

**Small files: Saudi Arabia:
Small files: Saudi Arabia -
16**

HS L 179:189



Dag Hammarskjöld's samml.

Saudi Arabia

July 60 - Aug. 61

Ribbing, Herbert de (1897 —),

Ambassador

- 9 letters/messages from D.H. + encl.
- 10 letters/cables to D.H.
- 8 annexes

25 July 1960

PERSONAL

Do you think you might make yourself available for an exploratory mission as personal representative of the Secretary-General to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area for some six weeks late August - early September. My representative would go in response to a joint request from the Governments of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to me, to explore the possibility of certain arrangements aiming at creating the proper setting for negotiations on the Bureimi question with me as third party.

The political background and the details of the mandate seen in their proper perspective is a chapter so long and orientally subtle as to require an oral explanation. Therefore, I would need to meet you, if you are interested in order to orient yourself regarding the character of the mission.

The Swedish Foreign Minister has approved of this approach to you, so you need not clear it with Stockholm; the decision is entirely yours. Please let me know if you would like to try this kind of adventure which may, but need not lead on to a much bigger mandate in the same area. I hope you will, because I believe that it would interest you and that you would be the right man for it. The problem which we are shooting at is one of the most explosive, although the dynamite charge is still under a blanket and barely recognised by most chancelleries.

Were you to be interested I would like you to come to New York immediately after my return from Africa about mid-August. I would appreciate your cabled answer about your general reaction. A cable will reach me quickly through Headquarters wherever I happen to be at that moment.

Dag Hammarskjöld

H.E. Mr. Herbert Ribbing,
Swedish Embassy,
Madrid, Spain.

26 July'60

SG

H.E. Mr. Herbert Ribbing,
Embassy of Sweden
Madrid, Spain.

(confidential. No distribution except
SG and Mr. Cordier)

Do you think you might make yourself available for an exploratory mission as personal representative of the Secretary-General to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area for some six weeks late August - early September. My representative would go in response to a joint request from the Governments of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to me, to explore the possibility of certain arrangements aiming at creating the proper setting for negotiations on the Bureimi question with me as third party.

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Were you to be interested I would like you to come to New York immediately after my return from Africa about mid-August. I would appreciate your cabled answer about your general reaction. A cable will reach me quickly through Headquarters wherever I happen to be at that moment.

(6 July 1941)

Ambassador Ribbing,

You will have received final British comments re Bureimi
by pouch.

I have now received following reply through Azzam Pasha. *Quote ... unquote*
In spite of some obscurities I believe this clinches it. I would
appreciate getting by cable (latest Saturday New York, thereafter
Geneva) your timetable for immediate future to see how we could
arrange for a meeting between you and him, so as to settle
timetable and arrangements for your second mission to Arabia.

D.M.

6 July Sent to Swedish Delegation
for transmission by code
to Ambassador Ribbing.

hm

22 Muharram 1381 (5 July 1961)

To: Mr. Abdul Rahman Pasha,

We read your telegram No. 16 dated Muharram. All your efforts are appreciated, and may God lead them to success. Our position is known to you STOP Since the English have supported Mr. Hammarskjold and what he had previously agreed upon concerning evacuation from Khur Al Adid and recognition of the rights of of refugees and securing their return home, with their full rights preserved, we agree to Mr. Hammarskjold's continuing his good offices, hoping them to be successful, God willing, as suggested in the second and third stages of his previous communications and in a report sent by Ambassador Ring STOP our only hope is to reach a solution that will re-establish justice, give satisfaction to us and our country for what the English have done, and prepare the way for a new era of good relations between the two countries STOP we express our appreciation and thanks to Mr. Hammarskjold for his efforts and good offices STOP We expect to receive from you a copy of the letter dated 26 June 1961 addressed to him by the English. We would like your coming here for consultations with regard to necessary arrangements. May God grant you success. Salaam.

Saud

٢٢ محرم ١٣٨١

نجديّة - نيويوك

برقية رقم ١٥٦١

هذه للسيد عبد الرحمن عزام باشا

اطلعنا على بريقيتكم رقم ١٦ في محرم و مساعيتكم كلها مشكورة و موفقة ان شاء الله
و نحن موقننا معلوم لديكم قف و مادام الانجليز قد ايدوا المستر همرشولد
و ما اتفق عليه سابقا من الجلاء عن خور العديد و الاعتراف بحقوق اللاجئين
و ضمان عودتهم الى ديارهم محفوظة حقوقهم فنحن نوافق على ان يستمر
مستر همرشولد في بذل مساعيه الحميدة الموفقة ان شاء الله حسب المقترح
في المرحلة الثانية و المرحلة الثالثة في مكاتباته السابقة و في تقرير بعثته
السفير رينج قف و غاية امننا هو الوصول الى حل يعيد الحق الى نصابه
و يعتبر ترضية لنا و لبلادنا عما وقع من الانجليز و يكون مقدمة لعهد جديد
من العلاقات الطيبة بين البلدين قف و المستر همرشولد تقديرونا و شكرنا
على ما يبذله من جهود و مساعي حميدة قف ننتظر منكم صورة كتاب الانجليز
اليه بتاريخ ٢٦ يونيو ١٩٦١ و نحب مقدمكم للتشاور في الترتيبات
اللازمة و الله يوفقكم و السلام

صعود

(49)

21 Aug. '60

AWCordier

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR HERBERT RIBBING

EMBASSY OF SWEDEN

MADRID (SPAIN)

I WAS VERY HAPPY TO RECEIVE YOUR FAVOURABLE RESPONSE TO MY INVITATION TO ACCEPT AN ASSIGNMENT AS MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ARRANGEMENTS FOR PROVIDING THE PROPER SETTING FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BURUNDI QUESTION. I WONDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO COME TO NEW YORK ^{THIS WEEK} ~~FOR~~ FOR CONSULTATIONS REGARDING THIS ASSIGNMENT/ I AM SORRY THAT THE CONGO CRISIS HAS BEEN SUCH A HEAVY PREOCCUPATION THIS SUMMER AS TO REPRESENT A HEAVY DRAIN ON MY TIME AND THUS TO REDUCE THE TIME LIMITS WITHIN WHICH IT SEEMS POSSIBLE TO ENGAGE IN APPROPRIATE CONSULTATION ON THIS MATTER. I WOULD THEREFORE BE ALL THE MORE GRATEFUL IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO COME AT THIS TIME SINCE THIS MATTER TOO IS ONE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE TOO LONG DELAYED. WITH CORDIAL REGARDS

P
DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

(89)

28 June 1961

Dear Herbert,

I was most happy to hear from you in the letter of 14 June, although it contains information which is quite disturbing. Before turning to the substance of the matter, I wish to thank you for your very kind and encouraging words which I appreciate especially as they come from one I know as a keen and cool observer of the affairs of our profession.

I do in no way exclude that the comments you got adequately reflected -- and maybe still reflects -- the views held by H.M.G. However, they may have to be taken with a grain of salt in the light of some other developments. As you mention, yourself, I had an opportunity for a long and thorough talk with Home, Heath, Selwyn Lloyd and their staffs. This discussion led to some discoveries, partly in the direction you indicate, but everything was so vague and tentative that I need not feel that I should be disheartened. I put up a strong fight in order to straighten matters out and was fairly satisfied with the result.

The British wanted to put their own conclusions in writing, and I have now received the letter which sets out their present views. It is rather cagey and could be a lot better, but it leaves, in spite of all, a door open which may induce the Saudi Arabians to try the next round. In fact, I believe that HMG is rather insecure in its own stand, disliking the development which may grow out of your mission, but, on the other hand, too uncertain about what risks may be involved in the situation to face the danger of closing the door.

