data that already exists, so much the better.
- (c) If United Nations agree to ask Doxiadis to have an immediate commission on the housing and building problem in Mogadishu itself, on their account, so much the better.

11. Conclusion

It is well agreed that survey and investigation is a means to an end, and that the end we seek to achieve, as soon as we can, is to produce lines of specified concrete action upon which funds can usefully be spent with tangible results. The conversation between Dr. Bloch and myself did not, of course, range over the entire field of study and action. We were primarily concerned with those points, listed above, where an immediate initiative by the United Nations could help to get things moving, in such a way that they could be administratively merged with the Special Fund activities, by organisational procedures which can be worked out in due course.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) : M. G. Ionides

Report from Mr. Robert Gardiner

Discussions held in Mogadiscio with
Mr. H. Bloch and other officials
22 - 24 February 1960

I left Addis Ababa on Saturday 20 February 1960 and arrived in Mogadiscio on Monday, 22. Mr. Bloch had already been in Mogadiscio since 19 and had had discussions with members of the United Nations Mission, the Administrator, the Prime Minister and other members of the Somali Government.

When I arrived I was informed that a meeting had been arranged with the members of the specialized agencies working in Somaliland. These included FAO, WHO, UNICEF, ILO and a specialist from FAO who was principally responsible for locust control. These officials gave brief descriptions of their activities and the difficulties they were encountering. The meeting decided that a brief note setting out the scope of the activities of each agency and indicating possible lines of expansion should be submitted to Mr. Bloch. It was pointed out during the discussions that in some cases the Government of Somalia was finding it difficult to provide matching funds and to make adequate provision locally for the execution of programmes. It seemed these difficulties were caused by lack of funds and shortage of trained personnel.

We met the former Mayor of Mogadiscio who described conditions for providing electricity in the urban centres and complained about the high costs of electricity for domestic and industrial consumption. It was not clear whether the high price of electricity was due to the monopolistic position of the private agencies responsible for the electricity supply. Mr. Bloch suggested that perhaps the equipment and the general organization of power supply might explain the high cost of production and distribution. We formed the impression that production of electricity for urban centres could not be accorded very high priority and that perhaps the Government would not submit a request in this connection.

Our third meeting was with the representatives of the Sinclair Oil Company. This company had been in prospecting for some time in Somalia and spent several million dollars but was still hopeful of finding oil and other mineral in commercial quantity. The company had undertaken extensive aerial surveys and their maps and other photographs were available to the Government

of Somalia but no request had been made for them. Mr. Bloch inquired whether further photogrammatic work could be justified and also wanted to know the extent of the work which had already been done. The representative of the Oil Company thought that for large scale irrigation, hydro-electricity and land use purposes there was ample room for photogrammatic work and that any work initiated with the help of the United Nations could be dovetailed into the investigations already undertaken by the Oil Company. Mr. Bloch undertook to follow up this suggestion.

A meeting was arranged with the local officer of the International Co-operation Administration. The officers who attend^{ed} the meeting represented public security, agriculture, small industries, organization of credit facilities, and general development branches of ICA. The question of a 2 million dollar loan from the Development Loan Fund to Somalia was raised and it was indicated that projects had not been properly prepared for submission and as a result, even though the amount had been ear-marked for Somalia no advances had been made. A request had been submitted in connection with the proposed port of Chisimaio and certain questions had been raised by the U. S. authorities but the Somalia Government had not submitted the required answers. The representatives of ICA agreed with Mr. Bloch that further exploratory work in connection with the port development either at Chisimaio or at an alternative site was needed. It appeared that, the financing of a port which had been referred to the U. S. Government was receiving serious consideration and could be left out of UN plans of additional help. The port development could not, however, be considered in isolation and Mr. Bloch felt that the exploration of agricultural, livestock and other possibilities in the Scebeli-Giuba region should be considered in relation with facilities which the port would provide. FAO had outlined a programme of investigations in that area and Mr. Ionides was expected to arrive in Somalia to start work shortly. It was felt that a general photogrammatic survey might widen the scope of the investigations proposed. It was agreed that if the Government of Somalia had somebody to assist them in preparing projects and submitting requests, that might help in expediting the receipt of aid and development generally.