.....
This puts me in a slightly embarrassing position as I cannot form a clear opinion of the degree of good faith on the British side. However, the present letter is such that I simply have to let the Saudi Arabians decide entirely for themselves without interference with any advice or any evaluations from my side. Therefore, I have sent the enclosed letter to Azzam, holding at his disposal a copy of the letter from Sir Patrick Dean. We shall see what happens. My guess would be that the Saudi Arabians will accept and, if so, you should prepare yourself for the second stage at the earliest possible time. This may well be earlier than you envisage in your letter, and I hope that, if so, you will be able to adjust your time-table without too much of a personal sacrifice.

Dag Hammarskjöld

H.E. Mr. Herbert Ribbing,
c/o Foreign Office,
Stockholm,
Sweden.

(94)

8 July 1961

Secgen

x

His Excellency
Ambassador Herbert Ribbing
Swedish Embassy
MADRID

Thanks cable. Azzam Pasha will be in Geneva from 15 July. Suggest you meet him there for one or two days week after next. Meeting can be arranged through Saudi Embassy in Berne. Azzam is likely to stay at Des Bergues. We should decide on visit by you to Headquarters in light outcome talks with Azzam. I shall be in Geneva myself next week, then in New York week after next, then finally in Delhi and Cairo last week of July. Believe talk between you and me for review of situation would be useful before your departure and also before visit by you to London. Van Wijk informed about latest developments and can be reached by you through Headquarters.

Hammaraskjold

101

29 July 1961 Secgen

xx

OMNIPRESS

LONDON

For de Ribbing. Suggested text press release NewYork Monday follows:

(quote . . . attached . . .)


Appreciate your amendments, if any, by cable latest Monday morning.
Release here will not take place until Monday afternoon so as not to precede Heath's statement. If Heath does not say anything, I will keep release and use it only in reply to questions if any.

Hammarokjold

As may be recalled, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, last year assigned Ambassador Herbert de Ribbing (Sweden) to assist the two Governments in clarification on the spot of certain problems related to the so-called "Bareini Question".

In fulfilment of his task, Ambassador de Ribbing paid a preliminary visit to the area last year. It has now been agreed that he could usefully proceed to the next stage of his work and he will, therefore, in the near future undertake a further tour of to the area in execution of the tasks entrusted to him.

105-



August 2 '67

ADMINISTRATION UNIT
FOR MESSAGE DISPATCH

YZA S (UN2) NY 190 2 143EZ *

ETAT PRIORITE

OMNIPRESS

LONDON (ENGLAND) *

240 RIBBING FOLLOWING CABLE RECEIVED FROM SAUDI ARABIA THIS
MORNING COLON QUOTE H E THE SECRETARY GENERAL U.N. NEWYORK
I AM NOW IN TAIF THE SUMMER RESORT OF H.M. AND THE GOVERNMENT
AND SHALL BE HERE FOR ANOTHER WEEK OR MORE STOP H.M.
WILL BE IN DAMMAT ON *

P2 *

THE ARABIAN GULF AFTER TWO WEEKS AND BY THE END OF AUGUST
HE MAY VISIT LEBANON AND BELGRADE FOR THE NONCOMMITTED
CONFERENCE ON THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER STOP I LIKE AMBASSADOR
DE RIBBING TO KNOW THAT HE MAY PLAN HIS VISIT AND I CAN
ARRANGE AUDIENCE WITH H.M. BEFORE HIS *

P3/40 *

VOYAGE OR AFTER H.M. RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA STOP THIS WILL
HELP ME PLAN MY STAY HERE OR DEPARTURE TO EGYPT STOP HOPE
TO GET ITENERARY WITH APPROXIMATE DATES BEST WISHES
A.R. AZZAT C/O ROYAL PALACE TAIF UNQUOTE *

SEC GEN NEWYORK +

COL 240 +

UNITED NATIONS
1951 AUG-2 1110 49
TELEGRAPH UNIT

(47)

AWC:dg

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ~~Strictly Personal for~~
~~Secretary-General~~

FROM: Cordier

DATE: 4 August 1960

NUMBER: 654

Ambassador Ribbing cabled Quote Received your kind and honoring offer to represent you personally in Bureimi question. I accept with pleasure in principle, hoping to be able to reasonably fulfil your expectations. Thus prepared to go to New York some time in August in order to receive your further instructions Unquote.

41

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY GENERAL
FROM: DERIBBING, LONDON
DATE: 20 October 1960 (sent 202021Z) (received 202234Z)
NUMBER: UNLON 406

Sir Roger Stevens of the Foreign Office opened today's discussion with disturbing news about Iraqi Pachachi initiative to introduce Oman case in general committee. Sir Roger's information indicated that the Saudi Arabian delegation will not allow Ribbing mission to be used as excuse for not pressing Oman case.

This according to British contrary to your letter of 9 June 1960 to Feisal.

There exists at Cabinet level already scepticism as to value of present mission. This attitude will be strengthened by above initiative, especially if supported actively by Saudis.

U.K. considers above initiative as deliberate effort to put pressure on them in outstanding area problems. They also invoke gentlemen's agreement that during Ribbing mission quietness in surrounding area, including Oman, would not be disturbed.

Feisal, during our conversations, indicated willingness to avoid any tension in area.

Have strong impression that Saudi initiative in New York does not originate from King or Feisal. We have had indications that Saudi representative has acted without proper instructions from Feisal in other case. Also it might have harmful effects on constructive work on Buraimi refugee question.

Madrid den 14 juni 1961.
Strängt förtroligt.

Käre Dag,

I The London Times förmäles att Du på Lord Home's middag för Dig den 31 maj hade tillfälle sammanträffa med Lord Privy Seal Mr. Heath och Sir Roger Stevens, så jag antar att Du är väl insatt i huru vår Buraimi-fråga ligger till ur brittisk synvinkel. Trots detta tror jag icke det är helt ur vägen att jag inberättar - om ej för annat så för jämförelsens skull - vad jag igår råkade erfara vid ett sammanträffande med minister C.P. Hope, rådet på härvarande brittiska ambassad. Denne visade sig vara väl underrätta om och noga följa spörsmålet ifråga, bl.a. därför att han på sin tid åtföljde dåvarande utrikesministern Selwyn Lloyd på dennes resa i Främre Orienten.

Enligt Hope hade numera en förskjutning skett i den brittiska inställningen på så sätt att man helt sonika återgått till sin ursprungliga ståndpunkt, gående ut på att först borde de diplomatiska förbindelserna, vilka brutits av Saudi Arabien, återknytas på sagda lands initiativ. Sedan detta väl skett vore det tid att inleda förhandlingar om eventuellt utestående frågor, såsom den om flyktingarnas återvändande till Buraimi. Med anledning härav vore man icke längre intresserad av min s.k. uppläggning av saken samt ansåge sig böra urgera att jag givit Saudis alldeles för mycket på hand. Jag hade givit dem ett finger, vilket betydde att de ansåge sig kunna taga hela handen. Man komme alltså att, kanske en smula orättvist, överdriva sitt ställnings-

Herr Generalsekreteraren i Förenta Nationerna
Dag Hammarskjöld,
N e w Y o r k.

tagande mot min rapport, i syfte att markera sin återgång till den ovannämnda tidigare ståndpunkten i frågan huru man borde nalkas problemen. När jag framhöll att Sir Harold Beeley på sin tid givits tillfälle att studera mitt utkast till rapport, innan det alls underställdes motparten, d.v.s. Azzam Pasha, och att Beeley för sin del utan större ändringar godtagit detsamma och betecknat rapporten som "fair and honest", svarade Hope att man nog i London beklagat att Beeley i detta sammanhang icke begagnat den honom givna möjligheten att även låta Foreign Office se utkastet för preliminärt ställningstagande.

Bakom skärpningen av den brittiska ståndpunkten låge att man genom att draga ut på saken vunnit en hel del tid, vilken begagnats för att öka de brittiska styrkorna kring Persiska viken och deras potential. På så sätt hade alltså det något utdragna ställningstagandet till min rapport "served a purpose"! Någon politik i eftergivenhetens tecken behövde därför ej längre föras, vartill komme att det med de nya maktmedlen vore angeläget att kunna effektivt skydda de många protektoraten i dessa nejder, vilka själva vore ur stånd att försvara sig gentemot saudiaraberna och dessutom sinsemellan vore som hund och katt. Som saken nu låge till vore man alltså från brittisk sida rustad att slå till- och slå till hårt - om Saudis gäve sig in på något "monkey business".

Som illustration nämnde Hope, att britererna nu förfogade över 2000 man i Muscat och Abu Dhabi med omnejd, 5000 på Bahrein och 10.000 i Aden samt en Air Squadron vid Persiska viken (sammanlagt vore en slagkraftig luftflotta på 500 flygplan tillgänglig i Främre Orienten), varest även patrullerade åtskilliga flottenheter med en kryssare i spetsen. Dessutom kunde avsevärda truppstyrkor vid behov snabbt flygas upp från Brittiska Östafrika. Saudi Arabien vore fullt medveten om denna nya militära situation. Man hade givetvis ej kunnat direkt meddela dem något härom, men man hade tillsett att genom en lämplig avsiktlig "läcka i det brittiska säkerhetssystemet" vederbörande fått väl reda därpå. Den

saudiarabiska ivern att snarast driva fram en fortsatt aktion efter mina, eller rättare sagt, våra linjer hade alltså numera något dämpats.

Hope framhöll vidare, att man nu i Oman Muskat ej blott hade inhemska trupper (Scouts) under brittisk ledning utan även ett par kompanier soldater från moderlandet självt, vilket även hade sin betydelse för framdrivandet av utveckling och statsbildning i modernare mening. Såväl sultanen och sheikerna m.fl. som befolkningen i "The Trucial States" vore så gott som helt likgiltiga och motsträviga när det gällde utveckling av sina respektive länder. De byggda skolorna begagnades i blott ringa utsträckning, sjukhus ville man ej ha. Och hotade fara litade man på Storbritannien! Nu sökte briter, delvis för tillgodoseende av de egna trupperna, här och där upprätta provisoriska sjukhus, i vilka även sjuklingar bland befolkningen intogs, ofta efter att ha flugits in från avlägsna platser. Man sökte alltså så vitt möjligt hos befolkningen skapa intresse för den moderna civilisationens välsignelser, men insåge att det krävdes årtionden för att bygga upp stater i modern mening, värdiga att exempelvis upptagas i FN.

Det vill alltså, av det ovan sagda att döma, förefalla som om "vårt" uppdrag i Buraimi-frågan något kommit i bakgrunden. Min interlokutör ville dock icke alldeles utsluta, att man från brittisk sida kunde komma att anse att brickorna nu lagts i sådan ordning att FN-aktionen åter i en nära framtid kunde taga vid.

Till det ovan sagda vill jag lägga, att jag nog hade en viss känsla av att Hope fått formligt uppdrag att något orientera mig - vilket han dock förnekade - men säkrast torde vara att vad här anförts ej återberättas utåt och att det i vart fall ej läggs i hans mun.

Jag skulle onekligen finna det vara mycket tråkigt, om min roll är utspelad, ty det är alltid otrevligt att lämna blott halvgjort arbete bakom sig, särskilt när det rör sig om något så intressant, stimulerande och från vardagen avvikande som Buraimi-frågan. Som saken synbarligen ligger

till är det min avsikt att följa den arbetshypotesen att jag som planerat saklost kan den 20 juli resa på två à tre veckor till San Sebastián för s.k. tjänstgöring där, samt sedan på sex veckors ledighet i Sverige. Såsom jag meddelat via van Wijk är jag emellertid alltid villig att söka bums träda till, om Du finner anledning eventuellt uppstå att låta kalla på mig.

Det är med stor glädje jag sett huru Du med Din fascinerande klarsynthet och oändliga självbehärskning samt med Ditt outtömliga tålamod hittills förmått rida ut stormen i Kongo-problemet. Vilket väl inte betyder att Chrustjov ej alltjämt är i färd med att vässa nya yxor eller samla på andra tillhyggen. Du är verkligen värd den största beundran och hyllning - om Du tillåter mig säga detta!

Med vänlig hälsning
Din
Herbert Ribbing

Herbert Ribbing

P.S. Det torde lätt kunna tänkas att bakom den brittiska ståndpunktsförändringen ligger att härskaren i Abu Dhabi och framför allt sultanen av Muscat och Oman visat sig mera ohanterliga än vad man beräknat och att engelsmännen nödgats inrätta sig därefter, vilket man gjort så mycket hellre som den brittiska prestigen vid Persiska viken och i arabvärlden skulle äventyras om eftergifter göras i Buraimi-frågan. Men å andra sidan misstar vederbörande sig nog rörande de äre-kära saudiarabernas möjligheter eller benägenhet att gå ifrån sina hittills framförda krav. Man torde därför stå inför en fastlösning av situationen, en "stale-mate", mot vilken åtminstone engelsmännen i och för sig ej torde ha något att erinra när man nu hunnit se om sitt och protektoratens hus. Medan kung Saud samtidigt lär få svårt att avstå från sin trängtan att utmärka sig på samma sätt som sin höge fader i expansionistiskt hänseende samt att bortse från sin fruktan för Nasser och hans hela arabvärlden omfattande reformlusta.

Ribbing

99

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL
FROM: DE RIBBING, LONDON
DATE: 28 JULY 1961 Sent 28 1715Z Recvd 28 1803Z
NUMBER: UNLON 412

Heath intends include in policy speech Commons monday July 31
brief paragraph concerning mission indicating "a little progress".
Last sentence reads "HMG and the Saudi Arabian Government have agreed
that he could usefully proceed to the next stage on his work and he
is not at the beginning of a further tour in execution of this task".
Not certain yet if paragraph be used in view preoccupation other
questions see personally no objection but willing to request Health
not to proceed if you think unwise at this stage to come out in open.
In anticipation questions from reporters would suggest simple statement
on mission issued in New York with copy text to be cabled to UNIC London.

(Underlined as per copy)

NY4 LONDON 47 31 11.30 BST

STAT PRIORITE

NATIONS =

NEW YORK =

LNLON 414 FOR SECGEN YOUR 237 DRAFT PRESS RELEASE EXCELLENT
DOESNOT REQUIRE ANY AMENDMENT STOP HEATH STILL INTENDS TO
INCLUDE PARAGRAPH BUT IN VIEW OF UNFORESEEN LAST MOMENT
CHANGES SUGGEST YOU HOLD RELEASE UNTIL WE CABLE THAT
STATEMENT ACTUALLY MADE

DE RIBBING - LONOMNIPRESS +++

106



ACTION

AUG 2 1961

TO

FILE NO.