We met the Prime Minister and the Minister of Trade and Industries. The Prime Minister observed that considerable delays were being experienced in receiving assistance for financing projects which he thought were obviously needed and promising. Mr. Bloch pointed out that Somalia's applications to the

Special Fund had not been properly prepared and on the whole the projects seemed not to have received adequate technical investigation. He advised that it would be necessary to have the services of some expert or experts to help in the preliminary examination of projects and the preparation of applications for aid. The Prime Minister stated that his Government had decided to set up a Planning Unit. Attention was drawn to the services to African countries in the organization of national statistics and the drawing up of development programmes which ECA was prepared to give at the requests of governments. The immediate needs in this respect of Somalia could be met wither by ECA or United Nations Headquarters or by a combination of the two. Mr. Bloch emphasized that the important thing was for a request to be made.

It was obvious that the civil service needed strengthening. Mr. Bloch was of the opinion that if the Somalia Government set up ^acommittee or advising group to review the Civil Service, arrangements could be made for ECA to help in the general process of adapting the civil service and its procedures to the new conditions which independence would create. Mr. Bloch mentioned the possibility of sending a Town Planning and Housing expert to work in lay-outs for urban centres and the provision of low-cost housing. There was no noticeable reaction to this indication. The Prime Minister, however, pointed out that those who had received loans at ^alow rate of interest had built houses and let them. It was suggested that under such circumstances the Government could collect the full rent until the loan had been repaid. The Prime Minister welcomed this suggestion.

The last meeting I attended was with the General Manager of the Bank of Issue. He had been loaned by the Bank of Italy, where he had worked for many years in the Research Division, to the Government of Somalia. The Manager was particularly interested in improving the statistics which will enable him to take decisions in monetary and financial matters - including the development of credit facilities. He would welcome the attachment of a statistician to his organization. He also agreed that the government did not have at its disposal any experts to help in investigating projects and in preparing applications for assistance. He and Mr. Bloch went over the names of competent Italians in the field of finance who might be appointed by the United Nations for service in Somalia.

I had a general discussion with the Italian Administrator, Signor Stefano and impressed on him the need to provide some plans for development and general economic activities in order to avoid a lag between the aid of

the Italian Regime and the coming into full activity of the independent Somali Government. As an illustration it was mentioned that even though Guinea received a loan of £10 million in 1958 and the United Nations offered assistance, up to now less than 3 million pounds of the loan had been spent and, apart from the community development activities, no feasible signs of new development had been registered. This information was also repeated to the Prime Minister.

I had to leave in the course of the meeting with the General Manager of the Bank and was not able to review the general situation with Mr. Bloch before returning to Addis Ababa. I indicated to Mr. Bloch that since ^{he} had been sent specially by the Secretary-General he could submit his report directly to the Secretary-General and that I would submit my observations to the Executive Secretary.

I suggest we forward a copy of my observations to Mr. Bloch and send our comments on Mr. Bloch's report directly to the Secretary-General as soon as the report is made available to us.

From: J. J. Cebe-Habersky
Principal Secretary, UNACS.
Resident Correspondent, UNTAB.

29 February 1960

To: Mr. John McDiarmid
Senior Director
Technical Assistance Board

Subject: Visit of Mr. Henry S. Bloch

My memo dated 23 February gave you an outline of our informal talks and negotiations which included extensive meetings with Mr. Abdullahi Issa, the Prime Minister and Mr. Hagi Farah, the Minister for Industry and Commerce. These meetings continued until the last day of Mr. Bloch's departure on 26 February. At the very hour of Mr. Bloch's departure we had a meeting with the Minister for Industry and Commerce at the airport.

Mr. Gardiner, Deputy Executive Secretary of ECA attended meetings arranged during his visit in Mogadiscio between 22 and 24 February. I noted in my previous memo that in addition to meetings with the Prime Minister and the Minister for Industry and Commerce we held meetings with other groups. Working meetings were arranged with TAB experts, substantive officers of my staff, ICA experts, the manager of Sinclair Somal. Corp. members of the Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Crispi (General Director of Somalcassa), Dr. Gasbarri, (Vice Secretary-General of the Italian Administration and President of ASES), several deputies in the Legislative Assembly, the Minister of Education and other representatives.

In the best spirit of coordination between Mr. Bloch and myself our policies, formulation of proposals and evaluation of possibilities were well prepared in all cases.