ACTION COMPLETED

INITIALS

Return to Records Control Room 2074

ZY45 LONDON 57 2) 17.30 EST

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

UNLON 423 FOR SEC GEN YOUR 280 HAD ALREADY CABLED AZZAM
31 JULY AT MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN JEDDAH ABOUT MY
ARRIVAL IN CAIRO FRIDAY AUGUST 4 STOP WILL NOW CABLE
AZZAM AT ROYAL PALACE TAIF GIVING SAME INFORMATION
AND EXPRESSING HOPE THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM CAN TAKE PLACE

P2

EITHER IN CAIRO OR TAIF

DERIBBING-LONONNIPRESS

UNITED NATIONS
1961 AUG -2 PM 1:41
TELEGRAPH UNIT

London,
29 July, 1961

1 Annexe.

Dear Dag,

I know how much you are preoccupied with the Bizerta crisis, but I thought you might be interested in receiving a short interim report of our activities in London.

Our visit coincided with the announcement of Selwyn Lloyd's austerity programme. Parliament and Government Departments are spending a good deal of their time and energy on this rather grim prospect for trimming down the present level of expenditure and activities. There is also preoccupation with the Common Market situation and the Kuwait crisis.

I have appreciated that in spite of these developments, the Lord Privy Seal has been able to see us for a short period. Not much was said because we had just started with our discussions, but it became clear that your discussion during the end of May had activated the interest in our efforts to bring about a relaxation between the two Governments.

Frankly speaking, the discussions with the "technical chaps" of the Foreign Office were rather disappointing. These talks confirmed the impression we already had gained during our October visit last year. The rigidity of their outlook causes us concern because we do not see many signs on their side to move voluntarily in the right direction. As a matter of fact, we had to shake them from time to time in order to get at least some concrete proposals which we can carry back to Azzam Pasha.

Our discussion with Sir Roger Stevens yesterday afternoon was a much more fruitful one and gave us some hope. He is flexible enough to understand our concern to show something to Azzam Pasha indicating progress. In spite of the fact that at this moment the Middle Eastern affairs are being handled by a new man, Mr. R.S. Crawford, Sir Roger still has enough authority to push through his ideas. It has become clear, however, that even Sir Roger Stevens could not meet us in our efforts to get a quick agreement along the "Azzam Pasha approach"; namely, to get now an agreement of principle of the refugee question and to work out practical arrangements through some machinery agreed upon by both parties. But at least Sir Roger Stevens gave us his assurance that the British Government was not dragging its feet and that it was genuinely interested in making progress on the Buraimi question. However, he wanted us and Azzam Pasha to understand the difficulties, the principle of which remains the need to get the co-operation of the local rulers, specially the Sultan of Muscat from whose territory most refugees have come. He pointed out that the British Government did agree with most of the recommendations of our report and wanted actively to proceed with Stage 2.

RMOTIAK JETIWW
VI /over wem
ABU . Y.N

Sir Roger Stevens, therefore, could not see any purpose in attempting to establish a set of principles. As he stated, the local rulers could never be convinced to accept these principles because they were primarily concerned with the individual cases. After all, they would have to cope with the return of hundreds - perhaps even more - individuals, to an area which they are really administering.

We are, therefore, working with Sir Roger Stevens and his staff on an agreed paper setting out in some detail what will be needed. The British want to have, first of all, a kind of registration of all refugees. This may require filling in questionnaires supplemented by oral testimony. We are trying, of course, to simplify this as much as possible, but we can foresee the need for some trained interviewing staff which might have to be drawn from UNRWA, being familiar with the problem of Arab refugees.

The real difficulties will start after this stage - namely, the decision to determine which of these individuals are genuine refugees, and this without having agreed beforehand on a definition of who constitutes a genuine refugee. It is here that we are facing a problem, because Sir Roger Stevens insists that the local rulers will screen these lists. This in effect would amount to veto power for the Sultan of Muscat all over the line. Therefore, I foresee great difficulties in convincing Azzam Pasha on this aspect.

We are continuing our discussions during Monday and Tuesday and then we hope to go to Cairo. There is one good development. We were able to convince Sir Roger Stevens that it would be useful to use as a channel, even at this preliminary stage, the good offices of Sir Harold Bealey, who has not lately been kept "au courant" with the developments but now will be briefed. This is a good omen because it may convince Azzam Pasha that the British are willing to help. I will keep you informed from Cairo.

With regard to the financial aspect of the Mission, the British have agreed - as did Azzam Pasha - to continue to share the expenses as was the case during Stage 1. I also enclose the text of the statement which the Lord Privy Seal might make in the House of Commons next Monday.

With warm regards,

Yours,

Herbert,

Mr. Dag Hammarskjold,
Secretary-General,
UNITED NATIONS,
New York, 17,
N.Y. USA.

5 August 1961

2 Annexes

Dear Dag,

I have attached a complete set of our summary records of the talks we have had in London. I do not know if you have the time to read them, but it might be useful to have one complete set already available at Headquarters.

As you will notice, we are now in Cairo and we are waiting word from Azzam Pasha. As soon as we knew our approximate departure date, we cabled from London to the two addresses Azzam Pasha had given us in Geneva. Upon the receipt of your cable which indicated that he had not yet received our cables, we sent him another one to the Royal Palace in Taif.

As I have already informed you in my letter of 29 July, the British have insisted to tackle the refugee problem in a different way than Azzam Pasha. They have flatly rejected the idea of an agreement on certain basic principles.

Instead they want :-

1) Registration of all refugees; it looks as if we have an agreement on limiting the information to the 320 heads of families quoted by the Saudi Authorities.

2) Discussions on the basis of the outcome of the registration.

There would be an interval between these two stages during which H.M.G. will consult the local Rulers. In effect, this means that the second stage will be split into two parts.

-- We have received from the British a paper which is more or less a summary of the discussions we have had in London. We are at liberty to show this paper to Azzam Pasha. I have attached it for your information.

If Azzam Pasha agrees to go ahead with the proposed procedure, we may need some help in the form of technical staff which could assist us in getting the basic information and interviewing the individuals. The obvious place for finding this staff would be UNRWA. I am contemplating the possibility of a short visit to Beirut in order to see if they can help us. I assume that there will be no objection from your side to enlisting this help. Otherwise, we have to contemplate other sources.

Once Azzam Pasha has given us his views, we will be in a better position to report to you on the organization of this project and our needs for assistance. I will do so at the earliest moment possible.

With warm regards,

Yours

HERBERT DE RIBBING.

12th August 1961.

Dear Dag,

We have returned from Saudi Arabia this morning and I am using the opportunity of the "pouch day" to give you in a nutshell a report of our discussions.

Our short visit to Taif, the summer residence of the King, has been an experience I will not easily forget. The Royal plane brought us from Jidda; the sight of the desolate, barren, mountainous landscape which surrounds Mecca in itself is a fantastic one; but when we were driven from our guest house to the summer palace, we had the sensation to be back in the days of a tribal Chief moving from place to place. The palace built by the father of the present King - unpretentious but simple and gracious - was surrounded with tents. The only difference with days bygone was that the camels were replaced by trucks and jeeps. The room where the audience was given was, as usual, guarded by fierce looking warriors in fantastic uniforms, with impressive beards and armed with daggers and 100 year old rifles.

We were able to see in record time the Chef de Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the King himself and, during our last day, Prince Feysal.

Needless to say that Azzam Pasha had organized this fast round of meetings in his usual charming way. But we were even more grateful for the way he has swallowed the "British pill". We could not offer him anything he had hoped for, no indication even about the outcome of the time consuming exercise we had to sell. He accepted the proposals after we had expressed our belief that there was a somewhat better climate in London. We showed him the statement Heath had made in the House of

Commons. We told him about the assurance Sir Roger Stevens had given us about the honest intention of the British to come to an agreement on the refugee question. We finally gave him the good news that Sir Harold Beeley was once again "in the picture".

We were asked if there were any developments in London that would support an optimistic view, and on various occasions we were reminded that the status quo ante should be restored before any refugee would ever return. In other words, the refugees should go back with their authority and their traditional rights, including full prerogatives for the Cheikhs, restored. My reply was that this matter would have to be considered at a later stage.

Azzam Pasha agreed and advised us to inform H.M. only in general terms about our findings and our programme. He was ready to discuss with us and Sir Harold Beeley in Cairo the details of the registration of refugees. He promised us every help so that this process could be completed in as short a time as possible in Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

I followed his advice and the audience with the King went smoothly. He enquired about you and he thanked us for the kind words we had given him on your behalf. He reminded us that the refugee Cheikhs last winter, as well as some of the tribal Cheikhs from the neighbourhood, had begged him to march to Bureim and to "harass" the enemy. He again had resisted these requests for armed action. H.M. expressed approval of our proposed plan of action as long as the Secretary General and Mr. de Ribbing were convinced that this would help in arriving at a peaceful solution. We had "his blessings" and could proceed with our plans to have further discussions about details in Cairo and to register the refugees in Dammam later. The audience was concluded with an invitation for dinner in the palace.

We have now the "green light" to proceed, and we will start discussing the details of the scheme with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold Beeley.

I would, however, be less than honest if I would not convey to you my concern about the results of this exercise. I am still pessimistic about the willingness or the ability of H.M.G. to obtain an agreement from the Sultan of Muscat on terms acceptable to the Saudis.

We have played it "straight" with Aszam Pasha, and he knows that we have this concern. His comment showed, ^{his} as usual, elastic mind. Let us, he said, then come to an agreement with Abu Dhabi, and we will try to deal separately with the Sultan (perhaps through armed intervention).

In spite of my concern, I assume that we are following the "track" you have set out, namely to proceed, and hope that every step forward will result in more willingness to come to an agreement. We heard again and again the comment :- "Do the British realize that in the defence of Kuwait the Saudis are their strongest allies?".

I believe that our efforts are within our mandate, and that by narrowing down the scope of the problem we have ended talking in generalities and we have arrived at a discussion of specifics.

We plan, therefore, after our talks in Cairo with Aszam Pasha and Sir Harold Bealey, to go to Beirut and discuss with UNRWA possible assistance - some 2 or 3 Arabic speaking officials trained in interviewing refugees.

We plan also to ask Sir Harold Bealey to have one British official assigned so that he can follow the registration process from the planning stage to the execution. In this way, we will bring the British in the picture from the beginning, we will add a note of impartiality, and we will commit them ~~from the~~ beginning.

The Saudis have already informed us that they will issue proper visas and make available accommodations in Dammam where most of the refugees are.

We bring these plans to your attention so that, if there is any objection to the proposed course of action, you have the time to send us a cable to Cairo.

It will take some time to assemble these people and work out the necessary arrangements. I believe that it is realistic to fix as a target date for the beginning of the registration around the second half of September.

I would, therefore, as soon as we have finished our work in Cairo and Beirut, like to go to Sweden, have some leave, settle my personal affairs and go straight to Dammam. Van Wijk will stay in the area as long as it is necessary to complete the preparatory work. He, then, would like to take whatever is left of his home leave, settle his affairs, and proceed also to Dammam around the second half of September. This would enable

him to collect some of the documentation still in New York.

We estimate that we may require some 4 weeks for the registration itself. After that, the crucial moment will arrive because the result of the registration will be used by the British for perusal by their "experts". At that moment, their consultation with the local Rulers will start.

It could take weeks and perhaps months before we will know the result of these consultations.

It will be essential, during this period, to quieten down the impatience of the Saudis who are anxious all the time to come to a final settlement. It will be necessary again and again to press upon the British their moral obligation to speed up this process of consultation. After all, it is as a result of their insistence on this procedure that we have agreed to the time consuming procedures now accepted.

I apologize for the length of this document, but I thought it was necessary for you to know where we stand.

With warm regards,

Yours

HERBERT DE RIBBING

Jerusalem
21 August 1961

Dear Dag,

We have almost completed our preparatory work for the registration. Before going to Sweden I would like to bring you up to date and give you an account of our activities since my last letter of 12 August.

I had an opportunity to discuss procedural questions and details of the registration with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold Beeley in Cairo. I have
..... attached for your information copies of the record of these conversations.

We have an agreement with both that the questioning will be conducted solely by UNRWA staff and that each of the parties will designate an observer who will have every opportunity to ascertain that the registration is being conducted in an objective manner.

We have also discussed in some detail the kind of questions which will be asked to the refugees. As I have informed you before, we hope to have not more than some 320 people (heads of families) who will participate in this process. Azzam Pasha has pleaded with us to keep the questioning and the whole registration process as short and as simple as possible. The only reason, he commented, why we go back to these people is because there is a discrepancy in the figures given by both parties as to the actual number of refugees. A lot of information has already been given by the refugees to the Saudi authorities. If a UN team and a British official be sent to Damman for a long period, he continued, these Bedouins would become very suspicious and would wonder what was going to happen to them. Expectations for a quick return would be raised and the after-effects of the registration might become unpleasant. In reality, the whole registration procedure means only a postponement of the crisis which undoubtedly will occur when the opposite positions come out in the open.

Azzam Pasha's point is, however, well taken and we have given a lot of thought to keeping this whole business as simple and fast as possible. We have pleaded with Sir Harold to agree on simple questions and we have actually discussed with UNRWA the possibility of streamlining the whole procedure.

Our friend Azzam Pasha again made quite clear his scepticism about the registration operation. The real question for him and the Saudi Government is, of course, what will happen afterwards. When I innocently asked if he himself would not agree with the necessity of getting more details in order to distinguish between "refugees" and "emigrants", he replied flatly that there is no such distinction, and that the Arabic language does not differentiate between the two categories. All these people are Saudis and should be able to return to Saudi territory. The whole refugee question is a side issue, the solution of which is a prelude to a solution of the real conflict, namely the sovereignty over the area.

We have discussed in Beirut with UNRWA our needs, and we have asked for their advice in view of their long experience. Both Mr. Davis and his deputy, Mr. Reddaway, gave us without hesitation their complete co-operation. My previous estimate that we needed at least a month to enable them to make qualified staff available proved to be correct. They will attempt to have three experienced people available approximately around 25 September. We will forward their names in a few days as we have promised Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold to secure approval on this staff. The British expect us to send as interrogators persons whose objectivity will be beyond suspicion. Beeley promised to rely heavily on Mr. Davis' judgement and my approval of the candidates. Azzam Pasha will ensure that they get proper visae.

Mr. Reddaway raised the question of financing the UNRWA participants. I agreed with him that no funds allocated to the welfare work of the Palestine refugees should be used for our operation. If you agree with this we will work out arrangements for the costs of the UNRWA operators to be added to the bill which ultimately will be presented to both parties.

We are at the moment discussing in Jerusalem the draft list of questions with the British official - Vice Consul Mr. E. Henderson, who was the British Agent in Bureimi when we visited the oasis last year - who will probably be designated as observer and who appeared to be the author of the questionnaire devised by the British earlier this year.

- 3 -

It looks as if all the details will have been completed in a few days. I am returning to Sweden on 23 August where I can be reached at Fåleberg, Hasslerör.