Possibilities of technical assistance and programmes envisaged for Somalia as communicated by Mr. Bloch were for me a complete and most pleasant revelation indeed. Until his arrival I worked under modest schemes provided for our activities until now. From this point of view the impact of his intervention projecting imaginative visions of new possibilities was most effective. The Prime Minister and his Government were deeply impressed and expressed their sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General. In the formulation of tentative proposals for technical assistance I was particularly happy to note the acceptance of my previous suggestions to establish a consultative group of United Nations experts attached to the Prime Minister and consisting of project officers, programme economists, experts in development finance and others. This plan will place great responsibilities on the United Nations experts, and when implemented, will be of basic importance

for future development of Somalia. For public administration Mr. Gardiner may assist the Somali Government considerably. Ways and means may be suggested to put this assistance on a more continuous basis during the period immediately following independence when the re-organization of the administration and its streamlining should be tackled.

Mr. Bloch's report will contain more detailed description of the various projects and experts suggested for their implementation.

Our talks with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Industry and Commerce took many long hours. They proved a deep interest of the Prime Minister in technical assistance matters. I noted the following general points which the Prime Minister wished to underscore:

- (a) emphasis on projects and not on experts;
- (b) the Prime Minister referred to a list of projects presented by the Administering Authority during the last years of trusteeship on which no action has been taken, and requested their re-examination.
- (c) referring to the necessity of submitting at present all requests through the Administering Authority, he suggested postponing the submission of requests until after independence.

With reference to the first point, Mr. Bloch made it clear that it is the intention of technical assistance to concentrate on projects with tangible and visible impact on the development of the Territory. He noted, however, that projects must be first well prepared by experts and fit in a general plan of assistance. This concerns particularly the projects presented by the Administering Authority.

After long meetings of preparatory talks when all possibilities and suggestions presented by the Prime Minister had been thoroughly discussed a tentative plan of assistance was drafted. It was evident that the Prime Minister would be more than happy to agree on the formulation of the various requests suggested by him. He pointed out, however, that Somalia is still a Trust Territory and that all requests must be submitted through the Administering Authority. Under these conditions he believed that the formulation of requests for assistance should be postponed until after independence.

In this connection I may refer that on 16 February I noted to Dr. Protitch that Mr. Bloch may face "certain difficulties arising from the Italian conceptions as to how the assistance after independence should be controlled". I have no doubt that the Somali Government prefers the pattern

of the United Nations assistance and the United Nations experts for whom it has full confidence.

In consultation with the representatives of the Administering Authority it was however possible to agree on the immediate request for some experts and projects on which Mr. Bloch will report.

The Prime Minister asked that his Government should be accorded a prolongation of the date for the presentation of technical assistance requests for 1961-1962 until the end of July. This will enable the sovereign Somali Government to present requests along the lines suggested by the Prime Minister and formulated during the last meetings with him. The desires of the Somali Government in the various fields of technical assistance are well known to Mr. Bloch and myself and I do not believe that it should be difficult to prepare and present the requests by the end of July on the basis of our discussions with the Prime Minister. I will inform you if changes or additional requests would be tentatively suggested by the Prime Minister.

I think that before my departure at the beginning of July we will have a good basis for planning for 1961-62. After my return to New York I will be happy to assist if necessary.

During our discussions with the Prime Minister we did not tackle the question of the Basic Agreement as it was evident that the Prime Minister is all for it. The only difficulty may be the question of the Somali contribution to the office of the Resident Representative. It must be admitted that Somalia's financial position is very poor. I reported to you how difficult it is to obtain the Somali contribution for the maintenance of the present WHO and UNESCO projects. The financial situation may be better in the future with our experts assisting in public administration and economic and finance matters.

Public expenditures face a great strain resulting from the necessity to establish its foreign service, office of the Head of State, and the Defence Ministry. The recent decision of the Government to establish a national army presents another financial burden. Expenses connected with the celebration of independence will also be very high. Two new hotels will be built in Mogadiscio and a guest house for official guests. It seems that the cost of these hotels will consume a major part of the financial assistance of Italy for 1960. The raising of taxes on sugar and petrol for the purposes mentioned above provoked a certain unrest in outlying districts, particularly in the northern part of the Territory.

I will have a conference with the Prime Minister on the Basic Agreement during this week and will report to you promptly. In general I would suggest that a liberal and patient policy be accepted for the Somali contribution during the first years after independence.

It is my firm belief that Somalia will depend on the United Nations after independence and that "the United Nations will necessarily assume the top post as a constructive moderator of developments through the various facets of the technical assistance", as I noted in my letter to Dr. Protitch dated 23 February.

I hope that the Resident Representative will be selected soon by you and that he may arrive here well in advance of my departure.

Mr. Bloch's intervention was most useful and I am happy to report that we had no difficulties to produce a good team work.