Van Wijk will follow in a few days and both of us will reassemble again in Beirut and then Saudi Arabia around the target date of 25 September.

With my best personal regards,
Yours sincerely,

Herbert de Ribbing

Annex

MEETING WITH UNRWA,
BEIRUT, 19 AUGUST 1961

(1) We discussed with Dr. J. Davis and the Deputy Director-General, Mr. Reddaway, the possible UNRWA contribution to the registration of the refugees.

Both promised us complete co-operation. Mr. Reddaway inquired how the financing would be undertaken. We replied that we had in mind to give the UNRWA staff a daily allowance of some \$5-\$6. In addition, the travel costs will be reimbursed and we suggested, in order to avoid accounting difficulties, that the staff be kept on the UNRWA payroll. Mr. Reddaway replied that he saw no objection to this, but that there might be questions raised by the auditors about the propriety of using funds specifically allocated for relief work of the Palestine refugees for an operation which is not covered by the mandate of UNRWA. We replied that this was an important point and that we saw no difficulties in adding these costs to the total cost of the operation. We suggested, however, that UNRWA send us one bill with particulars of the various cost items so that proper reimbursement action can be taken.

Mr. Reddaway raised another practical question, viz. the possibility of issuing some kind of a general insurance policy for the period of the registration which would cover the UNRWA staff. Mr. van Wijk promised to take up this matter with Headquarters.

(2) We gave in an exposé the general background of the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring about a settlement of certain conflicts between the Saudi Arabian and British Governments. We stressed the need to carry out the registration of refugees in as short a time as possible. We pointed out specifically that only trained staff, completely bilingual in Arabic and English, with long experience in this type of work could be used. We showed the draft questionnaire to Mr. Reddaway and asked for any specific comments. We expressed the hope that UNRWA could provide us with some three persons of unquestionable integrity who could perform the task in a minimum of time. We stressed the fact that it was necessary to have people who would be familiar with the Arabic language as it is spoken in that part of the world. We finally mentioned Sir Harold Beeley's request to select the individuals, if at all possible, from the international staff rather than from local recruits.

(3) Mr. Reddaway replied that his staff, especially Mr. Poulsen, had given a good deal of thought to the requirements. As far as Sir Harold's comment was concerned, he pointed out that there were not more than some 100 international staff, most of whom were not bilingual. However, they had among the other staff extremely well-qualified persons, mainly Lebanese, with ten years' experience in registration work. He himself could not see any objection to using these people and providing them with UN Laissez-Passers. Mr. van Wijk inquired if the individuals in mind were Christians or Moslems. Mr. Reddaway replied that they had Christians as well as Moslems, but he agreed with Mr. van Wijk that it might be better to select Moslems only.

(4) Mr. Reddaway asked what the estimate was for the registration process. Mr. de Ribbing replied that it was of the utmost importance to do the work in a minimum period of time. He hoped that the operation could be completed in approximately one week. He mentioned to Mr. Reddaway that the first seven questions in the draft questionnaire might be circulated in advance so that the Saudi Arabian officials would already secure the answers before the registration starts. This would save considerable time and he hopes to handle approximately 50 persons a day. Mr. de Ribbing also explained the procedure he had in mind, namely, to let the questioning be conducted solely by UNRWA staff while a British and Saudi observer would have the opportunity to make regular checks on the progress of the registration and make any comments they deemed necessary to Mr. de Ribbing or Mr. van Wijk. It was added that they both intended, before going to Damman, to come to Beirut and spend a few days in briefing the individuals who will be selected.

(5) Mr. de Ribbing asked Mr. Reddaway if it would be possible to have the names with some particulars around Tuesday or Wednesday, so that Sir Harold Beeley and Azzam Pasha could be duly notified and could take appropriate measures for issuing visae, etc. He informed Mr. Reddaway that the Saudis have promised to issue visae to the staff and to make living and working space available. Upon his return from Jerusalem he would be in touch with Mr. Reddaway so that the necessary details could be secured. Mr. Reddaway invited us for cocktails on Tuesday at 7 p.m. at which time he hoped to have the necessary information available.

Annex

MEETING WITH SIR HAROLD BEELEY,
CAIRO, 18 AUGUST 1961

(1) We gave Sir Harold an account of our discussions with Azzam Pasha the previous day.

(2) Sir Harold realized the importance of speeding up as much as possible the process of registration. We suggested to him one time-saving device, namely, to ask Azzam Pasha to obtain in advance answers to the first seven questions of the draft questionnaire. If the Saudis could ensure that each head of family brings with him the answers at the interview the UNRWA staff could quickly verify these answers and proceed with the other questions. Sir Harold did not see any objection and suggested that we discuss this point with Mr. Henderson in Jerusalem.

(3) We informed Sir Harold also about Azzam Pasha's objection to question 18, "Have you any money?". He asked us to check with Henderson what he had in mind. We replied to Sir Harold's question that we would support Azzam Pasha's contention that it might be better to eliminate this question in view of the fact that it could involve us in difficulties and that at first sight it indeed appeared to be irrelevant. However, we promised Sir Harold to discuss this particular point with Henderson and to report back to Sir Harold in writing.

(4) We then informed Sir Harold about our programme in Beirut and we asked him if he could ensure that at the earliest moment clearance will be given on the three individuals from UNRWA who will be selected for the registration. Sir Harold replied that he would of course rely heavily on the selection of these individuals by Mr. Davis and Mr. de Ribbing. He had one general comment, namely, that he hoped that international staff would be selected because he recalled that UNRWA had many local recruits. We replied that we did not know the staffing situation of UNRWA but that we would discuss this with Mr. Davis. We promised Sir Harold to let him have the names of those selected with some general information through the British Embassy in Beirut.

(5) Sir Harold informed us that London had notified Henderson in Jerusalem about our arrival and our intention to get in touch with him.

(6) Sir Harold enquired if we had given any thought to the role of the observers. We replied that we wanted to insist on a procedure whereby only the UNRWA people would ask questions. We proposed to Sir Harold that the manner in which the British and Saudi observers would verify the proceedings could perhaps best be decided on the spot, namely in Dammam. Sir Harold took note of this and did not indicate any disagreement with this procedure.

(7) We informed Sir Harold that at this moment we did not see any further need for a formal meeting with him and Azzam Pasha. However, the test would come once the registration was completed. We then intended to make the forms available to the parties, perhaps with a covering note which would give some general comments.

(8) We finally informed Sir Harold that we would do everything to speed up this process, that we tentatively had in mind to complete the whole procedure in approximately one week, and that we needed his support in order to achieve this target. We also pressed the point that once the registration material was completed it would be necessary to ascertain from the two Rulers and Her Majesty's Government their reactions so that stage 2 of the procedure could be completed without too much delay. Sir Harold promised to submit this consideration to the Foreign Office.

Amex

MEETING WITH AZZAM PASHA

CAIRO 17 AUGUST 1961.

1) After luncheon at the British Embassy, attended by Mr. Nutting, a former British Cabinet Minister who left the Cabinet as a result of the Suez policy, and Azzam Pasha, we had a long meeting with Azzam Pasha.

2) We informed Azzam Pasha of our discussions with Sir Harold Beeley, and we told him now that general agreement had been reached on the registration, only procedural questions had to be agreed upon.

3) We asked Azzam Pasha if he could arrange that the Government makes available in Damman living and working space for the UNRWA people, the British Official and us. We also proposed to Azzam Pasha that the questioning would be conducted solely by U.N. Staff, but that the Saudi and British Representatives could discuss with Ambassador de Ribbing any matter pertaining to the registration itself. We asked Azzam Pasha to facilitate the entry of these Officials, and we promised to let him have the names as soon as possible. We informed Azzam Pasha about our departure for Beirut in order to make the arrangements with the UNRWA Staff. Azzam Pasha agreed to do whatever was needed for the registration.

4) We then discussed with Azzam Pasha the questions we had in mind to ask. Azzam Pasha's comment was that he had no objection to any particular question except that he felt strongly that we should not ask anything about the financial situation of the refugees. In his opinion, that was none of our business, and it might create false impressions. After all, he said, this is not a real refugee operation like UNRWA does for the Palestine refugees, but it is purely a matter of getting information about facts which would enable the U.N. to ascertain who would be a genuine refugee.

5) Azzam Pasha had, however, an important general comment. He believed that it was of the utmost importance to make this registration as simple and as short as possible. If a number of U.N. Officials and a British Official would descend upon Damman for a long period, it was bound to create trouble. False expectations would be raised. People would expect action and would become impatient. They would say they had already given information and what do these people want more from them, etc. Azzam Pasha hoped that it would not take more

then approximately a week for the registration process.

6) He commented that the refugee question after all is a very minor side issue. The real question is that these refugees are Saudi citizens and should go back to Saudi territory without any humiliating conditions. Upon Ambassador de Ribbing's comment that the questioning was necessary in order to find out which individuals would be refugees and which ones could only be considered as emigrants, Azzam Pasha replied that one could not make a distinction between these two categories. The Arabic language, even, did not make a distinction between these two words.

7) We replied that we were just as much anxious to do the registration in as short a time as possible as Azzam Pasha was, but that we would have to count on his help in order to secure maximum cooperation for the registration process. We would do our best to complete the actual registration in one week approximately, if he could ask the appropriate Government Officials to make arrangements so that a maximum number of people could be interviewed during each day. We also would discuss with UNRWA the quickest methods to obtain answers. Azzam Pasha promised to help us on this.

8) We concluded the meeting with a promise to let him know from Beirut as soon as possible the necessary data which would enable him to go ahead with the arrangements. We also would let him know the approximate date when the registration would start.

Amex

MEETING WITH SIR HAROLD BERLEY
CAIRO 14 AUGUST 1961 10.30 a.m.

1) Ambassador de Ribbing informed Sir Harold on the result of his discussions in Saudi Arabia. Aszam Pasha "had swallowed the British pill" and had been most helpful in convincing the King about the need for the registration of refugees as a first step in the so-called second stage. There were now a number of details to be settled, and Mr. de Ribbing hoped that Sir Harold would be available for discussions with Aszam Pasha to the extent necessary. He had in mind particularly to get an agreement on the questions to be asked, to obtain formal approval for designating a British Official to be present at the registration, and to discuss eventually other procedural matters.

2) Sir Harold replied that he had no authority to discuss any general matter pertaining to the mission of Mr. de Ribbing, but he agreed to refer any questions to London. He recalled that the documentation from London had indicated that any changes in the questionnaire should be cleared with London.

3) Mr. de Ribbing stated that Aszam Pasha had agreed to the presence of a British Official - perhaps Mr. Henderson or Mr. Walker. He thought that no safe-conduct was necessary, but that the provision of a Saudi visa would be adequate. Sir Harold agreed.

4) The detailed questions were then reviewed, and it was decided that there would be no problems in connection with questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10. Sir Harold agreed, however, to substitute Muscat for Oman in questions 9 and 10.

5) Questions 5, 6 and 7 were not too clear. Sir Harold agreed that the author of the questions had probably in mind to get information on the nomadic and sedentary tribes in the Buraimi area. It might be possible to have the questions simplified as follows :-

- a) When did you leave Buraimi?
- b) How long did you live in Buraimi before leaving?
- c) Did you live there continuously, or did you spend part of your time elsewhere?
- d) When you left Buraimi, where did you go in Saudi Arabia?
- e) Have you been back in Buraimi since 1955 and for how long?

Mr. de Ribbing suggested to Sir Harold that it might be useful for Mr. van Wijk to get in touch, on an informal basis, with Mr. Henderson in

Jerusalem in order to see if the above interpretation was correct. If more information was needed, it might be obtained orally from the refugees.

6) Sir Harold commented that questions 11 and 13 could be perhaps combined.

7) Question 12 raises serious problems because it is not clear what is meant by "money". It was agreed to see what Azzam Pasha's reaction would be.

8) Mr. de Ribbing informed Sir Harold that as the questioning will be restricted to heads of families, he intended to add the following questions :-

a) How many wives are there in the household?

b) How many children under 16? (this age limit was suggested by Sir Harold)

c) How many males are there in the household above 16 (sons, retainers, servants)?; for this category names should be given.

Sir Harold agreed that it would be very useful to have such information.

9) Mr. de Ribbing mentioned that the questionnaire did not include anything on the allegiance. It was decided in London that such information might be obtained through oral questioning. Sir Harold agreed that particularly vis a vis the Sultan it would be very important where the refugees stood on this point. He agreed that this information should not be asked for by the British Representative.

10) Sir Harold asked Mr. de Ribbing if he intended to present the questionnaire as a U.N. document. Mr. de Ribbing replied that he wanted to use the draft questionnaire produced by H.M.G. as a basis for discussions with Azzam Pasha. In the case that Azzam Pasha had objections or amendments he would like to consider these. Any fundamental change would then, after possible discussion with Sir Harold, be submitted to London for approval. He also wanted to discuss the questionnaire with the UNRWA people who would have to work with it. Finally, there would be a possibility to discuss it with Henderson in Jerusalem. Sir Harold agreed and suggested that Mr. de Ribbing submit any communications on this matter to him through the British Ambassador in Beirut. Sir Harold also suggested - Mr. de Ribbing agreed - that the questionnaire would not be submitted as a British paper, but as a U.N. document.

11) Mr. de Ribbing informed Sir Harold about his forthcoming visit to Beirut in order to obtain the necessary technical personnel. He hoped that there would be not too many difficulties from the British side on agreeing to the staff selected after consultation with the Deputy Director, Mr. Reddaway.

12) Sir Harold replied that, as far as the International Staff was concerned, he did not see any difficulties if the individuals were acceptable to Mr. Davies and Mr. de Ribbing. There might be, however, a problem if local recruits would be proposed. In view of the fact that only some 3 people would be needed, he did not see any difficulties.

13) The discussion then centered around the role of the British and Saudi Officials during the registration. Sir Harold asked us if this had been discussed at all in London.

14) We replied that there had been no discussion on specific procedures, but that, as far as the U.N. was concerned, both parties should have the opportunity to ensure that the registration would be undertaken in an objective manner. We made it, however, quite clear that the questions themselves should only be asked by the U.N. staff. We might discuss further with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold the question how representatives of the parties should verify the registration process; there are two possibilities :-

- a) To let them be present whenever they want during the registration.
- b) To give them the opportunity to check at the end of the day through contacts with the interrogators how the questioning had developed.

15) Sir Harold concluded the meeting with a promise to :-

1) Inform London that a general agreement had by now been reached with the Saudis on the registration along the lines discussed by Mr. de Ribbing in London.

2) Inform London that a British Representative should be present in Dammam some time during the second half of September, the final date to be communicated from Beirut.

3) Inform London that any changes in the draft questionnaire would be forwarded to them, and specifically to inform them that questions

will also be asked on the number of wives, children under 16 years, and males above 16 years with their names.

4) Inform London on the names of the UNRWA Staff selected for the registration as soon as known.

16) Sir Harold Beeley invited us for lunch on Thursday 17 August. He asked us to extend this invitation to Azzam Pasha upon his arrival in Cairo. He would be willing to see Azzam Pasha earlier if he wished so.

Amex.

REPORT OF VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA 8 TO 12 AUGUST 1961

- 1) The Royal plane brought us from Jidda, where we arrived on 8 August 4 a.m., to Taif, the summer residence of the King. We were received at the airport by the Chef de Cabinet, Sheikh Youssuf, transmitting words of welcome from the King. Sheikh Youssuf knows the Bura'in question very well. He has been a Counsellor to the King for more than 40 years, and he was, for instance, the Saudi Arabian Representative in the Tribunal and earlier in the Conferences with the British which attempted to settle border line questions with Abu Dhabi and Qatar.
- 2) Sheikh Youssuf asked us immediately about our findings. Mr. de Ribbing gave him a short and general summary of our work in London. We detected a note of pessimism in Sheikh Youssuf's reactions, because he expressed his doubt that we would get anywhere with the British on this matter.
- 3) We had a meeting with Azzam Pasha to whom we gave a detailed report of our findings in London and the course of action to be followed. We pointed out :-
 - (I) That the British were willing to go ahead with the recommendations formulated in the report.
 - (II) That the climate in London was somewhat better than before as demonstrated by :-
 - a) A statement made by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons about the continued efforts of the Secretary General and his personal Representative to find a solution of the conflict between the Saudi Arabian Government and H:NG?
 - b) An assurance given us by Sir Roger Stevens to make an honest effort to find a solution of the refugee problem.
 - c) The fact that the British agreed to use Sir Harold Beeley as a channel.
 - (III) The British wanted to know the scope of the problem, and the only way in their view was to register all those claiming to be refugees.
 - (IV) The British agreed to limit the questioning to the 320 heads of families.
 - (V) The actual questioning would be undertaken by trained staff from UNRWA. We expressed the hope that the Saudi Arabian

Government would agree to facilitate the entry of these people into Saudi Arabia, and to agree also to the coming of a British Representative who would be present at the registration.

(VI) Time would be needed to organize properly the registration and to assemble the personnel. We informed Azzam Pasha that we had the following time table in mind:-

a) To work out details of the procedure, and specifically to get a full agreement on the questionnaire through discussions with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold Beeley in Cairo.

b) To go to Beirut, and perhaps Jerusalem, to discuss personnel requirements with UNRWA.

(VII) We estimate, therefore, that the actual registration process could start in Dammam during the second half of September.

(VIII) We had in mind to inform the King about our findings and our proposed programme in general terms, ask for his blessings to proceed along those lines.

4) Azzam Pasha replied that he was concerned about the time consuming procedure, especially if no result was forthcoming. He asked us if there was any serious British indication about the possibility of an agreeable solution. He reminded Ambassador de Ribbing about the insistence that the refugees would not go back until the status quo ante was restored and unless very specific conditions would be agreed upon.

5) Ambassador de Ribbing replied that he did not want to create false impressions. There would still be a serious problem with the Sultan. This would arise after the result of the registration would be discussed with the parties. Mr. de Ribbing stated that he could not formulate any recommendations before he had a clear indication of what the parties wanted. However, it was necessary to obtain first of all the facts, and it was for that reason that he had agreed to the registration procedure. He informed Azzam Pasha that the Sultan had been in London, that he had not seen him himself, but that one could assume that the present situation was being discussed between the Sultan and H:M:G.

6) Azzam Pasha replied that if there were possibilities to come to an agreement with the Ruler of Aby Dhabi, they could deal separately with the Sultan by arbitration or by armed intervention, if necessary.

7) Azzam Pasha concluded that he was willing to proceed along the lines Mr. de Ribbing had ^{outlined} ~~stipulated~~, and that he would be happy to meet with him and Sir Harold Beeley in Cairo.

8) He advised Mr. de Ribbing to limit his statement to the King to generalities, to explain the need for further consultations in Cairo with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold Beeley, to have the registration itself a few weeks later in Damman, and to ask for H.M.'s approval of this course of action.

9) Prior to the audience, we had a short discussion with the Chef de Cabinet and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the presence of Azzam Pasha. There was again an expression of scepticism about the outcome of the proposed procedure. It was mentioned again that the most important matter was not the return of the refugees as such, but the restoration of the status of these refugees, and particularly of the Sheikhs, to the prerogatives existing before the events of October 1955. The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked us if there were any significant developments in London justifying an optimistic view. The Chef de Cabinet asked Mr. de Ribbing why it was necessary to have further talks in Cairo with Sir Harold Beeley and Azzam Pasha after our visit to London. Mr. de Ribbing replied that he was optimistic enough to proceed with the second stage as proposed in his report. He wanted to discuss the details of the registration process with Sir Harold Beeley and Azzam Pasha now that there seemed to be agreement on the Saudi side, also to proceed with the second stage.

10) The audience itself was held in a pleasant atmosphere. Azzam Pasha had apparently had an opportunity to brief the King somewhat in advance of the audience. Ambassador de Ribbing informed the King about the meeting in Geneva where the Secretary General had decided to proceed with the second stage. He transmitted greetings from the Secretary General to H.M., thanking him specifically for the help given to the Mission and for the patience exercised by H.M. during the period that the report was under review by the parties.

11) He reminded H.M. that the report had proposed a step by step approach and that both Governments had now agreed to go ahead. After Geneva, he had gone to New York for further consultations with the Secretary General, and then to London where he found the "climate" a little better. The Lord Privy Seal had told Parliament that a little progress was being made.

12) Mr. de Ribbing informed H.M. that he would like now to clarify the refugee situation, and for this purpose to work out details in Cairo with Azzam Pasha and Sir Harold Bealey.

13) Mr. de Ribbing then had in mind to go to Damman after a few weeks where specialists from UNRWA would assist him in compiling a registration of all refugees.

14) The Ambassador expressed the hope to have the blessings of H.M. in pursuing the course proposed, in securing the wise counsel of Azzam Pasha, and in providing the necessary facilities in Damman. He hoped also that this course of action would facilitate the third stage.

15) H.M. informed Mr. de Ribbing that during last winter he had been asked by the refugee Sheikhs and some of the Sheikhs of the neighbouring tribes to march on Buraimi and harass the enemy. He had rejected this offer because Mr. Hammarskjöld was helping out. He agreed with the proposed programme as long as Mr. Hammarskjöld and Mr. de Ribbing considered that it would bring a peaceful solution. He then invited Mr. de Ribbing and Mr. van Wijk for dinner and asked Sheikh Youssuf to make arrangements for showing Taif.

16) The meeting with Prince Feisal was of an informal and personal character. The Crown Prince has no longer any official responsibility for the Buraimi question. Prince Feisal was obviously in better health and asked us only a few general questions. He enquired if the British were willing to let the refugees go back. Upon Mr. de Ribbing's answer that much depended on the Sultan of Muscat, his reply was "let us deal ourselves with him directly". Prince Feisal, however, made it quite clear that he had no more responsibilities in this matter. He asked about the Secretary General, and Mr. de Ribbing transmitted greetings from him, promising to bring Prince Feisal's good wishes back to Mr. Hammarskjöld.

17) Azzam Pasha told him that he found the differences between Prince Feisal and the King less serious than he had feared. There were differences of opinion on matters of broad policy, but there was no indication of a serious personal clash. H.M. has paid a visit to Prince Feisal the day before his departure to Riyadh.

18) We left Jidda 12 August at 3.30 a.m.